Conflict and the regional option: A study on the role of regionalism and regional arrangements in conflict management in the early post-Cold War period

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Declaration

The work presented in this thesis is entirely my own.

Charles van der Donckt

À Béatrice, ma douce mère, partie avant son temps

To Béatrice, my dearest mother, who left before her time

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Abstract

In the face of the post-Cold War depolarisation of the international system many of the external obstacles to regional cooperation have been removed. Additionally, there is an increasing demand for the management of security issues at the regional level. In this capacity regional communities are now faced with a wide range of sub and trans-national security related problems which challenge the traditional roles and structures of regional organisations. Though there have been numerous institutional developments and transformations on almost every continent since 1990, the actual record of regional groupings in attempting to prevent, manage and resolve conflict has been rather disappointing. Indeed, the result of regional attempts to control internal conflicts in such places as Yugoslavia, Somalia or Rwanda have considerably dampened expectations that regional organisations could lighten the conflict management burden of the UN or that they could otherwise tackle regional conflicts effectively on their own.

This thesis proposes an evaluation of the regional dimensions of conflict management in the early post-Cold War period. It examines different conceptual and institutional aspects of regionalism in order to ascertain its relevance and potential to the task of preventing, managing and resolving regional or localised conflict. It examines older and more recent scholarship on regionalism, UN-regional organisations relations, and relevant developments in regional political and security arrangements. It also looks at a number of factors currently having an impact on the evolution of regionalism.

This thesis concludes with an argument for a more pragmatic assessment of the potential of the regional option for managing conflict. It argues that the multiple regional conflicts of early post-Cold War period have stimulated the development of more fluid approaches to international conflict control efforts, partly as a result of the general disillusionment with the effectiveness of the UN and regional organisations in the early 1990s.

Contents

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFTA	American Free Trade Association
ANAD	*Accord de non-aggression et d'assistance en matière de défense*
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CARICOM	Carribean Community
CBSS	Council of the Black Sea States
CEDEAO	*Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'ouest*
CEI	Central European Initiative
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DPA	Department of Political Affaris
DPKO	Departement of Peacekeeping Operations
EAEC	East Asian Economic Caucus
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Community
ECE	Eastern and Central Europe
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organisation
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
EU	European Union
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangements
PfP	Partnership for Peace
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GUUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova Group
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organisation
LAS	League of Arab States
MERCOSUR	*Mercado del Cono Sur*
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Association

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIS	New Independent States
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPT	Non Proliferation Treaty
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
SADC	Southern African Development Conference
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SPF	South Pacific Forum
UEMOA	*Union économique et monétaire ouest africaine*
UMA	*Union du Maghreb Arabe*
UMOA	*Union monétaire ouest africaine*
UN	United Nations
UPD	Unit for the Promotion of Democracy
WEU	Western European Union

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Introduction

The current involvement of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) in Kosovo has highlighted in the clearest possible form the role played by regional groupings in enforcing norms of behaviour against regimes defying the most basic humanitarian standards. Some have already hailed NATO's muscular intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) as the confirmation that the central tenet of international order, the exercise of state sovereignty, should now be weighed against new humanitarian norms allowing concerned states the privilege, if not the right, to override established international decision-making mechanisms in certain extreme cases. Whether the NATO intervention in Kosovo will mark the beginning of a bold new era in international politics remains to be seen. However, what is readily apparent is that the intervention has rekindled the international debate on the legitimacy of various forms of forceful intervention, the effectiveness of the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security, and the powers of regional groupings in dealing with regional conflict.

It is fair to state that the regional dimensions of conflict and cooperation have been a prominent theme of both international politics and international relations (IR) scholarship for the last decade. Indeed, in its latest iteration, the renewal of interest in these issues came about largely as a result of the end of the Cold War. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, numerous predictions were made about the development of regionalism and regional organisations. In 1990, former U.S. National Security Adviser Walt Rostow foresaw the coming age of regionalism as the reigning metaphor for the post-Cold War international order.[1] In the new international environment, Rostow argued, the 'regional impulse' would be stimulated by a number of factors: the inadequacy of nation-states to handle complex problems on their own, the difficulties of generating practical global cooperation across a wide range of issues, the desire of regional communities to keep in check large regional powers, and an American withdrawal from Cold War military commitments overseas. For his part, Richard Rosecrance dismissed the hypothesis that the new strategic environment would herald in the development of regional balances and the rise of regional hegemons.[2] In a 1991 article on international governance conspicuous for its lack of reference to the UN's rising international role at that moment, Rosecrance argued that regionalism would flourish "in participation with rather than opposition to the new centralizing tendency in

modern world politics and economics", a centralizing tendency coming about as a result of the agglomeration of power in the hands of a new powerful concert of nations led by the United States and a few industrialised nations.

With the spate of new conflicts developing around the globe at the turn of 1990s, these broad considerations were quickly distilled into more precise questions: Could regional organisations and, more broadly, regionalism play a more effective role in preventing, managing and resolving regional and localised conflict? Was the post-Cold War environment more likely to facilitate the search for regional solutions to regional problems? Could the UN off-load or 'contract out' conflict management tasks to regional organisations?

For anyone attempting to answer these questions the early post-Cold War period offered a confusing picture. In 1990, for example, a divided Arab League was unable to persuade Saddam Hussein to retreat from Kuwait. Regional diplomacy had failed to provide the answer to a major crisis with strategic repercussions for international trade and security. The Gulf crisis opened deep wounds in the Arab world between conservative governments calling for an Iraqi withdrawal and supporters of the Iraqi regime composed of 'have not' Arab states and disenfranchised populations in the Middle East. United on the question of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, the UN Security Council enacted a series of decisive resolutions and had the will to implement them under a broad-based coalition led by the United States. Given inter-Arab divisions over Kuwait, the Arab League's failure to provide an early diplomatic a solution to the Kuwait crisis was perhaps not unexpected. But the crisis also highlighted one of the perennial difficulties of regional organisations over the years, that of dealing with determined regional powers.

In different areas of the globe, however, there had been indications throughout the 1980s that regional actors wanted to play a more active role in tackling localised conflicts. In the early 1980s, for example, a group of Latin American countries initiated a peace process in Central America, the so-called Contadora process, which eventually led to the signing of two regional peace agreements (Esquipulas I/II). A combination of regional leadership, and an American policy reversal regarding support to Central American right-wing governments and Contra forces fighting in Nicaragua, effectively set the stage for involvement by the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In Cambodia, with a military stalemate on the ground and Vietnam looking to withdraw its forces from the country, governments of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) sponsored peace talks in 1988 which proved to be the opening round of a protracted diplomatic and political process which culminated with the 1991 Paris Agreement and the dispatch of the most complex UN peacekeeping mission up to that point. Finally, as Liberia was

descending into chaos in 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) offered to mediate between belligerent factions and brokered a tentative cease-fire in August 1990. The latter fell apart as soon as it was signed, yet a number of ECOWAS countries led by Nigeria still dispatched a peacekeeping force to the country.

These and other events played an important role in reawakening the original UN vision of regionalism.[3] In 1992, under the rubric of decentralisation and burden-sharing, the UN's *Agenda for Peace* proposed a renewed partnership between regional organizations and the UN in the fields of preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peace-making and post-conflict recovery.[4] Moreover, the *Agenda* highlighted the possibility that the UN Security Council could move to give greater legitimacy to regional conflict management efforts, thus providing, in the words of former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a sense of 'democratisation' in the task of maintaining international peace and security.

Aim and Organization of this Study

This study proposes an examination of different dimensions of the regional organizations issue as it has developed since the beginning of the 1990s. It seeks to make a contribution to the literature on the role of multilateral action in dealing with conflict, focussing particularly on the role of regional organisations. It reviews several propositions about the latter's potential and, more broadly, that of regionalism, to prevent, manage, and resolve localised or regional conflict in the context of global security efforts and international diplomacy.

Three broad arguments are developed in this study. The first concerns the 'regional solutions to regional problems' argument on which regionalism is premised: this remains as problematic today as it was during the Cold War. Important geopolitical obstacles that previously hindered cooperation may have been removed in many regions of the world as a result of the end of the Cold War. However, the performance and record of regional groupings in handling a number of recent conflicts in Africa, Europe or the Middle East has exposed a number of serious problems and inadequacies which derive from competing visions of regional order, asymmetries of power and influence within regional organisations, lack of regional cohesion, lack of resources, problems of coordination, and structural deficiencies in addressing internal conflicts judged to be a threat to regional security and stability.

There have been some achievements. Indeed, some regional organisations, like the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for instance, have gone further than the UN in trying to develop mechanisms facilitating collective efforts to control internal conflicts. However, not only are many of the problems which

characterised the regional approach to conflict management during the Cold War still present today, but new ones have appeared and others have been magnified. New regional conflicts are putting more responsibilities on the shoulders of regional communities that often lack either the means or the necessary cohesion to offer effective collective responses to them. Regionalism can certainly be a positive force in world affairs, notably by promoting norms of behaviour and attempting to establish new patterns of cooperation. But the belief that regionalism necessarily constitutes an effective approach to resolving regional conflicts is simply not supported by recent experience.

Second, in spite of these problems, more regionalist endeavours have been launched during the early post-Cold War period than during any other single period during the postwar years. This is an aspect of regionalism which the author believes is not fully appreciated in the recent literature. Many if not most older regional organisations have seen their mandates revised, new forums and organisations of all types have emerged or are emerging, and many states have invested considerable energy in creating new regional solidarities. This situation can be examined from a number of perspectives. For some, it means that regional communities are taking greater responsibility in dealing with problems in their own 'neighbourhood'. For others, the proliferation of new regional groupings represents a diffusion of interests hitherto simplified by Cold War geopolitics. The two interpretations are not necessarily in contradiction. Yet we also need to place recent developments in context.

During the postwar years, regionalism arose as a result of a sense of common purpose and shared political outlooks in several regions, the struggle against colonialism in Africa or the desire to build a more peaceful order in Europe for example. But it also developed as a result of the structural inability of the UN to respond to the particular interests of superpowers, regional powers or given subsets of states, either in the context of East-West confrontation or in the context of specific regional conflicts. In the early post-Cold War period, regionalism has been propelled by new factors: a redefinition of global and regional geopolitical boundaries, the elaboration of new regionalist schemes and projects, and economic and political pressures in favour of creating more integrated regional markets. As a result, some regions which, at least from the outside, seemed to make sense as cohesive units during the Cold War, are now fragmenting, while others are enlarging.

The new regionalism in security affairs owes much to shifts in national and collective interests and to redefined allegiances to new regionalist projects or ideals. But it also comes in reaction to others factors a well, namely the increase in the number of localised conflicts with important or potentially important regional repercussions in the

early 1990s, and the attempts of a number of regional powers to further their own vision of regional order over neighbouring areas.

Finally, this study will also argue that in order to respond to multiple crises and conflicts states are increasingly embracing informal multilateralism – also referred to as 'intergovernmentalism' by some authors – rather than try to reach solutions through existing institutional mechanisms which are often seen as cumbersome or unresponsive.[5] For example, Washington's loss of patience with EC/UN mediation efforts in the former Yugoslavia led to the formation of a diplomatic 'contact group' in 1993-1994. Similarly, the UN's difficulties in trying to handle internal conflicts in such places as Somalia and the Great Lakes region have promoted an increasing resort to self-help strategies in dealing with regional or localised conflict in Africa. Contact groups and ad hoc coalitions of all sorts have proliferated in the early post-Cold War period, not only because institutions often appeared unable to provide timely solutions to pressing issues in a setting where only a restricted number of governments had incentives to act, but also because many emerging post-Cold War conflicts did not lend themselves very well to problem-solving through institutions whose 'rule book' was essentially written to handle inter-states issues. Though there exists some literature on this particular issue, the author believes this is an aspect of multilateral conflict management of growing importance and which has been under-examined in the current literature.

This study is organised in five core chapters. The introductory chapter discusses definitional issues as well as attempts to synthesise postwar scholarship on regionalism and regional organisations. Chapter 3 discusses the post-Cold War debate on regional organisations and brings in different interpretations from IR theory and research on the subject. Chapter 4 looks at the relationship between the UN and regional organisations in historical, legal and contemporary perspective, the latter primarily by an examination of UN debates on the subject during Boutros Boutros-Ghali's (1992-1996) tenure as Secretary-General of the UN. Chapter 5 examines recent developments in regional organisations with a particular emphasis put on institutional developments, mandates changes, and operational experience. It also highlights factors impairing or enhancing cohesion within regional organisations. Finally, Chapter 6 explores different factors which will influence the development of regionalism and regional organisations as we approach the 21st century.

Fieldwork for this study was conducted in Washington D.C. and New York in May 1995 and June 1996. In Washington, the author participated to an international conference on peacekeeping operations in Africa at the U.S. State Department and interviewed officials at the OAS. In New York, meetings were held with officials from the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the UN Department of

Peacekeeping Operations. A year long Fellowship in the Policy Group of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs in 1994-1995 also proved invaluable in terms of access to information and exchange of ideas with foreign policy practitioners.

Regionalism and Regional Organisations in the Literature

The development of regional cooperation frameworks was one of the most important issues facing the international state system throughout the postwar years. Not surprisingly, the extent of the relevant literature on the subject is enormous, ranging from historical case studies and legal analyses to more theoretically-driven research emanating from the developing international relations (IR) field. Attempting to cover all the literature on the subject is, to say the least, an ambitious exercise. For example, the respective bodies of literature on alliances and on regional integration, two prominent research themes during the 1960s and 1970s, literally cover hundreds of books and articles, to which must be added equally copious amounts of research on conflict behaviour and on the dynamics of international organisations.[6] The reality is that for decades scientific inquiry into the question of regionalism was undertaken through different epistemological, theoretical and methodological lenses often barely compatible which each other, giving birth to an extraordinarily wide range of interpretations. Some works stand out nevertheless, and scholars like Ernst Haas, Joseph Nye, Karl Deutsch, and Inis Claude, have made such important contributions to the study of regionalism that their ideas remain extremely influential today. To a large extent, these scholars mapped out important intellectual 'markers' which contributed considerably to the definition and analysis of the extremely heterogeneous phenomenon that is regionalism in international affairs.

More recently, there has been a revival of scholarly interest in questions pertaining to regionalism, regional security, and regional security organisations. Part of this resurgence stems from important developments in international affairs, first and foremost the end of the Cold War and its consequences on the political-security dynamics on regions. But it is also motivated by renewed interest in international peacekeeping and peacemaking actions around the world, the number and scope of which increased markedly in the early 1990s. Again, there are numerous relevant bodies of theoretical and empirical research, ranging from research into the changing nature of international security, to that on factors favouring or inhibiting success of multilateral endeavours, via case studies on various regional institutions or on broad aspects of political dynamics in different regions of the world.

This study will engage both IR theory and relevant empirical research. However, it puts neither theory nor methodology as its central focus as it is not

intended to be a self-reflexive study on the IR field but rather a contribution to the study of an important and complex IR phenomenon. In this respect, the author subscribes to Gary Goertz's views on the crucial importance of contexts in the study of international politics.[7] Regionalism is one of those big ideas which have many contexts: scholarly, historical, legal, and political. In the social sciences, as Goertz notes, the positivist and behaviourist traditions have always sought to isolate certain variables in order to identify generalizable patterns of behaviour which could then be 'tested' to see if they could confirm a theory. But the author believes that isolating just one aspect of the regionalism phenomenon, for example its legal-institutional manifestations, in order to develop a systematic and generalizable understanding of the phenomenon across all regions can only lead to partial and sometimes misleading conclusions. A choice has therefore been made for an eclectic methodological approach which not only draws on many traditions of the IR field but is also reflected by an organisation of chapters which discusses the issue in different contexts.

Patterns of conflict in the early post-Cold War period

As I. William Zartman reminds us, "it is tempting to assume that international relations of conflict and cooperation have been so globalized that they can be conceived of as occurring within a single collectivity".[8] In fact, the reality of violent conflict since the end of the Cold War has been quite different. The overwhelming majority of armed conflicts which took place during the 1989-1995 timeframe have been localised affairs with little or no potential threat to the global status quo. The dimensions of armed conflict are becoming increasingly regional and less global. Africa and Asia remain the two most conflict-ridden continents, with nearly half of all Asian conflicts being located in South and Central Asia. Europe saw sharp rise in the number of armed conflicts in the early 1990s, most of them located in or around the territory of the former Soviet Union and in the Balkans. In the Middle East, the number of conflicts has remained fairly stable while in Latin America it has decreased sharply.

The end of the decade affords us a chance to look back on the conflicts of the 1990s with some perspective. Between 1989 and 1997, the number of major armed conflicts declined steadily, from 32 in 1989 down to 21 in 1997.[9] A peak was reached in 1992 with 35 major conflicts. There has been a similar decline in the number of minor armed conflicts, from 15 in 1989 down to 12 in 1997. Again, a peak was reached in 1992 with 23 active minor conflicts. Beyond the statistical fact showing that 1992 was the worst year in terms of active conflicts, the trend which emerges most noticeably from these otherwise grim statistics is that violent internal conflict has been the chief producer of conflict-related deaths in the early post-Cold War period, the overwhelming

majority of them being civilians rather than military personnel. There were 43 intrastate conflicts in 1989, and 52 in 1992. These numbers declined sharply between 1992 and 1997; only 29 intrastate conflicts were recorded in 1997.[10] In all, out of 103 different conflicts occurring between 1989 and 1997, 88 were intrastate conflicts, many of which were accompanied by a disastrous corollary, so-called 'complex emergencies' combining internal conflict with large-scale displacements of population, famine, and disintegrating economic, social and political institutions.[11] It bears noting that many such conflicts were either caused by trans-border circumstances, and most had catastrophic consequences for adjacent states. Internal conflicts are rarely purely internal in nature and consequences.

Given these numbers, and the attendant political crises which struck such institutions as the UN, the EC/EU, and NATO in their efforts to come to grips with a number of regional conflicts, the question of how to deal with civil wars in socially-fragmented or multi-ethnic states can rightly be considered to have been one of the central challenges to the existing international institutional order in the 1990s. Whether in the Balkans, in the territory of the former Soviet Union, Somaliland or the island of Bougainville in Papua-New Guinea, the sort of micro-nationalism which emerged in many areas of the globe represented a threat not only to weak political regimes, but also to an international order based on 'rules of the road' inherited from the Cold War.

Interstate disputes over territory remain present as well, however. Here the Gulf War comes readily to mind. In reality, the majority of such conflicts do not have direct global implications and are chiefly local or regional affairs, for example the 1995 border conflict between Peru and Ecuador, or the skirmishes between Yemen and Eritrea over the Hanish Islands in the Red Sea. Still, others pose a definitive threat to wider regional equilibrium and may have direct international implications. The unresolved problem of the Kashmir remains an ever present source of tension between India and Pakistan, both now nuclear-capable; multiple territorial claims over the South China Sea have been the single greatest source of tension between China and its South East Asian neighbours in the 1990s; and the dispute over the Northern Territory/Kuriles Islands still prevents the normalisation of relations between Japan and Russia. The Asian continent maintains a conspicuous place in the geography of conflict, making it one of the high risk areas in terms of the potential for major armed confrontations in the next century.

In the post-Cold War political environment, it appears that the international community and regional communities are confronted with five types of armed conflict[12] First, classical international conflict between states (e.g. the Peru-Ecuador border war of 1995). Second, intranational replacement conflict, that is, conflict over state governance

posing a threat to extant political regimes (e.g. the Rwandan civil war of 1994). Thirdly, intranational separatist conflict, violent conflict arising over the pursuit of self-determination goals which pose a threat to state integrity and authority (e.g. the conflict in Chechnya in 1994-1996). Fourth, intranational conflicts with ethnic undertones that are primarily driven by a competition for wealth, local power and resources (e.g. Sierra Leone). Finally, transnational overflows of any of the above type of conflict into another.

A Short Typology of Regional Security Organisations

Both the end of the Cold War and, to a lesser extent, UN proposals for regional involvement in settling local conflicts, contributed to a blurring of the traditional distinctions between multipurpose regional organisations, regional defence organisations and other types of regional or sub-regional arrangements. Regional arrangements differ tremendously in their mandates, capability, track records, and approaches to conflict management. Structurally, they range from institutions with elaborate internal architectures, such as the OSCE or the OAS, to institutionalised regional dialogues on security such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Dialogue organisations such as the Commonwealth, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and *La Francophonie*, lack a geographically cohesive base and formal mandates in the peace and security field, yet they are often put under the general 'sub-global' political institutions category which more formal regional bodies find themselves in.[13]

In thinking about regional organisations it should be borne in mind that the political map is not uniformly covered by such arrangements. For example, Northeast Asia and South Asia are for all intents and purposes devoid of effective regional political-security cooperation mechanisms. Both regions, however, remain zones of potential conflict. Also, it should not be forgotten that the universal values embodied in the UN Charter may not be entirely compatible with the values held by certain regional groupings. For example, there is a long-standing human rights component in the OAS system. However, neither ASEAN, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the Arab League can be considered agencies which place a premium on respect for fundamental freedoms. This underscores the importance of regional norms and values as defined (and defended) by governments, and highlights the fact that the rationale for collective action can differ substantially between political regions.

At least three conceptions of regional security organisation can be distinguished.[15] The first is rooted in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and is represented by such classic multipurpose regional organisations such as the OAS, the Arab League and the OAU. Such organisations represented the original 'building-block

to world order' conception of regionalism promoted in the UN Charter. Although such bodies were structured differently, settling or resolving intra-regional disputes between member states was an objective all shared. To achieve this goal these organisations relied chiefly on pacific settlement of disputes methods similar to those spelled out in Chapter VI of the UN Charter (i.e. good offices, mediation, arbitration, etc). Measures requiring the deployment or use of armed force for were generally considered to be either the domain of the UN Security Council or were enshrined in various regional collective defence arrangements. It should be added that these bodies also had in common the promotion of norms of non-interference in domestic matters and of respect for territorial integrity. Not only were these meant to protect governments against territorial claims by their neighbours, they were also intended to enhance a sense of regional sovereignty and protect against unwelcome external intrusion into regional affairs.

For most of the Cold War quarrelsome regional politics and external influence over regional matters in Africa, Asia, or Latin America, precluded the development of indigenous regional security instruments which went beyond pacific settlement of disputes methods. Other factors, such a state-centered security doctrines, the political role of the military in many developing nations, and an intense preoccupation with internal stability also impeded the development of cohesive regional security 'thought' in many regions.

A second conception based on the principle of collective self-defense enshrined in Art. 51 of the UN Charter was represented by collective defense pacts which were originally designed to contain global, regional or systemic threats (e.g. Rio Pact, NATO, ANZUS, SEATO, Warsaw Pact, CENTO). These structures were intended to face external threats rather than deal with intra-regional disputes. With the exception of NATO, which developed both an intricate system of political consultation mechanisms and an extensive multinational military infrastructure, most such alliances lacked the inward community-building character which is one of the hallmarks of regionalism. Indeed, in most cases they were more an expression of the great power security concerns than a political vision emanating from within the regions themselves.

History has not been kind to most of these alliances and only a handful have survived. In Europe, NATO remains the leading security organisation after having undergone a period of flux in the early 1990s. Considerable political uncertainties remain nevertheless, chiefly as a result of the Europe's ambitions to develop an autonomous military role in the crisis management sphere. In the Asia-Pacific region, the ANZUS alliance remains a cornerstone of American regional security strategy, while the lesser-known Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which links Britain, Australia and New Zealand with Malaysia and Singapore, has thus far weathered

regional geopolitical changes in spite of an apparent lack of strategic rationale.[16] There is also an interesting case of sub-regional cooperation in the form of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Although its performance was unimpressive during the Gulf War, the GCC still functions as a political-security alliance with a wider mandate to promote regional cooperation among the oil-rich regimes of the Arabian peninsula.

In a third conception, the primary purpose of the regional security organisation is the enhancement of the regional stability and security of member states through cooperation in the political field writ large. Such organisations share two major attributes: 1) broad and inclusive membership, either at the regional or sub-regional level, and; 2) consensualism in decision-making. The Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) – a bit of a hybrid since it was recognised as regional arrangement falling under the terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in 1993 – shares the above characteristics and can be considered the original grouping of this kind. Other inter-governmental structures with similar characteristics have been developing in recent years. For example, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which adopted a more formalised political-security role (albeit yet inoperative), now unites all the countries of Southern Africa. Similarly, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), set up as a security dialogue process in 1993, groups together almost all countries from the Asia-Pacific region and a number from outside it. The need for inclusiveness has also inspired various political processes in recent years. The Middle East peace process (MEPP), for example, was launched in 1991 on the premise that regional stability in the Middle East could only be achieved with the vast majority of Middle Eastern states participating in discussion on different aspects of regional stability and security.

Typologies such as the one presented above are important, if only because lumping together all regional security organisations and arrangements under one broad heading is a problematic exercise. There remain wide discrepancies in terms of institutional resources, mandates and functioning. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War hasn't *ipso facto* transformed the institutional realities of the past. At present, many regional organisations remain under-resourced institutions with little organic capacity to deploy anything more than small monitoring or 'preventive diplomacy' missions. On the other hand, with the passing of the Cold War, collective defence has been de-emphasised as a rationale for regional organisation. Today, the stated objective of most regional political-security organisations is to promote stability and security through dialogue and, when possible, through collective action. As will be discussed later, however, regional organisations also continue to serve as forums for expressing or defending, specific regional interests.

Controlling and Resolving Regional Conflict: Whose Responsibility?

With the seismic changes of the turn of this decade in the structure of the international system the contextual background of international regionalism has changed considerably. The depolarisation of international cooperation patterns and the lifting of superpower confrontation over entire regions has generated a gradual movement towards the regionalisation of security politics which has already become an important factor in international politics. In many (though certainly not all) regions, political space has been created for genuinely regional discussions on peace and security issues where this was hitherto impossible. As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, the results have been quite remarkable in terms of institutional developments.

Beyond broad discussions on mandates and institutional developments, however, the real debate about the role of regionalism in preventing, managing and resolving regional conflict in the post-Cold War hinges on a complex equation between national interests, conceptions of collective responsibility, opportunity costs of action and inaction in the face of localised problems, and availability of appropriate and effective regional instruments. If only by the sharp increase in the number of regional conflict management initiatives in recent years, the early post-Cold War period offers some degree of evidence that many regional communities are placing an enhanced importance on developing a more organised role in fostering regional stability and security. Yet the credibility of regional organisations has also been tarnished considerably by major setbacks in such places as the Balkans, Central Africa, Haiti and elsewhere. Indeed, in recent years the UN has spent much energy trying manage situations that regional groupings proved unable to handle on their own.

In traditional thinking about regionalism and regional organizations, a number of advantages were ascribed to regional approaches to conflict control. They included: familiarity with the issues and problems of the regional 'neighbourhood', greater knowledge of regional actors, a sense of shared conditions, if not of common burden, likely to stimulate collective action in case of regional crisis. Many of these arguments were invoked as a rationale for regional initiatives in Liberia, where the outflow of refugees from the civil war threatened to destabilise Liberia's neighbours, and in Yugoslavia, where European leaders sought to demonstrate Europe's diplomatic strength and influence in the lead-up to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (in December 1991). Regional action in these and other conflicts has shown that the issues of responsibility and effectiveness of regional responses cannot be determined in the abstract. Each conflict has a specific context and particular dynamics which determine to a large degree whether or not it is amenable to a regional solution.

In the early 1990s another factor was increasingly coming into play. Since 1987-1988, the UN had taken center stage as the most important international conflict resolution forum, a fact largely attributable to the thaw in Soviet-American relations and propitious conditions for UN involvement in helping to put an end to a number of long-running conflicts. However, with rapidly expanding UN commitments in Cambodia, Yugoslavia and Somalia, an over-burdened UN looked increasingly for ways to share the responsibility for international peacekeeping and peacemaking with regional organisations.

From the outset, UN proposals to try to enhance the role of regional organisations raised considerable skepticism. During the Cold War period regional organisations had not proven to be very effective frameworks for resolving regional or localised conflict. In Africa, for example, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had very limited success in dealing with inter-state disputes and proved to be largely irrelevant to the search for solutions to internal conflicts. OAU norms of territorial inviolability, integrity of borders inherited from the colonial period and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states were adopted as a prescription against territorial disputes, external support to insurgent groups, and neo-colonial meddling into African affairs. However, they also provided repressive African regimes with a shield against possible action from the OAU itself. In effect, rather than becoming the force of progress and unity its intellectual fathers had hoped for in the early days of decolonisation, the OAU came to embody autocracy and collective weakness for most of its postwar history.

In the Americas, the OAS experienced a measure of success in resolving a number of minor inter-state conflicts early in the postwar period. However, with the United States, the organisation's dominant member, wary of Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere, the OAS soon became an instrument of American hegemony. By the 1970s bilateralism had become the order of the day in inter-American affairs and the OAS had fallen into such disrepute that it was widely perceived as little more than a forum where Washington entertained its anti-communist friends from Latin America. Lack of U.S. support for inter-American instruments during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982 further undermined the credibility of the OAS system. The pro-British American response to the conflict was a contributing factor to the organisation of Latin American peace efforts in Central America outside the OAS framework in the early 1980s.

As for the Arab League, the organisation's internal cohesion stemmed principally from the development of an Arab identity built upon shared views on the political environment: an anti-colonial sentiment, a mistrust of Western intentions in the Arab world, and a total rejection of the legitimacy of the Israeli state. After a

spectacular ascent, however, pan-Arabism underwent a period of decline following the Suez Crisis of 1956-1957. Various inter-Arab political integration schemes failed dismally in the early 1960s, and the outbreak of civil conflict in Yemen polarised relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Boosted again by Israel's quick military victory in the Six-Day War and the reconstitution of a united front against Israel in the early 1970s, Arab unity was dealt a dramatic blow when Egypt sued for peace with Israel and signed the Camp David Accords in 1978. Egypt, the League's senior member since its foundation in 1945, was expelled from the organisation and the League secretariat was moved from Cairo to Tunis.[17]

There were of course numerous other forms of regionalism during the Cold War. In Europe, the European Community (EC) changed the political equation in Western Europe by providing a integrative framework for cooperation which permanently transformed Franco-German dynamics. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) gave the West a forum through which it could raise human rights issues with Eastern Bloc countries when the Iron Curtain was still a tangible reality. And in East Asia, the fledgling Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) facilitated the normalisation of relations between regional states and permitted Southeast Asia to develop a tentative international voice at a time when conflict rather than cooperation best characterised the regional political-security environment. Contrary to the Arab League, the OAS, or the OAU, however, none of these latter regional bodies were formally mandated to deal with threats to regional peace and security. All, however, were subjected, if not captured, by the discipline imposed on governments by Cold War geopolitics.

It was thus against this historical backdrop, and the unexpectedly quick end to the Cold War, that in 1992 UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali put forward new proposals for renewed of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in his *Agenda for Peace*. In the brave new world of the 'New World Order', international institutions such as the UN, as well regional organisations, were to seek to provide solutions, however imperfect, for all sorts of internal conflicts in Africa, the Balkans and in the former Soviet Union (FSU). However, the hypothesis that the end of the Cold War had transformed long-standing patterns of regional relations and would change what had historically been a troublesome relationship between the UN and regional organisations was soon to be tested.

Notes

1 Walt W. Rostow, "The Coming Age of Regionalism", *Encounter*, vol. LXXIV, no. 5, June 1990, pp. 3-7.

2 Richard Rosecrance, "Regionalism and the post-Cold War era", *International Journal*, vol. XLVI, no. 3, Summer 1991, pp. 373-393.

3 See, for example, the discussions held during the symposium on peacekeeping held in Singapore in 1991. Institute For Policy Studies of Singapore/United Nations Department of Public Information, *The Singapore Symposium: The Changing Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution and Peace-Keeping*, Singapore, 13-15 March 1991.

4 United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping. Report of the Secretary General*, A/47/277, 15 June 1992.

5 See Werner Feld, Robert Jordan and Leon Hurwitz, *International Organizations: A Comparative Approach*, 3rd ed., Wesport Conn., Praeger, 1994, p. 278.

6 In his book on the origins of alliances Stephen Walt noted that a survey of U.S. publications on alliance dynamics produced no less than 270 books and articles. See Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 6, note 13.

7 Gary Goertz, *Contexts of International Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 14-33.

8 I. William Zartman, "Systems of World Order", in William Zartman and Victor Kremenyuk (eds.), *Cooperative Security – Reducing Third World Wars*, Syracuse N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1995, p. 4.

9 These numbers, and the ones that follow, are extracted from Peter Wallenstein and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflicts and Regional Conflict", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 35, no. 5, September 1998, pp. 622-624. Wallenstein and Sollenberg define major conflicts both as *wars*, i.e. armed conflicts producing more than 1,000 battle-related deaths during one particular year, and *intermediate conflicts*, i.e. armed conflict producing more than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict and at least 25 but less than 1,000, during any given year of conflict. *Minor armed conflicts* are defined are armed conflict producing less than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict.

10 It is important to note that numbers vary according to sources and definitions of what constitutes an armed conflict. For example, in its 1994 Human Development Report, for example, the UN calculated that there had been 82 different armed conflicts around the world between 1989 and 1992. See United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 47.

11 See Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1998; 263.). On the question of complex emergencies see *Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1995*, New York, United States Mission to the United Nations, January 1995. See also Joanna MacRae and Anthony Zwi, *War & Hunger - Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies*, New York, Zed Books, 1994.

12 Here I have adapted Christopher Mitchell's typology presented in "Asymmetry and Strategies of Regional Conflict Reduction", in I. William Zartman and Victor A. Kremenuyk (eds.), *Cooperative Security: Reducing Third World Wars*, Syracuse N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1995, p. 25.

13 The Commonwealth's peacemaking and peacekeeping track record is well-known. Interestingly, recent Commonwealth documents specifically refer to 'conflict reducing and resolving activities' of the organisation in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. For their part, the OIC and *La Francophonie* are only now beginning to be utilised as political fora in matters related to peace and security.

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15 See Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict", *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter 1993, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 442-443.

16 The future of the FPDA has been debated throughout the 1990s. A recent Malaysian decision (1998) to withdraw from planned PFDA exercise because of budgetary constraints once again raises questions about its viability as a credible regional defence framework.

17 Egypt reintegrated the Arab League in 1989, just prior to the Gulf War.

2

Regions and Regionalism: Definitional Problems and Conceptual Approaches

The meaning and essence of the concepts of 'region' and 'regionalism' have been debated throughout the development of postwar international relations, both in political practice and in the relevant literature. For a host of reasons, both terms have remained ambiguous. In fact the malleability of the concepts is such that, regardless of political allegiance or ideological inclinations, statesmen and scholars alike have used them to justify, defend, unite, analyse, dissect and discriminate in countless political and academic endeavours.

This chapter attempts to chart the evolution of the ideas of region and regionalism through an examination of the postwar and early post-Cold War foundations of the study of regionalism, with a particular emphasis being placed on issues of peace and security. The field is vast and properly surveying the literature on the topic requires more than one chapter. The second part of this review, Chapter 3, will also examine the literature on regionalism. However, its emphasis is slightly different from this chapter. It will focus on more recent assessments of regional action in the field of conflict management, with reference to earlier studies, and it will examine some current issues associated with regional action and regional organisations.

Definitions: Issues And Problems

An old debate: what is a 'region'?

Definitions of the concept of 'region' abound. Reviewing the extensive body of literature on the subject leads to the conclusion that a definitive interpretation remains as elusive today as when the framers of the UN Charter debated the issue in San Francisco in 1945.[1] Put succinctly, the concept of 'region' is one that has a variable geometry in international relations. This is because the concept is partly a perceptual one that has as much to do with geography as it has with history, economics, culture or politics. Geographers, for instance, might use the term 'region' in terms of areas of physical contiguity presenting similar physical or geological features. But economists might use the term to identify areas, or trade blocks, where markets are integrated or

certain currencies dominate.[2] Not surprisingly, with the establishment of numerous regional and sub-regional trade zones in recent years an increasing focus has been placed on economic regionalism in the study of international political economy.[3] There can also be important historical or cultural boundaries in the definition of a region. It has been noted, for instance, that the term 'Middle East' was coined by the British to refer to Arab lands coming under their influence earlier this century, particularly on the Arabian peninsula.[4] Over the years the term 'grew' in geographical scope, particularly in the postwar period, to the extent where today the expression 'Near East' denoting the area closer to the Mediterranean has nearly disappeared from English usage (though it is still commonly used in French as *Proche-Orient*).[5] As Russett observed in his influential 1967 study on international regionalism: "different definitions and different criteria will often produce different regions, and no two analysts may fully agree as to what the appropriate criteria are."[6]

The difficulty of agreeing on a definition of 'region' is a problem that has plagued both social scientists and legal scholars for a long time. As early as the mid-1930s American sociologist Howard Odum noted the difficulty of finding a definition in his studies on regional integration in the United States.[7] Definitional and delimitation problems stem from a number of factors. Authors agree that geography, which offers obvious physical and political boundaries, helps to define and narrow down the concept of 'region'. But it can also be a misleading parameter because, as Inis Claude put it: "the world does not in fact break easily along neatly perforated lines."[8] Thus, regions should be considered more as interpenetrable zones rather than well demarcated areas. Subsequent research published by Cantori and Spiegel (1971) and by Buzan (1991) lends credence to this interpretation.[9] It is interesting to note, however, that some authors have used the term 'regional organisation' for institutions that do not a have a truly regional membership and hold the geographical criteria to be a relative one.[10] According to this argument institutions such the Commonwealth, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) or *La Francophonie* whose membership is not based on geographical considerations constitute intermediate level institutions similar to more traditional regional organisations.

The current UN interpretation of the concept of regional organisation (or 'regional arrangement' as it is referred to in the UN Charter) is characterised by pragmatism. While certain principles guide the recognition of regional arrangements, the UN has in many recent instances welcomed the political and/or military role played by a wide assortment of regional groupings, both formal and informal. In *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), for instance, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reminded the international community that the Charter had deliberately avoided defining what regional organisations or arrangements were (para. 61). Indeed, in the *Agenda* we find references to ad hoc groupings such as 'The Friends of the Secretary-

General in El Salvador' (para. 62) or to organisations such as the OIC. Similarly, a spate of UN Security Council resolutions and documents related to the Somalia crisis make direct references to the efforts of the OIC, thus placing this organisation on the same footing as the Arab league and the Organization of African Unity.

As will be seen later in the text there are some problems associated with a very broad notion of what constitutes a 'regional arrangement', a notion sometimes so flexible as becoming as ambiguous as that of 'region'. By and large, international relations (IR) research methodology and international law have dictated a narrower view of 'regional arrangement' as a concept in order to facilitate operationalisation and analysis. A broad view of what constitutes a region, i.e. one that would not require geographical propinquity, was seen by some authors to become so inclusive as to be useless as a research tool or as an operational concept.[11] This opinion is still held by many scholars, reflecting a continued belief in the nexus between regional political institutions and fairly well defined geographic areas.[12] As seen in the preceding paragraph, however, the issue of geographical propinquity is one that seems to be of more concern to scholars than to the UN itself. A 1993 UN Disarmament Conference study on guidelines for regional approaches to disarmament illustrates the UN approach on this issue. It recommended that "states participating in regional arrangements [...] should define, as appropriate, the region to which the arrangements among them apply."[13]

There is a broad consensus in the relevant IR literature on regionalism that geography is not, and cannot be, the only defining criterion in identifying regions. A number of authors have written about the necessity for a region to be partially defined in terms of common goals or objectives. Political scientists and IR scholars in particular have found that this is a convenient method which helps to define both 'region' and 'regionalism'.

In his 1949 *Contribution à l'étude des ententes régionales*, Boutros Boutros-Ghali suggested 4 elements (*indices*) which facilitated the definition of a region: 1) natural frontiers; 2) economic frontiers; 3) frontiers of civilisation; and 4) political frontiers.[14] Implicit in these criteria is that regions can be fluid and temporal entities, for 3 of the elements Boutros-Ghali identified are modifiable by human societies. In his famous *Swords into Plowshares* (first published in 1956) Inis Claude described the difficulty of defining the concept of region by the function it should perform: "rational regional divisions are difficult to establish, boundaries determined for one purpose are not necessarily appropriate for other purposes."[15] Another postwar commentator on regionalism, Norman J. Padelford, defined regions as "...spatial areas which come to be spoken of as 'regions' as a result of usage stemming from the practices of groups of states, utterances of statesmen, or the terms of treaties and agreements between states."[16] The political element in this definition is self-evident. The region is then

perceived less as a geographical fact than as a political option taken when a 'region' is delimited in order to represent certain interests or to perform agreed functions.[17]

Joseph Nye's oft-cited definition of the concept of 'region' was one which encompassed both geography and a relationship between the units of the region: "a region can be defined broadly as a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence".[18] Nye's definition remains problematic, however, chiefly because it did not discriminate between units linked by a degree of interdependence and those linked by a common regional purpose or function; interdependence does not necessarily imply common purpose or common objectives. Yet the purposive interconnectedness between states, combined with a degree of geographical proximity, has been viewed by some as a basic requirement for a coherent region. For example, in what is perhaps an ideal definition, Karl Deutsch described the 'region' as follows:

> [A region] must cohere in many respects – in many transactions and commodities, in the flow of labor, management and capital, in economic structure, in education, in culture, in science, in politics, in intermarriage and migration, and in still other ways.[19]

Despite appearances of sterile debate there is, in fact, more to these issues than definitional quarrels. First, as Benjamin Rivlin has pointed out, a number of basic difficulties stand in the way of implementing Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN Charter, not the least of which is the fact that the concept of 'regional arrangement' in the UN Charter and in UN practice is too ambiguous and inchoate to provide clear and systematic guidance as to which regional arrangements can be expected to play an active conflict management role.[20] Far from introducing a well-defined division of labour between the UN and regional arrangements, in fact, the Charter remains a compromise between the authority of the UN Security Council and the autonomy of regional arrangements.

Second, the advocacy of a decentralised system of collective security relying on coordinated action by regional arrangements and the UN is certainly a worthy objective, but it remains a prescription rather than a reality in the absence of a clear division of institutional labour between the global and the regional level. Such advocacy is generally premised on an 'architectural' understanding of multilateralism whereby regional institutions, recognising the primacy of the UN, work in harmony with the UN Security Council to achieve common objectives. Beyond broad principles, such a level of institutional goal-compatibility is very difficult to achieve in practice, particularly in times of international or regional crisis when concrete and timely political or military actions are called for.

Finally, a third point that should be made about the definitional-conceptual issue is that, from a political perspective, defining or redefining a 'region' can be an exercise of considerable import. In the early 1990s the political (re)mapping exercise which took place between Australia and East Asia certainly provided one of the most interesting examples of this process and warrants a brief examination here.[21] Starting in the late 1980s, the Australian Labour government started promoting much closer association between Australia and the countries of East Asia, a region which was regarded by Australians for most of this decade as something of a new economic Eldorado. Australia played a central role in regional institution-building efforts (e.g. the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation or APEC process) and sought to strengthen bilateral ties with Southeast Asian countries and existing regional institutions such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).[22] Under the Hawke and then the Keating Labor governments this process was characterised by a high degree of political symbolism. Australian foreign policy and trade discourse made copious references to 'the new Asia-Pacific' and 'our common future' to flag its newfound inclinations.[23] A further rhetorical instrument for promoting Australia's inclusion in the region came later in the mid-1990s with the concept of 'East Asian Hemisphere' proposed by former foreign minister Gareth Evans, an idea somewhat reminiscent of the notion of 'Western Hemisphere' originally coined by the United States in the context of American efforts to stem the spread of communism in Latin America.[24]

Australia's eagerness to be considered the 'odd man in' in East Asia, however, was not shared by all countries in the region.[25] As evidenced by Malaysia's off and on attempts to establish an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) consisting exclusively of core ASEAN countries, there were some reservations as to the extent to which Australia (the United States, Canada or Chile for that matter) could claim some common identity with Southeast Asia by redefining itself as an Asia-Pacific country. Moreover, as Andrew Mack and Pauline Kerr noted, "Australians are somewhat ambivalent about whether or not they are part of the region; indeed some opinion poll data suggests that a majority do not see Australia as an Asian country."[26] Nevertheless, to the extent that Australia became an important player in the new Asia-Pacific regionalism it benefited from economic and political opportunities that would not have been possible without its push for closer involvement with its northern neighbours.

Examining the meaning of 'regionalism'

In international relations (IR) literature, regionalism is broadly conceived to be either a process of integration, or a process of coordination in specific issue-areas between states belonging to a given geographical region.[27] However, as with the concept of 'region', there is no agreed definition. For instance, regionalism has been defined as the

"formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of region; and in the doctrinal sense, the advocacy of such formation."[28] Therefore it can be considered as much a state of affairs as an overarching objective or a process. In the latter sense it has also been described as "a strategy for the focusing of popular loyalties upon the institutions, symbols or even, what have been called the icons of the larger area, but it does not necessarily do so."[29] The latter description brings in the role of non-state actors, a role often underplayed in an IR literature which traditionally places a heavy emphasis on the roles and actions of states are unitary actors in the international system.

Because institution-building and the adoption of common policies are often seen as the foremost expressions of regionalism, much of the focus of the study of regions has centred on various aspects of institution-building, regional organisation and cooperation mechanisms in the political, security and economic spheres. Current approaches to defining the concept still reflect this emphasis, but also allow for a broader understanding. Alagappa, for example, has defined regionalism as "cooperation among governments or non-government organizations in three or more geographically proximate and interdependent countries for the pursuit of mutual gain in one or more issue-areas".[30] This is a useful definition. It incorporates important aspects of regionalism such as institution building and regime-building. It also highlights the potential role of non-state actors at the regional level, a facet of regionalism which is growing more important not only through the development of regional economic links, but also with the development of regional non-governmental organisations (NGO's) in all spheres of activities.

Building some sense of community usually forms an important element of regionalist rhetoric and processes. The process was described in detail by pioneers such as Karl Deutsch in the 1950s and 1960s in reference to the post-World War II aftermath in Europe and the nascent European integration process.[31] Deutsch made the now classical distinction between those political communities that constituted 'security communities' and those that were still dominated by sense of mistrust that prevented them from resolving their differences peacefully. A security community, as defined by Deutsch, was a community in which there was a real assurance that its members would not fight each other physically, but would settle their disputes in some other way.[32] Pluralistic security communities, as opposed to amalgamated security communities which ultimately entailed full integration of its constitutive parts, were ones in which legal governments retained full independence; Western Europe or the Canada-United States nexus being the classic examples. Although the concept of security community is now decades old it does remain one of the key concepts in the study of regionalism, not least because it has frequently formed an integral part of the rationale behind a number of regionalist endeavours.

Whether state-led regionalism is always a voluntary process is a moot point. There have been instances of 'imperial' regionalism: the integration of Eastern European states into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (1949) and the Warsaw Pact (1955), for example. In other cases regionalism has been an institutional façade for a what was really a form of hegemonic control or influence. Seen in this light a number of regional alliances can perhaps be grouped with certain political and security relationships which evolved out of decolonisation. Here France's special links with sub-saharan Africa, its post-colonial *pré-carré* (back yard) for the better part of the last four decades, qualify as a case in point.[33]

Does the post-Cold War necessarily preclude the emergence of coerced or 'post-imperial' regional groupings or political entities? With the disappearance of the East-West confrontation it seemed that hegemonic regionalism had no future. Yet the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the unstable assortment of former Soviet republics produced by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, can arguably qualify as an example of 'post-imperial' regionalism. Branded by Boris Yeltsin as a "major inter-regional organisation", the CIS has seen Russia attempt to rebuild a centre-periphery relationship with its erstwhile federated republics.[34] Moscow's controversial peacekeeping record in its so-called 'near abroad' leaves no doubt as to how it perceives its role as far as the stability of the CIS is concerned, though that role has proven unsustainable.[35] While situated at one end of the spectrum the CIS example certainly underlines the continuing debate surrounding hegemonic influence within contemporary regional groupings. Here the pivotal role of the United States in NATO and that of Nigeria in ECOWAS are certainly worth reassessing as well.

An Overview of the Scholarly Debate

From the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s regionalism in all its forms was one of the major themes in the study of IR. As Lynn H. Miller remarked, the end of World War II provides a convenient benchmark in this regard because as a modern political phenomenon regionalism is a product of the postwar world.[36] Because of the institutional implications of regionalism this stream of IR research was closely associated with the study of international organisations, paralleling the development of regional organisations and arrangements during that period.

The breadth and extent of literature covering the subject of regionalism is vast. For the purposes of this study four prominent approaches of the study of regionalism will be examined, placing a particular emphasis on issues related to international peace

and security. Those four approaches are: 1) regionalism as a building-block to world order; 2) hegemonic regionalism; 3) regionalism as an experiment in regional integration; and 4) the regional subsystems approach. It should be noted, however, that these approaches do not examine exactly the same phenomenon. Some concentrate on international law and formal international institutions, others on the criteria for regional cohesion and action; some are prescriptive, others descriptive. The common ground between them lies in their examination of regionalism through the elaboration of frameworks for analysis and broader understanding.

Before entering into this discussion a few words need to be said about the sharp drop of academic interest in the study of regionalism which occurred between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s.[37] When, in 1986, Kratochwil and Ruggie declared "today, international organization as a field of study is the area where the action is; [although] few would so characterize international organizations as a field of practice", they were voicing the widely held opinion that there was too often a gap between research on multilateralism and the practice of international organisation, of which regional organisations were a major part.[38] They were stating this at that time when American support for the United Nations, and indeed for multilateralism, was at a particularly low ebb.[39] Regional organisations such as the OAU, the OAS and the Arab League were widely perceived as being moribund and ineffective institutions; even the European Community (EC), the very prototype of the regional economic organisation, seemed to be running out of steam and was in dire need of rejuvenation.

Many factors contributed to this decline of academic interest. Studies on regionalism were inconclusive and, as we shall see later in this chapter, sometimes contradictory. Various regional organisations and institutions, which had shown promise and potential in the early postwar years, were demonstrating a loss of dynamism or were in outright decline. In 1975 one of the most influential theorists of regional integration and international organisations, Ernst Haas, had voiced the opinion that regional integration theory had become obsolete as a "distinct and self-conscious intellectual pursuit."[40]

Haas' diagnosis was not insignificant. As one of the foremost specialists in the field he claimed that what was arguably the most developed empirical and theoretical body of knowledge in the study of international cooperation needed to be enlarged considerably if it were to account for the changes and processes of international cooperation. Haas openly questioned the value of continuing research in regional integration theory, because, as he put it: "the doctors quibble about the patients because they seem to be surviving despite theoretical ministrations."[41] In other words patterns of multilateral cooperation and regional integration schemes were not evolving as expected by the political scientists who studied them. The EC, invariably used as the default model for regional integration, was suffering from 'spillaround', i.e. a stagnation

of its activities, whereas in Africa and Latin America numerous regional integration schemes had failed or were faltering. Ten years after Haas' diagnosis, Ruggie and Krachtowil were to ask: "how and why the doctors [political scientists] can be thriving when the patient [international organisations] is moribund?" Their answer: "the reason is that the leading doctors have become biochemists and have stopped treating and in most cases even seeing patients."[42] In fact since the mid-1970s political scientists had turned to higher levels of abstraction to try to explain patterns and processes of international cooperation; 'interdependence' and 'international regimes' became the new buzzwords of the multilateralism research agenda and still remain major themes in IR research.[43]

This situation was short-lived. In the second half of the 1980s an often highly theoretical debate on aspects of cooperation and multilateralism was complemented by a strong renewal of interest in regionalism in IR research. This can be attributed to three factors: 1) renewed interest in institutional developments in Europe, developments which were accelerated with the end of the Cold War; 2) a growing interest in 'sub-regionalism' in the developing world, particularly as it relates to areas of growing economic and strategic importance; and 3) more recently, the renewed focus given once again to regional security and to the role of regional organisations in the context of the maintenance of international peace and security.

The regionalism-and-world-order school

Notwithstanding the problems related to conceptual definition that have preoccupied so many scholars, the concept of regionalism has historically taken on a specific flavour when it comes to scholarly debate about the UN and world order. In the UN context, 'regionalism' effectively meant 'regional arrangements or organisations', and the terms of the discussions on global and regional order were inspired by the parameters of the UN Charter. In many respects, the early 1990s witnessed a return to earlier debates on the respective merits of regionalism and universalism in matters of international security, a debate which corresponded to the development of liberal institutionalism in IR scholarship.

From the mid-1940s to the early 1970s, a great number of academic studies were published on the question on regionalism, largely, but not exclusively, coming from American ranks.[44] Studies and essays published by Boutros-Ghali (1949), the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (1953), Yakemtchouk (1955), Padelford (1954, 1955) and Claude (1956) give a good account of the early debates

surrounding regionalism in the immediate postwar period.[45] These early discussions were characterised by a strong emphasis on institutional and legal considerations, though some authors also evaluated the effects of the East-West confrontation on the UN system of collective security.

As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the debate between the advocates of regionalism and those of universalism was not entirely resolved at the San Francisco conference of 1945. An omnipresent consideration in the early literature on regionalism was therefore to ponder on the benefits and drawbacks of regional versus universal approaches to world order. Two key questions were usually the subject of investigation: (1) the role of regional arrangements as 'building-blocks' in the construction and maintenance of international peace and security; and (2) the consequences of the growth of regionalism on the UN's authority. Beyond the tedious detail of international law and the analysis of institutional effectiveness, however, lay a more fundamental debate. Liberal internationalist authors foresaw a tension between the universal approach to peace embodied by the UN and the growth of regionalism. The list of traditional arguments put forward to highlight the pros and cons of regionalism vs universalism were synthesised as follows by Plano & Riggs (1967) and Bennett (1991):

Pro-regionalism:

1. Regionalism is more effective than universalism because its capacities are more realistically attuned to its objectives.

2. Regionalism involves fewer states than universalism and offers greater propensities for consensus because of common traditions, similar political, economic, and social systems, and the regional nature of the problems to be solved.

3. Regionalism tends to produce greater support from the peoples of the participating states than universalism because of a closer identification of common interests.

4. Regionalism permits a more appropriate handling of administrative, technical and functional problems than universalism because the organisation's machinery is better matched with the nature and scope of its operations.

5. Regionalism is a necessary precursor to effective global cooperation because it lays the groundwork for a broader consensus.

6. Local threats to peace are more willingly and promptly dealt with by the governments of that area than by disinterested states at greater distances from the scene of conflict. By resolving local/regional conflicts and disputes at their level, regional groupings enhance world order and allow true international threats to peace to get through to the UN level.

7. By combining states into regional groupings a global balance of power will be maintained and world peace and security will be promoted.

8. Universalists fail to take into account the heterogeneity of political, economic, social and geographical factors throughout the world that militate against global unity. These differences can be more easily accommodated within a regional framework.

Pro-universalism:

1. Universalism is a more appropriate means of preserving peace than regionalism since peace is indivisible; a war anywhere in the world ultimately threatens to engulf all.

2. Universalism encourages a more effective pooling of resources to attack economic and social problems; a pooling of African regional resources, for example, would result only in a sharing of African poverty.

3. Universalism encourages a consensus of mankind based on universal principles; regionalism encourages conflicts between rival blocs and economic groups.

4. Universalism recognises that disease, hunger, illiteracy, and poverty are common to all regions of the world; a common attack carried by a single organisation, therefore, will avoid duplication and make the most effective use of available resources.

5. Universalism as embodied in the United Nations already exercises broader powers over a greater variety of subjects than any regional organisation; hence to speak of regionalism as a necessary precursor to universalism ignores contemporary facts.

6. Regions are imprecise and impermanent. No agreement can be reached on a system of regions into which the globe can be conveniently divided.

7. Only a universal organisation can provide an adequate check on the power of a large state that can often dominate the other members of a regional organisation.

8. Sanctions against an aggressor are usually ineffective if applied on a regional basis because of sources of aid to the aggressor from outside the region.

9. The existence of numerous, moderately successful universal organisations demonstrates the desire of governments and peoples to cooperate on a global basis without the necessity of first using regional organisations as laboratories for gradually developing enlarged areas of consensus.[46]

The regionalist case presented above highlights traditional arguments put forward by its advocates. The essential claim is that regional bodies, or cooperation on a regional basis, is more likely to lead to the resolution of local/regional problems.[47] Regional actors, it was (and still is) argued, have a greater familiarity with local issues; they are better placed to pick up early tremors of instability; their involvement in regional issues is less likely to be perceived as external intrusion in regional affairs; and they have a greater ability to forge a regional consensus. Advocates of universalism, on the other hand, claimed that only organisation on a global level could marshal the resources and political will to tackle problems confronting the international community, notably in matters of international peace and security where they stressed the indivisibility of peace in the nuclear age.

Such positions were sometimes being taken to dogmatic extremes by their proponents. The 'either, or' logic of the universalism vs regionalism debate was often put in such terms as to create a yawning gap between the realities of international politics and the more philosophical stance taken by advocates of each respective position. Many analysts, however, questioned the value of debating these issues in such polarising fashion. Positing a choice between universalism and regionalism was a false dichotomy, they argued, because both orders existed simultaneously. Boutros-Ghali, for example, criticised those who considered regional arrangements as being simply a replacement mechanism (*mécanisme de remplacement*) for universal, i.e. United Nations action. He considered that they should complement chapters VII through to IX of the UN Charter and that they could play a special role in promoting economic and intellectual cooperation (*coopération économique et intellectuelle*) between member states.[48] Similarly, Yakemtchouk (1955), an advocate of incremental rather than 'pure' universalism, similarly wrote of a "coexistence of two juridical orders hierarchically organised", both working harmoniously together.[49] Both Boutros-Ghali's and Yakemtchouk's support for regionalism were firmly embedded in the belief that regionalism should work within a larger framework of universal world order, acting as building-blocks for the construction of global peace and prosperity. Minerva Etzioni advanced this doctrine further in 1970 with her theory of regional compatibility, compatibility between regional and universal organisations being defined as when the activities of the latter did not undermine the activities of the former and vice versa.[50] Perhaps one of the most incisive comments on this classical international relations debate was written in the mid-1950s by Inis Claude:

> Theoretical debate as to the superiority of the regional or the universal approach to international organization for the handling of political and security problems is a rather sterile exercise, for experience suggests that statesmen need not, and do not, choose one these approaches to the exclusion of the other.[51]

With the benefit of hindsight, Boutros-Ghali's and Yakemtchouk's contributions were more of a normative than pragmatic nature. The relationship between nascent regional arrangements and the UN evolved quite differently than they expected. For most of the postwar period, many, if not most, regional arrangements actually grew away from the United Nations rather than parallel to it. Needless to say, the creation of NATO (1949) and the Warsaw Pact (1955), concurrent with the 'pactomania' phase of American foreign policy which saw the establishment of a host of regional defense alliances, injected considerable ideological flavour into the early postwar regionalism debate. However, this was an entirely different sort of regionalism than the one intended by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and debated by Boutros-Ghali in his writings; it was a regionalism of hegemon-dominated security alliances rather than one of multipurpose organisations working in closely with the UN.

A second wave of studies examining regionalism as a building-block to world order emerged during the 1960s. Authors evaluating regional organisations and regionalism tended to adopt somewhat more sophisticated analytical approaches than their predecessors, reflecting the rapid evolution of IR as a field of study during this period. As a whole this second wave of literature was less concerned with normative issues than with developments in the political and international security spheres. The relationship between the UN, the Charter, and regional arrangements, which constituted the overarching framework of much of the previous literature, ceased to be the central focus of consideration. Overall, the literature paid more attention to evaluating the role played by regional organisations in dealing with regional disputes and in promoting regional and international security. The evolution of the Cold War and the multiplication of regional security alliances had a considerable impact on the regionalist debate. Bipolarity, and its consequences on world order also became central themes of the regionalism research agenda.

As evidenced by the writings of Yalem (1965), Plano & Riggs (1967), Linda Miller (1968) and Lynn Miller (1969), there was little optimism as to the likelihood of enhancing world order through Chapter VIII regionalism under Cold War conditions, and even less so of attaining it through the faltering UN collective security system.[52] There was a general recognition that, as Ronald Yalem put it, regional arrangements had become "substituitive [*sic*] mechanisms for security as replacements for a discredited universalism".[53] Moreover, For Yalem, the regional approach to security practiced by the superpowers amounted to a repudiation of the theory of universal collective security because it rejected the major assumption of the theory: the indivisibility of peace.[54]

Regional security alliances, such as SEATO or the Bagdhad Pact for example, were not deemed to be entirely compatible with the basic characteristics of stable regional systems as enunciated by Boutros-Ghali in 1949.[55] Moreover, the subservience of regional arrangements to superpower interests was, at least in principle, anathema to the purposes of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, many authors argued that the takeover of regionalism by major powers became inevitable as a result of gridlock in the UN Security Council, the expansion of the East-West conflict beyond Europe, and the search for collective self-defense legitimised by Art. 51 of the UN Charter.

Multi-purpose regional organisations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) also came under closer academic scrutiny. There seemed to be general agreement that, as agents of conflict resolution between states, the capabilities of these organisations were rather limited given, among other things, the structural and political constraints under which they operated.[56] This is not to say that they were completely ineffective in that role. The OAS in particular had some measure of success in conflict resolution in its early days. However, as a whole, the conclusion that regional organisations were not particularly effective vehicles for conflict management constituted a powerful critique of the regionalist hypothesis.

The regulation of internal conflict by regional organisations never elicited the same measure of academic interest as the ability of these organisations to deal with interstate conflict. To be sure, to expect nascent regional bodies to play an effective role in this regard could appear unreasonable since regional groupings were not formally mandated to tackle civil conflicts within their membership. Indeed, part of their political mandate was precisely to avoid external involvement in their domestic affairs, this being buttressed from a legal standpoint by the disposition of the UN Charter itself. Not surprisingly, one of the few academics to tackle the issue of third-party involvement in trying to control internal conflict, Linda Miller (1967), concluded that the capacity of regional organisations was very limited and that they were rather ineffective in this respect. Wrote Miller: "the present resources of regional groupings like the OAU and OAS permit investigatory activities that present little risk and, too often, are of little value in civil strife."[57]

Initially a major focus in the study of regionalism, the regionalism-and-world-order school lost much of its direction and purpose in the meanders of the Cold War. It is interesting to note here the evolution of this school of thought from the mid-1940s on. From a normative and, to a certain degree a prescriptive stance, it became more descriptive and shed some of its optimistic foundations. By the mid-1960s there was a general consensus in the literature that with respect to providing for regional order regionalism had been at best a disappointment, particularly in the Third World.

The explanations put forward to explain this were manifold. First, as stated before, the Cold War had prevented the UN system from working as intended. The ideological rift between the Soviet Union and the United States had transcended the work of the organisation and had transformed it into a diplomatic battleground rather than an effective vehicle for international peace and security. Deep ideological divisions were apparent at the regional level as well, often preventing regional bodies whose effectiveness was based on consensual decision-making from carrying out their charter functions.

Second, no effective division of labour was devised between developing regional organisations, regional security alliances and the UN. This was as much the result of the constitutional ambiguities of the Charter as of the fact that both multipurpose regional organisations and regional security alliances were striving to assert their autonomy rather than working in close coordination with a polarised UN.

Highlighting these problems, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs in the U.S. State Department, Francis Wilcox, noted that:

> The experience of the last twenty years suggests that it is easy to overemphasize the effectiveness of regional organizations in the peacemaking process. Physical proximity often breeds controversy and in many instances the people of a particular region are less well equipped that outsiders to settle their own differences. Indeed, where disputes are deep-seated and bitter, the objective approach, the neutral facilities and the constructive encouragement of countries and organizations outside the region are sometimes more acceptable to the conflicting parties than the assistance proffered by neighbouring states.[59]

Some scholars took a somewhat different view on the matter, however. In a 1971 study on the UN and regionalism, Haas came to the conclusion that both the UN and some regional organisations were highly legitimate forums for the consideration of major disputes, and that it could be validly argued that the development of regionalism had not seriously handicapped the work of the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security, though Haas added that only the OAS and the OAU seemed to possess an independent legitimacy as organs for the preservations of peace.[60] Haas' more contemporary studies on this subject will be commented on in the following chapter, especially since the conclusion of some of his later studies contradicted his 1971 findings. Suffice it here to say that the conventional wisdom which emerged in the literature on the ability of regional organisations to handle and resolve regional conflict was on the whole rather negative at the beginning of the 1970s.

Realism and Regionalism: the Alliance School

The foundations of this very influential, indeed dominant postwar Anglo-American school of thought lay in the traditional notion of balance of power and in the inherent right to collective self-defense.[61] One of the major developments in international security affairs in the immediate postwar years had been the emergence of numerous treaty-based regional defence pacts and organisations.[62] Although the UN Charter was drafted in such a way as to allow the development of such alliances, it was not originally expected that they would become such a dominant feature of the postwar international order. However, as was noted above, with the functioning of the UN determined by bloc diplomacy as early as 1947-1948 major powers reverted to the creation of regionally-based security alliances to further their strategic interests. Geopolitical imperatives were to justify their maintenance until they lost their strategic relevance and faded in the background, though some of them imploded because of lack of internal cohesion.

The concept of 'hegemonic regionalism' articulated by Acharya is an apt description of the nature of the power relationships within a number of Cold War regional security alliances.[63] As Acharya pointed out, this superpower-sponsored regionalism stressed the need for Third World countries to anchor their national security on the political and military might of the United States since they would not be able to maintain regional security on their own. It should be noted here, however, that in discussing the concept Acharya referred to formal associations rather than to informal zones of influences.[64]

Liska's theory of 'Great Power Orbits' (1957) is often cited as the epitome of this current of thought which, from the American point of view, drew its underpinnings in part from early Morgenthaunian realist thought and George F. Kennan's advocacy of Soviet containment. It synthesised key elements of American postwar foreign policy: the need to support Western strategic interests though nuclear deterrence, the global fight against communism, and the necessity to maintain regional structures of containment. At the heart of Liska's arguments were his doubts as to the effectiveness of 'autonomous' regionalism as an instrument of global security. After cursorily assessing small-state regionalism, he concluded that such groupings were ineffective in providing regional security, hence his advocacy of anchoring them to nuclear powers. Wrote Liska:

> Smaller countries are hardly able to contrive regional integration and stability on their own; a more promising alternative might be regional groupings anchored in the superior resources of a nuclear Great Power. This idea was worked out during World War II in theories contemplating a world order based on such regions; the vision has been realized in some places.[...] The smaller communities [...] stand to gain by transferring to stronger hands the chief responsibility for organizing regional security and the Great Powers would also profit from having dependable allies within their strategic area.[65]

Liska's 'Great Power Orbits' exemplified the prevalence of security considerations in American conceptions of regionalism throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Given the international politics of the period, however, Liska's theory, and others of the same ilk, was at odds with non-western strategists, particularly in light of the increasing effervescence in the developing Third World. For example, K.M. Pannikkar, the influential Indian strategist and commentator, had warned as early as 1948 of the dangers of requiring regional organisations to play security functions as he believed that they would inevitably be influenced by external powers, thereby 'usurping' what he saw as the security functions of the United Nations. An advocate of 'autonomous' regionalism under the protection of the UN Charter, Pannikkar had proposed the creation of regional councils to deal with regional socio-economic issues as well as to act as "guardians of the interests of the lesser units of the area".[66]

Perhaps it is Ronald Yalem, one of Liska's contemporaries, who best criticised hegemonic regionalism by pointing out its flaws and shortcomings at a time when the rhetoric and practice of American alliance diplomacy was starting to crumble at the edges. Yalem disposed of Liska's arguments by pointing out the rather significant discrepancies between the theoretical benefits of his proposals and the somewhat different realities of hegemonic relationships in matters of security and integration. He observed that:

1. Great powers are unable to guarantee the security of their satellites against surprise attacks.

2. There is often conflict between the great power and its associates who tend to resent their power inferiority.

3. The necessity of maintaining regional solidarity may dispose the great power to exert periodic pressure or even coercion on recalcitrant smaller powers.[67]

To expand on Yalem's arguments, it could be added that peace was not necessarily indivisible within the framework of alliances either. The difficulty and ultimately, the failure of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) to deal conclusively with the Cyprus problem between Greece and Turkey, two NATO members, is a case in point.[68] Nevertheless, hegemonic regionalism remained one of the most enduring features of American postwar security policy. Cohorts of American foreign policy analysts and influential academics supported the maintenance of a strong 'hub-and-spoke' alliance system anchored on American power and leadership. It is debatable, however, whether many regional security arrangements constituted regionalism at all. Arrangements such as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (otherwise known as the Rio Pact), the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO, also known as the Manila

Pact) or the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) were US-dominated alliances rather than true expressions of a regional vision. Moreover, with the exception of NATO, which developed both intricate political consultation mechanisms and an extensive multinational military infrastructure, their tangible deterrent value was questionable. It might be relevant here to highlight the problems encountered by some of these alliances.

The political viability of the 1947 Rio Pact, which ensured American domination over hemispheric security affairs, began to wane in the mid-1960s with the rise of anti-Americanism throughout Latin America. Following a string of unilateral U.S. interventions in the region – the Arbenz affair in Guatemala in 1954, the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 and subsequent confrontation with communist Cuba over Soviet missiles on the island, and the 1965 American intervention in the Dominican Republic – many Latin American countries denounced U.S. heavy-handedness in the region and condemned the blatant misuse of the OAS and other Inter-American arrangements as a cover for the maintenance of American hegemony. In subsequent years, continued American unilateralism in Latin America further eroded the credibility and authority of the Inter-American system. By the early 1980s, the OAS was regarded as a decaying institution. When Argentina, with the support of many other Latin American countries, invoked Rio Pact provisions during the 1982 Falkands/Malvinas war, not only did the United States refuse to put the case before the OAS, but after unsuccessfully trying its hand at mediation between the belligerents, it dropped its neutral stance and actively supported London's position in the conflict instead.[69] Although several Latin American countries were privately concerned with Argentina's unilateral use of force, Washington's indifference to calls for management of the Falkands/Malvinas problem through inter-American institutions was perceived as an affront to Latin America and this effectively sealed the political fate of the Rio Pact which now largely regarded as a *lettre morte*.

Lack of cohesion also plagued the Bahgdad Pact/CENTO throughout its troubled history. Initially created in 1955 at the instigation of Britain (and with only lukewarm American support) as a security alliance to shield the Middle East 'northern tier' from possible Soviet expansionism, the Pact quickly lost credibility as a regional security vehicle because of the internal divisions and deep animosities within its membership.[70] In truth, neither Washington nor London had fully anticipated the rising strength of pan-Arab nationalism nor its impact on their security interests in the region. The overtly pro-Western orientation of the Pact severely undermined its political legitimacy in much of the Arab World from the start, especially as pan-arab ideology dictated a neutral stance between the communist world and the West. Reformed as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after the *de facto* withdrawal of Iraq from the Pact in 1959, the shaky unity of the alliance was further undermined during the

India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971 when it became clear to Pakistan that the United States would not support its position. In 1971, the withdrawal of Britain from the Persian Gulf and the shift of American policy towards the defence of the Persian Gulf oilfields under the 'Twin Pillar' policy confirmed Iran as CENTO's strategic pivot. With Iran – a non-Arab state – the chosen regional policeman, Pakistan reassessing the benefits of its association with the West, and Arab Gulf monarchies unenthusiastic about the prospect of a *Pax Iranica*, CENTO's cohesion slowly disintegrated. Following the fall of the Shah, in 1978, the alliance effectively lost its *raison d'être*. Iran cancellation of its CENTO membership, in 1979, led Pakistan and Turkey to withdraw from the organisation and the alliance was precipitately dissolved.[71]

SEATO also suffered from the outset from serious limitations that arose from the divergent political objectives of its motley membership.[72] Under the rationale of collective defence, SEATO reflected the Eisenhower Administration's desire have a formal instrument to justify intervention in Asia, unilaterally if necessary, in order to contain communism in the region, more particularly in Indochina.[73]. However, central to U.S. policy on SEATO was also the desire to avoid carrying alone the defence burden in Asia after the Korean experience. The lack of cohesion of this alliance was demonstrated during the 1960-1961 crisis in Laos when the SEATO Council failed to agree on collective measures. In 1964, the Johnson administration invoked its obligations under the SEATO treaty to justify U.S. intervention in Vietnam (Australia and New Zealand did likewise). However, there would never be any question of SEATO collective action; its membership was divided on the conflict and throughout the war SEATO remained but a convenient justification for garnering the support of U.S. allies in Asia and the Pacific. SEATO did not survive the American débâcle in Southeast Asia.[75] In 1975 it was collectively agreed to disband the organisation (effective in 1977).

Despite the rather troubled state of the American alliance system in the mid-1960s some American academics were still arguing the putative advantages of regional alliances. Witness Dinerstein's (1965) arguments:

> In the CENTO and SEATO alliances the hegemonic power has two tasks: first to create the conditions for economic growth, which it is hoped will permit the establishment of broadly based governments of the West European type in which the internal threat is practically nonexistent; and second, as in Vietnam, to aid a regime actually engaged in a civil war with Communists. [76]

Fedder (1968) also wrote strikingly similar comments about the economic aims of CENTO and SEATO and the struggle against world communism.[77] What is most surprising about these rather simplistic analyses is an obvious lack of understanding of regional political dynamics. In fact, prominent realist scholars raised serious questions concerning both the ends and the means of the U.S. anti-communist crusade. For

example, Hans Morgenthau, unlike Dinerstein and Fedder, had warned against the "delusions of 'universalism' and the over-estimation of power" from the early 1950s onwards. He predicted that the United States would not be able to stop revolutionary upheavals in the Third World.[78] For his part, Henry Kissinger judged in the late 1960s that:

> Lacking a conception of common interests, the members of these alliances [other than NATO] have never been able to develop common policies with respect to issues of war and peace. Had they been able to do so, such policies might well have been stillborn anyway, because the technical means of cooperation have been lacking. Most allies have neither the resources nor the will to render mutual support.[79]

As argued above, the record of the U.S. postwar regional security alliances with Third World states did not prove to be particularly positive, especially when compared to more successful alliances such as NATO, or the Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty (ANZUS).[80] They represented the expression of the security concerns of the great powers much more than a political vision originating from the regions themselves. In particular, they lacked the inward region-building character that in the classical Boutros-Ghali vision was one of the hallmarks of true regionalism. It is worth noting that none of the regional defense alliances discussed above showed a great capacity for adaptation or evolution, as NATO did throughout its institutional history. True, when compared to the other regional pacts, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) – which has been left out of this discussion thus far – did demonstrate a capacity for evolution. But this evolution was of military rather than political nature and never jeopardized Soviet political domination of the WTO and its structures.[81]

As a consequence of the fact that these alliances were essentially designed to face an external or otherwise identified threat (i.e. communism, 'subversion'), intra-alliance disputes and 'out of mandate' situations always proved difficult to deal with within their frameworks. Miller (1973) argued that the development of intra-alliance conflict resolution functions within these groupings might perhaps have solidified Western ties to these areas, thereby making credible the assertion of Western hegemony.[82] It is highly unlikely that it would have, however. Given the political dynamics of the Middle East or of Southeast Asia, one cannot see under what circumstances Arab countries would have chosen CENTO over the Arab League to settle Arab disputes, or how countries such as Malaysia or Indonesia could have relinquished their policies of non-alignment to resolve their differences under an American-dominated alliance framework.[83] At any rate, both CENTO and SEATO proved to be ineffective and unwieldy structures for their stated purposes. Perhaps these limitations, coupled with the relative ineffectiveness of extant regional organisations, explain in part the proliferation of sub-regional arrangements (e.g.

ASEAN, SADCC, OECS, GCC, etc.) in developing and under-developed regions from the late 1960s on.[84]

The Regional Integration School

Regional integration is a third major theme of the regionalism research agenda. Arguably, it constitutes the most developed theoretical and empirical body of research of the four presented in this chapter. The regional integration school was intent on examining the patterns of collaboration, institution-building and integration between states at a regional level, particularly in the economic and social spheres. The Western European postwar experience provided a unique laboratory in this regard. While innumerable studies on regional integration have focused on different African and Latin American integration schemes, the European experience provided the central empirical and analytical model of this school of thought throughout its development.

The 'beyond the nation-state' approach central to regional integration thought was considered to be conducive to peace by one of its foremost observers, Joseph Nye, as its proponents purported to "change the relationships between states", making them less prone to "exercise their sovereign power for violent conflict".[85] Regional integration doctrines were implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, designed to foster conflict avoidance – peace through cooperation – hence their inclusion in this chapter. As will become readily apparent, however, crisis management and conflict resolution (in the traditional political-security sense) lay outside the intellectual domain of the regional integration field.

The study of regional integration is closely associated with the neo-functionalist school which gained prominence in the late 1950s and throughout 1960s with the writings of Haas, Deutsch, Lindberg and Nye. As a theoretical/empirical research endeavour neo-functionalism was essentially the product of a critical reexamination of the European integration experience in light of David Mitrany's influential functional approach.[86] Mitrany's writings, it will be recalled, formed one of the early foundations of the liberal institutionalist school of international relations.[87]

Mitrany, a former League of Nations official, had argued that the development of international economic and social cooperation was a major prerequisite for the ultimate solution of political conflicts and elimination of war. He believed the principle of state sovereignty hindered international cooperation because it effectively advantaged the most powerful states and to the detriment of weaker and smaller ones. Inherent in his thinking was the belief that social and economic problems were the root causes of war, along with institutional under-development and attitudinal predispositions to conflict in international politics. His quintessential idea, therefore, was that international cooperation should be organised on the basis of common and apolitical

functions to be exercised cooperatively outside the control of the nation-state. Mitrany believed that cooperative endeavours in science and technology would challenge state-based authority and bring a demand for new transnational organisations.[88] Interestingly, Mitrany did not hail European integration and the goal of a European federal state as a shining example of his ideas. He had always criticised the territorial basis of international relations and therefore organisation on a regional, i.e. European basis contradicted his views.

The influence of Mitrany on international cooperation is most evident in the shaping of the United Nations system.[89] That a myriad of UN specialised agencies (e.g ILO, FAO, WHO, UNHCR, etc.) were created along the functional principle is, at least in part, a testament to the influence of his ideas. Over the years, however, the practice of functionalism demonstrated the limits of the theory. Mitrany's belief that effective global cooperation in the social and economic spheres could precede the establishment of harmonious political relations did not prove to be entirely founded. The UN and European experiences with functionalism demonstrated that there were often no clear and definite boundaries between political and non-political matters. In effect, cooperation in seemingly apolitical fields could never be entirely removed from the political influence of governments. As Inis Claude wrote, "the dilemma of functionalism is that its ultimate impact upon politics may never be tested because of the immediate impacts of politics upon functionalism."[90] This brings us to a second point.

Mitrany did not anticipate the importance of some of the practical/bureaucratic aspects of the functional approach. The kind of international cooperation he proposed would always need to be heavily financed, yet he did not elaborate on this critical aspect of his proposals. Moreover, he did not address the possibility that the international cooperation bodies he wanted to create might become entrenched, slow-moving bureaucracies, a criticism that became widely voiced in relation to many UN subsidiary agencies.

As stated above, neo-functionalism was an off-shoot of the functional approach. Its proponents held that "political institutions and policies should be crafted so that they lead to further integration through the process of the expansive logic of sector integration", the so-called *engrenage* principle.[91] We should distinguish here between the political forefathers of European integration, statesmen such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman who promoted neo-functionalist strategies, and the theoreticians of neo-functionalism, composed mainly of American-based scholars. The three authors most identified with this school, Haas, Lindberg, and Nye, produced considerable research on regional integration processes while Karl Deutsch, another influential theorist of European regional integration, studied attitudinal changes within the European context.[92] Deutsch's influential research reinforced the belief that regional

integration would come through higher levels of 'transactions' (i.e. political exchanges, tourism, trade, transport, communications) and through the development of security communities.[93] According to Deutsch the development of a greater sense of community lead to stronger respect for common institutions and would eventually lead to integration.

The concept of 'spillover' – integration in one sector which was expected to lead to integration in another and so on – was a central principle in neo-functionalist thinking. This is how Nye described the original neo-functionalist model:

> [In the original neo-functionalist model] the important actors are integrationists-technocrats and various interest groups which get governments to create a regional economic integration organization for a variety of convergent aims. Once done and depending on the degree of initial commitment this action unleashes the new forces of sector imbalance or *engrenage*, increased flows of transactions, and involvement of an increasing number of social groups which gradually focus their activities at the regional level.[94]

If this model was followed in linear and systematic fashion, neo-functionalists believed the result would be a political process leading to some form of political union. This is why Nye called them "federalists in functionalist clothing".[95]

Neo-functionalist theorists and practitioners differed fundamentally from Mitrany's functional approach on the role of the state in the integration process. Unlike Mitrany, they did not advocate bypassing the state in the international cooperation process. Neo-functionalist scholars recognised the fundamental importance of both governmental and non-governmental elites in the integration process, all too aware that politics would play a fundamental part in the path towards integration. As for practitioners, they knew too well that integration was a deliberate and highly political strategy made possible because governing elites within participating European states shared elements of a common vision, an element they recognised as fundamental to the success of their ultimate goal of a European federation.[96]

The early EC experience proved to be extremely positive for participating European countries, so positive in fact that it became a model to be emulated all over the world. However, even though this grand experiment was radically changing the Western European political landscape, by the late 1960s theorists and practitioners alike were finding that the nation-state remained a very obstinate obstacle in the path towards integration. The predicted shift towards supranationality in specific fields was not occurring as they thought it would, as attests the decidedly intergovernmental character of European Community institutions. Spillover wasn't occurring automatically on its own momentum; every time a political push was needed to open up new sectors, and then more political will was needed to ensure agreement and compliance with common

policies. When this did not occur, 'spillaround', i.e. a stagnation of regional integration activities, was said to occur.

Throughout the Cold War period, the forces leading the push toward European integration did not prove strong enough to break the wall between socio-economic issues and political-strategic issues; the internal logic of integration was confronted to the wider context of European security, and more precisely that of the Cold War.[97] It should be remembered here that the construction of Europe began with the success of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the early 1950s, but also with the failure of Western European countries to agree to the creation of a European defence system. The five-power Brussels Treaty alliance (1948) – which later became the Western European Union (WEU) – was essentially subsumed by the U.S.-led NATO once it was created in 1949, and both the European Defence Community (EDC) plan (1954) and the Fouchet proposals (1962) failed to win the agreement of Western European states. Thus, throughout the Cold War EC members maintained NATO's central role in maintaining European security, ensuring an unequivocal U.S. commitment to defend Western Europe while at the same time tying Germany to a common political-security framework.

By the late 1960s the neo-functionalists were fundamentally reassessing their original models of integration. They resorted to increasingly sophisticated theoretical/explanatory analyses to account for the seemingly unending fits and starts in the process of integration. A new type of actor, the actor with 'dramatic-political aims' (one should really read here Charles de Gaulle) was introduced by Haas to explain some of the difficulties of European integration. Later on, he coined the expression 'asymmetrical regional overlap' to explain how clusters of countries would adhere unevenly to certain aspects of the integrationist ideal while simultaneously supporting other political arrangements or processes which were seemingly inconsistent with each other.[98]

By the early 1970s, no amount of elaborate theorizing seemed to explain the complex and shifting evolution of regional integration in Europe. If the original neo-functionalist model wasn't working on the first patient how could it work in other regions? In fact, evidence showed that regional integration schemes in Latin America and Africa were faltering. Some suffered from 'spillback' – a reversal of the integration process – while others failed spectacularly, as was the case of the East African Community in the mid-1970s.[99] The fate of non-European integration schemes in the 1960s and 1970s certainly brought into sharper focus the uniqueness of the European integration experience. They also sounded a clear warning: models developed for specific regional circumstances did not lend themselves very well to reproduction on other continents.[100]

The setbacks and problems of regional integration attempts had a profound impact on the neo-functionalist research agenda. As was noted earlier, Haas – one its major figureheads – declared the theory of regional integration "obsolescent [in Europe] but still useful in the rest of the world". He proclaimed the ascendancy of interdependence, a somewhat broader analytical paradigm which was to become one of the principal theme of the IR theory field in the second half of the 1970s. Haas concluded that European integration had "disappointed everybody", that it hadn't produced the expected results and that "efforts at regional integration prove to be far more susceptible to influences exogenous to the system created by the participants than has been allowed."[101] In other words, there was too often a gap between the rhetoric of integration and its measurable accomplishments as political interference often introduced 'turbulence' in the integrative process. In effect, neo-functionalist scholars came to admit that the internal logic of cooperation was subject to considerable external constraints, particularly when issue-areas were highly politicised. Not surprisingly, they were criticised by their realist peers for not taking sufficiently into account the structuring environment of the international system.[102] From a realist perspective, this explained why the logic of integration could not easily flow into the political-security field; the external constraints imposed on West European states by the Cold War divide imposed tangible limits on the logic of integration.

Lately, the development of economic institutionalism and political-security cooperation in Europe appears to have given new relevance to neo-functionalism and its 'logic of integration'.[103] Keohane and Hoffmann, however, have expressed doubts that spillover could explain these latest developments, particularly in the security field.[104] However, they suggested that spillover had been useful in other ways, notably through the incentives for institutional change brought about by the enlargement of the EC membership in the early and mid-1980s. Others, like Tranholm-Mikkelsen, seemed to take the view that the new dynamism of the EC since the mid-1980s should lead to renewed research along neo-functionalist principles.[105]

Given that regional trading schemes seem to be *à la mode* once again, it is possible that neo-functionalism could yet find new and fertile grounds for study. It is also interesting to note how, in developing new concepts for the prevention and management of conflict, certain countries, notably Australia and Canada, seem to be reviving elements of the functional approach. For example, as a national contribution to the Middle East Peace Process the government of Australia organised a rainfall seminar in April 1995, recognising that water shortage is an issue of major strategic concern for many countries of the region.[106] Similarly, a 1995 statement on Canada's international security policy asserted that:

> [international] stability owes as much to voluntary participation in functional arrangements – economic integration, water management, trans-border transportation systems – as to more explicit security arrangements such as treaties of friendship.[107]

As intellectually interesting as such concepts as spillover and transactions may be, classical regional integration theory offers limited tools for a better understanding of conflict/crisis management in unstable regions where fragile states and weak regional institutions are often the norm. Peace through cooperation may have been the meta-objective of regional integration in Europe, but not necessarily in other regions where increased trade, not 'community-building', was the goal of participating states. The idea of regional integration is still widely regarded as contributing to the long-term prevention of interstate conflict by reinforcing positive patterns of cooperation. Whether it necessarily produces these results, however, remains very much a matter of debate within the IR field.[108]

The regional subsystem approach

A fourth research field in the study of regions is the sub-system theme which emerged in the late-1950s and 1960s as a subset of the systems approach to world politics popularized by Morton Kaplan.[109] The development of the concept of subsystem was closely associated with the prominent American realist school of IR.[110] As with neo-functionalism and regional integration, however, the scholarly debate on subsystems ran out of steam in the mid-1970s due to contradictory findings and lack of consensus. By that time, the quest for the optimal definition of the concepts of 'sub-region' and 'subsystem' had degenerated into a methodological exercise of little apparent utility. Although the concept remained present in the literature, it did not elicit the same level of scholarly interest today as it did in the 1960s. Indeed, a revisionist movement questioned the very theoretical premises on which these discussions were predicated.[111] Old concepts often have a tendency to reappear in the IR field, however. Partly as a result of the renewed focus on regions in the literature on international security, the subsystem theme has been making a strong return in recent years.

Researchers in the subsystem school were initially concerned with the identification of variables that tie states together as regions, sub-regions and subsystems. Using quantitative methodology, Bruce Russett's 1967 behavioural study of the 'political ecology' of regions attempted to highlight the degree to which states shared cultural, social, economic and political attributes and their potentialities for integration into cohesive groupings.[112] Russett's study raised more than a few eyebrows because it basically came to the conclusion that "the degree of congruence among the clusters produced inductively by the various criteria [in his study] would be relatively low, that is, the socio-cultural groupings would not closely resemble the political ones, nor the trade

groupings, etc."[113] According to Russett there was no region or aggregate of national units that could "in the very strict sense of boundary congruence be identified as a subsystem of the international system."[114] Gazing in his crystal ball, Russett's prediction were that there would be some further integration in certain geographic regions, but not any great change in the number or composition of regional coalitions.

From the point of view of advocates of regionalism these were disappointing conclusions. If one accepted Russett's results, defining regions would remain a near hopeless task since they didn't appear to act cohesively on a systematic basis. Incidentally, this conclusion also supported indirectly Haas's notion of 'asymmetrical overlap': there could be different regions for different issue-areas. In his writings about international organisation Taylor credited Russett's study as one the reasons for the decline of the study of regionalism in the late 1960s.[115] The fundamental issue raised by Russett is evident: how could social scientists study regions as units of the international system if there was no consensus on the object of study?

In their influential *The International Politics of Regions* (1970) Cantori and Spiegel departed radically from Russett's conclusions. They proposed a new relational method of studying the dynamics of regions beyond the parameters of the integrationist school taken by Haas.[116] Using a systems analysis framework, Cantori and Spiegel identified 15 subsystems, what we might term geopolitical regions, which were subordinate to the dominant international system, i.e. the patterns of "confrontation of the most powerful of nations". Every state, no matter how small in terms of size, population or power belonged to a subordinate subsystem. Each subordinate system was in turn subdivided in 'core' and 'peripheral' subgroups which were subjected to the influence of an 'intrusive' system, that is of influence by outside powers, as well as from intra-system conflictual interactions. Cantori and Spiegel came to the conclusion that the fifteen identifiable subsystems could be grouped into four types of subordinate systems (integrative, consolidative, cohesive, coherent).

Lynn Miller's attempt, in Cantori and Spiegel's volume, to reconcile the subordinate systems approach with existing patterns of regional organisation left a distinctive impression of a clash between systems analysis and institutional analysis.[117] Miller himself readily admitted that differences existed between the analysis of formal structures and the more sociologically-oriented approach of systems analysis. One of the more debatable arguments presented by Miller related to the positive role of 'cooperative' regional organisations (i.e. OAU, OAS, Arab League) in 'intersubordinate system', or intra-regional, relations. Miller asserted that alliances should not be expected to serve as particularly effective instruments for the conduct of intersubordinate system relations whereas cooperative organisations could. While it is true that many hegemon-dominated alliances often proved to be inappropriate vehicles for the development of intra-regional relations – indeed such was not their primary function –

it can also be argued that neither the Arab League nor the OAU, for instance, effectively played the central role in intra-regional relations that Miller suggested.

Placed in a contemporary context one could argue that Cantori and Spiegel's study hasn't stood the test of time even if some of their concepts have. The emphasis they placed on power politics and on the influence of 'dominant' and 'intrusive' systems too easily slid into a justification of the status quo and balance of power approaches in international relations. Moreover in revitalising the subordinate systems approach today one would have to account for such development in IR theory as transnational political approaches or regime theory. Nevertheless, in part as a result of their study, the notion of subordinate system has maintained a strong footing in the realist IR school, either in the concept of subsystem, or as we shall see below, in the more confined notion of security complex.

Certainly one of the most influential concepts to emerge out of the international security scholarship in recent years is the notion of security complex developed by Barry Buzan.[118] Buzan argued that there were strong grounds, both empirical and theoretical, to reject the arbitrary definition of regions. He believed that Cantori and Spiegel's effort to develop a global and comparative regional framework was too complex and cumbersome to develop a general understanding of regions. Focusing on the notions of 'region' and 'security' through an analysis of security subsystems would therefore provides a narrower and more manageable approach for analysis and, he asserted, one "with firmer roots in the realities of regional relations than that of the integrationists".[119]

Buzan suggested that, in security terms, a 'region' is where "a distinct and significant subsystem of security exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other".[120] He introduced the concept of security complex to label such groupings, defining them as a "group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another."[121] In his 1991 study *People, States & Fear* Buzan identified 5 security complexes in the so-called Third World: South America (excluding Central America), the Middle East (including North Africa), Southern Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia (surprisingly, Buzan excluded Australia from the latter).[122] Within any given security complex exists a range of relational/conflictual possibilities ranging from chaos, regional conflict formation, security regime and security community. Up the ladder from security community formation is regional integration which eliminates a security complex by transforming an anarchic sub-system of states into a larger, more unitary actor within the system.[123] Security complexes are not permanent configurations, Buzan argued. Power shifts and changes in patterns of hostility within complexes can lead to internal transformation, and external transformation can occur if there is contraction or expansion of the outer boundaries of the complex. Finally, Buzan put forward the notion of superpower

'overlay', a concept analogous to Cantori and Spiegel's 'intrusive system'. Overlay, as opposed to external intervention, occurs when external powers alter the 'indigenous security dynamics' of a complex, subordinating, or even obliterating it by the larger pattern of major power rivalries. According to Buzan's, the diminution of superpower influence in previously 'overlaid' regions leads to a revival of dormant regional security dynamics.[124]

Buzan's framework has gained considerable currency in the literature on regional security, chiefly because it provides a cross-region conceptual explanation of regional security which puts the emphasis on regional dynamics rather than on the interplay between superpower politics and regional security. In that respect, he goes beyond the usual analyses proffered in mainstream strategic studies, a field of studies historically dominated by American academia and attendant conceptions of international security.

While considerations of space prevent a comprehensive critique of Buzan's arguments to be undertaken here it is nevertheless important to highlight some of the premises of his construct. Despite his attempts to broaden the concept of security in *People, States & Fear,* his approach to understanding of regional security is essentially based on notions of geopolitical 'weight', balances of power and historical patterns of rivalry. States remain the principal actors of regional security and therefore, one would presume, the principal actors of conflict resolution. This is essentially why institutions play little or no part in his analysis of regional security. In fact, in discussing the role of sub-regional institutions, Buzan asserted that they often defined "lines of regional rivalry" rather than patterns of regional cooperation.[125] There are undeniably a number of examples giving credence to this interpretation in the 1980s timeframe: ASEAN vs Vietnam, the GCC vs Iran, SADCC (now SADC) vs apartheid South Africa. Overall, however, current trends would seem to go in the opposite direction, partly a result of the end of the Cold War, partly a result of domestic and regional political changes. For instance, Vietnam joined ASEAN in July 1995 and South Africa has now become the dominant player in SADC. Moreover, since the beginning of this decade there have been numerous examples in the developing world where regional and sub-regional groupings have gone beyond the rhetoric of cooperation and played an more active role in the security field. One hastens to add that the new regionalism in security affairs has had limited success. But it does highlight emerging patterns of cooperation which cannot be dismissed out of hand.

Buzan also raises the fundamental question of the inherent tension between the globalisation and the regionalisation of the world economy and its consequences for regional security.[126] A strong regionalisation of the world economy, he asserted, would reinforce existing regional patterns of security and contribute to the insulation of regions from each other; continued globalisation, however, would contribute to dampen

such patterns. Buzan essentially leans towards the regionalisation scenario, with some caveats attached.

What is particularly interesting to note here in relation to the Southeast Asian security complex is how Buzan's downplays the role of regional economic interaction in weaving broader links of regional interdependence and cooperation. His prognosis for East Asian security is unambiguously pessimistic, both because of long-standing historical enmities and territorial disputes in the region and because of the weakness of multilateralism in East Asia.[127] This is an assessment which is certainly not shared unanimously. Responding to an article on East Asian security authored by Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, Jim Richardson remarked:

> The task of constructing a regional security community [in East Asia] might indeed appear formidable, but to allow the present favourable conjuncture to degenerate into major wars fought with the weapons of the twenty-first century would signify political and diplomatic mismanagement of a high order.[128]

However, Richardson also noted that:

> despite the talk of a broader concept of security, it is not clear that the [regional] security dialogue is capable of addressing the most serious issues confronting the region. Military security in the narrow sense stills claims disproportionate attention.[129]

Richardson indirectly points to what is arguably the most problematic aspect of Buzan's construct. Conceptualising regional security by focussing on geopolitical and 'hard' security issues is a necessary but probably insufficient exercise for understanding regional security. The foci of such exercises remain states and the potential risks for inter-state conflict. Prospects for regional cooperation through regime or institution-building in the security or the economic field tend to be minimized, and sub-national and trans-national issues which might impact positively on a given region receive relatively scant attention.

In spite of these limitations, the security complex concept remains a useful tool. By placing the emphasis on the structure of regional security rather than on its cooperative manifestations (regional institutions, regimes, processes, etc.) it shifts the level of analysis from interaction to environment, highlighting the 'weight' of geopolitical factors in the process of regional cooperation. In effect, it forms a counterpoint to liberal institutionalist approaches to world order, reminding policymakers and scholars alike of the many difficulties of pursuing regionalist strategies that are not closely attuned to specific regional environments.

Concluding Remarks

As this chapter demonstrates, the understanding of regionalism is informed by a very wide range of ideas and concepts developed during the postwar period, ranging from the traditional understanding of regionalism-as-regional-organisation, to the more contemporary understanding of regionalism as an organising principle located somewhere between state-building and universalism. Within the IR discipline, inter-paradigmatic debates and definitional problems have weighed heavily in the development of the literature of the subject, with the result that there is no generally accepted theory of regionalism today.

However, beyond academic debates, the postwar literature nevertheless drew some conclusions on the potential effectiveness of regionalism. First among them, the traditional regionalist hypotheses, essentially the regional-solutions-to-regional-problems argument discussed by Bennett (1967) and others, are generally considered to be flawed. General explanations for the weaknesses of regional arrangements vary considerably, however. The quintessential arguments of the realist school is that states, not institutions, are the key actors in international politics; and that those institutions and alliances that were not central to the global balance of power were essentially weak reeds, unable to influence larger political events in their own regions in any significant fashion. Liberal institutionalists, without denying some of inherent weaknesses of the regionalist approach, have pointed to the strangling effect of the Cold War on regional organisations, which, much like the United Nations, were prevented from playing an effective role in the management and resolution of conflict because of the larger patterns of international confrontation.

Second, examining the institutional form of regionalism provides answers to certain question - mandates, functions, and so on - but certainly not to all. As a political project, regionalism cannot be separated from larger historical patterns of global and regional interaction that have contributed to mold minds, shape ideas, and form a sense of regional belonging or enmity. In this respect the postwar period certainly provided a rich tapestry, be it the development of the UN system and the new faith in international cooperation that followed the Second World War, decolonisation in Africa and Asia with its attendant crises, the Cold War and the development of the American alliance system, or regional integration in Europe.

Finally, as the European integration experience demonstrated in its formative years, regionalism is rarely a fully horizontal process, that is, regions may be able organize for certain purposes, but not necessarily for others. There a several explanation for this. Objective reasons to cooperate may be lacking, the issues that need addressing may not be effectively managed through the same regional state configurations, and differing political orientations may not permit the formation of cohesive 'all-purpose' regionalism. Whether in Latin America, Africa, or Asia, several attempts to create regional groupings were ultimately thwarted precisely because

organizational forms of regionalism never truly reflected the real extent of cohesion or compatibility amongst their constitutive membership.

A final comment is warranted here. The scholarly debate on regionalism remains inconclusive and limited in scope for several reasons. First, the literature on regionalism is inseparably linked to the larger theoretical and methodological debates which have informed the development of IR as a field of study, a field whose own shortcomings have come under closer scrutiny than ever before since the end of the Cold War.[130] Perhaps an unavoidable observation on the literature is the overwhelming American influence on postwar IR literature, reflecting Stanley Hoffmann's view (expressed in 1977) that IR was largely a product of American social science.[131] There is no doubt that an extensive survey of African, Arab or Southeast Asian postwar literature on regionalism would have revealed other concepts and interpretations where such themes as national self-determination, the 'Arab Nation' or 'regional resilience' would have figured much prominently than in mainstream Anglo-American IR thought.

Also, looked at with a revisionist eye, the classical literature on regionalism is limited by a lack of interdisciplinarity. Perhaps with the exception of some aspects of neo-functionalist scholarship, what is missing is a link with important bodies of research – such as conflict research, organisational theory or even political anthropology – which emerged in the late 1950s and the 1960s. By comparison, more recent literature on conflict resolution and international organisations has generally attempted to integrate explanatory strands coming from a wider range of research fields.

Are the conclusions reached above to be considered obsolete interpretations as a result of the experience of the 1990s? The following chapter will examine in more detail the terms of the post-Cold War debate on this subject.

NOTES

1 See Joseph Nye (ed.), *International Regionalism: Readings*, Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1968, p. vi.

2 For an overview of the use of the concept of region in different academic and research contexts see Melville C. Branch, *Regional Planning: Introduction & Explanation*, Praeger, New York, 1988, pp. 3-95.

3 See, among others, Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 294-296 and pp. 397-401; Robert Hormats, "Making Regionalism Safe", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 97-108; Marc L. Bush and Helen V. Milner, "The Future of the International Trading System: International Firms, Regionalism, and Domestic Politics", in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds.), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart, 1994, pp. 259-276; Andrew Wyatt-Walter, "Regionalism, Globalization, and World Economic Order", in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), *Regionalism and World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 74-121.

4 Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology*, Chicago, Rand McNally & Company, 1967, p. 3.

5 The question of Western conceptions of the Orient is discussed at length in Edward W. Said's classic, *Orientalism*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.

6 Russett, *International Regions*, p. 2. The conclusions of Russett's study are assessed later in this chapter.

7 See Howard W. Odum, *Southern Regions of the United States*, Chapel Hill N.C., University of North Carolina Press, 1938; Howard W. Odum and Harry Estill Moore, *American Regionalism: A Cultural-Historical Approach to National Integration*, New York, Harry Holt, 1938. These works are cited in Russett's *International Regions*.

8 Inis L. Claude, Jr, *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, 4th Edition, New York, Random House, 1971, p. 104.

9 Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1970; Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear*, 2nd ed., Hemel Hempstead, Harverster Wheatsheaf, 1991.

10 See Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1971, p. 8.

11 See Oran Young, "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor", *World Politics*, no. 21, April 1969, p. 488, cited in Nye, *Peace in Parts*, p. 8.

12 Muthiah Alagappa, for instance, posits that "geographical proximity provides identity as well as the interaction context distinguishing regionalism from organisation at other levels" and therefore considers that the Commonwealth and the OIC are not regional organisations. See Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and Security: A Framework for Analysis", paper presented at the 'Economic and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Agendas for the 1990's' conference, Australian National University, Canberra, 28-30 July 1993, p. 6 and note 10.

13 See UN, Disarmament Conference doc. A/CN.10/1993/CRP.4 (7 May 1993).

14 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Contribution à l'étude des ententes régionales*, Paris, Pédone, 1949, p. 51.

15 Inis Claude Jr, *Swords into Plowshares*, 4 ed., New York, Random House, 1964, p. 104.

16 Normand J. Padelford, "Recent Developments in Regional Organizations", *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, April 28-30, 1955, p. 25 cited in Ronald Yalem, *Regionalism and World Order*, Wash. D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1965, p. 15.

17 See also Michel Virally, "Les relations entre organisations régionales et organisations universelles" in *Régionalisme et Universalisme dans le droit international contemporain, Société Française pour le Droit International – Colloque de Bordeaux, 20-22 Mai 1976*, Paris, Pédone, 1977, pp. 152-153.

18 Nye, *International Regionalism*, p. vii

19 Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and its Alternatives*, New York, Alfred E. Knopf, 1969, p. 102. For an alternative view on the concept of 'region' see Kenneth Boulding, "Changing Conceptions of Regionalism", paper presented at the Asian Peace Research Association Regional Conference on 'Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific region: Post-Cold War Problems and Prospects', University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, January 31-February 4, 1992.

20 Benjamin Rivlin, "Regional Arrangements and the UN System for Collective security and Conflict Resolution: A New Road Ahead?", *International Relations*, vol. 11, no. 2, August 1992, p. 108.

21 Another such ongoing regional definition process is the the 'Visegrad group' (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) which seeks to create a Central European identity through closer economic and political ties amongst its member countries and with Western European countries and institutions.

22 For a more detailed overview of regional integration efforts in the economic and security fields see Stuart Harris "Economic Cooperation Institution Building in the Asia-Pacific Region", in Richard Higgott, Richard Leaver John Ravenhill, *Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990's*, St Leonards N.S.W., Allen & Unwin, 1993, pp. 271-289.

23 See Michael Byrnes, *Australia and the Asia Game*, St Leonards N.S.W., Allen & Unwin, 1994.

24 See *Address by Senator Gareth Evans, Foreign Minister of Australia, to the ASEAN PMC 7+7 Session*, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, 2 August 1995.

25 This expression "odd man in" used here is quoted from P. Kerr and A. Mack, "The Future of Asia-Pacific Security Studies in Australia", in Paul Evans (ed.), *Studying Asia Pacific Security*, Toronto, Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies - University of Toronto – York University, 1994,

26 Ibid., p. 34.

27 Of course, regionalism applies as well to intrastate politics. It has, however, a different meaning. At the national level, it is regarded as the practice of redistributing certain central governement powers to give to territorial authorities an intermediate position between the central and local levels. As with international regionalism, there is a wealth of literature available on this subject.

See Vernon Bogdanor, *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Science*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1991, p. 526.

28 Nye, *International Regionalism*, p. vii.

29 Paul Taylor, *International Organization in the Modern World*, London, Pinter Publishers, 1993, p. 7.

30 Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework for Analysis", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 21, no. 3, October 1995, p. 362.

31 See, among others, Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement*, Garden City N.Y., Doubleday&Co., 1954. Deutsch wrote extensively about the process of community-building in Europe in a number of other scholarly publications throughout the 1950's and 1960's.

32 Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political community and the North Atlantic Area: international organization in the light of historical experience*, Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 2. See also Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

33 The recent publication of the memoirs of Jacques Foccart, France's foremost 'Africa hand' for a quarter of a century, largely confirms the extraordinary relationship Paris maintained with its former colonies and the direct role the French government played in shaping the post-colonial political order in francophone Africa. See Philippe Gaillard, *Foccart Parle: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard*, vol. 1, Paris, Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1995.

34 See "Georgia: Shevardnadze Says Abkhaz Peacekeeping Plan On Track" in Reuters Newswire [online], 6 June 1994.

35 A CIS collective security agreement was signed in Tashkent in May 1992. However, it now appears as though the agreement is slowly falling apart See Suzanne Crow, "Peacekeeping in the CIS: An instrument of Russian Hegemonic desire?" in Winrich Kühne (ed.), *Blauhelme in einer turbulenten welt*, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993, pp. 351-375; Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Russia's Monroe Doctrine: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, or Imperial Outreach?", in Maureen Appel Molot and Harald Von Riekhoff (eds.), *Canada Among Nations 1994*, Ottawa, Carleton University Press, 1994, pp. 232-265. See also Andrew Katell, "Motive Doubted as Russian Troops go 'Near Abroad' ", *Washington Times*, 29 March 1994, p. 13.

36 Lynn H. Miller, "The Prospects for Order through Regional Security" in Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds.), *Regional Politics and World Order*, San Francisco, W. H. Freeman and Company, 1973, p. 51.

37 Taylor, *International Organization in the Modern World*, p. 9.

38 Kratochwil, Friedrich, and John G. Ruggie, "International Organization: a State of the Art on an Art of the State", *International Organization*, vol. 40, no 4, Autumn 1986, p. 753.

39 In 1987, for instance, the well known American conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote an article eloquently titled "Let it Sink!" which was scathingly critical of the UN. See *The New Republic*, 24 August 1987, pp. 18-23.

40 Ernst Haas, *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory*, Research Series no. 25, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1975, p. 1.

41 Ibid., p. 5.

42 Kratochwil and Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State", p. 753.

43 The following five volumes present the state-of-the-art on these topics: David A. Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993; A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), *Frameworks for International Cooperation*, London, Pinter Publishers, 1990; Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer (eds.), *Regime Theory in International Relations*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993; John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters: the Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993.

44 It must also be be noted however that there was also early French, Belgian, Indian, Arab and Latin American academic interest in this issue. See, among others, Pierre Vellas, *Le Régionalisme international et l'Organisation des nations unies*, Paris, Pédone, 1946; K.M. Panikkar, "Regionalism and World Security" in *Regionalism and Security*, New Dehli, Oxford University Press for the Indian Institute of International Affairs, 1948, pp. 1-6.

45 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Contribution à l'étude des ententes régionales*; Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, *Building Peace – Reports of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace 1939-1972*, Vol. 1, Metuchen N.J., Scarecrow Press, 1973, pp. 265-292; Romain Yakemtchouk, *L'O.N.U. – La sécurité régionale et le problème du régionalisme*; two studies by Norman Padelford, "Regional Organizations and the United Nations", *International Organization*, May 1954, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 203-216, and "Recent Developments in Regional Organizations", *Proceedings of the American*

Society of International Law, April 28-30, 1955, Washington D.C., American Society of International Law, pp. 23-41; and of course Inis Claude's *Sword into Ploughshares*.

46 Jack Plano and Robert E. Riggs, *Forging World Order: The Politics of International Organization*, New York, Macmillan, 1967, p. 63; A Leroy Bennett, *International Organization: Principles & Issues*, 5th ed., Englewood Cliff, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1991, pp. 216-217.

47 Former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere put case for regionalism as follows in 1964:

> Certain regional and ideological associations have an advantage over the UN. As a means of settling disputes, talking is more productive, and certainly easier, the greater the general feeling of sympathy and friendship among the participants[...]

Dag Hammarskjold Memorial Lecture (Dar es Salaam, 1964), p. 6, cited in Nye, *International Regionalism: Readings*, p. ix.

48 He also considered that, in the long run, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN should play the most important role of all UN organs, and that regional organisations should work alongside the priorities adopted by this body. Boutros-Ghali, *Contribution à l'étude des ententes régionales*, pp. 230-231. One notes the similarities between Boutros-Ghali's position and the proposals of the Egyptian Delegation during the San Francisco conference in 1945 (see Chapter 3).

49 Yakemtchouk, *L'O.N.U. – La sécurité régionale et le problème du régionalisme*, pp. 266-267. My translation from French.

50 Minerva M. Etzioni, *The Majority of One: Towards a Theory of Regional Compatibility*, Beverly Hill, Calif., Sage Publications, 1970, p. 18.

51 Claude Jr, "The OAS, the UN and the United States" in Nye, *International Regionalism*, p. 3.

52 See Yalem, *Regionalism and World Order* (note 15); Lynn H. Miller, "The Prospects for Order through Regional Security" in Falk and Mendlovitz, *Regional Politics and World Order*, pp. 50-77. See also Linda B. Miller "Regional Organizations and the Regulations of Internal Conflict", in Nye, *International Regionalism: Readings*, pp. 77-96, and; Jack C. Plano and Robert E. Riggs, *Forging World Order*.

53 Yalem, *Regionalism and World Order*, p. 146.

54 Ibid., p. 8

55 Boutros-Ghali suggested that 'stable' regional systems were composed of a mixture of necessary and sufficient elements. The necessary elements included 1) a treaty for the maintenance of peace; 2) a treaty based on a particular solidarity (mutual defense, economic matters, etc.); 3) geographic contiguity and; 4) an international agency of a permanent character. Additionally, regional sytems were said to require geographic contiguity (although not necessarily coinciding with geographic boundaries), legal equality between member states, free adhesion and more than five signatories. See Boutros-Ghali, *Contribution à l'études des ententes régionales*, pp. 22-59.

56 See, among others, Lynn Miller, "The Prospect for Order through Regional Security", p. 67, and; Plano and Riggs, *Forging World Order*, pp. 295-298, 303-306.

57 Linda B. Miller, "Regional Organizations and the Regulation of Internal Conflict", pp. 79-81 and p. 96.

58 Linda B. Miller, "Regional Organizations and the Regulation of Internal Conflict", pp. 79-81 and p. 96.

59 Francis O. Wilcox, "Regionalism and the United Nations", in Normand J. Padelford and Leland M. Goodrich (ed.), *The United Nations in the Balance*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, p. 443. Wilcox's text remains one of the more lucid analyses of this period.

60 Ernst B. Haas, "The United Nations and Regionalism" in Kenneth J. Twitchett (ed.), *The Evolving United Nations: A Prospect for Peace?*, London, published by Europa Publications for the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, 1971, pp. 121-140.

61 For a classic explanation of what constitutes a balance of power system see Morton Kaplan's *System and Process in International Relations*, New York, Wiley, 1957. Henry Kissinger's *Diplomacy*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, discusses at length about historical balance of power systems, their advantages and their failures.

62 Those are the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance or Rio Pact (1947); The Western European Union (1948); the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949); the ANZUS Treaty (1951); the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (1954); the Warsaw Pact (1955), and; the Baghdad Pact (1955), later known as CENTO.

63 Amitav Acharya, "Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 1, 1992, p. 7.

64 Obviously, in a broader sense the expression 'hegemonic regionalism' can be taken as meaning formal as well as informal manifestions of hegemonic influence.

65 George Liska, "Geographic Scope; The Pattern of Integration", pp. 236-237.

66 K.M. Pannikkar, "Regionalism and World Security" in *Regionalism and Security*, pp. 4-6

67 Yalem, *Regionalism and World Order*, p. 26.

68 Although many Atlanticists often point to NATO's moderating influence on Greece and Turkey on this issue. For an overview of the early proposals for NATO involvement in Cyprus see James A. Stegenga's *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1968.

69 See Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy Towards Latin America*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 180-181; Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, *Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982*, Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press, 1991, pp. 150-162..

70 Britain's failure to win French and Egyptian support for the establishment of a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) in 1953-1955 led to the formation of the more modest Baghdad Pact. Washington supported the MEDO plan but showed much less enthusiasm for the Pact, fearing that it might compromise is relations with the Arab World. See Victor H. Feske, "The Road to Suez: The British Foreign Office and the Quai D'Orsay" in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds.), *The Diplomats, 1939-1979*, Princeton N.J. Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 167-200. For an account of the unsuccessful attempt to set up a NATO Middle East Command (MECOM) see Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power – National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, Stanford Ca., Stanford University Press, 1992, pp. 476-485.

71 For an account of CENTO's problems see John C. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East – Problems of American Policy*, revised edition, New York, Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1960; Guy Hadley, *CENTO: The Forgotten Alliance*, Sussex, University of Sussex Institute for the Study of International Organization, 1971; Joseph A. Kechichian, *Security Efforts in the Arab World: A Brief Examination of Four Regional Organizations*, RAND Note N-3570-USDP, Santa Monica Ca., RAND, 1994, pp. 10-13.

72 Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines were members of SEATO, along with the United States, France, Britain, Australia and New Zealand. South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, although not signatories of the treaty, were included under a separate protocol and could invoke its collective defense provisions. From a historical perpective it is interesting to note that, following the French defeat in Indochina in 1954, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, privately withdrew his support for a Southeast Asia defence pact, a proposal which he had earlier recommended. He estimated that, without French and Vietnamese strength, the alliance was not viable militarily. The State Department didn't disagree with this assessment. However, it judged that the value of a regional treaty would be to advise Chinese leaders that if they 'crossed the line', the U.S. would retaliate. See David Lee, "Australia and Allied Strategy in the Far East, 1952-1957", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 16, no. 4, December 1993, pp. 519-520.

73 The Eisenhower administration's failure to win support for pacts amongst the neutral coutries of Asia in 1954 momentarily led to a proposal to set up an Asian regional economic organisation supported by the U.S. as a means of countering communist influence. The proposal was stillborn, however. At a conference in Simla, India, in May 1955, smaller Asian countries were reluctant to agree to a proposal which they believed would jeoparise the level of bilateral assistance from the United States and subject them to Indian or Japanese influence. See Joseph Nye, "United States policy towards regional organization" in Paul A. Tharp Jr, (ed.), *Regional International Organization/Structures and Functions*, New York, Saint Martin's Press, 1971, p. 259. For an overview of the 'Pakistan factor' in U.S.-India relations in the 1950's see Ramesh Thakur, *The Politics & Economics of India's Foreign Policy*, London, Hurst; New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994, pp. 150-152

74 The Eisenhower administration's failure to win support for pacts amongst the neutral coutries of Asia in 1954 momentarily led to a proposal to set up an Asian regional economic organisation supported by the U.S. as a means of countering communist influence. The proposal was stillborn, however. At a conference in Simla, India, in May 1955, smaller Asian countries were reluctant to agree to a proposal which they believed would jeoparise the level of bilateral assistance from the United States and subject them to Indian or Japanese influence. See Joseph Nye, "United States policy towards regional organization" in Paul A. Tharp Jr, (ed.), *Regional International Organization/Structures and Functions*, New York, Saint Martin's Press, 1971, p. 259. For an overview of the 'Pakistan factor' in U.S.-India relations in the 1950's see Ramesh Thakur, *The Politics & Economics of India's Foreign Policy*, London, Hurst; New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994, pp. 150-152

75 See Leszek Buszynski, SEATO: *The Failure of an Alliance Stategy*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1983.

76 Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems", in Richard B. Gray (ed.), *International Security Systems – Concepts and Models of World Order*, Itasca Ill., F.E. Peacock Publishers, 1971, p. 69. This article was first published in 1965.

77 Edwin Fedder, "The Concept of Alliance", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 12, no. 1, March 1968, p. 75.

78 Jaap Nobel, "Morgenthau's struggle with power: the theory of power politics and the Cold War", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 21, no. 1, January 1995, p. 76.

79 Henry A. Kissinger, "System Structures and American Foreign Policy", in Charles W. Kegley Jr and Eugene Wittkopf (eds), *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy - Selected Readings*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983, pp. 107-109. This text was written in 1968. In his famous *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* published a decade earlier, Kissinger had already questioned the effectiveness of U.S. alliance policy in the Third World, citing among other things the lack of common purpose in such alliances as the Bagdad Pact and SEATO as fundamental flaws. See Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Garden City NY, Doubleday, 1958, pp. 198-199.

80 SEATO's failure contrasts with the relative success enjoyed by the U.S. in its bilateral alliances in East Asia (with Japan, Korea, Thailand, Philippines). This success can be attributed to the existence of political regimes strongly favourable to American strategic interests as well as to the favourable bargaining position of the U.S. in its bilateral security relationships with those countries.

81 As the walls of the Soviet empire were collapsing in eastern Europe, the belated attempts to change the nature of the WTO from a military alliance under tight Soviet political and military control to a political consultative body were dismally unsuccessful. The WTO imploded and was disbanded in 1991.

82 Miller, "The Prospects of Order through Regional Security", p. 62.

83 An interesting and regionally-focussed account of the politics of regional organisation in Southeast Asia is presented in Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dhal, *Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia*, St Martin's Press, New York, 1982. See particularly pp. 9-44.

84 See in particular William T. Tow, *Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World*, Boulder, Co., Lynne Rienner, 1990.

85 Nye, *Peace in Parts*, p. 16.

86 David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1966. Mitrany first published this essay in 1943. I draw my arguments on functionalism from Inis Claude's penetrating analysis of Mitrany's ideas in his *Sword into Ploughshares*, pp. 379-407 and Clive Archer's *International Organizations*, 2nd edition, London, Routledge, 1992, pp. 88-101. In his own writing Mitrany always referred to the 'functional approach', purposefully avoiding the usage of 'functionalism' given to his idea by others, notably Claude and Haas, as too doctrinaire. Much of IR scholarship has since used both terms alternatively to refer to the same idea.

87 See Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew, "Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands", in Charles Kegley Jr (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory*, New York, Saint Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 133-136.

88 Justin Cooper, "Organizing for peace: Mitrany's Pragmatic Approach to War", paper presented at the 'Functionalism and Conflict Management: Re-examining David Mitrany's Contribution to the Study of World Order' workshop, Ottawa, 30 March 1995, pp. 5-6.

89 See, for example, John W. Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order*, vol. 1, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1979, pp. 72-73.

90 Claude, *Sword into Ploughshares*, p. 399.

91 Harold K. Jacobson, *Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System*, 1st ed., New York, Alfred Knopf, 1979, p. 72.

92 The following is a selection of studies on regional integration. Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, 1st ed., Stanford, Ca., Stanford University Press, 1958, and; *Beyond the Nation-State*, Stanford, Ca., Stanford University Press, 1964. These two works are often regarded as the classic neo-functionalist studies with Leon N. Lindberg's *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*, Stanford, Ca., Stanford University Press, 1963. See also Joseph Nye's *Peace in Parts*, pp. 21-54, "Comparing Common Markets; a Revised Neo-Functionalist Model", *International Organization*, vol. 24, no 4, Autumn 1970, pp. 796-835; "Regional Institutions", in Falk and Mendlovitz (eds.), *Regional Politics and World Order*, pp. 78-102, note 38, and; Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of the Historical Experience*, note 31, and Deutsch's *France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics*, New York, Charles Scribner & Sons, 1967.

93 The expression 'pre-theorist' is used here to highlight the fact that neo-functionalism, communications theory and federalist approaches were considered by Haas to be the three approaches, or "pre-theories' leading to or explaining the phenomenon of regional integration. See Ernst Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflection on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing", *International Organization*, vol. 24, no. 4, Autumn 1970, pp. 606-646.

94 Nye, "Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-functionalist Model", p. 799, note 93.

95 Nye, *Peace in Parts*, p . 51.

96 The practitioners perspective is presented in Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, trans. George Ball, Garden City NY, Doubleday, 1978.

97 For a perspective on neo-functionalism and European defence, see Alfred van Staden, "After Maastricht: Explaining the Movement towards a Common European Defence Policy" in Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (eds.), *European Foreign Policy – The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe*, London, Sage, 1994, pp. 139-155.

98 Ernst Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration", pp. 634-635.

99 See Jacobson, *Networks of Interdependance*, pp. 408-409.

100 In what can be called the 'nurture vs nature' debate of international cooperation, one notes that there is now a similar debate on the replicability of the ASEAN model. See Jörn Dosch and Manfred Mols, "Why ASEAN Co-operation Cannot Work as a Model for Regionalism Elsewhere – A Reply", *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, vol. 11, no. 2, November 1994, pp. 212-222.

101 Haas, *The Obsolescence of regional integration theory*, p. 39.

102 See Van Staden, "After Maastricht: Explaining the Movement towards a Common European Defence Policy", pp. 145-148.

103 For an overview of European institutional developments in the foreign policy and security spheres see Martin Holland, *European Community Integration*, London, Pinter Publishers, 1993, pp. 117-143; Sverre Lodgaard, "Competing Schemes for Europe: the CSCE, NATO, and the European Union", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 23, no 3, September 1992, pp. 57-68, and; Werner J. Feld, *The Future of European Security and Defence*, Boulder, Co., Lynne Rienner, 1993.

104 Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, "Conclusion: Community Politics and Institutional Change", in W. Wallace (ed.), *The Dynamics of European Integration*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991, pp. 289-290.

105 Jeppe Tranhom-Mikkelsen, "Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in light of the new dynamism of the EC", *Millenium*, vol. 20, no. 1, Spring 1991, pp. 1-22.

106 See CSIRO Division of Atmospheric Research, *Precipitation Enhancement Workshop - Summary of Papers*, 24-28 April, Terrigal, Australia. This workshop was conducted under the auspices of the Multilateral Water Resources Group in support of the Middle East Peace Process.

107 Gaetan Lavertu, *Directions in Canada's International Security Policy*, paper presented at the annual metting of the Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa, 26 January 1995. Lavertu was then Associate Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs (Policy) in the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

108 In what is called the relative gains debate, neo-realist scholars often emphasise that states engage in international cooperation in order to achieve gains relative to those of other states whereas neo-liberal scholars emphasis the absolute gains brought about by international cooperation. For an overview of the debate see David A. Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, New York Columbia University Press, 1993.

109 See Kaplan, *System and process in International* Relations (see note 59).

110 There is a wealth of literature on the regional subsystem theme. For a review of the approaches put forth between the late 1950's and 1970 see William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 1, March 1973, pp. 89-117.

111 For a contemporary discussion on systems and sub-systems see Tom Nierop, *Systems and Regions in Global Politics – An Empirical Study of Diplomacy, International Organization and Trade 1950-1991*, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1994. Chapter 2 presents an interesting discussion on the evolution of the concept.

112 Russett, *International Regions and the International System* (see note 3). Russett used five criteria to delineate regions and then tried to verify the congruence of each given aggregate cluster. His criteria were 1) social and cultural homogeneity; 2) political attitudes or external behavior; 3) common political institutions; 4) economic interdependance, and; 5) geographical proximity.

113 Ibid., p. 218.

114 Ibid., p. 168.

115 Taylor, International Organization in the Modern World, p. 9, note 30.

116 Cantori and Spiegel, *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach*, see note 9. There is a wealth of literature on the regional subsystem theme. For a review of the approaches put forth between the late 1950's and 1970 see William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem".

117 Miller, "The Subordinate System: Types of Regional Organizations", in Cantori and Spiegel, pp. 357-378.

118 Buzan, *People, States & Fear* (see note 8).

119 Ibid., p. 189.

120 Ibid., p. 188.

121 Ibid., p. 190. He also distinguishes between lower and higher level security complexes. A 'lowel level complex is composed of local states whose power does not extend much, if at all, beyond the range of their immediate neighbour. A higher level complex contains great powers whose power may well extend far beyond their immediate environment (p. 195).

122 A first edition of *People, States & Fear* was published in 1983.

123 Buzan, "The Post-Cold War Asia-Pacific Security Order: Conflict or Cooperation?", in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds.), *Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region*, St Leonard N.S.W., Allen & Unwin, 1994, p. 132.

124 See Brian Job, *Multilateralism: The Relevance of the Concept to Regional Conflict Management*, Working Paper No. 5, Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, October 1994, p. 13

125 Buzan, *People, States & Fear*, p. 194.

126 Buzan discusses the issue in "The Post-Cold War Asia-Pacific Security Order", pp. 141-143 and 150-151.

127 See ibid. and also Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security", *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 3-21.

128 Jim Richardson, *The Asia-Pacific: Geopolitical Cauldron or Regional Community?*, Working Paper 1994/6, Dept. of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, November 1994, p. 18. Richardson was responding to the *Survival* article cited in the preceding note.

129 Id.

130 John Lewis Gaddis, in "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol. 17 No 3, Winter 1992/93, pp. 5-58, presents a mordant and elaborate critique of mainstream theoretical approaches to international relations.

131 Stanley Hoffmannn, "An American Social Science: International Relations", *Dædalus*, vol. 126, no. 3, Summer 1977, pp. 41-59.

3

Regional Conflict Management in the Post-Cold War: Perspectives and Prospectives

The ability of international institutions to cope with armed conflict has remained at the forefront of the international agenda throughout the 1990s. At the beginning of this decade the UN peace and security system was put under enormous pressure, and expectations about its capacity to deal with erupting conflicts – particularly internal conflicts – were continuously raised. Not surprisingly, this resulted in disillusionment and criticism of its role and performance in a number of locations, most notably in the former Yugoslavia, in Somalia and in Rwanda.

Given the UN's problems in trying to shoulder the burden of global security there have been persistent calls for greater regional involvement and responsibility for preventing and managing violent conflict. Disagreements abound, however, regarding the appropriate mechanisms through which this can be accomplished. Analysts of international relations have basic, theory-derived disagreements about the effectiveness of regionalism in bringing about peace and security. Moreover their analyses of the implications of the end of Cold War for the management of regional conflicts vary widely.

This chapter examines this ongoing debate. The first two substantive sections examine realist and liberal readings of post-Cold War regional conflict management. A third section draws some conclusions on collective conflict management from a number of empirical studies. The final section presents some propositions on the possibilities for regional action.

The Current Debate on Regionalism and Security

Various analyses on the theme of the regionalisation of security politics have been proposed in recent years. At the risk of over-simplification, one may point to two basic interpretations. The first holds that as a result of the end of the Cold War the regional dimensions of security are taking on a much greater importance in the overall international security equation. However, the means through which regional security will be managed will continue to depend largely on the interests of concerned states, be they local players or 'outsiders' holding special regional interests. It also holds that

major powers will be less inclined to intervene in areas of diminished strategic importance and that emerging regional powers will therefore take on a greater role as determinants and arbiters of regional order. From this perspective, individual states rather than regional or global institutions are, and will remain, the most important actors in conflict prevention, management and resolution efforts.

A second view holds that regionalism will play an increasing role in the post-Cold War order, not only with respect to regional security but also in relation to the maintenance of international order. Its proponents agree that the regional dimensions of security are becoming more salient as bipolar superpower confrontation has receded. However their essential claim is that, with the end of the ideological divisions that often paralysed both regional organisations and the UN, the possibilities for effective collective action at the regional level are now improved. Therefore a devolution of security tasks to regional organisations should be encouraged in order to lighten the burden on the UN and to encourage greater regional responsibility in matters of conflict prevention, management and resolution. In many ways, these views represent something of a return to early postwar thinking on regionalism: regional problems should be solved at the regional level, and global problems at the global level.

There is little disagreement between the proponents of these two positions over the effect of the Cold War on regional politics. As a result of geopolitical competition between the superpowers the Cold War spilled over into many regional and local conflicts, restraining the intensity of regional disputes in some cases (e.g., Middle East); exacerbating them in others (e.g., East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America). Similarly, there seems to be little disagreement that there has been a fundamental shift in the nature of global strategic environment as a result of the end of the Cold War. The possibility of a nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia, the most serious threat to international security during the Cold War, is now extremely remote. Regional confrontations fuelled by global ideological divisions, so-called wars by proxy, now seem virtually unthinkable. The former Soviet Union has lost its superpower status and with it its capacity to be a key 'mover and shaker' in international affairs. The United States has considerably downgraded many of its large overseas military installations, and by and large – though with exceptions – the levers of influence of the major powers have shifted towards the economic realm.

The long-term implications of these transformations are currently the object of heated debate in the IR field, as are indeed the nature of the new threats to international security. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism and sectarian conflict are regularly cited as the most immediate and potentially destabilising global threats. However, issues such as transnational crime, environmental degradation and climate change, and large-scale population movements are also beginning to take their place on the new global security agenda.

Realist Perspectives on Regional Conflict Management

Many scholars associated with the broad church of realism have tended to analyse the post-Cold War in terms of changes in the structure of the international system, from loose bipolarity to diffuse multipolarity, and their potential impact for the international role of the major powers. In an early analysis, Huntington (1991) saw the post-Cold War security environment as characterised by changes in the distribution of power.[1] Famous for his alarmist *Clash of Civilizations* essay published in 1993, Huntington expected Japan to continue its rise as a global economic power with Germany becoming the pre-eminent European power. He also foresaw a general diffusion of economic and military capabilities in the 'Third World' that was to be coupled with the rise of locally dominant regional powers.[2] In a similar vein, Kenneth Waltz, the leading theorist of structural realism, has argued that the end of the Cold War would see the development of regional blocs organised around leading regional economic powers – Japan in East Asia, Germany in Europe, and the United States in North America – thus signalling an era of increased inter-regional competition.[3] Waltz also saw Japan and Germany likely "to replay roles in some ways similar to those they played earlier" in the next century, a controversial view with thus far remains unsubstantiated.[4]

Speculations on the global distribution of power bring us to a second element of realist outlooks, the expected resurgence of regional dynamics previously 'dampened' by the systemic constraints of the Cold War. For some this means the return to traditional patterns of confrontation unmitigated by the stabilising influence of superpowers. As discussed in the previous chapter, Barry Buzan's argues that multipolarity and the diffusion of power toward 'regional states' will herald in a shift towards 'indigenous' patterns of regional security.[5] For others, the decentralisation of international security will see the resurgence of regional subsystems and the drive toward more regional autonomy in international politics. Consider, for instance, Thomas Perry Thornton's views:

> The key to the broad development lies not [...] primarily in the organizational forms [i.e. regional organizations], which may be ephemeral, but in the dynamic that underlies them, a dynamic that must be conceptually understood as prior to the organizational form. That dynamic, in its broadest form, is the search for autonomy, that is, the exclusion of powers external to the region – generally the superpowers – from a management role in regional security and political matters. Such exclusion takes on particular meaning when one realises that loss of autonomy has in the past resulted – and could again result – in the merging of regional problems into the rivalries of the global system. When that happens, the Third World states are rarely long-term winners.[6]

Thornton highlights a key feature of the realist interpretation, a marked tendency to downplay the potential role of regional institutions and norms over state interests and regional configurations of power. In particular, prospects for effective regional conflict management are often represented as a function of a reordering of geopolitical interests of the major powers. Benjamin Miller's analysis essentially sums up the current neorealist 'common wisdom' on the role of the latter in managing regional conflicts:

> [...] systemic transformation, with the end of bipolarity and the disintegration of the USSR, could make the task of regional crisis management/war termination much more difficult than used to be under postwar bipolarity, especially in the former Second World, but potentially also in certain parts of the Third World. In general, the problem of crisis management will be especially acute in those regions from which the powers disengage. Disengagement is most likely, in turn, from those regions in which the powers (especially the US as the leading Great Power) do not seem to have vital interest in the post-Cold War era (Yugoslavia, the Caucasus and Somalia might be examples).[7]

Both of these views deserve critical inspection. Contrary to Thornton's claim that regional groupings will seek to exclude great powers from regional politics, however, most of the significant developments in major regional organisations (e.g. OAS, CSCE/OSCE, ASEAN-ARF, OAU) have, in fact, taken place with the support of major international powers. As for Miller's arguments, they are certainly fashionable, but they also fail to stand up to closer scrutiny. The United States and the UN did indeed beat a hasty retreat from Somalia in 1995. However there has been no comparable blanket disengagement from the United States and other leading international powers from places such as the Caucasus and Yugoslavia. In fact, there has been more international engagement in both regions than ever before, with a major NATO stabilisation force deployed in Bosnia (since 1995) and more international interest in the fractious Caucasus region than in any other period since the beginning of the 20th century.

While Miller's views seems fairly representative of mainstream realist views, other realist scholars have been particularly critical of the new 'institutionalism' of the early post-Cold War. Foremost amongst a small but influential group of hardcore realists, John Mearsheimer has argued that both policy makers and institutionalist scholars have placed undue expectations on multilateral institutions as agents of stability and international peace.[8] His central, and rather unqualified proposition is that "institutions have minimal influence on state behaviour and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world".[9] Therefore policies based on institutionalist theories – which he incorrectly describes as liberal internationalism, collective security and critical theory – are bound to fail since, in his opinion, they "do not accurately describe the world".[10] For Mearsheimer, the real determinant of

international politics remains anarchy (or the threat thereof) in the international system, not international institutions. And in this system states still enjoy a considerable freedom of action, including that of endangering the other units of the system or that of threatening the global status quo.

Mearsheimer's vision of the post-Cold War world is very much the stuff of realism à la Hobbes, Machiavelli and E.H. Carr. The international system remains constituted by states largely unrestrained by either international regimes or institutions; in an anarchical world American interests, and those of "vulnerable people around the globe" continue to be threatened by instability; extant international institutions remain too weak to play the role of international sheriff effectively (Mersheimer cites as examples the failures of the League of Nations and those of the EC and the UN in the former Yugoslavia). However, where Mearsheimer's analysis is at fault is in his selective use of examples that only support his views and his disregard of those that do not. Moreover, his inability to formulate any alternative visions as to how the international community could function without those institutions raises serious questions as to the validity of his assessment.[11] There is also a logical flaw in his argument; if international institutions are essentially the creatures of states – a proposition few would dispute – then governments surely bear a large part of the responsibility for their weaknesses. Indeed, as some commentators have noted, the 'institutional failures' Mearsheimer is so keen to illustrate have been more often than not the result of lack of cohesion amongst key international players or that of a fundamental reluctance on their part to get involved in complex or politically unpopular situations.[12]

This being said, Mearsheimer's views certainly represent a strong and persistent undercurrent in conservative American foreign policy thinking. International institutions, particularly international political institutions, are often regarded as hindering the fulfilment of the American national interest.[13] Thus, the UN is frequently viewed with suspicion if not outright contempt, and other institutions where American leadership is challenged or diluted are regularly criticised for their indecisiveness. Given prevailing American political attitudes towards multilateral institutions in general and the UN system in particular, opinions such as Mersheimer's will no doubt continue to be voiced and invoked. What is arguably more important, however, is the extent to such ideas will influence U.S. policy in the future.

If Mersheimer's concerns are very much in the tradition of 'big picture' realism, other scholars who straddle the line between realist approaches and more traditional liberal concerns have argued that a domestic level approach is necessary for the understanding of local and regional instability. In particular, they have strongly argued for the continued relevance of the 'Third World' as an analytical category for the analysis of national and regional security.[14] The emphasis of these analyses is not regional security per se. However, they hold that regional (in)stability is often the result of

domestic insecurity within Third World States. As Mohammed Ayoob argued, "fragile polities, by definition, are easily permeable. Therefore, internal issues in Third World societies [...] get transformed into inter-state issues quite readily".[15]

This interpretation has obvious implications for regional conflict management in what has fashionably come to be known as the 'zones of turmoil', that is, the zones most likely to be affected by conflict and instability.[16] Insecure regimes are less likely to seek assistance from regional organizations or encourage regional solutions to local problems because of fears of enhancing the position of regional rivals. For the same reasons, insecure regimes seek to avoid regional intervention into their affairs, even if such avoidance means seeking external alliances or making ad hoc compromises for the purpose of maintaining a regional balance of power.

Ayoob, a prominent proponent of 'Third Worldist' approaches to security studies, argues that Third World regimes are obsessed with state security. He posits that they are unable to effectively respond to the societal demands generated by the state-building process, a problem that is compounded by their lack of control over their international environment, or ability to insulate their state-making processes from international systemic pressures.[17] Third World states, therefore, are caught between the imperatives of state-making which are protected by those international norms supporting juridical statehood and state sovereignty, and the external pressures brought upon them by developing global social, economic and political norms (i.e. human rights, market liberalisation, democratisation, etc.), norms which, Ayoob asserts pessimistically, Third World states will be unable to meet for many decades to come.[18]

A subtler, perhaps more theoretically potent argument on the same theme was developed by Brian Job who posits that Third World states are confronted by an *insecurity dilemma* fundamentally different from the classical notion of *security dilemma* developed by Robert Jervis in the late 1970s.[19] It differs in that "there is no singular notion of national security and no dominant externally oriented security dilemma for the typical Third world country".[20] Under the 'insecurity dilemma', a metaphor by his own admission, he argues that threats to security originate from contending forces within Third World societies themselves, forces which are competing to advance their own security. The resulting competition has wholly negative effects since it results in 1) less effective security for all part of the population; 2) less effective capacity of centralised state institutions to provide services and order; and 3) increased vulnerability of the state and its people to influence, intervention and control by outside actors, be they other states, communal groups or multinational corporations.[21]

It is difficult to accept some of the generalisations on the Third World theme present in both Job's and Ayoob's analyses, not least because the 'Third World' as both a concept and political reality is rapidly losing its relevance in the post-Cold War era (as is the concept of 'neutral and non-aligned'). One notes here that the expression is now

seldom used in official circles, the Third World's status as a Cold War 'mega-region' having disappeared. Another observation relates to the argument presented in the preceding paragraphs. Job's *ad initio* acknowledgment that the insecurity dilemma metaphor does not describe all Third World states somewhat undermines the utility of his description of the 'typical' Third World state, and Ayoob's generic portrayal of the 'security predicament' of Third World states sometimes borders on caricature.[22] The fact is that at least some of the attributes Ayoob ascribes to Third World countries, notably an obsession with possible threats to internal security, were present in different forms in developed countries as well during some periods of the Cold War.

One contentious aspect of 'Third Worldist' approaches to security relates to their application at the regional or sub-regional level. The logical corollary of Job and Ayoob's description would be groups of insecure regimes mutually supporting each other's right to be left alone (at least in principle) in order to pursue state-building policies unimpeded by the threat of intervention from their neighbours or outside powers. One could make solid case for arguing that this was precisely the rationale for a number of OAS, OAU, Arab League and ASEAN norms adopted over the past decades. However, since the end of the Cold War there have been too many regional institutional and political developments to be able to sustain this line of argument further at a general level.[23] Indeed, regional norms and experiences now differ so widely that it seems increasingly inappropriate to group together large groups of underdeveloped or developing states as the 'Third World' according their modes of governance, their internal political situation or their level of socio-economic development.[24]

To sum up, the realist view is generally characterised by a perception that regional systems and regional dynamics are becoming more salient elements of international security. Strong regional powers may (re)emerge, and, in time, some of them may present a threat to the global status quo. Linked with this view the belief that regional configurations of power will be much more relevant to the management of regional conflict in the future and that major international powers will be less prone to intervene where their (diminished) strategic interests are not at stake.

There appears to be no consensus among realist scholars on the problem of disintegrating or inherently unstable states. They do recognise the problem and its symptoms. However, beyond notions of preventing instability from spilling over into larger areas, realism offers limited insights on how to deal with such problems. This is because the realist school essentially deals with states as the primary unit of international relations, not with ethnic minorities, religious groups or other sub-national and/or trans-national forces. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the formulation of concepts for understanding this issue and policies designed to deal with it has come mostly from the more liberal and militant side of the international relations field.[25]

The question of failed or weak states presents important challenges to realists arguments regarding the potential stabilising role of regional powers. In many recent cases of internal strife (e.g. Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia) the main players among neighbouring states have either proved unable to deal with the problem on their own or have directly or indirectly contributed to it. In such cases the realist hypothesis that regional powers can fill the power vacuum left by the strategic withdrawal of the superpowers appears to have little relevance.

Liberal Internationalist and Neoliberal Perspectives on Regional Conflict Management

Scholars and policymakers closer to the liberal tradition initially drew different conclusions than the ones discussed above. Essentially, they differed from realists in that they have tended to analyse post-Cold War changes more optimistically, not only at the global level but also at the regional level. A central feature of the liberal internationalist view – a view which was more prominent at the turn of the 90s decade than it is closer to the end of the century – has been the assumption that the end of the Cold War signalled the definitive demise of the major remaining ideological challenge to liberal democratic values.[26] As Peter Lawler notes, the liberal internationalist assumption of the increasing entrenchment of democratic principles and the belief in the "impending domestication of international relations" through the emergence of a more principled world order had profound implications.[27] First, it tended to reinforce the view that the international security environment would become more benign than during the Cold War. Second, it buttressed claims that international cooperation could now proceed forward without the ever present East-West divide frustrating the work of multilateral institutions.[28]

This interpretation gave rise to a wide range of security concepts in recent years, notably the idea of cooperative security. It is not the intention here to discuss this concept in elaborate detail. That has been done elsewhere.[29] Suffice to say here that the concept of cooperative security is characterised by a multi-dimensional understanding of security which emphasises multilateralism over bilateralism, inclusion over exclusion; and institutional as well as non-institutional solutions to security problems. Furthermore, cooperative security places a central value on creating 'habits of dialogue' on a multilateral basis as the preferred method through which to manage security issues.

The liberal vision has also been heavily influenced by the so-called democratic peace theory.[30] Democracies do not go to war with each other, or so the theory holds.[31] So strong is the belief of some authors in this proposition that some see it as perhaps the only demonstrable empirical law in the field of international relations.[32] From both theoretical and policy perspectives, promoting democracy and supporting

democratisation processes are increasingly presented as major contributions towards building and reinforcing peace, and, not surprisingly, a debate on the 'right to democratic governance' is now emerging in policy circles.[33] To be sure, international electoral observation and assistance missions have proliferated in recent years, and internationally supervised elections have become a fairly standard component of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. UN experiences in Namibia, Cambodia and Mozambique, and the more recent OSCE experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina have shown that elections can be carried through even under the most difficult circumstances.

Whether such exercises lead to effective democratic governance is open to debate, however.[34] As a societal practice, democratic governance cannot be created overnight, and neither can it be imposed from the outside through international assistance and supervision. International pressures or assistance may well be indispensable to give a boost to viable and responsible statehood. Ultimately, however, the responsibility for nurturing that process forward lies not with the UN or any other international body, but rather with governing elites, political movements and civil society within the countries themselves. Moreover, proponents of 'global democracy' often tend to forget that states undergoing a transition towards political liberalisation are often the object of important (and often deadly) internal turmoil.[35] The 1991 Algerian elections which would have given power to the fundamentalist *Front Islamique du Salut* is a case in point. After it became clear that the first round of legislative elections had delivered an outcome which the Western-backed *Front de Libération National* (FLN) government would not accept, Western calls for a more democratic Algeria suddenly evaporated. The tragic case of Burundi, with its political system polarised along ethnic lines, also provides an example of a democratic process astray, its latest relapse into sectarian warfare corresponding with its most recent (internationally supported) attempt at representative democracy (1993-1996).

Conflict and multilateralism in the post-Cold War

The liberal interpretation is certainly not univocal in content. Many currents traverse it, ranging from the classical liberal internationalist vision of a rules and institutions-based international order in which international organisations play a central role, to more state-centric neoliberal institutionalist approaches in which multilateralism plays a more instrumental role.[36] Robert Keohane, perhaps the leading theorist of the latter approach, is quick to point out that:

> [neoliberal] Institutionalists do not elevate international regimes to mythical positions of authority over states: on the contrary, such regimes are established by states to achieve their purposes. Facing dilemmas of coordination and

> collaboration under conditions of interdependence, governments demand international institutions to enable them to achieve their interests through limited collective action.[37]

This interpretation of international cooperation might appear to be a return to more state-centric thinking compared to earlier notions of complex interdependence and transnational relations put forth by Keohane and Nye in the 1970s.[38] However, Keohane posits that complex interdependence remains the operative principle of cooperation within the 'zone of peace', an area which corresponds roughly to the OECD area.[39] Within this zone, international regimes will continue to provide the favoured frameworks for the management of both interstate and transnational relationships. However, in the 'zones of conflict', which encompass large portions of Africa, the Middle East, the former Soviet Union and Asia, weak states and divided loyalties will continue to be the sources of local/regional instability and conflict; regional security will still be conditioned by the persistence of security dilemmas; and international regimes will not be as salient in the management of local or collective problems as they are in the zone of peace.[40] Moreover, Keohane's view links up with that of some realist scholars when he argues that powerful democratic countries will be reluctant to intervene for the purpose of reestablishing order in the zones of conflict, though they will "seek to prevent threats to their security from developing [and] threat control may replace both balance of power and collective security as the major principle of security".[41]

However conflicting the liberal and neoliberal approaches to international cooperation may be at times, they indubitably cohabit in practice at the UN and in all manner of more sectoral or limited institutions, regimes or mechanisms. For varying reasons, both approaches have strong constituencies in the international state system. In the field of international security they are representative of a cooperation rhetoric in which collective decision-making and collective action are privileged. Applied to the question of regional security proper, what flows from this outlook is a broad orthodoxy that emphasises the new or renewed possibilities for global-regional cooperation and accentuates the need for greater coordination between the UN and regional organisations.[42]

The project described above, especially in some of its more vigorous liberal internationalist forms, becomes somewhat problematic when one considers that the pursuit of power politics and hegemonic relationships is under carried out under the rubric of international cooperation. The somewhat ahistorical vision of an international system that can be transformed through the diffusion of liberal democratic values is also open to question. As Lawler argues, it is easy "to slide from observations about the development of institutionalism as both perspective and practice to presumptions about the convergence of national foreign policy outlooks towards a universal liberal means".[43]

In effect, there is an inherent tension between the idea of cooperation as development of interstate dialogue, and the promotion of Western liberal values (human rights, democratic governance, rule of law, etc.) which ultimately entail social and political change within states.

Whether the enmeshment of security problems in complex multilateral webs can effectively resolve major security problems, or even be an appropriate approach for the lesser task of crisis management, is highly questionable. One can certainly construct a potent argument to the effect that, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, the extraordinary multiplicity of decision-making fora inhibited rather than facilitated the development of a coherent external response to the conflict.[44] Yet at the same time, nowhere on the globe is the political environment so rich in institutions, regional norms and regimes as it is in Europe.

Two observations should be made here, the first relating to the relationship between regional politics on the one hand, and economic and security cooperation on the other, and the second relates to the ends and means of the new multilateralist agenda embraced by so many liberal internationalist scholars and policymakers. First, the 'habits of dialogue' idea present in so many discussions about cooperative security can be read at different levels. If the primary objective of developing a regional security dialogue is to increase confidence, reduce security dilemmas and develop some sort of collective understanding of the key security issues facing a given region, then promoting 'habits of dialogue' can play a useful role. At least two examples come to mind. The now defunct North Atlantic Cooperation Council created by NATO in 1991 (replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in early 1997) paved the way for a greater level of cooperation between NATO countries, Russia and Eastern and Central European countries in the early stages of post-Cold War Europe. Similarly, the recently created ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has played an important role in launching multilateral Asia-Pacific talks on a wide range of security-related issues. Another reading of the 'habits of dialogue' idea, however, is that this benign form of multilateralism reinforces if not enhances other aspects of regional cooperation. Here, the idea is considerably more ambitious and is the object of a long-standing controversy between liberals and realists who aver that the possibilities for cooperation in the security field are much more restricted than in the economic field because the costs of 'betrayal' and 'defection' can be much higher, and sometimes more immediate, than in the economic field.[45] Realists do not consider such cooperation to be impossible; after all, the EC and NATO joined together historic enemies. However, as Joseph Grieco puts it, cooperation is possible under anarchy, but it is "harder to achieve, more difficult to maintain, and more dependent on state power than is appreciated by the institutionalist tradition". [46]

The debate on the relationship between economic-security cooperation is more than likely to go on for some time. However, few analysts would disagree with the

proposition that regional cooperation in security matters remains heavily contingent upon the nature of state actors (e.g. liberal democratic regimes, ultra-nationalist or fundamentalist regimes) and on the compatibility of their regional interests. Likewise, few would dispute the view that such cooperation is, or can be heavily influenced by patterns of intra-regional and extra-regional relations.

It may be the case that in Latin America, for example, conditions are ripe for the logic of cooperation to take hold more firmly than in the past. The resolution of civil wars in Central America and the gradual entrenchment of democratic governance norms in Latin America have allowed the development of a greater sense of regional cohesion.[47] This has been both the effect and cause of the movement towards economic integration as well as some measure of regional cooperation in the political-security sphere.[48] By contrast deep political cleavages continue to inhibit the development of a sense of regional cohesion in South Asia and the Middle East. In Africa, where efforts to reinvigorate the OAU have been under way since the early 1990s, the process of continental cooperation is considerably hampered by numerous internal conflicts, long-standing bilateral animosities, weak levels of continental economic interaction, and by the lack of a common vision by key African governments. Regional cooperation is more important than is usually appreciated, but it is organised along sub-regional lines, often in an ad hoc manner. Finally, in Northeast Asia, the development of mechanisms that would enhance regional cooperation remain hampered by the lukewarm, if not hostile response of some key regional players to proposals for sub-regional organisation.[49] The least that can be said about chances of successfully implementing blueprints for economic-security cooperation is that such endeavours must confront widely different regional contexts, some of which are more propitious to cooperation than others.[50]

With respect to the second observation raised above, the answer of liberal internationalists is grounded in the belief that in the post-Cold War era the international community can muster both the collective will and the sufficient resources to prevent, manage and ultimately resolve conflict, including internal conflict. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that not only have they generally supported the conflict management framework proposed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace*, but they also sought to build upon it. Witness, for example the elaborate proposals put forth by former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans in his *Cooperating for Peace* (1993), influential reports on UN reform by the Commission on Global Governance (1995) and the Ford Foundation (1995), and innumerable books and journal articles.

This being said, the question of international mediation and intervention in civil wars remains extremely problematic. In recent years such conflicts have dominated the agenda of both the UN and a number of regional organisations, and great efforts have been made to develop better mechanisms to prevent, and where prevention fails, to

manage them, with some limited successes. However the claim that the way towards more effective management of such conflicts lies with more appropriate techniques and concepts elicits skepticism. Not that such concept are not needed. They have been important in fostering a better understanding of the different phases of conflict and of the functional capabilities needed to deal with them. However, absent political will and a clear sense that national interests are being furthered by intervention in faraway places, they are clearly insufficient on their own. Indeed, experiences in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have shown that externally-generated prescriptive solutions and formulas which appeal to rational logic can all too often run counter to the 'ground truth' and the chaos of sectarian or internal conflict.

Beyond the consensual gloss of UN documents and declarations on preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-building, what is much more significant from both the perspective of the intervening third-parties and the disputants is how those concepts and principles are played out in actual conflicts. Given the intrinsic idiosyncrasies of each specific situation, over-reliance on a conceptual 'recipe book' approach to conflict prevention and resolution could prove ineffectual, if not dangerous.

Perhaps a good example of the liberal internationalist vision of the role of regionalism was to be found in the well-publicised 1995 report of Commission on Global Governance, an internationalist manifesto reminiscent of the work of the Palme Commission published in 1982.[51] Though the Commission attempted to develop a multi-actor, multi-level project of global governance, its very title reveals its intrinsic bias for a global and UN-centred view of post-Cold War security in which the security of regions is part of a seamless web between the 'security of people' and 'the security of the planet'.[52] In its report, the Commission judged that the "end of the Cold War opened up new possibilities for the involvement of regional organisations in responding to local conflicts in conjunction with the UN" and optimistically assessed that the actions taken by a number of regional organisation in support of peace in Southeast Asia, Central America and the former Yugoslavia "pointed to a tremendous potential".[53] Its prescription for relieving the burden of UN in dealing with localised conflicts will sound familiar:

> One way to deal with certain conflicts could be to delegate the actual implementation of an operation to a regional organization or arrangement, but to maintain Security Council control over enforcement action and its over-all political leadership. This has already been done in some cases, but it could be developed further. Political authority must be maintained at the global level, to ensure international control over any given situation.[54]

However, the report also sounded the following warning:

> The relationship between the UN and regional organizations needs to be clarified in the light of recent experience. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia

> has led to a number of Security Council resolutions with explicit references to Chapter VIII and the active involvement of the EU, NATO, and the WEU. But there have been problems of co-ordination between the UN and regional organizations. Although some flexibility must be maintained, more structured mechanisms of co-operation are needed.[55]

If the last statement acknowledges that the project is not unproblematic, the actual project remains the same nevertheless: the necessity of more structured relations between regional organisations and the UN in order to lighten the burden of the world organisation.[56] Skeptics will not fail to note that at the time of the publication of this report (early 1995) all relevant UN political bodies had already debated these issues extensively and, one hastens to add, inconclusively. Perhaps even more difficult to understand, however, is the Commission's assessment of regional organisations showing 'tremendous potential' when a number of recent and admittedly extremely complex cases (e.g. Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, etc.) have, it seems, highlighted the major limitations of regional organisations rather than their advantages.

Many scholars associated with the international organisations research field have drawn far less optimistic conclusions than the Commission on Global Governance as regards the current potential of regional organisations.[57] Weiss and MacFarlane, for example, have concluded that "there is good reason to doubt the will and the capacity of regional organisations to perform well in the management of conflict within their areas", noting that the end of the Cold War had done little to change their views on the matter.[58] Other analysts have gone further in their assessments. Beyond problems of political will and capabilities yet another line of argument relates to the very nature of intergovernmental organisations and their ability to cope (or not) with fluid, rapidly developing situations such as civil wars. Consider Touval's viewpoint:

> Decentralizing mediation efforts by making greater use of regional organizations might ease the plight of the overburdened U.N. Security Council and Secretariat [...]. [Yet] such a course is unlikely to be an improvement. Most of the problems that hamper the United Nations also impede regional organizations. They, too, are hindered by complex decision-making procedures, the inability to effectively commit usually scant state resources, and hence insufficient flexibility and leverage. By their very nature as intergovernmental organizations, they are incapable of pursuing coherent, flexible, and dynamic negotiations guided by an effective strategy.[59]

Part of the solution, Touval asserts, lies in giving states more responsibility in the peacemaking process rather than to continue to 'dump' problems on cumbersome intergovernmental organisations (IGO's). Acting as mediators, capable states should be allocated conflicts in which they have a special interest as well as some leverage on disputants. Oversight and mandates for such 'allocated mediations' would be granted by

the UN Security Council, or, one assumes, other political bodies such as the OSCE or the OAU.

There are many problems with Touval's arguments. First, formally anointing states with the role of peacemaker would no doubt be perceived in some quarters as a reduction of the legitimate role of the UN and/or regional organizations, and it could arguably undermine their authority and credibility in the long run. Second, disputants might feel uneasiness or even hostility towards the allocated mediator state at different stages of the peacemaking process, a process contingent upon recognition of their role by the disputants in the first place. Finally, mediator states might seek particular outcomes conflicting with those of the disputants, raising questions about their impartiality and ultimate motives. For these reasons it is highly unlikely that Touval's proposal of allocated 'mediator states' can be adopted and implemented on a systematic basis.

This being said, his prognosis remains interesting in that he highlights deficiencies and problems with institutional approaches to conflict resolution that do exist and are tacitly recognised by the international community. Moreover, Touval indirectly points the finger towards two important trends in international/regional conflict management: ad hoc peacemaking efforts, and intervention-cum—peacemaking interventions by great powers. From a theoretical perspective, what is significant about these approaches is that they are consistent with a 'self-help' logic which can be seen as supporting either some form of 'benign realpolitik' or neoliberal institutionalist principles of collective action whose ultimate goal is the preservation of international peace and security. Moreover, in both cases this interested self-help logic effectively circumvents the traditional conception of regionalism as an effective basis for conflict prevention and management. Indeed, what is viewed to be much more determinant is the strength and/or influence of the coalition of interests behind preventive or peacemaking efforts, coalitions which may include regional as well as extra-regional players.

As evidenced by the above discussion, there is at present little unity within the liberal school as to ends and means of regional conflict management in the post-Cold War. Indeed, there is a divergence of views between those who see the post-Cold War order as characterised essentially by a liberal core and an unstable periphery, and those who hold that greater regional order and cooperation will come through strengthened regional and global processes (admittedly with many shades of grey in between). The first interpretation has won over many neoliberal as well as some realist scholars. However, it can be criticised for its rather reductionist approach to the 'periphery', a tired euphemism for casting aside the 'have nots' of the international system which reduces *a priori* the possibilities of regional cooperation. The second embodies some of the classical arguments of liberal internationalism, with its internal tensions between

core liberal values (i.e. self-determination, human rights, etc), on the one hand, and international cooperation, on the other hand. It leaves us with an inchoate theoretical picture in which ideals are often conflated with analysis, and interesting concepts with proven methods.

One particularly remarkable aspect of the liberal 'world view' (writ large) is the unease with which the question of regional identity is treated. Liberal values are widely portrayed as global values. This often translates into a 'what is good for us is good for you' attitude amongst liberal scholars and Western policymakers. Obviously, it would be difficult to argue that increased trade, closer interstate cooperation and higher compliance with good governance norms would not benefit the more impoverished regions of the world. The fundamental question for analysts, however, remains whether regional organizations can contribute usefully and effectively to security.

Some Perspectives from Conflict Research

Weiss and MacFarlane's doubts about the capacity of regional organisations in the post-Cold War raise a number of interesting questions, the first of which must be: what precisely is the record of such organisations in managing armed conflict? Part of the answer to this question is provided by the findings of conflict research, an eclectic field which covers a broad range of scholarship and whose roots are located in the behavioural tradition of the IR research field.[60] The basic assumption of conflict research field is that there are enough similarities between the different types of conflicts to warrant their worthwhile study as a class of human behaviour.[61] A logical policy-related corollary of the study of conflict is, of course, the study of international conflict management, a subject which has attracted the interests of scholars ever since the development of IR as a field of study and even more so over recent decades.[62]

Over the last 25 years a fairly large contingent of analysts have focussed their attention on the role of regional and international institutions as 'managers' of conflict. Perhaps best known amongst the early studies on this subject is Joseph Nye's 1971 *Peace in Parts* which was referred to in the previous chapter.[63] In this study Nye examined 45 violent conflicts that took place between 1958 and 1967, 20 of which were internal conflicts. He concluded that there was empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that macro-regional organisations (OAS, OAU, Arab League) had, in certain circumstances, contributed to controlling conflict within their respective membership. They had done so either by 1) helping to isolate the conflict; 2) by helping to end the fighting; 3) by helping to abate the conflict, or 4) by helping to settle the conflict.[64] They had been most successful in helping to isolate conflicts and contributing to the abatement of fighting, and least successful in stopping fighting and in settling conflicts. Nye also concluded that their capacity to manage conflict had been inversely

proportional to the intensity of conflict, underlining the demonstrable fact that the UN had consistently dealt with the hardest, most 'intense' cases.[65] Moreover, he noted that regional organisations had been completely unsuccessful in dealing with cases of primarily internal conflict, yet presciently remarked they would probably become the most important type of conflict in the future.[66]

In a study published in 1979, Mark Zacher examined the performance of the UN and the three macro-regional organisations (OAS, OAU, Arab League) in managing interstate conflict during the 1946-1977 timeframe.[67] One of Zacher's central hypotheses in this study was that the likelihood of organisational intervention and success in conflict [management] is significantly determined by the nature of the coalition configuration prevailing in the system in which a given conflict occurs.[68] The conclusions of his study were more elaborate than Nye's and, given the previously stated hypothesis, also emphasised more fully the 'alignment' variable (i.e. pro-western, pro-socialist, neutral or non-aligned). However, Zacher's conclusions were also limited in that he did not examine institutional involvement in intrastate conflict on the grounds that they were not formally mandated to deal such types of conflict. Moreover his definition of institutional success, defined as compliance with an organisational resolution, gave a rather imprecise account of the result of institutional action on the conflicts studied.[69]

Keeping these limitations in mind, Zacher's conclusions did not substantially depart from Nye's with respect to the performance of both the UN and regional organisations. He found empirical evidence supporting the view that in some cases institutions had been 'successful' in managing conflict, although only in a meagre combined score of 18% of all 116 cases analysed. Moreover, there was institutional involvement, both from the UN and regional organisations, in only 35% of the total number (116) of conflicts examined.[70] The performance of the OAS was far above that of the Arab League and the OAU, whereas the UN had been the least successful institution. In noting that regional organisations had been confined largely to managing conflict in which there was a challenge to a consensual norm Zacher made a point that is still extremely relevant today.[71]

Ernst Haas also made substantial contributions to research on the issue. The findings of his 1971 study on regionalism and conflict management. were already noted in the previous chapter.[72] He published two other studies, in 1986 and in 1993, that are elaborate and deserve first-hand reading if justice is to be done to them.[73]. Their respective conclusions are summarised below.

In his 1986 study Haas analysed the performance of the UN and macro-regional organisations in managing 319 interstate 'disputes' during the 1945-1985 timeframe.[74] Organisational involvement in intra-state conflict was not examined. Success and failure were determined by the ability of institutions to either 1) stop hostilities; 2) settle

disputes; 3) isolate disputes, or 4) abate disputes that were formally referred to one, or in some cases, two of the institutions examined.

Haas found that neither the UN nor regional organisations had been successful in stopping ongoing hostilities with any consistency since the 1960s and that their record in settling disputes had "almost always been dismal".[75] Furthermore, he found that while there had been a general decline in institutional effectiveness in managing conflict over the years, regional organisations had shown less decline in effectiveness than the UN. However, he demonstrated that they generally proved ineffective in managing serious disputes, (i.e. disputes that involved fighting and military operations) if only for the simple reason that such disputes were usually referred to the UN.[76] On a more positive note, Haas found that regional organisations had been somewhat more successful in isolating and in abating disputes, in certain cases even more so than the UN.[77] These conclusions are consistent with Nye's own 1971 findings and suggest at long term trend.

Amongst many of Haas' conclusions in this study, two stand out as being particularly important. Firstly, although he found that the UN usually ended up with the 'harder', most intense cases, he concluded that there had been no global division of labour between the UN and regional organisations during the 1945-1985 timeframe. The reason: after 1965 the profiles of disputes referred to the UN and regional organisations did not differ systematically. In effect, both levels competed for the same tasks.[78] Secondly, he also concluded that poor institutionalisation of conflict management functions within the UN was not the main 'problem'. For Haas, the real issue was that the UN "is and always has been viewed by its members as an instrument of national foreign policy".[79] Therefore, adaptive success – the UN's institutional capacity to 'adapt' to emerging issues or changing situations – was essentially determined not by the development of new mechanisms, procedures or bureaucracies, but by the "salience of the UN to the advancement of whatever national interests are funnelled into the organisation".[80] The same logic no doubt applies to regional organisations as well; presenting a powerful counterpoise to the view that institutional development can in and of itself provide the answer to more effective regional conflict management.

Haas' 1993 study was essentially an update of his 1986 findings. He examined 43 disputes that took place during the 1986-1990 timeframe. This period corresponds with the advent of *Glasnost* in the Soviet Union, the historic thaw in Soviet-American relations, and Javier Pérez de Cuéllar's successful second term at the helm of the UN. His objective was to ascertain whether there was empirical evidence to suggest a new era was emerging in terms of the collective management of international conflict. Not surprisingly, he found evidence that the UN was reversing the downward trend in 'authority' and 'relevance' that had plagued the organisation since the early 1960s.[81] However, the overall role of regional organisations declined during this period.

Essentially, they were largely overshadowed by UN activities in situations where they were called upon to manage conflict jointly.[82] After examining what he called the 'spotty fortunes' of regional peacekeeping throughout the late-1980s and early 1990s, Haas opined that "the main justification for seeking better regional conflict management – escape from global meta-issues and big power hegemony – are no longer valid", and therefore did not share the hopes that a revival of regionalism was either possible or desirable.[83] Wrote Haas: "any conceivable future for the familiar regional organisations in local conflict management rests on the abstinence of powerful nations from regional military intervention [including interventions under UN mandates]".[84]

A number of important conclusions can be drawn from the studies discussed above. Firstly, some observations concerning their past performance.

- Generally speaking, regional organisations did not prove to be effective managers of armed conflict during the Cold War, not only in cases of interstate conflict but particularly so as managers of internal conflict. However, their overall 'success' score was not significantly lower than that of the UN, which was also low. Some regional organisations (e.g. the OAS before the 1960s), however, on occasion fared better than the UN itself.

- During the Cold War period (pre-1984) regional organisations generally dealt with conflicts that were of lower intensity than those taken up by the UN. More serious disputes were consistently taken up by the UN, often (but not always) at the initiative of the members of the Security Council. This suggests that the Great Powers had a limited faith in the ability of regional organisations to deal with serious regional disputes, particularly if they threatened international security or their own geopolitical interests. Moreover, with very few exceptions, the UN, rather than regional organisations, provided the necessary legitimacy and the institutional machinery for international peacekeeping forces.

- In term of outcomes, the record of regional organisations indicates that their actions have been more successful in isolating disputes or abating fighting than stopping hostilities or resolving disputes. The fact remains that none of the major regional conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s were resolved through regional or sub-regional organisations. The legalistic pacific settlement of disputes mechanisms enshrined in their respective charters were seldom used to full effect, particularly when regional conflicts were fuelled by superpower competition in their area. Historically, regional organisations were used principally to restrain disputants, avoid the spread of conflict, or try to ensure compliance with regional norms such non-interference in internal affairs and respect for territorial integrity.

- Beyond the fact that between 1945 and 1984 more high intensity disputes went to the UN than to regional organisations, there is little evidence to support the view that a clear division of labour between the two levels existed during this period. Between 1984 and 1990, the pattern of referrals is more muddled, and regional organisations remained largely ineffective. The conclusion that emerges from these observations is that, from a historical perspective, Chapter VIII of

> the UN Charter was never used in any consistent manner as a guide for regional dispute settlement.[85]

Some observations about the criterion for determining institutional success are also in order. Both Nye and Haas judged institutional success in terms of the ability of organisations to abate conflict, isolate conflict, stop hostilities or settle conflict.[86] All of these relate to the effect of institutional intervention *after* a dispute or a crisis has erupted. By contrast, in current liberal internationalist thinking about conflict management the bar has been set higher. Not only should success be determined by the capacity of global/regional institutions to do all of the above, but also by their ability to *prevent* both interstate and internal conflict and restore intra-state harmony (post-conflict peace-building), often after long and destructive wars.[87] As the experience of recent years as demonstrated, this places a extraordinarily heavy burden on the shoulders of both international and regional organisations

Continuity or Discontinuity?
Regionalism and Conflict Management in the post-Cold War

Does regionalism hold any promise for the possibility of more effective regional conflict management? The author submits six propositions on the issue, followed by a few comments on the wider explanations for the current trends.

The regionalisation of security politics: Institutional consequences

The first proposition is that the end of the Cold War has given way to an unprecedented of level of regional institution-building. With the seismic international changes of the turn of this decade the 'contextual' background of international regionalism has changed considerably. The depolarisation of international cooperation patterns and the lifting of superpower overlay over entire regions has removed some of the external obstacles to more effective regional organisation. In turn this has generated a gradual movement towards the regionalisation of security politics which will become increasingly salient in years to come.

In many – though not all – regions, political space has been created for regional discussions on peace and security issues where this was hitherto impossible. In terms of institutional development the results have been quite significant. Witness the institutional development of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Europe; the revival of the OAS in Latin America; changes in the OAU structure; and the emergence of an institutionalised security dialogue in Southeast Asia in the form of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Similarly, the Atlantic Alliance, which not so long ago was considered by many to be a relic of the Cold War, has made

great strides in trying to move from a collective defence rationale towards a common security orientation.

Institutions remain only one part of the equation

In spite of all the institution building of recent years, the fact remains that the capabilities or regional organisations vary widely across the spectrum of conflict prevention, management and resolution functions. These differences in capabilities and track record have been recognised by scholars and policymakers for decades. The obverse proposition is perhaps more interesting to examine from an analytical perspective; different conflict prevention, management and resolution functions place different demands upon regional systems and regional organisations.

In those regional systems demonstrating a high or an increasing degree of interstate cooperation (e.g., Europe, North America, Latin America) there seems to be a developing consensus around certain functions to be exercised collectively, functions such as trying to prevent conflict, strengthening democracy and civil society or increasing regional confidence. This is demonstrated by the evolving mandates of a number of institutions, such as the OSCE and the OAS. The transatlantic community, however, still demonstrates a higher level of commitment to collective problem-solving than any other region. By contrast, in those regional systems dominated by division if not confrontation (e.g., Middle East, South Asia) even the least demanding collective conflict management functions, building regional confidence for example, remain extremely problematic. Existing regional arrangements are either too weak to play a useful role or the level of regional mistrust so high that existing regional dispute-settlement mechanisms remain under-utilised by their own membership.

As argued above, there is a direct link between the level of regional cohesion and the capacity of regional arrangements to exercise progressively demanding conflict management functions. However, this relationship cannot be regarded as a straightforward principle applicable in all circumstances. Solidarity within a political community is often fragile, even amongst more cohesive regional groupings. Moreover, the regionalist principle does not necessarily restrain states from pursuing foreign policy interests unilaterally. For instance, the 1991 German decision to recognise Slovenia and Croatia dealt a fatal blow to EC peace efforts in Yugoslavia in 1991-1992. In 1994, the United States finally bypassed the OAS and sought a UN mandate to intervene military in Haiti. And Indonesia's 1995 bilateral security treaty with Australia indicated to its Southeast Asian partner's that its pivotal position within ASEAN did not necessarily prevent it from pursuing its own security interests outside the organisation's framework.

Managing internal conflict: A major challenge for regional organisations

As pointed out in the introduction of this chapter, internal conflict is the most prevalent form of violent conflict today. Yet, as inter-governmental organisations based on state-state relations, most regional organisations are ill-equipped to deal with internal conflict. The reasons for this are well known. First, in spite of some evolution in UN practice in recent years, intervention in the domestic affairs of states often remains a regional taboo, particularly for those regional bodies primarily composed of weak states and insecure regimes. Second, many regional organisations still lack a formal mandate and accompanying framework to deal with intrastate conflict. Thirdly, many of them cannot bring any significant political, economic or military pressure to bear and can launch little more than small 'preventive diplomacy' missions or low-key peacemaking efforts.[88] These limitations do not *a fortiori* preclude occasional accomplishments. Overall, however, the recent performance of regional organisation in civil wars leaves much to be desired, most particularly in those cases where intense fighting or protracted ethno-political violence is taking place.

Where regional approaches might perhaps stand a better chance of addressing internal instability in the future is with respect to domestic crises that are primarily constitutional in nature which jeopardise regional norms, especially norms concerning governance. Such efforts, however, require a strong political consensus around certain norms and standards as well as a consensus on the collective instruments necessary to apply them. However, those conditions are brought together in only very few regional institutions.

New inter-American norms upholding the primacy of democratic governance in the Americas provide an example of what can be done through this approach. Following the coup which deposed the Aristide government in Haiti, in September 1991, the OAS imposed sanctions on the new junta for having breached the so-called Santiago Commitment to Democracy which is had just adopted in June 1991.[89] Although UN involvement, and American intervention later became necessary to remove the Haitian junta, the Santiago Commitment proved to be a significant instrument in the OAS arsenal, allowing it to take political action on internal issues which were previously considered outside the purview of its Charter. Since the Haitian coup, the OAS has taken similar action to uphold democratic principles (with more or less success) in a number of Latin American countries.

Managing inter-state conflicts: The limits of regional collective security

In those regions where cooperative forms of interstate relationships are weak, the ability of relevant regional organisations to deal collectively with interstate conflict remains weak. The failure of the Arab League to present a united front against Iraqi during the Gulf War is a case in point.[90] Similarly, continued Indo-Pakistani rivalry inhibits the use of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as a vehicle for

regional collective security. Conversely, in those regions in which cooperative forms of interstate relationships are strong or strengthening, regional organisations often carry more moral and political weight and are regarded as essential vehicles for collective action.

By and large, however, the lack of effective military instruments of regional organization poses real limits to their ability to perform peacekeeping or peace support missions, let alone collective security tasks. Proposals to develop such capabilities within established regional structures have proven to be controversial in recent years, not only because they would represent an important departure from tradition, but perhaps more importantly because they would also require a strong consensus amongst states that have historically had a limited political capital to invest in regional organisations.

There is nevertheless one trend that should not go unmentioned. Since the early 1990s a number of state coalitions have been forming sub-regional or multinational peacekeeping forces outside existing regional structures. In 1994-1995, for example, the three Baltic States formed the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion to be eventually used by the UN. In Central Asia, West Africa and Southern Africa, other coalitions have launched similar endeavours. Are these significant developments? This question will be discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6.

UN-Regional organisations cooperation: Essential but difficult

Despite numerous recent examples of UN-regional organisation cooperation only limited progress has been made on the important division of labour issue. As will be seen in the next chapter, both states and regional organisations are reluctant to adopt formal mechanisms of coordination that would go beyond the broad principles of the UN Charter concerning the role of regional arrangements.[91] Given the wide range of regional responses to the UN's own efforts in this respect, it is difficult to put forward one all-encompassing reason why this has been the case. Two factors stand out, however. First, states are wary of losing flexibility through formal mechanisms of coordination, and for the same reason they want the regional organisations to which they belong to retain autonomy vis-à-vis the UN. Second, there is considerable scepticism amongst governments as to the desirability and practicability of a clear-cut division of labour between the UN and regional organisations. Recent experiences, notably in Bosnia (UN-NATO) and Central America (UN-OAS), have shown that coordinating joint institutional action can be both a difficult process and a major source of friction between the UN and some its member states.

The rise of 'contact group' politics

Given the perceived inflexibility and uncertainty of outcome of institutional approaches to conflict prevention, management and resolution, ad hoc approaches and contact group politics are bound to proliferate. In recent years states have been increasingly resorting to non-institutional mechanisms for dealing with conflict, a development which historians of international relations might very well see as a return to old style diplomacy if not to concert-style arrangements. Whether in Central America with the Contadora Group, in Cambodia with the Indonesian JIM talks and the subsequent Australian-French-American diplomatic waltz, or in Bosnia with the Contact Group and the subsequent US-sponsored Dayton peace plan, adhockery has yielded some major peacemaking successes.[92] These approaches offer a number of advantages. They can provide states interested in peacemaking with a framework for coordination when institutional approaches are insufficient, ineffective or deadlocked. They place a premium on flexibility and timeliness rather than confining problems to (often) unwieldy institutional structures. Moreover, they are often non-committal, thus allowing mediating parties to 'save face' should their effort fail to reach a solution.

There are, however, limitations and drawbacks to such peacemaking approaches. Without some form of acknowledgment by the UN or relevant regional organisations, ad hoc peacemaking can suffer from a lack of legitimacy. Moreover, it raises the possibility that regional or even major powers will use 'ad hoc' peacemaking to further their own foreign policy objectives, resulting in the possible (re)assertion of zones of influence. It is fairly clear, for instance, that UN observer missions in Liberia (UNOMIL) and Georgia (UNOMIG) were designed not only to assist local peacemaking efforts, but also to provide some modicum of international oversight over the activities of Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces and Russian peacekeeping troops.

Another limitation to ad hoc approaches is also that while they have played an important process role in a number of recent conflicts, the fact remains that the burden of implementing major peace agreements still rests on the shoulders of extant international or regional institutions. Thus the Cambodian peace was negotiated outside UN structures but its implementation handed over to the UN. Similarly, the Dayton Peace process was piloted by the United States, and then handed over to NATO, the OSCE and other agencies for implementation under a multilateral political authority, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). Should ad hoc approaches go forward without the imprimatur, formal or otherwise, of relevant international institutions, its seems unlikely that key international players will want to support them fully, and that support may be precisely what is needed to carry the efforts forward.

Possible explanations for regional variations

It is obvious by the above propositions that there have been considerable variations in regional 'performance'. Beyond the differences in structures and capabilities between extant regional bodies, a likely initial explanation for variations may be found via the examination of the practice of multilateralism in regional contexts. More precisely, some analysts have argued that the particular characteristics of regional systems are central determinants of the extant forms of regional conflict management.[93] In ascending degree of 'cooperativeness', the latter range from balance of power, concerts, collective defence, collective security, security community, and integration. As Job argues, these forms of multilateral arrangements (some are institutionalised, some are not) can be arrayed over two dimensions: commitment (deep or shallow) and scope of membership (narrow or broad).[94] For example the OSCE has a 'broad' membership (53 states), but the institution entails fairly 'shallow' commitments on the part of its member states. By contrast the ANZUS Treaty has a narrower membership, but it entails deeper commitments on the part of its members, particularly in terms of collective defence.

The analytical approach presented above also posits that different forms of conflict management structures may evolve through incremental and cognitive transitions.[95] This is reflected by the recent enlargement of mandates/functions within certain regional organisations (e.g. OSCE, ASEAN/ARF, etc.) and also by the simultaneous existence of different forms of conflict management within given regional contexts (e.g. NATO and OSCE)

Analytically, Job's approach is useful in differentiating regions across various forms of collective conflict management. By placing the focus on regional contexts (and the differences between them) without denying the possibility of external influence from external actors, it constitutes a major step forward in trying to come to grips with the structure of regional security in the post-Cold War.

A second plausible explanations of the variance in effectiveness of different regional orgnanisations derives from Ernst Haas' *When Knowledge is Power* (1990), his groundbreaking analysis of inter-governmental institutions (IGO's) as learning organisations.[96] In it, Haas presented some important insights into how IGO's can either adapt to contextual changes in their environments or learn from them. Learning organisations make better institutions, Haas argues. Adapting institutions, on the other hand, are usually the victims of contextual evolution; reactive rather than proactive towards their environment. Is it not possible to think of the early post-Cold War period as a period when regional organisations, confronted by the challenge of relevance, are undergoing a process of learning and adaptation (and perhaps regression in some cases) that may last for some time?

I have alluded earlier in the text to Sadia Touval's rather negative assessment of IGO's as managers of conflict. Touval's arguments indirectly join Haas' in highlighting the conservatism with which major international institutions manage change within their

structures and decision-making procedures. At the same time, however, an examination of the major regional organisations must acknowledge that institutional change has been managed in quite different ways since the end of the Cold War. The rapid evolution of the OSCE, for example, created new possibilities for conflict avoidance and conflict prevention, including intra-state conflict prevention, which were difficult to contemplate just a few years ago. This contrasts with the Arab League, an institution which has shown very little sign of institutional adaptation since the end the Cold War.[97]

Finally, a third possible explanation for variance involves applying Starr and Most's idea of 'opportunity' and 'willingness' to regional conflicts.[98] Opportunity is a variable referring to the system/environment, and willingness relates to decision-making/process variables. Changes in global 'opportunity' have undoubtedly removed some obstacles to regional cooperation. However, without corresponding 'willingness' on the part of regional states to respond to the opportunity, such changes do not necessarily translate into more regional cohesion or effective collective action on security issues. The same logic applies in regional contexts as well. Changes in regional 'opportunity', for example, the enlargement or deepening of security functions within a regional body as a result of consensus on a new conflict management function, does not *ipso facto* translate into effective regional action in a given local dispute.

The foregoing remarks suggest that institutional evolution should not be considered as the pivotal benchmark in evaluating the role of regional organisations. Rather, assessments of what makes them effective in preventing, managing and resolving localised regional conflicts should be measured against a demonstrated ability to alter the position of belligerents parties or disputing states so that a positive or at least a less negative outcome emerges. Viewed in this light, it is clear, for example, that the OSCE Assistance Mission in Chechnya (sent in early 1995) cannot be considered successful since it neither restrained the belligerents nor provided an effective peacemaking vehicle for the settlement of the conflict. The same can be said about the MIOB, the OAU observer mission in Burundi (sent in early 1994), which went in country with so few observers and under such a vague mandate that all it could realistically accomplish was to report on incidents back to OAU headquarters.[99]

These explanations should be seen as complementary. Each one could be developed further and used to explain one aspect of regional security or conflict management at the regional level. Put together, however, they present a rather untidy picture lacking any elegant theoretical line of argument. Like any complex reality, however, a proper understanding of regionalism and conflict management can only be achieved by drawing on and integrating a range of plausible explanations. The issue is, and will continue to be informed by an understanding of domestic, regional as well as global politics. These levels interact differently across time and space, and, therefore, attempts to provide explanations of regional conflict management solely through the

examination of one level (e.g. the institutional level, the system level, etc.) can only yield partial answers.

Concluding Remarks

It has become somewhat of a cliché to state that the end of the Cold War has compelled us to take a look at regional issues like never before. Despite what can only be described as a general lack of consensus in the IR field on the prospects for increased regional peace and stability in the post-Cold War era, most interpretations actually start from the same premise. Not only is it recognised that the dimensions of conflict are increasingly shifting downward towards the regional and the local, but it is also recognised that states are increasingly resorting to regional mechanisms and strategies to try to deal with them. However, a fundamental question remains: to what extent will regional security and regional conflicts be amenable to management through strictly regional solutions?

Thus far, the record does not support the hypothesis that in the post-Cold War finding regional solutions to regional conflicts will be any less difficult than during the Cold War. Beyond that statement, it is difficult to make generalisations that apply to all conflict situations. Indeed, as argued in this chapter, the management of regional conflict cannot be easily reduced to one single explanation based on realist or liberal assumptions of the dynamics of international relations. A variety of factors need to be taken into account: the nature of the conflict or dispute in question, the nature of international, regional and domestic interests at stake, the presence or absence of effective regional institutions, the nature of collective tasks to be performed, and so on. Most of these issues raise the question of collective action across different regional contexts. To a large extent, these different contexts determine whether regional collective action can be both possible and effective on a given issues.[100]

The overall assessment that regionalism does not at present, or for the short to mid-term, constitute a reliable basis for solving regional conflict carries important consequences for the elaboration of a post-Cold War cooperative security order, some of which are already being felt. After a period of optimism lasting until 1993-1994, ideas of a revamped hierarchical structure of international security based on the UN and regional organisations have been shelved once again and there has been somewhat of a rediscovery of the virtues of traditional state diplomacy in the conflict prevention and peacemaking process, albeit often in the form of ad hoc groups and coalitions.

Some analysts have argued that a global system of cooperative security designed to reduce regional conflict will only function under some form of Russian-American concert, or at least by the incorporation of Russia into the 'concert of global states'.[101] This is a disputable view. Though Russia has successfully lobbied for a seat in the G7

alongside the leading economic powers, Russian foreign policy has been conspicuously absent from major peacemaking ventures outside the CIS, the former Yugoslavia or Iraq. Moreover, both its past record in the developing world and its current inability to exert international economic leverage due to its disastrous economic situation make it an unlikely international peacemaker for the foreseeable future.

Second, given that institutions can at present provide only a limited answer to the pressing demands of conflict management, there is something of a learning cycle taking place amongst the actors involved in managing regional security. Both big and small states are rediscovering the value of concerted diplomatic action both outside and within intergovernmental institutions. For smaller states, this often involves the development of closer mechanisms of coordination either for the promotion of local interests (e.g., the Baltic states, Central Asia) or as compensatory/complementary mechanisms to weak regional institutions. The latter are most evident in Africa with ECOWAS, IGADD, SADC and the East African coalition that tried to restore some measure of stability to Central Africa.

Finally, the regionalisation of security politics, combined with the very serious problems encountered by global and regional organisations in handling regional conflict, has led to a third important development. Western countries are actively promoting a much greater degree of regional responsibility in handling regional conflict, to the point of extending substantial diplomatic and/or financial support for the development of regional mechanisms of conflict prevention, management and resolution (both institutional and non-institutional). Again, this is most obvious in Africa where the United States and European countries are lining up to help the OAU and a number of African states to improve their capacity to contribute to collective conflict management efforts. It is also evident in Southeast Asia where the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) could not have been created without Western support. Whether out of consideration for greater international order, such as lightening the burden on the UN, or motivated by more self-interested reasons, such as supporting greater regional effectiveness as a substitute for Western intervention, this appears to be an underlying and long-term trend.

In the fluid and amorphous environment described above, values often clash with interests, and multilateral processes with national objectives. The fundamental question will not be whether the UN or a regional organisation should intervene, but rather which form of multilateral or national action is best placed to perform a certain function at a given moment in the development of a dispute or conflict. Regional organisations and the UN will rarely have vertical 'ownership' of a conflict management process. A multiplicity of institutions and coalitions will often have to work together at different stages of a conflict, making the issue of coordination – coordination between

institutions and coordination between coalitions and institutions – an increasingly critical aspect of regional conflict management for years to come.

Notes

1 Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests", *Survival*, vol. 33, no. 1, January/February 1991, pp. 5-6.

2 Ibid. For Huntington's essay on 'civilizational' conflict see "The Clash of Civilizations", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.

3 Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1995, pp. 49-59 and pp. 60-61

4 Ibid., p. 61.

5 Buzan, *People, States & Fear*, p. 208. Buzan is misquoted by Fawcett (1995) on this very point. Fawcett argues that Buzan expects regional arrangements to assume greater importance in the international system. However, a careful reading of Buzan's chapter on regional security in *People, States & Fear* reveals that Buzan discusses about regional *systems*, not about regional *arrangements*. He is, if anything, rather dismissive of the latter. See Louise Fawcett, "Regionalism in Historical Perspective", in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), *Regionalism and World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 20.

6 Thomas Perry Thornton, "Regional Organizations in Conflict Management" in I. William Zartman (ed.), *Resolving Regional Conflicts: International Perspectives* issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 518, November 1991, p. 134.

7 Benjamin Miller, "International Systems and Regional Security: From Competition to Cooperation, Prominence or Disengagement?", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 18, no. 2, June 1995, p. 86.

8 John Mersheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", in Michael E. Brown and Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (eds.), *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security*, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1995, pp. 332-376.

9 Ibid., p. 334.

10 Ibid., p. 334 and p. 376.

11 Indeed, following the publication of "The False Promise of International Institutions" in *International Security* (Winter 94/95), Mersheimer was taken to task by several scholars in subsequent issues of this journal.

12 See, for example, Stanley Hoffmann, "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism", *Foreign Policy*, no. 98, Spring 1995, p. 172.

13 See, among others, Jeremy D. Rosner, "The Know-Nothings Know Something", *Foreign Policy*, no. 101, Winter 1995-1996, pp. 116-129.

14 For recent writings on the subjects see Brian L. Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma – National Security of Third World States*, Boulder Co., Lynne Rienner, 1992; Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, Boulder Co., Lynne Rienner, 1995.

15 Mohammed Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World" in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), *Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies from Southeast Asia and the Middle East*, Boulder Co, Westview Press, 1986, p. 14.

16 See Max Singer and Aaron Widasky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil*, Chatham N.J., Chatham House, 1993.

17 Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Predicament of the Third World State", in Job (ed.),*The Insecurity Dilemma – National Security of Third World States*, pp. 65-66.

18 Ibid., p. 78.

19 See Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", *World Politics*, no. 30, January 1978, pp. 167-214.

20 Brian Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National Regime and State Securities in the Third World", in Job (ed.),*The Insecurity Dilemma – National Security of Third World States*, p. 18.

21 Ibid.

22 In later writings on regional security, Job (1994, 1996) seems to have put aside the Third World theme in favor of a variation of the regional security complex approach, thus acknowledging more fully the substantial differences in regional dynamics and types of states within regional security complexes.

[23] It should be pointed out that there does not seem to be a clear consensus amongst 'Third Worldist' security analysts as the consequences of end of the Cold War on regional conflict management. Acharya, for example, argues that "the end of superpower rivalry creates favorable conditions for a more "adaptive role by Third World states in the making of a new international security order", which makes them more likely to participate in "common or collective frameworks". See Amitav Acharya, *Third World Conflicts and International Order After the Cold War*, Working Paper No. 134, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1993, p. 28.

[24] This conclusion is supported by Lake and Morgan (1996) who write: "[...] to understand security affairs in the contemporary world requires a nuanced and variegated approach, one that takes regional differences specifically into account". David A. Lake and Patrick Morgan (eds.), *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, Pittsburg, University of Pennsylvania Press (forthcoming), p. 674 of book draft. I am grateful to David Lake for providing a copy of this book while it was still in draft form.

[25] Though it should be acknowledged that realist scholars are increasingly interested in the issue of internal/ethnic conflict. See, among other, Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", in Michael Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J., 1993; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict", *International Security*, vol. 21, no. 2, Fall 1996, pp. 41-75.

[26] Fukuyama's 1989 controversial thesis on the 'end of history' is often credited for launching this debate. See Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History", *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18; and Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man*, London, Penguin Books, 1992.

[27] Peter Lawler, "Constituting the 'Good State' ", in Paul James (ed.), *Critical Politics: From the Personal to the Global*, Melbourne, Arena Publications, 1994, p. 158.

[28] These assumptions have also produced interpretations that are at least as doctrinaire as those of the most unabashed of realists. Witness this sentence by David Long in his liberal internationalist critique of neoliberalism: "The changes after the Cold War appear to bode well for liberalism, notwithstanding the warning signals of the collapse into barbarism in Bosnia, ethnic strife increasing worlwide, and the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons, materials, or expertise". David Long, "The Harvard School of Liberal International Theory: A Case for Closure", *Millenium*, vol. 24 , no. 3, Winter 1995, p. 504.

[29] For a range of views on the subject see David Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security", *The Pacific Review*, vol. 7, no. 1, 1994, pp. 1-16; Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond*, Sydney, Allen&Unwin, 1993; Stephanie Lawson (ed.), *The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond*, Sydney, Allen&Unwin, 1995; Andrew Mack, *Concepts of Security in the Post-Cold War*, Working Paper 1993/8, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1993; Jane Nolan (ed.), *Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century*, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1994; I. William Zartman and Victor A. Kremenyuk (eds.), *Cooperative Security: Reducing Third World Wars*, Syracuse N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1995.

[30] For a review of the theory see Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J., 1993.

[31] The liberal peace theory has been heavily critised in academic circles, not least because it makes ahistorical generalisations and downplays the belligerence of democracies towards authoritarian regimes. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 1, no. 4, December 1994, 491-517; Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace", in Brown, Lynn-Jones & Miller (eds.), *The Perils of Anarchy*, pp. 287-331.

[32] Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence", in Philip E. Tetlock et al. (eds.), *Behaviour, Society, and Nuclear War*, Vol. 1, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 270.

[33] See, for instance, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, *Democracy Forum – Report of the "Democracy Forum" in Stockholm*, June 12-14, 1996, Stockholm, 1996, pp. 23-32.

[34] For a reassessment of the arguments on peace, democracy and liberalism see Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 6, November/December 1997, pp. 22-43; Thomas Carothers, "Democracy", *Foreign Policy*, no. 107, Summer 1997, pp. 11-18.

[35] See Renée de Nevers, "Democratization and Ethnic Conflict", in Michael Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, pp. 61-78.

[36] See Mark Zacher and Richard A. Matthew, "Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands", in Charles Kegley (ed.), *Controversies in International Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995, pp 107-150; Jim Richardson, *Contending*

Liberalisms, Working Paper No. 1995/10, Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1995.

37 Robert Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War", in David A. Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 274.

38 See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Cambridge Ma., Harvard University Press, 1971; *Power and Interdependance: World Politics in Transition*, Boston, Little Brown, 1977.

39 Robert Keohane, "Hobbe's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society", paper presented at the conference on 'Economics and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Agendas for the 1990s', Canberra, 28-30 July 1993, pp. 20 ff.

40 The centre-periphery approach is also developed in James M. Goldgeiger and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era", *International Organization*, vol. 46, no. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 467-492.

41 Keohane, "Hobbe's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society", p. 26.

42 See, for example, Alan Henrikson, "The Growth of Regional Organizations and the Role of the United Nations" in Andrew Hurrell and Louise Fawcett (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics*, pp. 123-168.

43 Peter Lawler, "The Core Assumptions and Presumptions of 'Cooperative Security' ", in Stephanie Lawson (ed.), *The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond*, St. Leonards, Allen&Unwin, 1995, p. 49.

44 The following institutions or groupings were involved, in some form of another, in the conflict prevention and peacemaking process in the former Yugoslavia: EU, OSCE, NATO, WEU, UN, OIC and the so-called Contact Group on Yugoslavia.

45 Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs", in David Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, p. 76

46 Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory", in Ibid. p. 302.

47 Though, as evidenced by the Peru-Ecuador border war of 1994-1995, territorial disputes have by no means disappeared from the Latin American security landscape.

48 See "Les économies sud-américaines en marche vers l'intégration", *Le Monde*, 18 January 1995. For a review of the latest measures on the OAS security agenda see the first report of the recently created (1995) OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security, OAS Document AG/doc. 3352/96 (29 May 1996).

49 It should be added that it is mainly Chinese and North Korean reluctance to countenance greater Northeast Asian multilateralism which has thus far prevented meaningful progress on this issue. For an overview of Chinese regional policy see Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China", *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 4, Spring 1994, pp. 107-135.

50 On this question see Gerald SCHNEIDER and Patricia Weitsman, "Eliciting Collaboration from "Risky States": The Limits of Conventional Multilateralism in Security Affairs", *Global Society*, vol. 11, no. 1, January 1997, pp. 93-110.

51 Ingvar Carlsson and Shridath Ramphal (Chairmen), *Our Global Neighbourhood. The Report of the Commission on Global Governance*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. The report considers a very wide range of issues. I will not elaborate on its content beyond those concerning regionalism and regional arrangements.

52 Ibid., p. 338

53 Ibid., p. 105.

54 Ibid., p. 104. A document produced by John Mills, a staff member of the Commission on Global Governance, noted that "it is difficult to generalise about the role of regional organisations" while also stating that "regional organisations enjoy real advantages in the more useful areas of preventive action, peacemaking and confidence-building". John Mills, *Remarks at "Asia Pacific Security at Century's End"*, Tokyo, United Nations University, 31 October 1995, p. 1 and p. 3.

55 Ibid., p. 105

56 A report by the Ford Foundation on the future of the UN system released at the same time did not acknowledge the growing decentralisation of international security but asserted that 'by the next century' regional organisations would play a more effective role, in partnership with the UN. See *The United Nations in its Second Half-Century – A Report by the Independent Commission on the Future of the United Nations*, New York, Ford Foundation, 1995, p. 8.

57 See, amongst others, Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1993, pp. 119-131; Ernst B. Haas, "Collective Conflict Management: Evidence of a New World Order?", in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), *Collective Security in a Changing World*, Boulder Co., Lynne Rienner, 1993, pp. 63-117; Thomas G. Weiss, "New Challenges for U.N. Operations: Implementing an Agenda for Peace", *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 16. no. 1, Winter 1993, pp. 51-56; S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "Regional Organizations and Regional Security", *Security Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1, Autumn 1992, pp. 6-37; Benjamin Rivlin, "Regional Arrangements and the UN System for Collective Security and Conflict Resolution: A New Road Ahead?", *International Relations*, vol. 11, no. 2, August 1992, pp. 95-110.

58 S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "The United Nations, Regional Organizations and Human Security", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 15, no. 2 June 1994, p. 284.

59 Saadia Touval, "Why the U.N. fails", *Foreign Affairs*, no. 73, September/October 1994, p. 55.

60 For an overview of the field see Chris Mitchell, "Conflict, War and Conflict Management", in Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom (ed.), *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory*, London, Pinter, 1985, pp. 121- 140.

61 Ibid., p. 121.

62 Of particular note is Christopher Mitchell's *The Structure of International Conflict*, often regarded as a modern classic of the conflict behavior and conflict resolution genre. Christopher R. Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, London, Macmillan, 1981.

63 Joseph Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*, Boston, Little Brown and Co., 1971.

64 Ibid., pp. 169-172.

65 Ibid., p. 171. The conflict intensity index used by Nye (the Nye-Haas index) took into account the following factors: 1) number of casualties involved, 2) duration of hostilities, 3) likely alternatives if the organisation had not acted.

66 Ibid., p. 172.

67 Zacher, Mark W., *International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946-1977: the United Nations, Organization of American States, Organization of African Unity, and Arab League*, New York, Praeger, 1979.

68 Ibid., p. 206.

69 Ibid., pp. 15-20.

70 Ibid., p. 214.

71 Ibid., p. 213.

72 Ernst B. Haas, "The United Nations and Regionalism" in Kenneth J. Twitchett (ed.), *The Evolving United Nations: A Prospect for Peace?*, London, published by Europa Publications for the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, 1971, pp. 121-140.

73 See Ernst B. Haas, *The United Nations and Collective Management of International Conflict*, New York, United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1986; "Collective Conflict Management: Evidence for a New World Order?" in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), *Collective Security in a Changing World*, Boulder Co., Lynne Rienner, 1993, pp. 63-117.

74 Disputes being defined as "a specific grievances between two or more states about a dsiting subject involving an allegation that a provision of the Charter or a major resolution of an authoritative United Nations organ has been violated. Haas, *The United Nations and Collective Management of International Conflict*, p. 7.

75 Ibid., p. 9.

76 Ibid., p. 13. Despite this higher referral rate for higher intensity cases, Haas found that the UN's success rate in managing these disputes was low.

77 Ibid., p. 9.

78 Ibid., p. 25. Though Haas does mention that the pre-1965 record of the OAS came as close to an ideal division of labour with the UN as could be possible, with the OAS dealing principally with low intensity, localised intet-American disputes. The principal exception to this record were U.S.-led OAS actions against Castrist Cuba.

79 Ibid., p. 50.

80 Ibid.

81 Haas, "Collective Conflict Management: Evidence for a New World Order?", p. 64.

82 Ibid., p. 67.

83 Ibid., pp. 77-78 and pp. 92-94.

84 Ibid., p. 94.

85 Though, as pointed out by a number of authors, OAS dispute settlement actions from the late 40's to the late 50's come very close to reflecting the regional role envisaged in the UN Charter. Chapter 3 examines these issues in more detail.

86 Haas later revised his views about what constituted institutional success in the OAU's case. Wrote Haas (1993): "Of course if we agree that the real purpose of [the] OAU is not conflict management but providing the legal and rhetorical arsenal for asserting the otherwise questionable sovereignty of African states, then the organization is a success despite itself". This position is supported by Lyons (1996) who takes a somewhat more positive view of the effects of OAU territorial integrity and non-interference norms. See Ernst Haas, "Collective Conflict Management: Evidence for a New World Order?", p. 93; Terrence Lyons, "Regional Dynamics", in Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, et. al., *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa*, Washington D.C., Brookings, 1996, p. 159.

87 For two contrasting views on the management of sectarian conflicts see Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intra-State Conflict", *Foreign Policy*, no. 96, Fall 1994, pp. 3-20; Chaim Kaufman, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars", *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 4, Spring 1996, pp. 136-175.

88 Though such peacemaking efforts can be given greater weight if fully backed by external actors.

89 The OAS gave the Santiago Commitment its teeth when the OAS General Assembly adopted its resolution 1080 (5 June 1991) which called for the immediate convocation of the OAS Permanent Council (its central decision-making organ) in the event of a "sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political process". I will discuss the relevant OAS developments later in Chapter 4.

90 The other relevant regional organisation, the Gulf Cooperation Council (which is technically a sub-regional security alliance) did not fare any better and failed to deter Iraqi aggression. The fact remains that most Arab countries initially saw the conflict essentially as a bilateral dispute over oil prices rather than a clear threat to regional security. Moreover, many Arab states proved to be sympathetic to Iraqi grievances against the conservative Kuwaiti monarchy.

91 He the OAU's position differs significantly from that of other major regional organisation. If anything the OAU Secretariat and many among the OAU's membership seem to favor more formal links with the UN in order to ensure continued and reliable access to UN's resources.

92 This contrasts with earlier and rather negative assessments of ad hoc peacemaking by some authors. See, for example, Arthur R. Day, "Conclusions: A Mix of Means", in Arthur R. Day and Michael W. Doyle (eds.), *Escalation and Intervention – Multilateral Security and its Alternatives*, Boulder Co., Westview Press, 1986, pp. 166-167.

93 Brian Job, *Multilateralism: The Relevance of the Concept to Regional Conflict Management*, Working Paper No. 5, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1994, pp. 8-17; Patrick Morgan, "Regional Security Complexes", in David A. Lake and Patrick Morgan (eds.), *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, pp. 43-73 of book draft.

94 Job, *Multilateralism...*, p. 8.

95 Ibid., p. 16.

96 Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge is Power*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990.

97 Though some proposals have been put forth by its Secretary General and by Egypt.

98 See Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, *Inquiry, Logic and International Politics*, Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, pp. 23-35.

99 MIOB stands for *Mission de l'OUA au Burundi*.

100 For more on the contextual theory of international relations see Gary Goertz, *Context of International Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994.

101 I. William Zartman and Victor A. Kremenyuk, *Cooperative Security – Reducing Third World Wars*, pp. 333-334. For a similar argument see also Phil Williams, "The potential for US-Russian security co-operation in the developing world", in James E. Goodby (ed.), *Regional Conflicts – The Challenge of US-Russian Co-operation*, London, SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 13-33.

4

The UN and Regionalism: Historical and Contemporary Debates

At the beginning of the 1990s, the pivotal role played by the UN Security Council during the Gulf War was perceived by many as heralding the political rebirth of the United Nations. Coming after a string of UN successes in the late 1980s, the Gulf War rekindled the venerable ideals of collective security enshrined in the UN Charter. In January 1992, following a period of extraordinary consensus between the world's leading powers, the UN Security Council had met in an extraordinary heads of state and government session and had requested that the UN's new Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, outline plans for updating and improving the organisation's role in the field of peace and security. Boutros Boutros-Ghali tabled his *An Agenda for Peace* the following June. The *Agenda* presented bold proposals for enhancing the organisation's conflict management and conflict resolution capabilities, among which were the Secretary-General's calls to improve the relationship between regional organisations and the UN and to make greater use of regional arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Given the unprecedented increase in UN peace operations since the end of the 1980s, the question of regional arrangements did not initially elicit as much attention as other aspects of Boutros-Ghali's proposals. Those designed to strengthen and consolidate the organisation's peacekeeping capabilities, an enduring object of debate at the UN, came under intense scrutiny yet nevertheless attracted the support of large sections of the international community.[1] In particular, there was wide interest in the conceptual framework for conflict management proposed in the *Agenda*, a framework that ranged from 'preventive diplomacy' to 'post-conflict peace-building'. Boutros-Ghali's suggestion that 'peace-enforcement' units composed of volunteers be available on call to the UN, however, was received much more cautiously, notably by the United States, which has been traditionally opposed to the idea of a supra-national UN military force.[2]

Not unlike Dag Hammarskjold at an earlier time, it seemed Boutros-Ghali was willing to go beyond well-trodden paths in order to place the UN squarely at the forefront of international security. He wanted to recapture the central role for the UN envisaged by the drafters of the UN Charter, but denied to the organisation because of nearly 45 years of superpower confrontation.

One important aspect of the original UN vision for international peace and security was, of course, regionalism. Boutros-Ghali was no stranger to this question. He had authored a doctoral thesis in international law on regional arrangements in 1949 and had published extensively on the subject throughout his distinguished academic career.[3] As the first Secretary-General of the post-Cold War period Boutros-Ghali remained a stalwart supporter of regional approaches to peace and security, and during his tenure as chief UN executive he would accord more importance to this particular issue than any of his predecessors.[4]

This chapter examines the UN debate on regionalism and conflict management as it unfolded after the publication of *An Agenda for Peace*. It is divided in two principal sections. The first section provides the necessary background for a historical understanding of the regional arrangements provisions of the UN Charter and discusses some of the problems and ambiguities associated with them. The second section focuses on the current debate on the UN and regional organisations as it evolved during the 1992-1996 timeframe.

Regionalism and the UN: Historical and Legal Perspectives

Any examination of regionalism and the UN logically starts with a review of Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN Charter. It is in this section of the Charter that the relation between regional arrangements and the UN is articulated. However, as a prolegomena to a short review of the substantive aspects of Chapter VIII it is essential to highlight the circumstances which originally led to the inclusion of a section on regional arrangements in the UN Charter.

Early debates on the role of regional arrangements (1942-1943)

In January 1942, 26 allied countries convened in Washington and declared themselves to be the United Nations, pledging to employ their full national resources to win the war against Germany and Japan.[5] The succession of international conferences and wartime summits that ensued were to lay the bases of the postwar international order. The United States and Britain began examining possible postwar security structures in late 1942 when the concept of a United Nations organisation was still inchoate. With the outcome of hostilities in Europe and Pacific still uncertain, neither government committed itself to specific blueprints. However, the weaknesses of the League of Nations loomed high above these early debates.

By the second half of 1943, a consensus was emerging between the United States, Britain and a number of influential allied powers, notably Canada. The postwar system of international security was to be embodied by a strong world organisation,

and this organisation was to be tasked with a wide range of functions: relief and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons, regulation of the postwar international monetary system, international civil aviation, etc. Defining the shape and powers of a future world organisation was to prove both problematic and controversial, however, especially with regard to the fundamental issue of peace and security.

The question of regional arrangements figured prominently during early British-American discussions. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in particular had raised the possibility of a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia consisting of a number of sub-regional blocs, a proposal, or variations thereof, which he was to voice often during the remainder of the war. However, the Roosevelt administration was not very enthusiastic about a regional basis for postwar international security.

The interwar experience of the League of Nations with regionalism – Article 21 of the League's Covenant stipulated that regional arrangements whose purpose it was to secure "the maintenance of peace" were admitted as legitimate under League rules – had been unsuccessful.[6] Although there was a general agreement that regional arrangements consistent with the aims of a world organisation should be permitted, the United States stressed the need for a strong universal body for the making of international security policy, a body to which such arrangements would be subordinate. Realising that his scheme for regional councils would not carry the support of the United States, Churchill later came to acknowledge the necessity of a global decision-making body. Nevertheless, he remained favourable to the concept of regional security structures. He found potential allies in Australia and New Zealand which in January 1944 had signed the ANZAC Pact of Mutual Assistance calling for a Southwest Pacific conference on regional security to be held "as soon as practicable".[7] This proposal was not well received by the Roosevelt administration, which held the view that an agreement on a postwar international security system should be reached before binding regional security agreements were concluded.

Dunbarton Oaks (1944) and the lead-up to the San Francisco conference

The question of regionalism came to a head during the two defining events in the development of the UN peace and security system: the Dunbarton Oaks Conference of August-October 1944 and the United Nations Conference on International Organization (otherwise known as the UNCIO), which took place in San Francisco in April-June 1945. In late 1943, well before Dunbarton Oaks, the US State Department had assembled a group of officials and academics to flesh out options for a postwar international organisation. Known as the Informal Political Agenda Group, this body laid the ground work for what was later to become Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In the spring of 1944, it drafted a number of preliminary recommendations on the

issue of regionalism: 1) regional agencies should be free to promote and facilitate the pacific settlement of disputes; 2) they could use non-military and military measures for enforcement actions provided they were used in accordance with the purposes of the future world organisation and kept the Executive Council (as the future UN Security Council was then termed) fully informed of its activities; 3) the Executive Council should have a right to determine whether the measures undertaken were consistent with the purposes of the organisation and if the latter were adequate to prevent a serious breach to international peace, reserving a right to take action on appeal or of its own initiative if they were judged as inadequate; and 4) the Executive Council should use local and regional agencies for enforcement actions, or authorise such actions.[8]

At Dunbarton Oaks, representatives of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China assembled for preliminary discussions on a future world organisation.[9] American and British proposals dominated the talks, which eventually produced the United Nations Dunbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International Organization.[10] During the conference there was general agreement that regional arrangements should be "auxiliary to, consistent with, and under the supervision of" a global organisation in matters of international security.[11] Britain and the United States, however, held differing views on the role of regional arrangements. Britain placed emphasis on their potential security value rather than on their wider political role, while the United States insisted, *inter alia*, on their potential usefulness for the pacific settlement of disputes. It was judged that both views were not incompatible, and they were therefore enfolded in Section VIIIC of the Dunbarton Oaks proposal which covered issues related to the maintenance of international peace and security. Overall, the proposals placed fairly strict controls on regional arrangements, giving a right of veto to the Security Council over regional enforcement actions.

In the months preceding the San Francisco Conference, it became apparent that the Dunbarton Oaks provisions on regional arrangements were becoming controversial. Wishing to protect the autonomy of the inter-American system, Latin American countries insisted on greater autonomy for regional arrangements. Their opposition to the strict control of the Security Council became even more pronounced following the Inter-American Conference on Problems of Peace and War held in Mexico City in February-March 1945. While Latin American countries recognised the supremacy of a future general international organisation, they also believed that the Conference's final act, known as the Act of Chapultepec, would give them a legitimate juridical framework for regional collective security.[12] At the time, there was great pride in the Pan American Union (PAU), then the oldest and most elaborate regional organisation. For Latin American governments, the Inter-American Conference was designed as a demonstration of political maturity; the gathering sent

the message that Latin America was capable of taking care of its own problems at a time when the United States was more preoccupied with events further away from its shores.[13]

There were similar calls for increased regional autonomy from Australia whose Labour government let it be known before the San Francisco Conference that it thought regional arrangements should keep a 'right of action' if the Security Council proved unable, or unwilling to take measures for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. Delegations from European countries, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Turkey in particular, also proposed changes to the regional arrangement provisions of the Dunbarton Oaks text, suggesting that Security Council approval of regional enforcement measures be lifted in cases where suspension of such action might cause 'irremediable delays'.

Perhaps the second most important challenge to the regional arrangements provisions of the Dunbarton Oaks proposal beside the one mounted by Latin American countries came from France and the Soviet Union. Both countries mounted separate campaigns to seek special exemptions from the Dunbarton Oaks proposals in order to keep an unencumbered right of enforcement action against Germany should a threat re-emerge from that country. The Soviet Union was particularly concerned that potential action through its bilateral defence pacts might be subjected to Security Council oversight, as were regional arrangements, after the extinction of the special rights accorded to the wartime victors under the transitional arrangements provisions (Section XII) of the Dunbarton Oaks proposals.

UNCIO debates on regional arrangements

The UNCIO debates on regional arrangements surely rate as one of the more epic aspects of the San Francisco Conference. What became clear for the United States was that failure to strike a compromise with Latin American countries on regional enforcement action – they then made up two-fifths of the 51 nation UN membership – could imperil the success of the conference and harm the U.S. relationship with its southern neighbours. To a degree, the United States had shown some sympathy towards the Soviet and French positions. The German question had received special consideration at Dunbarton Oaks and the United States understood that however strong its desire for a powerful universal organisation, its latitude for negotiation on the issue was limited by the views held by the latter two countries. But the unexpectedly strong opinions of Latin American governments on regional enforcement presented American negotiators with a dilemma. Europeans had indeed been granted special rights in dealing with the possibility of a resurgent threat from Germany. However, in the name of universalism, the nascent inter-American security

system – of which, ironically, the United States was the most prominent and influential member – could have its actions stunted by a veto of the Security Council. This proved to be unacceptable to Latin American countries.

During the UNCIO the position of the United States delegation to Committee III/4 (regional arrangements), led by the pro-PanAmerican senator Arthur Vandenberg, eventually converged with that of Latin American states. Despite the overriding American desire for a strong universal organisation, the United States found strategic reasons for leaning towards the position of its Latin neighbours. The State Department realised that should a serious Latin American dispute require United States military involvement, and should another member of the Security Council veto action by the pertinent inter-American security arrangements, the United States might be placed in the impossible situation of contemplating the use of force thus disregarding a Security Council decision, something which might quickly spell the end of the UN's credibility.

After a tortuous and sometime acrimonious debate on the exceptionalism of regional enforcement action, the conundrum was finally resolved. The United States introduced a proposal developing the concept of a right of collective self-defence partly inspired by a pre-conference French amendment on the right of individual member states to "act in the interest of peace, right and justice".[14] The proposal allowed individual states, or states which were members of defence pacts or regional security alliances, to act in self-defence until the Security Council took the necessary measures to restore international peace and security. After further refinements to the text, considerable negotiations with the British and the Soviets, and backdoor discussions between the American and Latin American delegates, the American amendment eventually satisfied all key players on this issue. It was to become Article 51, one the pivotal peace and security provisions enshrined in the UN Charter.[15]

A major political hurdle had been crossed with the agreement on regional enforcement action; the principle of universalism had been upheld while at the same time providing for exceptions in cases of self-defence. Still, a number of states continued to raise important issues. For instance, New Zealand proposed that not only should regional arrangements be consistent with the purposes of the UN Charter, but also that the UN also should approve them. The proposal was rejected (though a more or less formal recognition process emerged in UN practice thereafter). France and the Soviet Union continued their drive to ensure that they would have unrestricted right of action in the event of a renewal of German aggression. For their part, Latin American countries, led by Colombia, raised the fear that in cases of pacific settlement of disputes the UN Security Council could bypass a regional arrangement before the latter had the chance to demonstrate its effectiveness. This led the Colombian delegation to submit an interpretation of the proposed Article 52 of the

Charter to the effect that where a regional arrangement exists for the purpose of peaceful settlement of disputes, the Security Council should limit its actions and let regional procedures run their course until the moment the latter were demonstrated to be ineffective. Only then would the Security Council have the freedom to propose measures for the settlement of the dispute. However, in the case where pacific settlement of dispute measures proved ineffective and an armed attack upon a state member of a regional arrangement occurred, self-defence, either individual or collective, could be invoked until such time as the Security Council could restore peace and security. Both elements of the Colombian interpretation were accepted by the Committee.[16]

Egypt was also to play a notable part in the discussions on regionalism. As the host country of the recently formed Arab League (the League was formed in March 1945) and self-appointed leader of the Arab world, Egypt saw itself as the natural defender of Arab interests at the UNCIO. But unlike Latin American countries, it found few allies in Committee III/4 and was particularly unsuccessful in having its proposals accepted. Egypt took the position that the section of the Charter that dealt with regional arrangements was not intended to cover military pacts, but rather regional arrangements of a general nature such as the Pan-American Union and the Arab League. It had insisted early in the conference, without success, that social and economic aspects of regional activities should be incorporated into the regional arrangements provisions of the UN Charter. Amongst a number of Egyptian amendments was the following proposal to define what constituted a permanent regional arrangement:

> There shall be considered as regional arrangements organizations of a permanent nature grouping in a given geographical area several countries which, by reason of their proximity, community of interests or cultural, linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities, make themselves jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise between them and for the maintenance of peace and security in their region, as well as for the safeguarding of their interests and the development of their economic and cultural relations.[17]

The Egyptian delegation twice introduced this amendment and both times it encountered the opposition of the United States, supported on this point by other influential national participants in Committee III/4. The American delegation argued that no definition could cover all possible types of arrangements, and that, in any event, the important issue was not what constituted a regional arrangement but rather whether or not such arrangements were consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Underlying this position was no doubt a desire of other national delegations that supported the U.S. position to keep the door open for regional

arrangements which might be strictly political and military in nature rather than multipurpose.

The final text of the UN Charter section on regional arrangements, Chapter VIII, represented substantial modifications to the Dunbarton Oaks proposals. It was a political compromise between advocates strong universalism and effective regionalism based on the specific interests of states expressed during at the time of the UNCIO. The UN Security Council, with its exclusive enforcement powers, was to be the ultimate authority for the maintenance of international peace and security. But regional arrangements or agencies could play an important, indeed prominent role in the pacific settlement of disputes; they could be used by the Council for enforcement action; and under the collective self-defence provisions of article 51 they could initiate military actions in self-defence until the Security Council could restore peace and security. As discussed in Chapter 1, this proved to be a pyrrhic victory for the supporters of a strong universal body. The prominent regional arrangements which emerged during the Cold War were not those claiming to come under Chapter VIII, as the UN Charter had originally intended, but rather regional collective defence arrangements which effectively institutionalised Article 51 by the formation of permanent structures such as the North Atlantic Alliance, SEATO, and the Warsaw Pact.

The ambiguous Chapter VIII

Debate of a legal nature on the role of regional organisations in peacekeeping and peace enforcement has not been a central feature of the post-Cold War debate on the role of regional organisations. Rather, the focus has been placed on assessing their institutional capabilities in the field of conflict management and trying to enhance their capabilities in that respect. Nevertheless, highlighting some of the ambiguities in the UN Charter on this issue remains important for two reasons. First, because since the publication of the *Agenda for Peace* in 1992, many commentators and policymakers, not least Boutros-Ghali, have called for a 'revival' of Chapter VIII and a greater involvement of regional organisations in the prevention, management and resolution of regional conflict. And second, because the failure of European and African regional organisations to act decisively in such places as the former Yugoslavia, the Horn of Africa or Central Africa has cast serious doubts on the possibility of achieving an effective division of labour between the UN and regional organisations.

As seen in the preceding section, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides the normative framework for the role of regional 'arrangements and agencies' in the maintenance of international peace and security, along with Articles 33 and 37 (Chapter VI) and Article 51 (Chapter VII). It is not the intent here to present a

comprehensive article-by-article interpretation of Chapter VIII. Numerous analyses have been proposed in the past and launching into such an exercise would not add in any particular way to a contemporary understanding of the problems of regional organisations and arrangements in the field of conflict management.[18] Neither is the intention to describe all the circumstances in which the Security Council has invoked provisions of Chapter VIII in the last few years. Chapter VIII has had a complex and chequered history since the heady days of the San Francisco Conference, notably in relation to American-led OAS actions against Cuba and OAS decisions regarding the crisis in the Dominican Republic in the mid-1960s.[19] However, despite what is indisputably a very significant growth in regional actions in the first half of the 1990s, an examination of early post-Cold War Security Council decisions would fail to produce controversial cases that have truly tested Chapter VIII. Indeed, what seems most remarkable about recent Council decision-making in relation to the role of regional organisations is how relatively seldom Chapter VIII provisions have been directly invoked (most references by the UNSC to Chapter VIII were made in 1992 and 1993).[20]

Before examining the ambiguities of the UN Charter on the issue of regional action, it is pertinent to remind the reader of the relevant sections (in abbreviated form) of the Charter regarding regional arrangements.

Chapter VI

- Art. 33(1): Parties to any dispute which are likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security may resort, among other means, to regional agencies or arrangements to settle their differences through peaceful measures.

- Art. 37(1): Should the parties to a dispute fail to resolve their differences through the measures indicated in Art. 33, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

Chapter VII

- Art. 51: Nothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by member states in self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take at any time actions it deems necessary to maintain and restore international peace and security.

Chapter VIII

- Art. 52(1): Nothing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies provided they are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN charter.

- Art. 52(2): Regional organisations should make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of disputes before referring them to the Security Council.

- Art. 52(3): The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

- Art. 53(1): The Security Council shall, where appropriate, use regional organisations for enforcement purposes under its authority, but no regional organisation or arrangement can undertake enforcement actions without the Council's authorisation.

- Art. 54: The Security Council shall be kept fully informed of the activities undertaken or in contemplation by regional arrangements and agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

A careful reading of the Charter raises several important questions relating to regional arrangements and agencies, questions that have both a juridical and practical impact. Firstly, while the absence of a definition of what constitutes a regional arrangement in the Charter certainly provides interpretive flexibility, the issue obviously bears on the division of labour between regional arrangements and the UN. If the Charter does not provide specific guidance as to what constitutes a regional arrangement, and consequently on how such arrangements are to be recognised, under what circumstances, then, are such arrangements bound by the provisions of Chapter VIII?

A review of UN practice demonstrates that even though there may not be a formal, i.e. UN Charter-based, process whereby regional arrangements are recognised as Chapter VIII organisations or arrangements, there does exist, nevertheless, a political recognition process. This process is based on (1) the fulfilment of certain requirements (e.g. consistency with the aims of the UN Charter, regional character, presence of an organisation), and (2) on the political recognition of the arrangement by the Security Council or General Assembly through its resolutions. It is in this manner that in the past such classic multi-purpose regional organisations as the OAS and the OAU were recognised as Chapter VIII organisations. The Arab League is also considered to be an arrangement falling under Chapter VIII. Because of the anti-Israel stance of its membership early in the postwar period, however, recognition of this claim originally proved to be problematic.[21] With respect to the more recent experience of the UN, it is fair to say that the Security Council retains very wide discretionary powers on such matters, and over the last decade it has sanctioned all manner of regional actions and initiatives in the peace and security field.

A second important, indeed fundamental, issue arising from the Charter concerns the division of labour between the United Nations and regional organisations. The UN Charter relies heavily on the voluntarism of regional organisations when it comes to the pacific settlement of disputes, *encouraging* them to settle local disputes at the regional level before referring them to the Security Council. At the same time, the Security Council has a right to investigate any dispute at any stage (Art. 34 and Art. 36 of the Charter) and has the authority to decide on the existence of a threat to international peace and security (Art. 39 of the Charter). Moreover, the Charter states that any member of the UN may bring any dispute to the attention of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) or the Security Council (Art. 35 of the Charter). Thus, we find that the Charter states a general principle in Chapter VIII that may, in principle, be circumvented at any stage either by a UN member state or by the Security Council on its own initiative.

Notwithstanding the particular circumstances that led to the development of Chapter VIII in 1945, the provisions of the Charter regarding regional arrangements and dispute resolution can either be regarded as allowing considerable flexibility or be so open-ended as to preclude the development of a clear division of labour between the UN and regional arrangements. States unhappy with regional conflict settlement procedures may bypass a regional organisation and bring their grievances directly to the Security Council (which may or may not decide to consider them formally). They may ignore regional dispute settlement mechanisms altogether and go directly to the General Assembly or the Security Council, and although Chapter VIII directs states who are parties to regional organisations to make every effort to settle their disputes through these organisations before referring it to the Security Council, the dispute in question may be taken up simultaneously at the regional level and at the UN. Thus, one can probably conclude that the original Colombian interpretation of Chapter VIII was in reality only one amongst a number of possibilities allowed in the Charter.

Issues related to enforcement action are similarly very complex. According to Article 53(1) of the UN Charter, the "Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize regional organizations for enforcement action under its authority". Several aspects of Article 53 remain problematic, however. Firstly, given the contemporary tendency toward a blurring of the traditional difference between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement in many recent UN and regional peace operations, the use of the term 'enforcement' in Article 53 begs clarification. Where do 'robust' peacekeeping operations cease to be peacekeeping and become enforcement actions? This thorny question has caused the UN innumerable problems in the last few years and it is no less problematic for regional organisations undertaking, or contemplating, peacekeeping actions.

Perhaps an even more fundamental problem with Article 53 is that it is be politically very difficult, if not impossible, for the Security Council to direct an regional organisation to carry out an enforcement action. Why? First, because such a momentous decision may not carry the support of the members of the regional organisation in question, or they may strongly disagree with the approach and decisions of some of the members of Security Council regarding a given crisis. And second, because the vast majority of extant regional bodies, particularly those in the developing world, are neither equipped nor structured to carry out military operations, nor do they have strong constitutional powers allowing them to impose economic or other sanctions against their membership.

The financial aspects of this question are extremely important. The UN's chronic difficulties in funding new peace operations in recent years have clearly demonstrated that financial considerations cannot be dismissed as secondary issues. Such considerations have in fact become issues of primary importance. If the Council, on its own volition, were to mandate – as opposed to agree to or authorise – a military enforcement action through a regional organisation, it is more than likely that the UN would be under heavy pressure to bear the cost of the operation.[22] Yet in the UN's history there are no precedents for UN-assessed contributions financing non-UN commanded operations, be they in the form of multinational coalitions or through regional organisations. The possibility of such an occurrence, therefore, appears fairly remote if one considers that record. Again, the Charter appears to rely on the voluntarism of regional organisations rather than on a clear definition of obligations between the UN and regional organisations. The implications of the foregoing analysis should not be under-estimated, particularly in light of the views put forward to the effect that the UN should 'sub-contract' conflict management tasks, including peacekeeping and enforcement tasks, to regional organisations.

Two other aspects of the Charter remain particularly problematic as regards regional organisations and arrangements: (1) the long-standing debate surrounding the specific conditions under which self-defence, including collective self-defence, can be invoked, and; (2) the complex issue of sovereignty and intervention in internal conflicts.

Trying to define what constitutes self-defence has long been a grey area of international law, especially in light of the fact that Article 51 of the Charter does not spell out in detail what constitutes that right and how it can be exercised. Tom Farer has remarked that through their persistent invocation of the possibility of self-defence in cases other than clear violations of territorial integrity, the United States and other major powers have, over the years, "occupied the interpretive space the founding fathers left" on this issue, thus widening considerably the boundaries of the concept of self-defence.[23] Most authors agree that necessity and proportionality are the two

fundamental elements of self-defence. But over the years there have been many interpretations, both restrictive and expansive, of how and when that right can be exercised.

The issue that arises as far as regional organisations and arrangements are concerned is the ambiguity between Article 51 and Article 53. On the one hand, the Charter authorises collective self-defence (Art. 51), while on the other hand it states that no enforcement action shall be taken without the authorisation of the Security Council (Art. 53). Given the wide scope of cases where self-defence has been invoked during the postwar and post-Cold War periods, one presumes regional arrangements and coalitions could avail themselves of the 'interpretive space' discussed above and take decisions on the use of force without going to the Security Council. It was certainly the case during the Cold War that military alliances coming under Article 51 of the Charter, such as NATO or ANZUS, were not bound to prior approval by the Security Council for the exercising of self-defence. In fact, an obligation to the contrary would have made a mockery of the concept. Has the end of the Cold War made it more difficult for regional organisations to make decisions on the use of force without prior approval of the Security Council? Recent experience in such places as Liberia and Bosnia, and more recently in Kosovo, has shown that this issue is more ambiguous than ever. This is particularly the case when peacekeeping forces or monitoring missions are deployed in situations of internal conflicts. On the one hand there is a duty of impartiality, on the other, a duty to ensure the fulfilment of a mandate or to defend certain principles, often with marginal or conditional support from warring parties on the ground.[24]

Another ambiguous area of the Charter with regard to international peace and security is the long-standing controversy surrounding the question of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states, most particularly in reference to Article 2(7), but also, by extension, to Article 2(4).[25] Although not specifically related to the question of regional organisations and arrangements, the issue obviously informs their scope for action. If, for example, regional arrangements can only carry out enforcement action with the authorisation of the Security Council, then the Council has to make an *a priori* judgment on the compatibility of the action being contemplated with the obligations of the UN vis-à-vis Article 2(7).

In recent years, conventional legal theory on this issue has been largely overshadowed by the willingness of the UN Security Council to authorise peacekeeping or humanitarian action within states, either with or without the consent of the conflicting parties on the ground.[26] Of the two cases, the former can be considered as being by far the most preferable situation. Acting with the prior consent of former disputants, for example, the UN has been recently called on to help rebuild states after years of civil war in Cambodia and Mozambique. Prior agreement

from the conflicting parties also permitted the UN to play an important role in facilitating the transition to peace in Central American countries. Conditions of lack of consent or limited consent, however, usually make for far more problematic and potentially divisive situations. As the interventions in Somalia and in the former Yugoslavia demonstrated, the humanitarian impulse that motivated international action did not in and of itself prove sufficient to sustain decisive international action on the broader political-military situation.

Notwithstanding the serious problems associated with some of the latter interventions, a strict reading of Article 2(7) is now considered anachronistic by most Western governments, a fact that was amply demonstrated by the Security Council's creative (re)interpretation of the UN Charter when it authorised the dispatch of a humanitarian Task Force (UNITAF) to Somalia in December 1992.[27] Perhaps a Canadian diplomat best summed up Western opinion when he stated that "the mantras of non-intervention are becoming increasingly ritualistic".[28] The problem, however, is that this view remains controversial amongst a large number of developing states which, at least from a declaratory standpoint, cling to a much more orthodox notion of state sovereignty. For historical as well as geopolitical reasons, major regional powers such as Brazil, China, India and Nigeria are especially concerned that a relaxation of the norm of non-interference might hurt their sovereign status and justify greater international pressure, if not intervention, in what they regard as strictly domestic matters.

In essence, the question presents itself not in the form of legal debate, but in the question of attitudinal dispositions towards the notion of collective responsibility. The adherence of some governments to a traditionalist conception of state sovereignty certainly presents weighty obstacles to the development of more effective regional organisation for the prevention and management of intra-state conflict. On the other hand, and as Chapter 5 will demonstrate, there are also indications that some regional communities are, at least from a declaratory standpoint, willing to entertain a greater collective role in preventing and managing internal conflict.

The Role of Regional Organisations: UN Debates (1992-1996)

From the UN's perspective, the early 1990s seemed to indicate a growing willingness on the part of regional organisations to play a more direct role in the management of regional disputes. Whether in Liberia, Central America or Yugoslavia, regional and sub-regional institutions were either taking the lead in conflict management or acting in collaboration with UN efforts. Thus, it should not be surprising that in 1992 the new UN Secretary-General would look towards reviving Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

In the four years that followed the publication of *An Agenda for Peace*, an important debate took place on the issue, both within and outside the confines of the UN. Like so many other aspects of the *Agenda*, it was heavily influenced by developments in such places as the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda where international and regional institutions were found wanting, and concepts such as preventive diplomacy and peace-building proved extremely difficult to apply in practice. Still, numerous developments took place. Many went relatively unnoticed, for example, the plethora of UNGA resolutions regarding regional organisations, while others such as the very open disagreements between NATO and the UN over the use of force in the former Yugoslavia in 1994-1995 brought into sharper focus the complex nature of the issues involved.

For analytical clarity the following sections focus solely on the regional arrangement issue within the framework proposed in the *Agenda*. While this question is admittedly inseparable from some of the other aspects of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's proposals, it is worthy of a separate and detailed treatment, both because of the distinctiveness of the issues involved and because the question of regional arrangements in the recent literature has been largely overshadowed by the wider debate on the UN's own conflict management role.

Regional arrangements in An Agenda for Peace (1992)

In *An Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali called for a revival of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter under the rationale of lightening the burden of the Security Council and contributing to a sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in world affairs. His proposals could be broken down into three basic propositions. The first one was essentially a statement of fact. The Cold War impaired Chapter VIII from working as originally intended and, in some instances, regional arrangements had undermined the effectiveness of the UN. The second proposition gave the direction of his vision on regional arrangements. With the end of the Cold War, a new sense of cooperation and solidarity could be developed, particularly if regional arrangements or agencies acted both in a manner consistent with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and if their relationship with the Security Council was governed by Chapter VIII. The third proposition identified the instruments for the realisation of this vision: early warning, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict peace-building. These were the different conflict management concepts and instruments that Boutros-Ghali elaborated on in *An Agenda* for use both by the UN and by regional organisations.

The haziness of the proposals was noteworthy, especially when compared with the more specific nature of some of the other proposals contained in the *Agenda*. In

effect, their basic thrust was that in the post-Cold War period, regional arrangements and agencies could, in certain circumstances, play a useful role in the maintenance of peace and security, especially when the Security Council supported their action. In and of itself this hardly constituted a revolutionary proposition. Moreover, considering the long-standing problems surrounding the division of labour issue – problems which at the time of the publication of the *Agenda* were more than evident in numerous locations where the UN and regional organisations were jointly involved – the lack of a more detailed discussion on the subject was surprising. It either reflected a calculated reluctance to engage the issue in detail for fear of putting off balance certain regional bodies, or it represented an attempt to flag the issue in a diplomatic manner, with the expectation that it would eventually be raised in ensuing debates (which it was).

Another puzzling aspect of the *Agenda* relates to the statement: "should the Security Council choose specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it could serve to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort" (para. 65). Undeniably, UN Security Council support for a given regional effort, even if only declaratory, may increase its perceived legitimacy (though not necessarily its effectiveness). However, what is rather surprising about this statement is that it appeared to imply that regional organisations need the authorisation of the Council in order to take the lead in addressing a regional crisis. Yet, as seen in a previous section, Art. 52(2) of the UN Charter strongly encourages regional action *before* referring a dispute to the Security Council. Moreover, given the inconsistency with which the Security Council has applied the UN Charter's rules concerning the use of force by all types of regional organisations – notably in relation to regional action in Liberia, the former Yugoslavia and the Former Soviet Union – it would appear that the traditional argument that there is an absolute need for them to gain the Council's approval under Art. 53 is only applicable under specific conditions. Here the problem lies with the new circumstances under which force is exercised, more often than not peace or stability operations in situations of internal conflict, whereas the founders of the Charter had in mind the more conventional collective security notion of repelling inter-state aggression by an invading state.

In spite of the rather vague statements of *An Agenda for Peace* on regional arrangements, there was nonetheless a novelty value in putting forth these proposals. The *Agenda* recognised the growing activism of regional organizations in the peace and security field and put the crucial question of Chapter VIII of the Charter and the relationship between the UN and regional organisations on the UN agenda, an issue that had been left dormant for decades. Here the personal interest of Boutros-Ghali on these matters should not be viewed merely as an interesting footnote. It became

obvious in 1992, and more particularly in 1993 in the context of the debates on *An Agenda,* that the UN Secretary-General was the major driving force behind the renewal of UN thinking on the question of regional arrangements.[29] With his eagerness to promote greater cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, and his emphasis on the need for greater regional responsibility, Boutros-Ghali continually attempted to push the issue forward.

While in 1992 the level of interest in regional arrangements at the UN could be characterised as healthy, in 1993 the debate on the *Agenda* was essentially overtaken by events far from UN headquarters in New York. By the middle of that year the worsening situation in both Somalia and Yugoslavia had had a profound impact on international opinion. In both cases, the UN had attempted to operationalise every conflict management concept found in *An Agenda,* including cooperation with regional arrangements, and yet in both cases the situation had deteriorated. In mid-1994, this situation was further compounded by the disastrous turn of events in Rwanda, which for many epitomised the inherent weakness of the UN peace and security system. For many governments, as well as for the UN, these crises had brought home the considerable political and practical difficulties of implementing the UN's 'new thinking'.[30]

Responses to *An Agenda for Peace*

The following sections examine the responses to Boutros-Ghali's proposals on regional organisations through recent UN debates. References will be made to relevant developments in UNGA, the Security Council, and the UN Secretariat in New York. The responses from regional organisations to the UN proposals are also examined.

The UN General Assembly (UNGA)

Anyone familiar with the inner workings of the UN knows that the UN General Asembly is a rather unwieldy body for the formulation of UN policy. At each of its annual sessions, it adopts literally hundreds of floridly worded resolutions, which, on paper, make it appear as though it were a powerful body with the power to alter the course of international relations. International politics has dictated otherwise, however. The permanent members of the Security Council retain an overwhelming influence on the UN's peace and security agenda, whereas the Assembly remains an essentially deliberative body that oversees the UN's work and adopts broad priorities for the organisation and its myriad of specialised agencies.[31]

From time to time, certain peace and security issues have attracted the support of such a high number of UNGA members that the UN has been compelled to put them on its agenda, often despite the reluctance of major powers. Such was the case of the nuclear weapons free zone concept in the 1970s, for example.[32] Still, one cannot escape the fact that the practical relevance of the General Assembly's work has been questioned for decades. Today its overloaded annual agenda remains cluttered with dozens of repetitive or procedural items, which take up valuable time and often prevent it from playing a more relevant and timely role in current issues and problems facing the international community.

While UNGA has played a role in the initial review of *An Agenda for Peace* through an 'Informal Open-Ended Working Group' which was supportive of the Secretary-General's proposals, it is difficult to conclude that it has been at the forefront of UN policy development on conflict management issues. Rather, it has sanctioned already existing proposals and consolidated ideas put forth both by the UN Secretariat and individual member states. Nevertheless, regarding regional organisations specifically, there have been a number of recent resolutions that give the flavour of UNGA direction on this matter.

In December 1992, the Assembly adopted Resolution 47/120 on preventive diplomacy which, *inter alia*, called on the Secretary-General and the Security Council to consult, as appropriate, with regional organisations, in order to develop appropriate strategies for the peaceful settlement of disputes.[33] The wording of the resolution is ambiguous in its reference to the external/internal nature of disputes; the words settlement of disputes between 'parties' and 'states' are both used. But the resolution also states that the General Assembly "may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which is deemed likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations." Resolution 47/120 also called on regional organisations to "play a leading role in developing confidence-building measures appropriate to the region concerned and to coordinate their efforts in this regard with the United Nations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations."

A year later, in December 1993, UNGA adopted Resolution 48/42 on a comprehensive review of peacekeeping which, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to "review and improve arrangements for training civilian, police and military peace-keeping personnel, using the appropriate capabilities of Member States, regional organizations and arrangements, in accordance with their constitutional mandates and Chapter VIII of the Charter [...]".[34] The resolution encouraged the involvement of regional organisations and arrangements, as appropriate and "in accordance with their respective areas of competence", and welcomed efforts by the UN Secretariat to develop, in consultation with member states, a set of guidelines governing cooperation

between them and the UN. Finally, it also called on the UN to consider ways to provide advice and assistance to regional organisations and arrangements in order to enhance their capacity to cooperate with the United Nations in the field of peacekeeping operations.

Another relevant resolution adopted by UNGA in December 1994 emanates from the Special Charter Committee.[35] The 'Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Arrangements and Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security' (Resolution 49/57) is the final result of a Russian-sponsored draft declaration on which discussion first began in 1992.[36] This is a comprehensive statement covering most aspects of the conflict management spectrum (i.e. confidence building, early warning, fact finding, preventive diplomacy, peace observation, peacekeeping, peacemaking, enforcement, peace-building). Essentially, it reiterated the broad principles of Chapter VIII of the Charter; it sought to enhance cooperation and coordination between regional organisations and arrangements, and it encouraged the use or development of regional early-warning, conflict prevention and pacific settlement methods, as well as the development of regional capabilities in the field of peace observation, fact finding and peacekeeping.

Two other important aspects of this document are noteworthy. First, in its preamble the declaration underlined the necessity of respecting the principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-intervention. Second, the document stated that "cooperation between regional organisations or arrangements and the UN should conform to the former's respective mandates, scope and composition, and should take place in forms that are suited to each specific situation, in accordance with the Charter." It appears that this formulation has been adopted as a central operating principle by the UN Secretariat and the Security Council in light of the many coordination problems that surfaced in the 1992-1994 time frame between the UN and regional bodies.

There are, of course, a plethora of other recent UNGA resolutions or documents mentioning the role of regional organisations and arrangements. Attempting to list all of them here would be a pointless exercise. Of note is the long-standing UNGA practice of adopting declarations of cooperation between the UN and specific regional organisations, declarations that are adopted annually with almost predictable regularity. Of particular interest in this regard is the addition in 1993 of the CSCE (now OSCE) to the list of regional organisations that have formalised their relationship with the UN.[37] The recent evolution of the UN-OAU relationship is also noteworthy. An examination of 1994 and 1995 UNGA documents indicates that the OAU became the object of considerable UN attention in the conflict management field, having been singled out by the UN Secretariat and a

number of major states as one of the regional organisations most in need of international support.[38]

Finally, a statement by the 49th UNGA Session President, Amara Essy of the Ivory Coast, is also worthy of mention in this section.[39] Speaking at a UN seminar in Salzburg, Austria, in July 1995, the then president of the General Assembly made the remarkable suggestion that relations between the UN and regional organisations in the field of peacekeeping should be institutionalised along the lines of Article 63 of the UN Charter.[40] Article 63, which defines how a number of UN specialised agencies are brought into formal relationship with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), states that "[ECOSOC] may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies [...]". In essence, Essy argued for a much deeper formalisation of UN-regional organisations relations, with, one presumes, the Security Council as the hub and regional organisations as the spokes of the UN international security system.

It appears extremely unlikely that any existing regional organisation would agree to such an approach, either now or in the foreseeable future. If the logic of Article 63 were to be followed, then Essy's proposal would have the effect of reducing their autonomy vis-à-vis the UN. However, the inescapable reality appears to be that those proposals that would have precisely this effect are essentially doomed to irrelevance. It can also be noted that Essy's proposal did not exactly run parallel with the UN Secretariat's own thinking on the issue. Nevertheless, his suggestion was certainly not an isolated one. There have been other calls, particularly from the academic world, for a more formalised relationship between the UN and regional organisations.

The UN Security Council

In recent years, the Security Council has both acknowledged and welcomed the growing role of regional organisations and arrangements in the maintenance of peace and security. Be it in relation to specific conflicts in Central America, Africa, the Former Yugoslavia, the CIS, and others, the Council has generally embraced regional preventive diplomacy actions and regional peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in dozens of its resolutions. In their May 1993 final statement on the examination of *An Agenda for Peace*, the members of the Security Council called upon regional organisations and arrangements to "consider ways and means of enhancing their contributions to the maintenance of peace and security".[41] In the same document, the Council also expressed its readiness to "support and facilitate, taking into account

specific circumstances, peace-keeping efforts undertaken in the framework of regional organizations and arrangements in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter."

Individually, all the permanent members, bar China, have actively contributed to the UN debate on the matter.[42] An examination of recent P5 Heads of State and Foreign Ministers speeches at opening sessions of the UN General Assembly reveals that the role played by regional organisations in dealing with regional conflict has become an important issue. France and the United Kingdom have been especially concerned with the development of European regional organisations and the improvement of African conflict management capabilities.[43] For its part, Russia, which initiated the 1994 Declaration of Cooperation between the UN and Regional Organisations discussed in the previous section, has been eager to have the CIS recognised as a Chapter VIII organisation.[44]

Here a comment on the CIS is in order. Despite its wishes, Russia has been unsuccessful in its bid to have its peacekeeping troops granted 'blue-helmet' status by the UN, and it has thus far failed to reach an agreement with the OSCE on so-called 'third party' forces engaged in peacekeeping. Western countries have been extremely reluctant to grant Russian peacekeeping troops an exceptional status without some form of international oversight. Russia, on the other hand, has been generally opposed to UN or OSCE oversight on the grounds it constitutes interference in its affairs.

Tom Farer has argued that "nothing of consequence turns on the designation [as a Chapter VIII organisation]".[45] Russian diplomacy obviously believes otherwise, namely that such recognition does in fact put a legitimising blanket over Russian peacekeeping within the boundaries of the former Soviet Union, and that the formal recognition of the CIS at the UN (which was arguably granted in 1994) could constitute a basis for claiming UN financial assistance. Relevant precedents exist, for example, UN financial assistance (on a voluntary basis) to the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, and UN technical and financial assistance to the OAU's conflict management mechanism. The fact that ECOWAS, a Western African sub-regional organisation, is not generally recognised as a Chapter VIII organisation, probably makes it an even more relevant example from the Russian perspective.

The U.S. position towards regional organisations is summarised in the unclassified summary of PDD-25, the 1994 Presidential Decision Directive on multilateral operations. The document stated:

> In some cases, the appropriate way to perform peace operations will be to involve regional organizations. The U.S. will continue to emphasize the UN as the primary international body with the authority to conduct peacekeeping

> operations. At the same time, the U.S. will support efforts to improve regional organizations' peacekeeping capabilities.[46]

The same document also set a number of conditions for U.S. support for regional peacekeeping operations: 1) adherence to the principles of the UN Charter; 2) consent of the parties; 3) formal Security Council oversight; and 4) finite renewal mandates. Interestingly, the document expressed the view that requests for UN blue-helmeted operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union will be considered on the same basis as other requests, using the factors outlined previously. This could only be interpreted as an oblique statement to the effect that the United States was unwilling to accord special peacekeeping privileges to Russia. In practice, however, American policymakers have been restrained in their criticism of Russian peacekeeping, in part because they want to avoid damaging U.S.-Russia relations at a time when democratic forces in Russia are fairly weak, and also because the United States tacitly recognises that Russia does indeed have legitimate security interests in its so-called 'near abroad'.

Expressions of support for an enhanced role for regional organisations have also come from the G8.[47] For seven years in a row (1992-1998) G7/G78 summit declarations have supported various regional initiatives related to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.[48] Although the G8 is not technically an international agency with operational responsibilities, its powerful membership has a considerable say in the setting of the international security agenda, and its annual summits contribute to an important extent to the direction taken by what is referred to as the 'international community' on matters of high politics. Moreover, with its active role in the search for an end to the Kosovo conflict, this body is now seen as having considerable diplomatic potential. Apart from the four members of the Security Council now taking part in G8 political discussions (in 1995 Russia secured a seat in G7 political discussions, group explaining why the group is now referred to as the G8), it should be remembered that two other G8 members, Germany and Japan, are strong contenders for a seat at the UN Security Council if and when an enlargement of the Council becomes a genuine possibility.[49]

To leave the above overview at this point would be both insufficient and simplistic. It would be difficult to argue that the apparent embrace of the Security Council towards regional organisations has always represented a true vote of confidence. Praising regional efforts may make for good declaratory diplomacy, but recent experience indicates that many such demonstrations of institutional good neighbourliness have often masked institutional rivalries and political differences, or have led to unrealistic expectations as to what regional organisations and arrangements are really able to accomplish.

The fact is that in recent years, the Security Council has spent considerable time and effort reacting to situations which regional organisations or arrangements proved unable to resolve on their own despite the Council's backing of their efforts, be it in Somalia, Liberia, Haiti, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda. While it's true that in most of these situations it was never suggested that regional bodies should have 'ownership' of the conflict management process, in others it was. The EC's failed intercession in Yugoslavia (1991-1992), which was enacted on the principle that in the post-Cold War European states, through their common institutions, were best placed to solve European problems, is now a notorious example of the latter case.

The whole issue of Security Council support for regional action is further complicated by the knowledge that despite the Council's overture towards regional bodies, there has, in fact, not been a single example of an unequivocal Chapter VIII enforcement mandate given to a specific regional organisation in the 1990 to 1998 period. As seen earlier in this chapter, regional organisations are not formally required to obtain Security Council approval for undertaking peacekeeping operations. In principle, however, they do need it *before* undertaking enforcement actions. On that count, the recent practice of the Council, at least in the Bosnia case, has been to seek approval of the Council to authorise limited or specific enforcement actions by NATO under Chapter VII of the Charter. One hastens to note, however, that this was done *after* the NATO membership had already decided to contemplate such action; a reality that simply underlines the national interests behind much of the UN Security Council's decision-making..

Responses from regional organisations

In January 1993, the Security Council invited Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to seek replies from regional organisations and arrangements on the proposals of the *Agenda* with a view to promoting the ideas contained therein and to solicit proposals on how to improve inter-institutional coordination.[50] A wide variety of organisations responded to the Secretary-General's calls, but it is relevant to note that some important regional groupings, such as ASEAN and the GCC, did not, to the knowledge of the author, present submissions.[51]

The replies received from the major regional organisations followed an interesting pattern. Transatlantic and European organisations (CSCE, NATO, EC, WEU) recalled their recent activities in the field of conflict management, particularly in the former Yugoslavia. They expressed general support for the ideas contained in *An Agenda*, and they stressed that their activities had, in many cases, been undertaken in support of the UN or the CSCE (now OSCE) mandates or decisions. The CSCE highlighted the need for better cooperation amongst European organisations in order

to make full use of available resources, while both it and the EC mentioned the need for flexibility in dealing with each specific situation. Both NATO and the CSCE suggested improving the flow and quality of communication with and from the UN.

NATO, the OSCE and the EC/EU have had to rapidly adapt their structures in the context of what can only be qualified as an uncertain, but evolving, European institutional environment.[52] While these developments are still under way, with NATO grappling with the enlargement issue, the EC/EU assuming greater security responsibilities, and the OSCE consolidating its activities, all three organisations did enfold in some way or another the general concepts of *An Agenda for Peace* in their respective mission statements, though their implementation in real situations often proved extremely problematic.

The response of the Arab League and the OAS contrasted with those from transatlantic and European organisations. In its curt reply to the UN Secretariat, the League failed to produce a substantial response to *An Agenda* but stressed that its position, apparently to be communicated to the UN Secretariat 'at the appropriate time' would be based on the principles of its 1945 Charter, particularly those that affirmed the right of every state to 'sovereignty and freedom'.[53] For its part, the OAS went to considerable lengths to reassert the autonomy of the inter-American system vis-à-vis the UN, its reply to the UN Secretariat stating:

> [The] OAS could not be a mere executor of decisions issuing from the United Nations. Any attempt to establish collaboration on the basis of prescription by one organization to the other would vitiate the concept of cooperation. [...] The potential conflict between the desired collaboration and the instruments suggested for establishing it would be even greater if the United Nations ever came to define the fields of action and/or the procedures or instruments of the regional organization. Such normative definitions would generate greater controversy if it were attempted to apply them to existing organizations with their own structures, legal basis and modes of operation.[54]

The rigidity of the OAS statement was unsurprising given the origins of Chapter VIII. Still, in the immediate post-Cold War period where the UN was at the centre of international attention, the OAS response was a strong reminder of that organisation's traditional desire for autonomy and of the caveats of adopting a centre-periphery approach to UN cooperation with regional organisations.

Contrary to the Arab League and the OAS, the OAU took the Secretary-General's proposals on board with more enthusiasm, as they corresponded to its own institutional efforts, through the development of its new 'Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution' to improve its organic capabilities. The success of the OAU Mechanism was said to "require the OAU to cooperate and work closely with the United Nations, not only with regard to issues relating to peacemaking but, and especially, also those relating to peace-keeping".[55] Given the OAU's chronic

lack of financial resources, the organisation based its response on a comparative advantage concept. The OAU's original thinking was that the UN was best equipped to carry out peace operations on the African continent while the OAU should carry out less financially draining tasks such as preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. In light of the Security Council's failure to intervene more forcefully in Rwanda, however, the OAU Secretariat subsequently revised its position and is now advocating greater African responsibility in keeping peace on the continent.[56]

The first UN-regional organisations summit (August 1994)

The result of the first exchange of views on *An Agenda* did not prove to be particularly fruitful in terms of specific proposals for improving coordination between both levels of organisation. Still, the issue had been declared an area of priority by the Security Council and Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was keen to make progress on the issue. The institutional dialogue was therefore taken a step further with the holding of the first ever summit between the UN and regional organisations in August 1994. Ten regional organisations (five of them European, none from Asia) were represented at the senior or Secretary-General level.[57] The UN was represented by Boutros-Ghali and the then Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding.

In a forthright speech to the delegates Boutros-Ghali presented his revised vision of UN/regional organisations cooperation after two years at the helm of the world organisation.[58] He emphasised that the UN could not act in all situations and that the time had come to make full use of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Therefore he set as the goal of the meeting the study of ways to improve the planning of joint activities.

He identified three areas where regional organisations "should play a more active role": 1) the peaceful settlement of disputes; 2) peacekeeping in the broad sense of the term (including preventive diplomacy, peace-building and confidence building); and 3) the possible implementation of coercive measures. His speech stressed the need for cooperation, decentralisation, delegation and democratisation between the UN and regional organisations. Yet at the same time he reaffirmed the primacy of the authority of the Security Council with regard to coercive measures. When undertaken by regional organisations, he stated, such activities "should be conducted with the permission, under the control and on the authority of the Security Council".[59] Boutros-Ghali concluded that there was a need for 'real' guidelines of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in three areas: political cooperation, operational cooperation and financial cooperation.

Judging by the response of regional organisations during the meeting, the agenda set by the Secretary-General seemed overly ambitious. A summary of

discussions prepared by the UN Secretariat lists a series of intervention or comments by specific regional organisations.[60] Few decisions were taken during the meeting and only broad conclusions were agreed to. For example, on the division of labour issues, participants agreed on the need for flexibility, pragmatism and a case-by-case rather than universal approach to institutional cooperation. This had been the custom over the years and did not represent a particularly novel point of view. On the issue of responsibility for securing world peace, participants were in broad agreement that the UN, and in particular the Security Council, bore the primary and ultimate responsibility for world peace. Intimations to the contrary would have been quite surprising. On the issue of resources, many participants saw the lack of financial and other resources as the single most important obstacle to promote the launching and maintenance of regional activities to promote peace.[61] Again, insufficient funding of peace-related activities is hardly a new issue for many regional bodies, and it is certainly not for the UN itself.

One area where the meeting seems to have been more productive concerns the question of the exchange of information. Many delegations agreed that the key to closer and better cooperation between the UN and regional organisations lay in a smoother exchange of information. A number of concrete suggestions were made in this respect, many of them stemming from the experience of UN-regional organisations cooperation in the former Yugoslavia.[62] On the whole, however, the meeting fell short of the UN Secretariat's aim of establishing more precise guidelines for cooperation. In reality, the opposite result would have been surprising. It is difficult to envision high-ranking officials committing their institutions to financial, operational or political guidelines without first referring them to their respective memberships.

The UN Secretariat

Within the UN Secretariat, the functions outlined in *An Agenda for Peace* (early warning, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, etc.) are performed by different responsibility centres.[63] Responsibility for liaising with regional organisations rests primarily with the Secretariat's Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).[64] Following the 1992 reorganisation of labour within the UN Secretariat, the DPA was charged with preventive diplomacy and peacemaking functions, whereas the DPKO was given responsibility for the planning and implementation of military, civilian and electoral aspects of peacekeeping operations.[65]

While the UN bureaucracy is in charge of implementing or developing policies that have been broadly decided upon by the Security Council or the General

Assembly, the drive to enhance the role of regional organisations at the UN was in large measure imparted by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali himself, not the UN bureaucracy. In many respects, the issue remained one of the Secretary-General's favourite 'hobby horses', and on a number of occasions Boutros-Ghali placed over-optimistic expectations on the potential of regional bodies to prevent or manage crisis situations.

There is evidence to suggest that some of Boutros-Ghali's most senior bureaucrats did not fully share his enthusiasm for the regional approach to resolving conflict. Marrack Goulding, then Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs and former head of peacekeeping at the UN, privately admitted that he did not believe that regional organisations had the capacity to react quickly and decisively to crises that threatened international peace and security, identifying the exercise of consensus decision making, lack of financial and material resources, under-equipped secretariats, and lack of impartiality as major problem areas for many of these organisations.[66] Another high-ranking DPA official with experience in UN field operations told the author that some regional organisations often regarded the UN as a rival rather than a collaborator.[67] He identified the 'need for distance' as a major consideration; regional organisations were often too close to the problem to take effective action. He also cited inter-institutional coordination as a major problem area, highlighting the cases of the UN Operation in Central America (ONUCA) where UN-OAS relations apparently proved so poor that a decision was made to make ONUCA's offshoot, ONUSAL, a purely UN operation, and the management of UN-CSCE relations regarding the situation in the Caucasus (specifically, in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh), where there had been poor coordination between the two organisations.

There is further evidence that the UN bureaucracy was not altogether optimistic as to the prospects for effective regional peacekeeping. In 1993, the DPKO undertook what it called an 'analysis of regional organisations involved in peacekeeping'.[68] The result of this project, which was completed in April 1994, was an unofficial report entitled *Regional Organisations and Peacekeeping*.[69] The report covered the broad principles of UN peacekeeping and examined the involvement of three regional organisations (OAS, OAU, ECOWAS) in that field.[70] Interestingly, there was no discussion of the peacekeeping role of European/transatlantic organisations. The author of the report concluded that prospects for effective regional peacekeeping were generally not very good, and that the disadvantages of regional peacekeeping often outweighed possible benefits. Prospects for joint UN-regional action were also deemed problematic; the best scenario for joint cooperation was a situation where a preference was expressed for regional peacekeeping, but with UN support.

Special UN support for African peacekeeping

As discussed earlier, the UN's relationship with the OAU was the object of considerable attention during Boutros-Ghali's term in office. Given the extent of UN involvement in trying to resolve African conflicts since the beginning of the 1990s, and the strong personal interest of Boutros-Ghali for African affairs, this is perhaps not surprising. Since the Somalia and Rwanda debacles, however, there has been a major decline in international support for UN interventionism on the continent. Donor fatigue no doubt contributed to this trend, the UN having reportedly spent $5 billion on peacekeeping activities in Africa, most of it in Somalia, between 1991 and 1995.[71] More than anything, however, Western countries were stepping away from getting directly involved in African civil wars under the UN flag. Their earlier enthusiasm for intervention on the continent had led to such controversy that international support for 'robust' UN peacekeeping operations in Africa effectively dissolved.

In the aftermath of the 1994 Rwanda genocide, supporting the development of African conflict resolution capabilities became priority issues for the UN and many Western countries. However, evidence shows that major powers were initially more eager to launch national initiatives than to work through the UN on this issue. Great Britain announced an African peacekeeping initiative in September 1994. France and the United States followed suit separately shortly thereafter.[72] In early 1995, the UN Secretariat redoubled its efforts in this matter, prodded along by Security Council members trying to keep the momentum going on trying to improve African conflict resolution capabilities.[73]

In March 1995, the DPKO produced an internal concept paper, entitled *Improving Preparedness for Peace-keeping in Africa: An Informal Note*.[74] It discussed various measures that could eventually be undertaken to support the development of African peacekeeping capabilities, including such issues as personnel and training, equipment, planning, support to the OAU Mechanism, and financing. An expanded report on the same subject was submitted to the General Assembly by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in November 1995.[75] In it Boutros-Ghali reasserted the centrality of the UN role in keeping the peace in Africa. However, he proposed a more direct UN involvement in the improvement of African peacekeeping capabilities, both on a national basis and through support for the OAU or other African sub-regional organisations. If one read between the lines, this report reinforced the prevailing post-Rwanda perception that African states should play a larger military role in keeping the peace on the continent as key western nations were simply not prepared to intervene further militarily on a systematic basis.

Recasting the Vision: The *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* (1995)

In early January 1995, two-and-a-half years after submitting his original *Agenda for Peace*, the UN Secretary-General submitted his *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* to the Security Council.[76] The UN's 50th anniversary year seemed an appropriate moment for the Secretary-General to review the work of the organisation in its most crucial of functions, the maintenance of international peace and security. The *Supplement* was an attempt to update the *Agenda* in light of the considerable experience gained since 1992. It also came after two extremely difficult years for the UN, which had led to a sobering reappraisal of *Agenda for Peace* concepts in many national capitals. Although the UN had had presided over some major conflict management successes during that period, the political fallout of successive setbacks in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia, Rwanda led to a growing rift between the UN Secretariat and the members of Security Council.

Most of the *Supplement* was dedicated to a reassessment of what Boutros-Ghali termed the 'instruments for peace and security', those concepts and measures he had proposed in *An Agenda for Peace*: early warning, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, post-conflict peace-building, etc. It is perhaps particularly important to highlight the report's conclusion on enforcement because of its potential significance regarding regional organisations. In the *Supplement*, Boutros-Ghali candidly admitted "neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this purpose, except perhaps on a very limited scale".[77] Given his earlier proposals to create UN peace-enforcement units and his eagerness to intervene forcefully in Somalia, this can only be seen as an admission of failure. Still, he reasserted his belief that an organic UN enforcement capacity would be desirable in the long-term.

Whether the UN should have an organic enforcement capability - a 'UN army' as it is often simplistically proposed - is the object of a long-standing debate amongst scholars and practitioners.[78] There is one unswerving political reality that cannot be escaped, however; P5 countries do not at present support such a proposal nor are they likely to do so in the foreseeable future.[79] Responsibility for enforcement actions, therefore, remains guided by the political will and interests of the permanent members of the Security Council acting either through regional agencies or, more likely, through coalitions.

The *Supplement* cited Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia as examples of the coalition approach, an approach not dissimilar, in fact, to the approach adopted by leading international powers in mustering support for military deployments in Korea (1950-1953) and in Kuwait (1990-1991). Although the Secretary-General raised some caveats about resorting to such measures, such as their possible impact on UN

credibility and legitimacy, the *Supplement* effectively endorsed what has often been called the 'willing and able' model of enforcement action in the absence of a UN enforcement capability.

In its section on coordination, the *Supplement* treated the ongoing problems of the UN in lucid fashion. The document discussed the range of pressing challenges: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building: coordination with informal groups of states, coordination with regional organisations, coordination with non-governmental organisations, and coordination amongst UN agencies and departments. Of all these issues, the question of regional organisations received the most comprehensive treatment and the document constitutes a milestone in the evolution of the post-Cold War UN debate on regional organisations. No other UN document up to that point had gone this far in attempting to clarify the organisation's relationship with regional groupings.

Basing itself on past and current UN experience, the *Supplement* identified five different forms of UN-Regional organisations cooperation: 1) consultation; 2) diplomatic support; 3) operational support; 4) co-deployment; 5) joint operations.[80] A sixth category, technical support, was later added to this list by Kofi Annan, then Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.[81]

What was of fundamental importance about this categorisation is that, first, it was based on actual experience and precedents rather than on prescription, and second, it demonstrated the range of possibilities for cooperation. Moreover, even though it did not address the critical question of qualitative effectiveness, it went a long way toward disarming the arguments of the proponents of a 'sub-contractant' relationship between the UN and regional organisations by effectively demonstrating that this had not been the direction taken in the recent past. The *Supplement* recognised that regional organisations have varying capabilities, mandates and decision-making processes which made a universal model of cooperation inappropriate.[82] Therefore, the report suggested, cooperation ought to be based on a set of principles rather than tied to a specific formula. Those principles included:

- Agreed mechanisms for consultation should be established, but need not be formal;
- Respect for the primacy of the UN on peace and security issues;
- A clearly defined and agreed upon division of labour on specific conflicts;
- Consistency by members of the UN as well as by members of regional organizations, in dealing with common problems.

The first two principles are fairly uncontroversial. The latter two, however, are much more problematic. The division of labour issue is clearly an area where major

problems have arisen in the recent past, whether in the former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus or Central America. And if the past is any indication of the future, such problems will arise again, especially in highly volatile situations where a pre-ordained division of labour might become irrelevant due to rapidly changing developments on the ground, a situation all too familiar to the UN. One should also note that in the *Supplement* the UN seems to be advocating a division of labour after a problem has been identified. This can only be viewed as a sensible strategy. However, it obviously depends on the existence of a political consensus on which institutions should play which role. As the Yugoslav conflict clearly demonstrated, that consensus may take quite some time to develop.

The question of consistency also remains a contentious issue. The *Supplement* argued that states belonging to the UN as well as to one or many regional organisations should seek to be more consistent in dealing with problems of common interest, citing peacekeeping standards as one such area.[83] The problem is obvious: the principles that have underpinned the deployment of past and present regional peacekeeping efforts have not always run a parallel course with the UN's own principles in that field. This obviously raises the larger question of compatibility between the UN and regional approaches to security. Certain states may agree to UN statements regarding UN/regional cooperation while at the same time pursuing different agendas at the regional level. As for peacekeeping proper, lacking a clear and unequivocal commitment from regional organisations that they will adopt UN peacekeeping principles, one wonders exactly how consistency in that field is to be achieved in practice. The *Supplement* did not advance any specific proposals on this important matter.

In April 1995, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping (the so-called C-34) took up the issue of consistency during its annual session. Some countries belonging to the Neutral and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) who were present at the session suggested that a declaration of UN peacekeeping principles be developed based on the NAM Cairo Summit declaration of June 1994 that spelled out a set of guiding principles for peacekeeping. However, several of the NAM guidelines were judged to be too restrictive by a number of Western countries, notably those related to international intervention in situations of internal conflicts.

The *Supplement* remains an important document. But even more important is how its recommendations will be implemented in the future. Following its publication the Security Council held a debate with 40 delegations present (including the 15 members of the Security Council) in mid-January 1995. Most of the discussions focussed on preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping issues, and little time was devoted to the coordination theme. Nevertheless, it appears that recommendations on coordination were endorsed by a majority of delegations even though many of

them stressed that a majority of regional organisations, with the exception NATO, lacked the resources to play a major role in peace support operations.[84] Later in 1995, a working group was formed as a follow up mechanism to the *Supplement*. It was divided into a number of sub-working groups, each examining one or more themes found in the *Supplement*: preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, enforcement, post-conflict peace building, sanctions, coordination, etc. These different groups were to prepare a number of recommendations and present them to the UN General Assembly in 1996.

The second UN-regional organisations summit (February 1996)

The second UN-regional organisations summit took place in February 1996, a year after the publication of the *Supplement*.[85] In his opening statement to the delegates present, Boutros-Ghali noted that the UN was facing the most severe financial crisis in its history, making the search for a division of labour between the UN and regional organisations more urgent than ever. He called on delegates to move beyond discussion on general principles in order to consider more immediate and practical aspects of UN-regional organisations relations.[86]

A summary of discussions held at the meeting lists few such suggestions, however.[87] The discussion focussed mainly on four different topics: the different forms of UN-regional organisations cooperation, the principles of cooperation enunciated in the 1995 *Supplement* (on which there was general agreement), the need to agree to clearly defined institutional responsibilities, and the apparent weakness of the link between conflict prevention/resolution and post-conflict recovery efforts. Furthermore, regional organisations present accepted that in principle there should be a consistency of standards in the execution of different conflict management activities.

Overall, the conclusions of the second UN-regional organisations meeting did not depart substantially from the 1995 discussion on the *Supplement*. In its summary of the regional organisations issue, the sub-working group on coordination (chaired by Norway) tabled a provisional text in early July 1996 that essentially summarised the elements found in the 1995 *Supplement* and in the February 1996 discussions.[88]

By that time, it is fair to say that there was a general loss of interest in the consultation/discussion process.[89] The combined effects of the Rwanda disaster and of UN helplessness in Bosnia had severely damaged the political credibility of the organisation, and the UN's acute financial crisis was having very negative repercussions on the UN's peace agenda and, importantly, on the morale of UN staffers in New York. Furthermore, the UN's membership itself was decidedly unenthusiastic about more prolonged discussions on peace and security issues. This was particularly true of developing countries that lamented the neglect of the UN's

social and economic agenda while peace and security issues had gotten the lion's share of the West's attention since the beginning of the 1990s. Considering the evolution of UN outlays dedicated to peacekeeping between 1990 and 1995 this was not an entirely inaccurate perception. The UN peacekeeping budget increased more than tenfold during this period, whereas its general budget – which deals with social and economic programs as well as general administrative expenses – stagnated as a result of the zero-growth policy insisted upon by industrialised countries, and more particularly by the United States. Indeed, the Secretary-General's *Agenda for Development*, tabled in 1994, did not generate anywhere near the level of interest from Western countries in comparison to peacekeeping-related issues.

Concluding Remarks

The relation between the UN and regional organisations remains an extremely complex issue. To try to reduce it simply to a question of comparative advantage, or to a hierarchy-based model of conflict management where the UN acts a 'director' organisation, contradicts the evidence presented in this chapter. Many factors affect the UN-regional organisations relationship: legal, political and military. Often the influence of these factors is clearly identifiable. In other circumstances their influence is subtler, having more to do with historic contexts or long-term political trends than with organisational logic. Here we can only remind ourselves that the question of the role regional organisations issue has a long history in the context of the UN, and that, still today, that context looms high above official discussions on the matter.

The shape and substance of the current debate on regional organisations has nevertheless pointed to some possible future directions, especially with the publication of the *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* in 1995. First, the question of institutional resources, both financial and otherwise, has been recognised as a major issue. Few regional organisations have the financial means to sustain expensive peacekeeping operations or undertake costly post-conflict recovery projects. Many of them, in fact, are simply not organised to undertake such tasks. Second, given these shortcomings, a majority of regional organisations have acknowledged the experience of the UN in carrying out conventional peacekeeping. Though the paradox here is that more and more of them are getting involved in the peacekeeping field at a time when the importance of traditional peacekeeping is subsiding somewhat. And finally, decisions on major enforcement actions are still largely made and carried out by a small group of powerful nations. This remains as true today as it was in the early postwar years.

The general consensus that seemed to emerge from the UN debate on regional organisations in the early 1990s is that the potential strength of regional institutions was located in the lower ranges of the conflict management spectrum; in early

warning, in trying to prevent conflicts before they erupt, and in certain cases in peacemaking processes. However, recent experience in the Balkans and in Central Africa seem to demonstrate that immutable rules do not really exist in such matters, and that the existence of a 'potential' regional capability does not easily translate into effective regional action.

The UN debate on regional organisations should be seen as one aspect of a much larger debate on regionalism and international governance. Each regional system is different, and the influence and power of initiative accorded to regional bodies varies widely. Some regional organisations have become involved in peacekeeping where the UN would not. Others have failed dismally to prevent or manage conflicts in their own area in spite of apparent strengths. The following chapter will present a detailed examination of the evolution and experiences of regional organisations in the 1990s.

Notes

1 For an analysis of the problems of reforming the management and conduct of UN peacekeeping operations see Mats R. Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping*, Adelphi Paper 281, London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, October 1993.

2 The United States government has been opposed both to a standing UN military force and to the handing over of command authority over U.S. forces to a UN chain of command for quite some time. These positions were formally reiterated in the 1993/1994 review of multilateral operations known as Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PPD-25). However, it cannot be argued that the U.S. has always been opposed to the idea of a 'stand-by UN force'. Indeed, in his August 1958 speech to the UN General Assembly, President Eisenhower had argued precisely in favour of the creation of such a force. However, his proposal was quickly reinterpreted by his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, as U.S. support for a UN force that could intervene to counter 'indirect' (read communist) aggression. For a summary of PPD-25 see "United States: Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations", *International Legal Materials*, vol. XXXIII, no. 3, May 1994, pp. 795-813.

3 Boutros-Ghali's doctoral dissertation was published under the title *Contribution à l'étude des ententes régionales*, Paris, Pédone, 1949. He also published eleven other books as well as innumerable articles on Arab and African law and politics, notably in the Arabic journal *Magallat al-siyassat al-dawliyat* and in the *Revue égyptienne de droit international*.

4 His continuing interest was demonstrated by the fact that one of his very first non-official publications after becoming UN Secretary-General was a text on regional arrangements. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Les ententes régionales et la construction de la paix", *Défense Nationale*, 48th year, October 1992, pp. 11-20.

5 In the following pages I draw many of my arguments from Ruth B. Russell's seminal *A History of the United Nations Charter – The Role of the United States 1940-1945*, Washington D. C., Brookings, 1958.

6 Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulated that "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." For an overview of the debate on regional security in the League of Nations see Constantin Svolopoulos, "La Sécurité régionale et la Société des Nations", in *The League of Nations in Retrospect*, Berlin - New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1983, pp. 266-281.

7 For an overview of the Australian position on regionalism during the San Francisco conference see W. J. Hudson, *Australia and the New World Order: Evatt at San Francisco, 1945*, Australian Foreign Policy Papers, Canberra, Australian National University, 1993, pp. 83-86.

8 Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, p. 256. My enumeration is a synthesis of Russell's own.

9 Consultations with China were held separately during the so-called 'China phase' or second part of the Dunbarton Oaks Conference.

10 The original debates on regionalism are published in the the official records of the San Francisco Conference, otherwise known as the UNCIO Documents. For the debates on regional arrangements see United Nations Information Organizations and Library of Congress, *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization - San Francisco 1945*, vol. III, *Dunbarton Oaks Proposals*, London-New York, 1945, and; United Nations Information Organizations and Library of Congress, *Docs of the United Nations Conference on International Organization - San Francisco 1945*, vol. XII, *Security Council*, London-New York, 1945.

11 Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, p. 472.

12 Obviously the American delegation present at the Conference didn't have the same interpretation of the event as Latin Americans countries did, even though it had been a full participant and signatory of the Act. The official State Department report on Chapultepec stated that the Act of Chapultepec, the section of the Final Act that dealt with Inter-American Arrangements (Part VIII), was "fully in harmony with that part of the Dunbarton Oaks proposals which had to do with regional arrangements". Two months later, the Americans found at San Francisco that the Dunbarton Oaks provisions for regional arrangements had in fact aroused considerable controversy with Latin Americans countries. See U.S. Department of State, *Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace - Mexico City, Mexico, February 21-March 8, 1945*, Conference Series 85, Washington D.C., G.P.O., 1946, p. 18.

13 The Pan American Union (PAU) was founded before WW I. In 1889, U.S Secretary of State James G. Blaine had convened a conference with 17 American republics, and at the end of the conference, in April 1890, participating countries decided to create a Bureau of American Republics in Washington D.C. to exchange commercial information. By 1913, the Bureau of American Republics had evolved into the Pan American Union.

14 Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter*, p. 690.

15 See p. 11 for the text of Article 51.

16 In fact, the former came to constitute one of the conflict settlement mantras of the Organization of American States (OAS) – the 'OAS first' rule – in the years following the foundation of the organisation in 1948.

17 *UNCIO Documents*, vol. XII, p. 857.

18 A detailed legal interpretation of Chapter VIII is presented in Jean-Pierre Cot et Alain Pellet (eds.), *La Charte des Nations Unies*, Paris, Economica, 1985. See also *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, vol. 6, *Regional Cooperation, Organizations and Problems*, New York Elsevier Science Publishers, 1983, pp. 289-295; Frederic L. Kirgis, *International Organizations in Their Legal Setting*, 2nd ed., St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing, 1993, pp. 708-713.

19 For a description of those events in relation to Chapter VIII see Walter L. Williams Jr, *Intergovernmental Military Forces and World Public Order*, Dobbs Ferry N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1971, pp. 325-340.

20 Resolution 788 (19 November 1992) supporting ECOWAS efforts in Liberia, one of the relatively rare occasions when the Council did mention Chapter VIII, is an interesting case for international jurists. In the preamble to the resolution, the Council "recalled the provisions of Chapter VIII of the [UN] Charter". From a legal perspective the main issue for ECOWAS was whether SC Res. 788 amounted to an authorisation to use force under Art. 53 (1) of the Charter. While not explicit on the issue of use of force, the resolution can be said to have offered an endorsement of ECOMOG actions.

21 As part of the recognition process, the League was finally invited to attend the sessions of the UN General Assembly in November 1950. See Clovis Maksoud, "Diminished Sovereignty, Enhanced Sovereignty: United Nations-Arab League Relations at 50", *Middle East Journal*, vol. 49, no. 4, Autumn 1995, p. 583.

22 From a legal perspective it is possible that member states of the regional organisation could invoke the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the *Certain Expenses of the United Nations* case (1962), and argue that if the Security Council adopts a resolution for the maintenance of international peace and security mandating – as opposed to authorising – a regional organisation to carry out enforcement action – then the financial obligations incurred by the regional organisation in carrying out the resolution could constitute expenses of the UN and therefore be paid through assessed UN contributions.

23 Tom J. Farer, "A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention", in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), *Enforcing Restraint – Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, p. 320.

24 It also remains a hotly debated topic. Speaking in New York at the UN's 50th Anniversary Summit in October 1995, just after NATO air raids on Bosnian Serbs positions had taken place, Russian president Boris Yeltsin declared that it was "inadmissible for a regional organisation to make decisions on the mass use of force by bypassing the Security Council". Given the use of force by Russian 'peacekeeping' forces in Tajikistan and other locations, however, Yeltsin's statement appears somewhat inconsistent with Russia's own policies.

25 Article 2(4) of the Charter stipulates that "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations". Article 2(7) stipulates that "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII".

26 The literature on this issue is extensive. See, among others, John Mackinlay, and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations", *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 15, no. 3, Summer 1992, pp. 113-134; Alan James, "Internal Peace-Keeping: A Dead End for the UN?", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 24, no. 4, December 1993, pp. 359-368; Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights", *International Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 3, July 1993, pp. 429-449; Thomas, G. Weiss, "Intervention: Wither the United Nations", *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 1, Winter 1994, pp. 109-127, and Weiss's "The United Nations and Civil Wars", *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 1994, pp. 139-159. See also William J. Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, New York, St Martin's Press, 1993; Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993; Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (eds.), *A Crisis of Expectations – UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s*, Boulder Co., Westview Press, 1995.

27 Western scholars have long recognized the ambiguity of Article 2(7). D.W. Grieg, for example, wrote that "although the attempt is still made to define Article 2(7) in legal terms [...], the conclusion seems inescapable that it is largely disregarded as an inconvenient potential limitation on UN action". D.W. Grieg, *International Law*, 2nd edition, London, Butterworth's, 1976, p. 407.

28 Comment made by David Malone, senior diplomat in Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs, during the 'Engineering Transitions' conference, Ottawa, April 28, 1995.

29 See the following Boutros-Ghali texts and statements, "Les Ententes Régionales et la Construction de la Paix", *Défense Nationale*, 48th year, October 1992, pp. 11-20; "An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later", *Orbis*, vol. 37, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 323-333. See also UN Documents SG/SM/4929 (17 February 1993), A/47/965-S/25944 (15 June 1993), SG/SM/5014 (17 June 1993).

30 In the case of the United States, the Somalia debacle brought the demise of the Clinton Administration's short-lived policy of 'assertive multilateralism' and was the catalyst behind the 1993/1994 reassessment of U.S. policy on multilateral operations (PPD-25). See note 2.

31 Lest it be forgotten, the General Assembly also adopts the UN's budget through a complex process involving the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the General Assembly's Fifth Committee (Budget).

32 See Michael Hamel-Green, "The UN Role in Facilitating Regional Denuclearisation and Arms Control" (paper presented at The United Nations: Between Sovereignty and Global Governance? Conference, La Trobe University, Melbourne, - July 2-6, 1995).

33 UN Doc. A/RES/47/120 (18 December 1992).

34 UN Doc. A/RES/48/42 (10 December 1993).

35 Otherwise known as the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on Strengthening the role of the Organisation.

36 See the *Declaration on the strengthening of cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations and Arrangements in the field of peace-keeping and international security*, UN Doc. A/RES/49/57 (9 December 1994). The original Russian draft declaration can be found in UN Doc. A/AC.182/L. 72 (30 January 1992). Substantial revisions made to the draft declaration between 1992 and 1994. Efforts were obviously made to steer away from a statement of broad principles in order to produce a more pragmatic Doc..

37 Following the 1992 CSCE Helsinki Summit decision declaring the CSCE to be a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the CSCE has, since May 1993, gained observer status at UNGA. In a clear demonstration of the recognition process for gaining 'Chapter VIII' status, the Security Council officially acknowledged the CSCE declaration. See UN Doc. S/25184 (28 January 1993). A number of major regional organisations have observer status at the UN General Assembly, a status that is often associated with a bilateral agreement of cooperation with the UN. Among these organisations are the Arab League, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the European Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the OSCE. Regional bodies that have a political-military orientation, such as NATO or the WEU, are absent from this group, as is ASEAN.

38 See in particular UN Documents A/50/575 (17 October 1995), A/50/575/Add. 1 (17 November 1995) and A/50/711–S/1995/911 (1 November 1995). Genuine movement on this issue is attributable to two specific factors: (1) the adoption by the OAU, in 1993, of its new conflict mangement 'mechanism', and (2) the American, French, and British conflict management initiatives in Africa which followed in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwanda disaster.

39 Essy was the 1994-1995 president of the UN General Assembly and subsequently became the Foreign Minister of Côte D'Ivoire. Following the Clinton Administration's announcement that it would oppose a second term in office for Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Essy became one of the four leading African candidates for the post of Secretary-General.

40 UN Doc. GA/8894 (8 August 1995).

41 UN Doc. S/25859 (28 May 1993).

42 One of the few comments attributed to a Chinese official on the issue of regional organisations is the statement reportedly made in 1996 by Ambassador Wang Xuexian of China to the UN's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Said Xuexian: "Peacekeeping operations by some regional organisations have shown some unhealthy tendencies, manifested in focussing on the use of military means and even bypassing the Security Council." See "Debts Undermine UN Peacekeeping", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 27, no. 1, 8 January 1997, p. 20.

43 See, for example, *Statement to the 49th Session of the United Nations General Assembly by the Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd CBE MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Kingdom and Northern Ireland*, New York, UK Mission to the United Nations, 28 September 1994; *Intervention de S.E. M. Alain Juppé, ministre des Affaires étrangères, devant la 49ième session de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations unies*, New York, Mission Permanente de la France auprès des Nations unies, 28 septembre 1994.

44 This information was made available to the author in a non-attributable context. It is to be noted that in his 1995 speech to the 50th General Assembly, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev declared that "Russia, together with its CIS partners, expects the UN to radically change its attitude to peace-making problems in our part of the world". See *Address by H.E. Andrei V. Kozyrev minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the UN General Assembly*, New York, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, 26 September 1995, p. 7.

45 See Tom Farer, "A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention", p. 337.

46 "United States: Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations", *International Legal Materials*, vol. XXXIII, no. 3, May 1994, pp. 795-813. PPD-25 remains a classified document. Only an unclassified summary of its key elements was released by the State Department.

47 The United States, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, Canada and Italy. Russia was granted participation in the G7 political talks at the Halifax G7 Summit of 1995. This enlarged group was originally referred to as the P8 (Political 8). It is now designated as the G8. The G7 still exists, but deals essentially with international economic issues.

48 *Chairman's [German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's] Statement*, Munich G7 Summit, July 6-8, 1992; *Tokyo Summit Political Declaration*, Tokyo G7 Summit, July 6-9, 1993; *Chairman's Statement (Political)*, Naples G7 Summit, July 8-10 1994; *Chairman's Statement*, Halifax G7 Summit, June 15-17, 1995; *Chairman's Statement: Toward Greater Security And Stability in a More Cooperative World*, Lyon G7 Summit, June 29, 1996; *Denver Summit of the Eight Communique*, Denver G7/G8 Summit, June 22, 1997;

49 The symbolism of the new G8 designation is extremely important for Russia. It reflects its demands for inclusion in one of the worlds most exclusive bodies, and also, its wishes to be recognised by the West as a leading international power.

50 UN Doc. S/25184 (28 January 1993).

51 Ten organisations answered the call: the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, the Arab League, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Central African Customs and Economic Union, the Commonwealth, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the European Community (EC), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Western European Union (WEU). See UN Documents S/25996 (15 June 1993), S/25996/Add.1 (14 July 1993), S/25996/Add.2 (30 July 1993), S/25996/Add.3 (1 September 1993), S/25996/Add.4 (14 October 1993).

52 The names OSCE and EU are used here rather than CSCE and EC. The OSCE acquired it new name at the December 1994 CSCE Summit in Budapest. The EU's case is slightly more problematic since it is the EC, and not the EU, which was granted observer status at the UN (in 1974). Today, however, it is the EU's executive institutions that are tasked with coordinating the development of a common European foreign and security policy.

53 UN Doc. S/25996 (15 June 1993), section C.

54 *Ibid.*, section D.

55 UN Doc. S/25996/Add.3 (1 September 1993).

56 OAU Doc. CM/1883 (21-23 June 1995).

57 Represented at the meeting were the Arab League, the CIS, the Commonwealth, the CSCE, the EU, NATO, the OAU, the OAS, the OIC, and the WEU. The presidents of the General Assembly and of the Security Council were also present.

58 UN Doc. SG/SM/5382 (4 August 1994).

59 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

60 *Meeting on Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations*, 1 August 1994, UN Secretariat Summary. Mimeographed.

61 My emphasis.

62 Several delegations also raised the issue of inter-regional cooperation, that is cooperation *between* regional organisations, in order to avoid duplication of efforts.

63 For a critique of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy see Mats. R. Berdal, "Reforming the UN's Organisational Capacity for Peacekeeping", in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (eds.), *A Crisis of Expectations – UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s*, Boulder Co., Westview Press, 1995, pp. 181-192.

64 The Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations were both formally created in February 1992 following a major organisational reform of the UN Secretariat. Since then the DPKO has undergone a seemingly permanent process of evolution and reform due to the rapid increase in the number of UN peacekeeping operations. External political pressures have also played key a role in getting the UN to increase both the responsiveness and effectiveness of its peacekeeping bureaucracy.

65 The Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) is the third leg of this departmental triumvirate, playing a leading role in humanitarian, emergency and rehabilitation questions.

66 Information made available to the author in unattributable circumstances.

67 Confidential discussion, Melbourne, 3 July 1995.

68 The item 'analysis of regional organisations involved in peacekeeping' appears in the UN Committee for Programme and Evaluation's 1995 *Final report on the in-depth evaluation of peacekeeping operations: start-up phase* under the heading "Status of Department of Peace-keeping Operations training activities/material". Despite the importance accorded to this issue by the Secretary-General this was the only DPKO item listed in the Committee's report pertaining to regional organisations. See UN Doc. E/AC.51/1995/2 (17 March 1995), para. 93.

69 Eiko Ikegaya, *Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping*, New York, DPKO, 5 April 1995. Mimeographed.

70 A section on Arab League peacekeeping was deleted from the first draft of the report. It was replaced by a section on ECOWAS peacekeeping in Liberia.

71 "Peacekeeping bill tops $5b", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 24, no. 5, August 1995, p. 16.

72 Canada and Japan have also played a role in this regard, financially and otherwise. More discussion on these initiatives will follow in Chapter 6.

73 See UN Doc. S/PRST/1995/9 (22 February 1995). The United Kingdom's UN mission in New York can be credited here with organising a series of meetings on the subject in the spring of 1995.

74 *Improving the Preparedness for Peace-keeping in Africa: An Informal Note*, New York, DPKO, 21 March 1995. Mimeographed.

75 UN Doc. A/50/711–S/1995/911 (1 November 1995).

76 UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 (3 January 1995).

77 *Ibid.*, para. 77.

78 For views on the subject see Eric Grove, "UN Armed Forces and the Military Staff Committee - A Look Back", *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 172-171; Brian Urquhart, "For a UN Volunteer Military Force", *The New York Review of Books*, vol. XL, no. 11, 10 June 1993, pp. 3-4; John F. Hillen, "Policing the New World Order: The Operational Utility of a Permanent U.N. Army", *Strategic Review*, Vol. XXII, Spring 1994, no. 2, pp. 54-62.

79 It should be noted that since the Rwanda disaster of April 1994 a number of Western countries have begun examining ways of improving UN military capabilities. In 1994-1995, Canada, Denmark and The Netherlands tabled specific proposals for creating a rapid UN military response capability. See Dick A. Leurdijk, "Proposals for Increasing Rapid Deployment Capacity: A Survey", *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 2, no. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 1-10; and also Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada), *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations - Report of the Government of Canada*, Ottawa, September 1995.

80 In *Supplement to Agenda for Peace* terminology, operational support consists of 'on the ground' assistance from either a regional body or the UN in direct support of an ongoing peace operation (e.g. NATO in support of UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslavia). Co-deployment consists of deploying a UN field mission in conjunction with that of another organization or grouping (e.g. ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia, UNOMIG and the CIS Force in Georgia). Joint operations consists of jointly staffing, directing and financing field missions (e.g. The UN/OAS civilian mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) during UNMIH I in 1993). Consultation and diplomatic support are self-explanatory.

81 The category 'technical support' was added by the UN in a speech given in April 1995 by the then UnderSecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Kofi Annan, to SHAPE/NATO officers. It refers to technical support as technical advice provided by the UN to regional organizations planning to undertake peacekeeping, or who wish to improve the peacekeeping capabilities of their member states.

82 UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 (3 January 1995), para. 87.

83 *Ibid.*, para. 88(d).

84 This information was made available to the author in unattributable circumstances.

85 Thirteen regional organisations participated to the meeting at the Secretary-General or Assistant Secretary-General level, three more than in 1994. New participating organisations were ASEAN, CARICOM and ECOWAS.

86 See UN Doc. SG/SM/5895 (14 February 1995), p. 1.

87 *Report on Meeting on Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations*, United Nations Headquarters, New York, 15-16 February, unofficial document.

88 UN, Informal Open-Ended Working Group of the General Assembly on An Agenda for Peace, *Sub-Group on Coordination: Provisional Text*, 3 July 1996, unofficial document.

89 One high-ranking official from the Department of Political Affairs involved in the preparation of UN-regional summits told the author in June 1996 that, for all intents and purposes, a 'plateau' had been reached in terms of discussions and consultations on the regional organisations issue.

5

Recent Developments in Regional Organisations

In what can be viewed as a post-Cold War wave of institutional re-engineering, most extant regional organisations have seen an expansion of their responsibilities in the peace and security field. These developments have been paralleled by the emergence of a proliferating array of regional and sub-regional forums purporting to address political and security issues. In Europe alone, for example, established transatlantic and continental institutions are now complemented by a burgeoning collection of 'mini-lateral' groupings, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) framework, the Visegrad group, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The European setting is unique in terms of institutional wealth. However, whether in Asia, Africa or Latin America, new regional/sub-regional organisations have been developing at an accelerated pace as well.

In principle, regional institutions should bring legitimacy, impartiality and moral authority to efforts to control and manage conflict. In practice, however, their political and institutional capabilities vary widely. Their mandates and conflict resolution mechanisms differ tremendously, as do the range and scope of resources they can bring to play in their respective geographic areas.

This chapter presents twelve case studies. It highlights trends in regional organisations, with a special emphasis placed on charter and institutional developments as well as on recent regional conflict management experiences. The selection of institutions presented therein is based on two criteria. First, on the importance of the organisation for the region concerned. Second, on the crisis/conflict management role played by the organisation in recent years.

European/Transatlantic Organisations

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE – known until December 1994 as the CSCE – is an institution best known today for its innovative use of civilian missions to monitor human rights and defuse ethnic tensions in volatile areas. With its broad membership (fifty-four states), it is also widely regarded as an important instrument for furthering democratisation and transparency in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe (ECE) and those of the

former Soviet Union (FSU). While these are important functions, they also represent a much diminished role vis-à-vis earlier proposals to make the organisation the articulating framework for European security.

The end of the Cold War, and internal conflicts in Yugoslavia and in the FSU, were in large part responsible for providing the impetus for institutional reforms in 1991-1992. For more than half of the 1990s decade, however, the key players of European security were unable to agree on whether OSCE should remain a low-key process-oriented forum or become a more institutionalised intergovernmental organisation.[1] As a result, the OSCE was propelled through a cycle of functional contortions which produced numerous OSCE institutions, an unending catalogue of special mechanisms, and ever-widening mandates, but little change in the way the OSCE operated ever since its Cold War debut in 1975: through dialogue and consensus amongst all member states.

Evolution of the CSCE/OSCE

With its steps towards setting up a more formal structure and its efforts to consolidate fundamental freedoms in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe (ECE), the Paris summit of November 1990 heralded the birth of the post-Cold War CSCE.[2] The summit took place at a time of tremendous uncertainty as to the make up of the future European security architecture. If Europe was to become a security community from 'the Atlantic to the Urals', what were the roles of existing institutions and what how should their responsibilities change?

EC countries attempted to answer part of that question for themselves over the following months. Eager to demonstrate leadership and cohesion after their disunited performance during the Gulf War they took it upon themselves to find a European solution to the Yugoslav crisis, obtaining the imprimatur of the CSCE and the UN to do so. The Bush administration, singularly preoccupied with maintaining NATO's place in Europe, but uninterested in taking the lead in Yugoslavia, could only applaud; it had been urging European governments to show more interest in the Yugoslav problem since late summer 1990.[3]

Throughout 1991 the CSCE was confronted with events that highlighted what is generally regarded as its greatest weakness: its inability to take timely and effective measures against violators of its principles which result from its consensus decision-making rule.[4] The crisis between Russia and the Baltic states, and later the failed coup in Russia, had shown the difficulties of using CSCE mechanisms in the disintegrating Soviet Union. The feebleness of the CSCE response to the unfolding events in Yugoslavia crisis, however, was arguably even more damaging for the organisation,

leaving many European leaders, notably those of ECE countries, disillusioned about its potential as a collective security organisation.[5]

By early 1992, the most pressing issues on the CSCE agenda were clear: enhancing the decision-making ability of the organisation and trying to deal with the thorny problem of national minorities in post-Cold War Europe. In January 1992, CSCE members amended the rule requiring unanimity and adopted the so-called 'consensus minus one' principle in cases of massive and gross violations of human rights. This rule provided the basis for the suspension of Serbia from the Conference in 1992.

At the Helsinki II summit of July 1992 further steps were taken to improve the organisation's effectiveness. It was declared a regional arrangement coming under the terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, with the authority to undertake peacekeeping (but not enforcement) actions within the CSCE region with the support of NATO, the EC, the WEU or the CIS.[6] The summit launched the process of upgrading the organisation's decision-making organs, a trend which culminated with the establishment of a Permanent Committee at the CSCE Rome summit of December 1993 (now Permanent Council).[7] A position of High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) was created with a specific mandate to provide "early warning and, as appropriate, early action" in areas of ethnic tensions.[8] CSCE members endorsed the use of small fact-finding and monitoring missions as new instruments in the CSCE toolbox, a trend which began in 1991 and early 1992 with missions in Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Finally, the summit also established the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), charged with the daunting task of addressing arms control negotiations, confidence and security-building measures, security enhancement and cooperation within the CSCE/OSCE framework. The FSC produced numerous agreements over the next two years, notably a Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994) that, *inter alia*, promoted standards on the use of force by national militaries in internal security missions.

The Helsinki summit highlighted the preference of the CSCE membership for a low-key, consensus-based, and flexible approach to conflict prevention rather than an institutionalised 'coerce and enforce' approach to conflict management. The paradox, of course, was that CSCE members, at the urging of Germany, declared the CSCE a Chapter VIII arrangement under the UN Charter. It was, in fact, Chapter VIII *redux* since they shied away from adopting new provisions allowing coercive measures. None of the key players of European security favoured developing the organisation into an enforcement agency. Such a move would have called into question the authority of other European bodies (e.g. NATO, CIS, WEU) and, at any rate, would have demanded major changes to the organisation's decision-making rules for which membership-wide support was non-existent.

In spite of numerous structural developments the CSCE's role remained somewhat unclear throughout 1993-1994. Beyond its traditional arms control role, its preventive diplomacy functions, and its human rights and democratisation mission attracted consensus; there was agreement for its sanctions monitoring role (jointly organised with the EC) in Yugoslavia, but little more. Attempts to use it as a legitimising agency for individual state action were mired in controversy (e.g. Russia's failed bid to have CSCE approval for CIS peacekeeping) and Western states, almost by default, turned to the UN Security Council for hard decisions. Furthermore, Serbia's refusal to prolong the CSCE monitoring mission to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina in 1993 patently demonstrated the limitations of the 'softly, softly' approach adopted in Helsinki.

For many, the Budapest CSCE summit of December 1994 epitomised the organisation's inability to deal with serious conflict. The summit's lengthy final document (known as the CSCE Budapest Document) saw the official transition in status from that of conference to that of organisation (becoming the OSCE); it discussed various OSCE initiatives; and it clarified the different levels of responsibility within the burgeoning OSCE structure.[9] However, the Budapest Document did not refer to the situation in Bosnia, the most important European conflict since the Second World War. Russia and the Bosnian government both blocked the adoption of a declaration on the conflict, and the summit ended in acrimony and cynicism.[10]

In December 1995, the annual OSCE Ministerial Council in Budapest concentrated its efforts to the crucial role the organisation was to play in Bosnia as part of the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement; electoral organiser, human rights monitor, and arms controller. This was a political rehabilitation of sorts for the OSCE. Never before had it faced a challenge of this scope. Still, the role it was entrusted to fulfil effectively confirmed its position as complement to 'harder' regional and international security mechanisms. It also marked a momentary halt to the numerous proposals to transform it into a more formal and legalistic collective security agency.

The 1995 Council summit also launched anew the OSCE's Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, a project somewhat moribund since it had been proposed by Russia during the 1994 Budapest summit. The Model, which was officially adopted at the 1996 OSCE summit in Lisbon, is a comprehensive article of faith in common security, good neighbourliness and respect for OSCE guidelines and procedures. It also launched a lengthy diplomatic process leading to the drafting of a new OSCE Charter on European Security (expected to be completed in time for the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul).

Whether these documents and processes make a real difference to the future of European security remains unclear. On the one hand they may contribute to articulate a common vision of security for the OSCE area that could perhaps provide the basis for

the development of new methods of collective action. On the other hand, it should not be lost that the NATO vision of European security has been much more influential in shaping the regional security environment than OSCE declarations, and that, at any rate, the Charter for European Security exercise is only likely to codify current OSCE practice as perceived by the majority of its membership.

A mixed record

Overall, the OSCE record during the 1991-1996 period presents a decidedly mixed picture. The organisation has played a key role in promoting standards of good European citizenship and military transparency, and it has gone further than any other regional organisation in devising flexible tools for looking into intra-state conflict so as to attempt to defuse internal instability before it occurs. It should be noted, however, that the organisation's operational activities have been mainly concentrated in the Balkans and in the former Soviet Union. Attempts to use OSCE mechanisms in other European hot spots, in relation to the Kurdish problem in Turkey, for example, have thus far proven unsuccessful.

It is fair to say that many OSCE missions have helped to stabilise a series of potentially dangerous situations, and that in some cases, in Moldova, for instance, it contributed to create an environment conducive to negotiation. As many analysts have noted, however, the OSCE's *modus operandi* and the modest size of its institutions effectively ensure that it is unable to address anything but fairly localised situations. Moreover, the impact of OSCE measures is often limited when not followed through by direct diplomatic involvement on the part of the OSCE's most powerful states. Possessing neither the decision-making structure to make 'hard' political decisions nor coercive instruments which could be used to restrain disputants, many feel that the OSCE is not very well equipped to deal with conflict once it has reached at certain threshold. Yet many governments consider that the organisation's strength is precisely the non-threatening nature of its instruments that have often allowed it to act as a monitoring and facilitating body in situations where opposing parties would have rejected involvement by any other inter-governmental organisation.

If there is agreement that conflict prevention should be one of the organisation's primary tasks, such is not the case for using it as a vehicle for traditional peacekeeping. The Helsinki II summit provisions on peacekeeping have proven to be considerably more problematic than originally envisaged, not least because the debate on the ultimate source of legitimacy for launching peacekeeping operations in the European region – either the UN or the OSCE – remains unresolved. Moreover, despite the creation of a temporary military staff in 1995 in order to prepare for a mission in Nagorno-Karabakh, the OSCE remains ill-equipped to carry out peacekeeping operations. The fact remains

that that the United States and most European countries regard the UN or NATO as much more credible peace operations structures. This does not mean that the OSCE will never be used as a political vehicle from which to launch peacekeeping operations; as noted earlier it does, in fact, have a mandate to do so. But it is certainly the understanding amongst a majority of OSCE members that the organisation's organic capabilities remain extremely limited as far as mounting military operations are concerned, and that, therefore, an enhanced civilian peacekeeping role is likely to be the way of the future for the OSCE.

Over the years the work of the FSC has come under closer scrutiny as well. Some critics of the FSC process pointed early on that in, the absence of effective provisions for ensuring compliance with FSC agreements (which are not international treaties) the latter would "be useful in organising various [OSCE] commitments but not much more than that."[11] During the Chechnya conflict, for instance, neither the OSCE Code of Conduct (adopted in 1994), nor the presence of an OSCE mediation mission had any restraining influence on the Russian military's indiscriminate use of force against civilian areas. Unsurprisingly, at the 1996 OSCE Lisbon summit, Western countries insisted on strengthening the body of FSC agreements.[12] Beyond their confidence-building rationale, however, questions remain as to their ability to help prevent conflict, and more particularly the kind of internal conflict seen in the Balkans and the FSU since the end of the Cold War.[13]

Continuity in tradition

Through practice, the OSCE has carved up an important niche for itself in performing certain functions falling within the range of early preventive action, peace-building and confidence-building. It is also making a discrete but important contribution to European security by helping to strengthen legal institutions, democratic processes and civil society throughout ECE states and in the CIS. However, the experience of the last few years has also demonstrated that the OSCE acts a complement to NATO and to the EU. It is hardly Europe's pivotal security institution. Indeed, there often appears to be an inverse relationship between the intensity of the conflicts it is called on to deal with, and its ability to take effective action.

The OSCE's position relative to that of other European institutions will remains a critically important issue in years ahead. The organisation operates in a very crowded institutional environment and, despite the rhetoric on interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions, NATO and the EU are generally perceived as more important forums for European security and stability. Having acquired neither the political, military or economic clout of these two organisations, it should not be surprising, then, that the OSCE muddles its way forward in its long-standing tradition of quiet

consensualism and its ability to remain a very flexible diplomatic instrument. Here its broad European membership can only be an asset, not a liability.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

NATO's post-Cold War foray into the management of European conflicts has evolved largely in reaction to a wide range of internal and external pressures, among them the urgent need to define new roles for the Alliance, pressures to enlarge NATO while managing a difficult relationship with Russia, and accommodating to calls for a stronger European voice within the Alliance. The evolution from collective defence to 'collective defence plus' has been neither smooth nor easy. However, NATO has thus far demonstrated a far larger measure of flexibility and innovation than the critics who forecasted its downfall envisaged just a few years ago.[14] Rather than withering away, in fact, it has consolidated its position as the most important security organisation in Europe.

NATO is not a multipurpose regional organisation falling under the purview of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In the Yugoslav case, though, it did act as the enforcer of UN Security Council resolutions. That ambiguous relationship is unlikely to change. The United States fundamentally objects to Alliance decisions being subjected to a possible veto of the UN Security Council, a point on which NATO's European members agree. NATO countries have invested considerable political and military capital in developing the Alliance's crisis management capabilities over the last few years, capabilities which include the ability to deploy forces 'out of area' for peace support operations and for preventive actions. Crisis management and peacekeeping, in fact, now constitute two major justifications for maintaining significant NATO forces in Europe.

Charting a new course, take one

The central plank of NATO has always been Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (1949), which provides its membership with an unambiguous commitment to collective defence in the case of armed attack. However, with the eclipse of the Warsaw Pact came the recognition that collective defence function no longer ranked as NATO's most urgent task.[15] In 1990-1991, NATO countries quickly began to downsize their standing forces in Europe and shifted Alliance strategy towards a defence concept based around a mix of rapid reaction and reinforcement forces.[16]

The new Europe posed a major challenge for an institutional order essentially designed to manage East-West relations. For NATO in particular, suggestions of an extension of its role 'out of area' – that is, outside the territory covered by the NATO

treaty – presented a weighty problem. With a mandate that restricted the exercise of the Alliance's primary function to the territory of its membership, an unreconstructed NATO appeared unable to provide the kind of framework necessary to deal with future European conflicts. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that so many European policymakers and legislators pondered aloud on the necessity for a new, more European framework for security policy.

Throughout 1990-1993 the outlook for NATO remained very uncertain. The organisation searched for new roles that would preserve its legitimacy while Western policymakers struggled to come to grips with changes in the European political landscape. At the Rome summit of November 1991, NATO's first comprehensive effort to define its future role, western leaders adopted the Alliance's new Strategic Concept. The Concept restated that the primary purpose of the Alliance was to safeguard the freedom and security of its members.[17] But it also promoted a new, more cooperative approach to security in which dialogue and cooperation with all European states would play a vital role. The Concept also elaborated a rationale for NATO operations out of area, raising the possibility that economic, social and political difficulties, ethnic rivalries or territorial disputes could develop into crises affecting the security of Alliance countries.

The very idea of an expanded military role in Europe for NATO not only went against the sweeping tide of post-Cold War troop reductions and cuts in defence expenditures among NATO countries, but it also raised thorny political questions. Under the authority of which agency, for example, would this role be exercised? Would the leaders of a disintegrating, but still nuclear-capable, Soviet Union ever accept NATO military operations in non-NATO countries? These questions would haunt NATO leaders as they examined the military options for intervention in Yugoslavia.

The Rome summit would also prove to be an important event in term of U.S.-European relations. European governments and the Bush administration papered over important differences for unity's sake. But a sense of growing rift existed between the United States and its allies. In 1990-1991, the articulation of Franco-German plans for laying the foundations of a common defence policy on behalf of Europe had piqued Washington as well as atlanticist-oriented EC governments.[18] Taken aback by various schemes for reorganising continental security, the Bush administration reiterated its position that NATO was, and should remain, the cornerstone of security in Europe. The thorny question of the 'europeanisation' of European defence was thus left essentially unresolved.

Cooperation with the East: conflict prevention as inclusion

As part of its new outreach effort towards the East, in December 1991 NATO held the first meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a new high-level security forum whose main objective was to establish links with Russia and ECE countries.[19] The NACC was useful towards establishing a rapport between NATO and its new counterparts in the East. It quickly became apparent, however, that a number of ECE countries aspired to much more than dialogue; military cooperation with the West and NATO membership was their ultimate objective.

NATO countries were all too aware that a precipitous decision on expanding the Alliance might have dire consequences at a time when Boris Yeltsin's fragile presidency was threatened by ultra-nationalist forces in the Russian Duma. Moreover, an internal NATO consensus on enlargement did not yet exist (and would not until 1995). Nevertheless, by 1993 the damage to NATO credibility as a result of the tepid reactions to Eastern appeals for membership and lack of leadership in Bosnia was becoming an increasingly serious problems. Criticised for its passivity towards European security problems, the Clinton administration put forth two major initiatives in October 1993 which sought to respond to the demands of ECE states as well as to those of Western European countries vying for a stronger European defence role. The first initiative was the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, a military cooperation scheme with NACC countries and OSCE members on matters primarily concerned with peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations. The second was the proposal for Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), which will be discussed below. PfP was formally endorsed at the important North Atlantic Council (NAC) summit of January 1994 alongside an interrelated commitment to enlarge the Alliance.[20] The timing of enlargement, the 'who' and the 'when', however, remained open.

PfP was designed in large measure as a training/proving ground for prospective NATO members.[21] Even though the program did not extend formal security guarantees to prospective members it quickly managed to attract interest from all corners of the OSCE region, including from the faraway Central Asian republics. By June 1994, twenty states had joined the scheme, including a reluctant Russia which erroneously believed PfP would forestall NATO enlargement. Seven other nations joined later.

Since its inception the PfP program has become a NATO success story, proving to be an extremely valuable mechanism for honing the skills of inter-operability between NATO and PfP militaries.[22] Furthermore, the value of the scheme has gone beyond the military field into European politics proper. For instance, PfP proved to be particularly helpful in facilitating the participation of non-NATO countries to the NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia. In light of PfP achievements to date a 'PfP+' follow-on program was approved by NATO in 1997. As for the NACC, it was formally disbanded and replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in early 1997.

The EAPC is to provide the overarching framework for cooperation between NATO and non-NATO countries.

Going out of area, in theory

Although it had been the object of intense speculation ever since 1990 the institutional debate surrounding the Alliance's out of area role can be traced back to the first half of 1992 when European institutions ran out of options in Yugoslavia. Here we must distinguish between the complex negotiations on institutional development, and NATO's reactions to the unfolding events in Yugoslavia. The following paragraphs discuss institutional developments. They are followed by a section on NATO's role in Yugoslavia.

At the Oslo North Atlantic Council (NAC) summit of June 1992, which was followed soon thereafter by the CSCE summit in Helsinki, NATO countries stated their preparedness to support peacekeeping activities on a case by case basis and under NATO procedures, under the responsibility of the CSCE. This decision had come largely as a reaction to calls for NATO involvement in Yugoslavia. The following December, NATO's Defence Planning Committee (DPC) formalised Alliance support for UN and CSCE peacekeeping by including 'peace support' as a NATO mission. After discussions lasting more than half of 1993 during which the NATO Military Committee examined possible Alliance roles in peace support operation, a general policy document was adopted in August 1993.[23] Known as MC 327, the document provided a standardised terminology for different peace support tasks, as well as accompanying principles for their conduct within the framework of NATO.[24]

Important developments came in the fall of 1993 with the American proposal for the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept, and its endorsement by NATO countries, at the Brussels NAC summit of January 1994. From a military perspective, CJTF's were designed to allow task-tailored NATO forces, with potential PfP member participation, to fulfill non-collective defence (i.e. non-Article 5) missions. CJTF discussions also fulfilled a number of political objectives, such as mollifying the calls of the U.S. Congress for greater defence burden-sharing with Europe, and giving more substance to the European role within the Alliance.

By endorsing the development of the CJTF concept Europeans countries effectively moved the WEU closer to the ambit of NATO. Moreover, the fact that France was ready to discuss CJTF's signalled a warming of France's position towards the Alliance.[25] This shift was confirmed following the election of Jacques Chirac as France's new president in 1995, but it would have a price. Supported by Germany, France proposed that a new transatlantic bargain be struck between the United States and Europe. Later on, Paris would insist that Washington give up its authority to appoint

the NATO Southern Command commanding officer.[26] From France's perspective, neither of those issues has been satisfactorily resolved.

Tension between Paris and Washington were particularly evident throughout the process of devising implementation arrangements for CJTF's and differences quickly emerged over political authority and military command arrangements. From the outset American officials saw CJTF's as a NATO-led mechanism for carrying out non-collective defence missions. This clashed against France's view that CJTF's should allow European countries to organise out of area actions through the WEU, supported by NATO military assets. At the Berlin NAC summit of June 1996, after two and a half years of often frustrating negotiations, the United States finally agreed to let the WEU lead possible CJTF operations should European countries express that will, albeit under the understanding that they should be formed within the context of the Atlantic Alliance and according to NATO standards and procedures.

Yugoslavia: interests, responsibility or image?

In a recently published study on European security, Catherine McArdle Kelleher argued that CJTF's may be a military-operational solution to what is essentially a political problem. In her opinion, CJTF's can provide the 'how' but may not be able to address the 'why' nor the "political divisions that promote action or inaction" in cases of out of area contingencies.[27] An examination of NATO involvement in Yugoslavia largely bears her out. Divided on key policy aspects, European countries and the United States played the humanitarian and the diplomatic card until the UN confronted the prospect of an ignominious withdrawal from Bosnia and Croatia in mid-1995.

From September 1992 on NATO countries proved willing (if often reluctant) to commit military resources to UN efforts in Yugoslavia, but only in the context of UN sanctions and humanitarian-cum-peacekeeping efforts. As the conflict was spreading to Bosnia, in March-April 1992, NATO military planners had looked into a number of military measures that could be used to send 'restraining signals' to the Bosnian Serbs.[28] Their political masters, however, remained too wary of getting sucked into the conflict to put them in motion. In effect, the internal nature of the Bosnian war and the absence of overriding Western interests in Yugoslavia had ruled out direct NATO military intervention.

Major national differences would be at play throughout the conflict, preventing decisive NATO action until 1995. European NATO members and Canada strongly

favoured a EC/UN-brokered solution, though they also showed that they were not always willing to back up UN Security Council decisions, the disastrous UN 'protected areas' policy being a case in point, with sufficient and effective military means.[29] Furthermore, in the absence of American troops on the ground in Bosnia they steadfastly rejected U.S. proposals to undertake retaliatory strikes against Bosnian Serb forces, fearing direct reprisals against their lightly armed troops. The U.S. administration, for its part, oscillated between a rhetorical position of overt assistance for the Bosnian government, half-hearted support for EC/UN efforts, the contact group approach, and, in a policy reversal occurring in the Spring of 1995, found itself arguing against the very 'lift and strike' policy it had advocated on a number of occasions.[30]

The shift from peacekeeping to enforcement finally came in mid-1995 when the rationale for peacekeeping in Bosnia collapsed. In the fall of 1994, NATO planners began to examine the military requirements of a UN withdrawal. The increasing resort to limited, but apparently ineffective, NATO air strikes, exasperating problems of command and control between NATO and the UN, and very strict UN rules of engagement, had taken their toll. In the absence of a political settlement between the warring Serbs, Croats and Muslims, France and Britain, the two leading European players in Bosnia, were rapidly coming to the conclusion that their troops ran unacceptably high risks, and that, in the end, UN neutrality was no longer sustainable. Publicly, no NATO government was willing to call for a UN withdrawal. What is less well known, however, is that by the spring of 1995 NATO was actively preparing to send a massive covering force for the withdrawal of UN troops.

Ultimately, it would be the outrageous actions of the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) in May-July 1995 that turned the course of the conflict. In May and June, BSA actions against UN troops compelled France, Great Britain and the Netherlands to set up a heavily-armed protection force in Bosnia, the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). As the force was being deployed, however, the eastern Bosnian enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica, two UN 'safe areas', fell to the BSA under tragic and controversial circumstances, leaving Western troop contributors to UNPROFOR and the United States scrambling for a coherent response.[31]

The London conference of July 21, 1995 – which was marred by serious divisions between Russia and NATO governments over the use of force in Bosnia – issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serb leadership. It was quickly followed by an American diplomatic campaign led by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke designed to 'decouple' the Bosnian Serb leadership from its Serbian caretakers in Belgrade. Following more BSA actions against UN troops, and yet another murderous Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo (August 28, 1995), Western governments could procrastinate no more and finally gave their go-ahead for a NATO air campaign

(Operation *Deliberate Force*). The offensive air operation crippled the ability of BSA forces to conduct major military operations and allowed Bosnian government forces to recapture a major portion of the territory lost to the BSA in 1995. The Dayton proximity talks followed in November, leading to a peace agreement and the dispatch to Bosnia of the NATO Implementation Force (later renamed the Stabilisation Force), which received the imprimatur of the UN Security Council.[32] The fact that there has been no renewal of hostilities in Bosnia is certainly attributable to NATO's continued military presence. However, the final makeup of the Bosnian state is still uncertain and many of the key dispositions of the Dayton peace agreement, such as the return of refugee populations to their original dwellings, have not been fully implemented.

The Lessons of Bosnia

Many important lessons can be drawn from the pre-Dayton NATO experience in Bosnia, an experience which constituted NATO's first out of area test in its history. First, NATO can mobilise considerable political and military resources in support of collective conflict management efforts, more so than any other European/transatlantic institution. The Alliance has clearly evolved into something more than a collective defence alliance, but although is did act an the implementing agency for UN decisions it is by no means an organisation subservient to the authority of the OSCE or the UN.

Second, maintaining NATO solidarity is seen as far more important than risking deep intra-alliance rifts over conflicts posing little threat to core NATO countries, even if the resulting policy paralysis is itself highly damaging to NATO's image. Throughout the conflict, for instance, NATO countries expressed indignation and moral outrage towards the 'ethnic cleansing' taking place in Bosnia, yet they were at the receiving end of constant criticism for doing little to stop it. Why? Essentially because it would have required a dramatic shift in their commitment, from peacekeeping to direct intervention, which would have seen the probability of significant western casualties increase exponentially. No support existed for that option. As Hayes and Weitz observed in 1995, Western policymakers had concluded that if attempting to prevent a Serbian victory in the conflict would risk destroying NATO, then Alliance solidarity should receive priority.[33]

Finally, NATO has shown considerable adaptability in organising for various military peace support tasks. However, the quintessential question remains 'why' and 'when' that potential should be exercised. As most analysts have concluded, NATO is unlikely to be a determinant player if U.S. leadership is not fully engaged, or where other

options, such as OSCE missions and mechanisms, for instance, have not already run their full course.

NATO's glowing future?

It remains to be seen whether CJTF's will provide the solution to the division of labour between Europe and the United States on out of area crises. Though the political cost of not participating to a CJTF operation could be high for any of NATO's core members, there remain clear distinctions between the national obligations flowing from Article 5 of the NATO treaty and those flowing from a less stringent commitment to contribute to peace and stability outside the territory of NATO members. This being said, the NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia is certainly a major demonstration of the Alliance's willingness to play a stabilising role in Europe outside its traditional Article 5 responsibilities. Though, it needs to be reiterated that this was only made possible because of the centrality of the U.S. role within the Alliance.

In the wake of the dispatch of the NATO forces to Bosnia the question of enlargement has been the single most important issue facing the Alliance. Throughout 1995 to 1997, enlargement was largely sold on the premise that it constitutes a fundamentally desirable conflict prevention measure; that it would reinforce stability and democracy in ECE countries and prevent a return of balance of power politics in Europe.[34] There are solid grounds to believe that this may be the case, but only if other conditions are met. First, both the security interests of Russia and its perceptions of Western intentions must remain a major consideration. Second, both the United States and EU countries need to remain committed to NATO as the principal framework for European security. Finally, the EU must finally move forward on its own hesitant enlargement process.

Needless to say, enlarging NATO is a historical (and controversial) decision, one that was only possible as a result of a carefully orchestrated diplomatic campaign towards Russia.[35] However, the basic decision to enlarge does not mean unequivocal NATO consensus on all aspects of enlargement. For instance, no sooner had Moscow signed an agreement creating a Permanent Russia-NATO Joint Council (May 1997) than NATO governments were bickering amongst themselves over who should be invited to join. Similarly, new defence spending incurred as a result of enlargement has already become a transatlantic sore point.[36]

Supporters of enlargement are also keeping their eyes on the U.S Congress. Thought the Congress did endorse NATO enlargement plans in 1998, an important number of American legislators remain unenthusiastic about an expanded Alliance. Without a clearly identifiable threat to European security, expansion is perceived to be a political imperative rather than a military necessity. However, it is an imperative that

entails extending U.S. commitments in Europe. This is not a popular idea for an American Congress intensely reluctant to see U.S. troops get involved in ethnic brushfires.

Enlargement will also mean more voices around the high table. In some quarters this is seen as complicating the search for common ground and diluting U.S. influence in Europe. Expanding the Atlantic Alliance may complicate decision-making, particularly with respect to out of area issues. However, given the express interest of so many ECE states in joining NATO, the costs of a decision not to enlarge would have been incalculable, not only jeopardising the transatlantic link in the long-term but also leaving the impression NATO countries wanted to maintain a strategic glacis in Eastern Europe. Here a review of European history this century should weigh at least as much in the minds of policymakers as a balance sheet account of the costs of enlargement for the next twenty years.

The European Union (EU)

Is Europe condemned to be an "economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm"?[37] For much of this decade this question has haunted those European policymakers who have favoured a greater foreign policy and defence role for the EU.[38] Collectively EU governments have found it extremely difficult to transform what was primarily an economic integration framework into a united political force able to act cohesively in peace and security matters. Common EU actions in the field of foreign affairs are possible. However, the goal of building a European foreign and defence policy is now essentially on hold. As ever, the fundamental problem resides in the fact that there is no agreement on what the end point of the European project should be: a United States of Europe, or a union based on a mix of supranational and national powers.

The start of monetary union – which began in January 1999 with eleven participating countries – followed closely by what is sure to be a protracted and controversial EU enlargement process, will no doubt create a new dynamic in European politics. Many fear that the introduction of the single currency will threaten the EU's political cohesion and that EU enlargement, with the difficult reforms to EC policies it will entail, might dilute the European political project even further. Only time will tell whether these forecasts are correct. In the meantime, what seems clear is that the EU's ability to be a cohesive foreign policy player acting beyond its membership's borders will remain very much in doubt.

The CFSP: Europe's rhetorical foreign policy

In February 1992, with the signature of the Treaty on Political Union as part of the overall Maastricht agreement, EC members established a new framework for formulating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which would become the second pillar of the European Union (the first being economic and monetary union, and the third, justice and home affairs).[39] Bar certain long-term objectives, such as the eventual framing of a common defence, the CFSP was not originally designed as a specific set of policies. It was rather conceived as an enabling framework requiring EU members to inform and consult one another on matters of foreign and security policy and also allowed them to formulate common positions or take common action on relevant matters.[40] The Maastricht treaty also enshrined two important obligations: mutual loyalty and solidarity for CFSP actions and positions, and restraint in taking actions that might be contrary to EU interests.[41]

In many quarters these measures were heralded as historic steps towards the creation of a more politically active Europe; a continuation of Europe's *longue marche* towards the formation of a European super-state. Indeed, combined with the historic agreement on economic and monetary union (EMU), some saw in Maastricht the rise of a new 'metropolitan colossus' that would challenge U.S. leadership in world affairs.[42] This early optimism was short-lived.

The record of European policies in the early days of the Yugoslav conflict (1991-1992) strongly suggested that European attempts at forging common foreign policy positions would remain a disorganised complement to the national policies of the core EU countries: Britain, France, and Germany.[43] Since then, the hypothesis of a convergence of European foreign and defence policies has been tested on many fronts: on the issue of WEU-EU relations (see section on the WEU); on NATO's future role in Europe; in Africa during the 1993 South African elections and in the ongoing crisis in the Great Lakes region; in Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East with the tentative promotion of the EU as a regional actor; following the resumption of French nuclear testing in the Pacific; on UN reform; in the Balkans once again following the Dayton agreement; and, more recently, following the collapse of state control in Albania.

What emerges from this experience is the fact that the EU wields considerable influence as a voting and proposal bloc within bodies such as the UN and the OSCE, and it has become a leading international player in the humanitarian and disaster relief field. It has also known some discreet diplomatic successes, notably the 1995 Pact on Stability in Europe, a French proposal adopted by the EU as a common action initiative under CFSP rules. Overall, however, the body of policies that constitute the embryo of a European foreign and defence policy reflects an unsatisfactory lowest common denominator approach that was evident throughout the Yugoslav conflict. There the EU played a pivotal humanitarian relief role. But European countries couldn't agree

amongst themselves on a common strategy to end the conflict and constantly looked towards the UN and NATO for decisive measures.

Parallel roads? EU external action and national interests

One could speculate at length about the procedural/institutional framework of the EPC or the Maastricht treaty to explain the lacklustre performance of Europe as a foreign policy actor between 1991 and 1997.[44] Rightly or wrongly, CFSP requirements for unanimity, continuity problems posed by the six-monthly rotation principle of the EU presidency, and the lack of a dedicated political analysis and planning unit within the EU Commission, have all been pointed to as contributing factors for the feebleness of the CFSP. There are, however, more fundamental issues.

The first one is the paradox on which the CFSP was founded; a conventional notion of foreign policy and defence based on inter-governmental consensus, whereas the whole EC edifice is historically based on an unconventional notion of international cooperation which transferred some elements of national competence to supra-national authority. Is this paradox a determinant issue? Undoubtedly. Consider the conclusions of the EU Reflection Group, a high-level consultative body set up in the lead up to the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) reviewing the Maastricht treaty. Its final report noted that the EU's most effective instruments for external action were those flowing out of common EC policies (the EC remains an integral part of the larger EU framework) rather than from the CFSP, which, the report stated in uncharacteristically frank manner, had "a long way to go".[45]

The second point flows from the first; the CFSP does not preclude the pursuit of national foreign and defence interests and can only function when EU members agree that an issue can best be dealt with collectively. Then again, because foreign affairs and defence ultimately remain a matter of national competence, states retain the privilege to opt out or even 'defect' from the CFSP framework. Thus, just as it was about to sign the Maastricht treaty, in December 1991, Germany went ahead with its disastrous policy of 'preventive recognition' of Slovenia and Croatia, a move that effectively short-circuited EC peace efforts in Yugoslavia. In a similar vein, Greece blocked EC recognition of Macedonia and held its European partners hostage to its national position because Greek parliamentary approval was vital in securing the survival of the Maastricht treaty. Both cases demonstrated how specific historical associations could prove stronger than the EC/EU framework of collective decision-making. Germany was openly supportive of Croatia's bid for independence well before the EC was tasked with drawing up a common policy on the recognition of the secessionist Yugoslav republics, and Greece was ready to go to war with Yugoslav Macedonia over the republic's name, seen by Greece as an appropriation of Macedonian

identity (Macedonia is also the name of a Greek region). More recently, in 1995, the resumption of French nuclear testing in the Pacific despite universal opprobrium again showed how the exercise of 'higher national interests' could undermine the EU's credibility as an international actor.

The pursuit of national interests is also a leading factor behind the growing foreign policy 'sub-groupism' within the EU membership. Amongst all of the EU countries, for instance, France and Germany were the most enthusiastic promoters of a European defence identity throughout the early 1990s. Similarly EU countries which have important Mediterranean interests, France, Spain and Italy, are at the forefront of the EU's Mediterranean initiative. Scandinavian countries, which have a long history of regional cooperation, represent another special cooperation cluster, and, it should be noted, remain cautious bystanders in the EU's global foreign policy agenda. In effect, as Robin Niblett notes, the principal actors of 'EU foreign policy' are grouped by coalitions of the "willing and able, the able but unwilling, and the unwilling with regards to certain parts".[46]

European leaders are increasingly open in their acknowledgment that the EU is a 'multi-speed' (if not 'multi-track') construction. Consider the French government's call, in 1996, for a recognition of the *coopération renforcée* principle, enhanced cooperation amongst given EU members on given issue-areas (the special relationship between France and Germany being the classic example).[47] In 1997, this proposal was taken up by the Dutch presidency of the EU under the heading of the need for a more 'flexible' union.[48] However, introducing too much flexibility might well result in a Europe *à la carte* where individual states increasingly pick and choose what they want to do under the EU framework.

Amsterdam treaty amendments

One of the key objectives of the 1996 IGC was to find ways to improve the coherence of EU external action and examine how the functioning of the CFSP could be improved. Reflecting on the EU's external policy role since the adoption of Maastricht, the EU Reflection Group concluded in 1995 that the EU should give itself "the means appropriate to more effective and more coordinated external action".[49] IGC negotiations began in Turin in March 1996 and lasted until the spring of 1997. The real negotiations, however, took place closer to the deadline of June 1997 for agreeing to revisions to the EU treaty.

The CSFP came up as a topic for discussion at the post-IGC Noordwijk summit of May 1997. The new British Labour government reiterated its opposition to plans for a WEU-EU merger backed by France and Germany, as did Sweden and Finland which proposed a compromise plan. France nevertheless pushed ahead with its proposal for a

'Mr. CFSP', a new post of EU representative for foreign affairs. In spite of an apparent urgency to deal with Europe foreign policy coordination, however, the CFSP did not prove to be the dominant issue of the summit. The increasing tensions over Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) weighed much more heavily on the agenda, as did the unrelenting unemployment crisis in continental Europe, and the unfinished business of defining a more precise timetable for EU enlargement, a extremely complex process hastened by NATO's decision to go ahead with own enlargement process.

The June EU summit 1997 in Amsterdam resulted in the signing of a revised EU treaty which, like Maastricht, is the quintessential example of compromise in the EC/EU tradition; complex, ambitious and ambiguous on many points.[50] It is not my intention here to discuss the treaty in elaborate detail. I will therefore limit my comment to certain aspects of the revised CFSP procedures as the latter have a direct bearing on the ability of the EU to play a regional/international political role.

Overall, the Amsterdam treaty represents an attempt to clarify (but, alas, not simplify) CFSP procedures and objectives in light of recent experience. Some elements were introduced with a view to enhance the EU's decision-making process and its ability to play a more coherent international role, notably in regard to possible European humanitarian/peace support operations, others were adopted in order to circumscribe more precisely the responsibilities of signatories under the treaty. Three new measures appear particularly important.

First, the CFSP is to be personified by a High Representative of the CFSP, a function exercised by the new position of Secretary General of the EU council (Art. J.8 of the Amsterdam treaty). The six-monthly rotating EU Presidency, however, will still be the EU political voice between EU Council meetings, and will be responsible for the implementation of CFSP decisions. The EU Presidency will also present common EU positions in international organisations and conferences. EU decision-making is likely to remain laborious and complex, more so than many would like. However, it is hoped that the position of High Representative of the CFSP, having a higher status than ordinary EC commissioners, will improve the EU's ability to undertake effective public and private diplomacy.

Second, CFSP decisions will still be taken on the basis of unanimity (Article J.12). However the treaty provides for 'positive abstention', that is, a country which will abstain from voting on a CFSP issue will not be able prevent the adoption of a CFSP decision at the EU Council and will have to refrain from taking any action likely to conflict with or impede EU action on that decision. Moreover, by derogation, the treaty provides for qualified majority voting when adopting joint actions or joint decisions on the basis of a common strategy, or when adopting decisions on the implementation of joint actions or decisions. Qualified majority voting, it is important to note, will not

apply to decisions having military or defence implications. Unanimous agreement will therefore be required before any military action is launched under the EU flag.

Finally, the treaty clarifies somewhat the role of the WEU vis-à-vis the EU. Building a common defence policy remains a CFSP objective, but with the new and important proviso "should the European Council so decide" (Art. J.7). Few observers think this is a realistic possibility anytime soon. What is probably more important for the short to mid-term is the approval of the Swedish-Finnish proposal to enfold the WEU's Petersberg tasks (see section on the WEU) as falling within the purview of CFSP. This measure establishes a direct link between EU political authority and decisions of the WEU Council. As observers will note, however, these tasks were precisely the object of NATO negotiations on CJTF's and on NATO/WEU command authority in 1994-1996. One might expect, therefore, that the United States will carry an important voice in any EU decision to launch a major peace support mission should transfers of NATO military assets to the WEU be required.

The Amsterdam treaty – which, like Maastricht, will need parliamentary ratification by all EU members before it enters into force – will perhaps make marginal improvements to the functioning of the CFSP. However, CFSP fundamentals will remain essentially the same: all EU countries will have to get on board before big decision are made. The introduction of majority voting as the basis for all CFSP decision-making would have been a radical change. EU leaders, however, have decided that unanimity, with the possibility of positive abstention, (which existed *de facto* before Amsterdam in any case) was a more pragmatic and politically sustainable option.

Broken ambitions?

Given the EU's disappointing foreign policy record since the signing of Maastricht it is difficult to argue against the view expressed by some that EU external policy is better equipped collectively in deploying economic instruments.[51] These effectively constitute the EU's greatest comparative advantage vis-à-vis other European institutions. The EU is not a regional security organisation per se, but it nevertheless continues to be an important provider of regional and, to a certain extent, international stability. It can probably be argued that its most important contribution to preventing conflict and peace-building lies in what it represents for its neighbours and the international community at large: a leading economic and financial bloc, a major aid provider, and a community of values which, despite its internal shortcomings and contradictions, remains a powerful magnet for Europe's surrounding regions.

Perhaps what is even more significant in the long term, however, is that the European political project appears to have been shifted to the background under the weight of its internal contradictions. For Germany, historically the leading advocate of

European federalism, it has become more difficult to sustain at home the argument that the European project is about war and peace. Not only do important segments of the German political elite see upcoming EU reforms as potentially threatening to the German *sozialstaat,* but as the largest financial contributor to the EU, Germany is now keen to put a cap on its contribution to ever growing EU budget. As for France, its efforts to create a new European security order in which the Franco-German tandem would play the leading role ran into the ground in the killings fields of Yugoslavia. The conflict demonstrated that the United States remained the key player in European security affairs, that post-Cold War Germany was unwilling to play the role of European policeman, and that, for the moment, there were no alternatives to a strong NATO. In late 1997, France half-heartedly tried mount a new challenge to U.S. leadership by attempting to form a European 'troika' with Germany and Russia, a sort of European *directoire* outside the EU framework.[52] However, with a difficult economic situation at home, the Kohl coalition government did not appear particularly interested in any grand new diplomatic schemes. Initiatives such as these do not leave smaller EU members indifferent, and anything resembling turn-of-the-century great power diplomacy between major European countries is usually viewed by them with considerable suspicion, if not outright disdain.

The inability of EU governments to define and agree on the end point of the European project has not prevented them from forging ahead with what is indisputably the most significant European undertaking since the Treaty of Rome: monetary union and the adoption of a new common currency. It is, by any measure, a tremendous gamble whose consequences for European economies and domestic politics is not yet fully known. There are plenty of forecasts, both optimistic and pessimistic. What seems clear, however, is that in the short to mid-term the future of *l'Europe politique* has been staked on the success of economic and monetary union rather than on a what has been thus far a very disappointing Common Foreign and Defence policy

The Western European Union (WEU)

The WEU was formally established by the Modified Brussels Treaty, signed in Paris in 1954, in the aftermath of the demise of the European Defence Community (EDC) plan.[53] Meant to express Western European solidarity and facilitate Germany's entry into NATO, it was a defensive alliance without any military forces of its own, nor with any real responsibilities in matters of collective defence. Not surprisingly it quickly faded in the shadow of NATO, though it maintained a role as an inter-parliamentary forum on defence issues for European legislators.

In 1984, following the Franco-German rapprochement on security and defence begun two years earlier, the WEU was reactivated at the initiative of the French socialist government. The controversy surrounding the deployment of new American intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, and French-led attempts to breathe new life into the moribund EC political agenda, provided new impetus for Western European dialogue on matters of continental security. As well, the WEU was increasingly seen by some EC leaders as a promising forum for Western European defence cooperation. In 1987-1988, the threat to oil tankers in the Persian Gulf provided a first chance to WEU members to show collective resolve and a European naval task force was dispatched to the Gulf for escort and de-mining duty.

Europe's poor collective showing during the 1990-1991 Gulf war was an important factor in the WEU's revival. The conflict strengthened the French government's views on the need to develop an independent European military capability. However, the ensuing Yugoslav conflict impacted very negatively on the credibility of the WEU and provided critics with ample demonstration of the rather shallow nature of EC/EU rhetoric on European security. Perhaps more importantly, the conflict in Yugoslavia compelled EC/EU countries to make hard choices in matters of security policy which have tended to reinforce NATO's position in Europe rather than of the WEU.

A defence organisation for whom?

To a large extent, the inter-governmental debate over the WEU's post-Cold War role has mirrored existing political fault lines over the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the European flag. Led by France and Germany, proponents of political integration promoted the WEU as the defence component of the future European Union throughout the early 1990s. France's socialist government, singularly obsessed by U.S. prominence in world affairs, ultimately wanted to see the organisation develop as a coequal partner to NATO (if not its replacement) with its own military forces and related agencies. Germany's position was considerably more ambiguous, if not outright confusing. Caught between its French and American allies, the Kohl government said yes to the WEU, yes to NATO, and then proceeded to put its weight behind a strengthened CSCE. Britain's Conservative government, on the other hand, held a clearer, if more predictable position. As the standard bearer of atlanticism in Europe it opposed any moves which would weaken NATO, and only timidly approved of the strengthening of the WEU's capabilities, but only as NATO's 'European pillar'.[54]

The 1991 Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) proved to be a jewel of creative ambiguity between these views. On the one hand, the treaty enshrined the need

to develop a EU security identity, including "the eventual framing of a common [EU] defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence"(Art. J.4.1 of TEU), and it designated the WEU as the implementing agency of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications (Art. J.4.2). However, the treaty stated that these previous provisions did not prejudice the security and defence policy of EU member states under NATO, nor should they impede them from developing closer cooperation within the WEU or NATO framework (Art. J.4.4. and J.4.5).

The different positions presented above have been hotly debated throughout the first half of this decade. However, after a few years of confusion, the situation has become somewhat clearer. The goal of developing an independent European defence policy and creating a 'European army' has been put aside (once again) because of the overarching need to maintain translatlantic unity. Furthermore, given the opposition of many EU countries to the formal integration of the WEU in the EU, the WEU is no closer to being a subsidiary agency of the EU than it was back in 1990. In fact, as a result of NATO negotiations on CJTF's there has been a closer level of institutional cooperation between NATO and the WEU than between the EU and the WEU. Only recently have we seen moves to strengthen political cooperation between the latter two bodies.

A rapidly evolving structure

There is no doubt that the WEU is a considerably more capable organisation today than it was just a few years ago. Both from a constitutional and institutional point of view the WEU has acquired mandates and capabilities which were virtually non-existent during the Gulf War and at the outbreak of the Yugoslav conflict. Consider the following developments.

In June 1992, in Bonn, WEU members adopted the Petersberg Declaration which, *inter alia*, defined the organisation's role in relation to collective security. The so-called 'Petersberg tasks' stipulated that military units of WEU member states could be employed for humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and combat tasks in crisis management, including peace enforcement, in support of the UN or the CSCE. The WEU then moved to create a stronger crisis management capability at its new headquarters (it moved from Paris to Brussels in 1993) by establishing a WEU planning cell.

In May 1993, the WEU adopted the concept of Forces Answerable to the WEU (FAWEU), national or multi-national units which could be put at the disposal of the WEU. Since then a number of military formations have been designated as FAWEU, many of them theoretically 'double-hatted' between NATO formations and the WEU. The same year, the WEU belatedly opened a satellite data interpretation centre in

Torrejon, Spain, largely established in reaction to Europe's dependence on American satellite intelligence means during the Gulf War.[55] Given the unfavourable economic situation in EU countries, however, the two acknowledged leaders of the European satellite program, France and Germany, have found it increasingly difficult to justify spending vast amounts of public funds on costly military programs, and as a result the scope of the European military satellite program has had to be curtailed

In January 1994, EUROGROUP, formed in 1968 as the European consultative grouping within NATO, was disbanded and its previous activities divided up by the WEU and NATO. The following May, in Kirchberg, Luxembourg, the WEU Council adopted a new four-category system of membership, partly as a political reaction to NATO's own openings towards Eastern and Central Europe.[56] The WEU is currently composed of twenty seven European countries, ten of which are full members.[57]

At the Lisbon WEU Council meeting of May 1995, WEU defence and foreign affairs ministers approved the establishment of a new politico-military analysis group to support the WEU decision-making, as well as the establishment of a new situation centre and a new intelligence centre as part of the organisation's planning cell. Then, in November 1995, the WEU Council unveiled a comprehensive European security blueprint which, *inter alia*, acknowledged the importance of WEU-NATO cooperation in matters related to peacekeeping and other contingency operations.[58]

In May 1996, the WEU signed a cooperation agreement with NATO on sharing intelligence information. In June 1996, after nearly three years of debate, the North Atlantic Council gave its long-awaited agreement to the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept which would allow 'coalitions of the willing' within NATO, to launch out of area, non-collective defence operations with NATO's military support, but not necessarily with the participation of all NATO members.[59]

Common structures, yes, but common policies?

As a French observer of European politics put it, "the real world of real crises must be reconciled from the abstract world of institutional debates".[60] Perhaps the real post-Cold War test for the WEU was never in the chimera of an independent European defence organised outside the transatlantic framework, but rather in its capacity to organise a collective European response to out of area crises. This raises the crucial issues of political support and military capabilities for such contingencies.

Whether during the Gulf War, the Yugoslav conflict or the crises in Central Africa, however, the European record does not inspire a great deal of confidence in the capacity of European states to mount military operations under the EU flag. As Philip Gordon notes, there is little indication that the subset of NATO which may support a

contingency operation out of area will necessarily correspond to the WEU membership.[61]

The WEU's quandaries are by-products of three essentially political dilemmas. First, the WEU remains wedged uneasily between competing visions of European security, some of which are mutually compatible, others less so. Second, irrespective of the NATO enlargement process and the June 1997 Amsterdam treaty revising the Maastricht treaty, the WEU remains a junior partner to both NATO and the EU. And third, beyond the statements of a few enthusiastic politicians, it has become blatantly clear that, collectively, EU governments have neither the inclination nor the financial means to invest the vast funds required to create an independent European defence system, particularly at a time of stagnating growth and high unemployment in core EU countries.[62] Though, as a counterpoint, both the downward trend in defence spending in Western Europe and increased commercial competition from U.S. defence industries have been driving a wave of industry mergers in the European defence sector. This is arguably a necessary, if commercially driven, step to take on the road to a more coherent European defence policy.

Yugoslavia serves as a potent reminder of the WEU problems. Without any operational land formations or command structure of its own, the organisation's real contribution to conflict control efforts was extremely limited. In 1991 and 1992, proposals to send a European interposition force in Yugoslavia were repeatedly rebuffed. Britain and other European NATO members rejected French-German proposals on the grounds that WEU peacekeeping was impossible in light of the situation in Yugoslavia and that, at any rate, the WEU was unprepared to play such a role.[63] WEU members, however, did agree on more limited measures.

In July 1992 European ships started patrolling the Adriatic under the WEU flag in order to enforce UN sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia. European navies had previously played a similar role late in the Iran-Iraq war as well as during the Kuwait conflict, which, in the latter case, turned out to be an infelicitous experience. In June 1993, the WEU naval operation in the Adriatic Sea was combined to NATO's own naval force to form a joint NATO/WEU operation (Operation *Sharp Guard*) under overall NATO command. From June 1993 onward European countries also provided elements for the WEU police and customs operation on the Danube organised jointly with Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Finally, a small WEU police element was dispatched to Bosnia as part of the ill-fated EU Administration of Mostar (1994-1996).

It has become obvious that European countries hold varying levels of allegiance to the European defence and security ideal. Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal and Spain are all keen to promote a stronger European defence identity and are all actively involved in the establishment of various 'euro-forces', for example EUROCORPS and the Mediterranean-oriented EUROMARFOR and EUROFOR

maritime and land forces. On the other hand, Europe's neutrals, nearly all of whom are EU members, are opposed to the type of 'Euro-defence' which was envisaged off and on by French policymakers and other proponents of a higher level of European defence cooperation.[64] They do agree in principle that Europe should be able to launch humanitarian interventions or peacekeeping missions – these roles, in fact, where enfolded in the 1997 Amsterdam treaty – but they do not agree on integrating national defences under the EU framework. As for Britain, it worked steadfastly against the development of the WEU outside the NATO framework for most of the 90s. The new British Labour government initially made it clear that it was no more interested in a militarized EU, or a WEU/EU merger, that its Conservative predecessor. However, as a result of Europe's disorganized diplomacy in Kosovo, the British New Labour government has fundamentally revised its position and is now favourable to the development of an autonomous European military capability, albeit under the condition that it not undermine transatlantic solidarity.[65]

To complicate matters further, many northern European countries are strong supporters of UN rather than regional solutions to peace and security problems and are piloting their own separate initiatives in the field of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. For instance, some Nordic countries, in conjunction with Austria, Canada, the Netherlands and Poland, are currently spearheading the creation of the Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) which is essentially a command structure to be used by the UN for conventional (i.e. Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations.

In light of this extraordinary *mélange* of national policies, it is perhaps not surprising the WEU is still searching for a clearly defined role. The Secretary General of the WEU, Jose Cutileiro, asserted in October 1996 that the WEU is the framework "for European countries to carry out humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in cases where the Americans have no interest in taking part".[66] That may well be the goal. Yet it is also true that over the last few years the development of the WEU was led by a small group of true believers rather than the whole of Western Europe in unison.

Politically time may well be running out for the organisation. Recent events in Kosovo have demonstrated once again how 'theoretical', and ultimately unusable, its military potential is. As a result, a growing number of European leaders are coming out in favour of outright integration of the WEU into the EU. There may be more to this trend than a repeat of 1997 debates on the subject. With a new coalition government in Germany eager to reform European institutions, and a British government ready to invest political capital under EU's name, the WEU looks likely to be integrated into the EU, and thus disappear as a wholly separate organisation, in the short to mid-term. Whether EU countries are politically and financially ready to invest the resources necessary to develop a truly autonomous European defence capability, however, is not altogether clear.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was hastily established in December 1991, as the Soviet Union was formally dissolved. Initially consisting of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, it quickly expanded within a few weeks to include 11 of the former 15 republics. Since then, CIS membership has been far from stable. Azerbaijan temporarily withdrew in 1992 only to come back to the CIS fold in October 1993 after a striking a deal with Russia. It has now announced its intention to withdraw from CIS collective security structure. Similarly, Georgia joined the CIS in late 1993 in a controversial *quid pro quo* with Russia allowing Moscow to maintain military bases in the country. More recently, in 1996, both Kazakhstan and Georgia threatened to leave the Commonwealth if their independence was threatened.

The CIS has been gradually developed into a web of coordinating institutions and sectoral regimes. The main CIS decision-making organs, the CIS Council of the Heads of State (CHS) was established early on. On the political-security side, a CIS Collective Security Council (CSC) was set up in December 1993 as the supreme defence decision-making organ of the Commonwealth pursuant to the 1992 Collective Security Treaty somewhat sidelining the CIS Council of Defence Ministers (CDM) was established earlier on in order to deal with the immediate requirements of CIS military cooperation. By 1995, Russia was reported to have already signed more than 200 military agreement with CIS governments.[67] Most of these agreements, however, have either focussed on trying to maintain infrastructure inherited from the Soviet era or have simply never been acted upon because of lack of resources.[68] Russian efforts to create an integrated defence space unified under the CIS framework have proved particularly contentious, and many of the New Independent States (NIS) emerging from the defunct Soviet order have adopted an increasingly selective approach towards political-security cooperation with Moscow.

CIS economic cooperation has also been an important priority for Russia, which has spent considerable energy trying to organise a CIS economic and customs union loosely modelled on the EC. However, even though hundreds of economic cooperation agreements have been concluded between CIS countries, many were, in fact, never implemented. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, economic growth and production in the NIS declined sharply. As a result of drastic economic changes and of the disorganization of post-Soviet economic order, real incomes in many of the republics quickly plummeted and the internal CIS economic union sought by Russia never really materialized (perhaps with the exception of the Russia-Belarus relationship).[69] Today many NIS countries remain heavily dependant for credit and finance on international financial institutions and other international lending agencies,

and most have actively tried to attract non-CIS sources of investment and capital to boost their economies.

Russia indisputably provides the 'glue' that binds the CIS together. However, that bond has been weakening ever since the CIS was established. Given the scope of Russia's own economic, political and military problems and the volatility of Russian-CIS relations, it is not at all clear that the CIS can ever constitute the strategic and economic 'buffer zone' Russian leaders had originally hoped for. It is, at best, an unstable regional arrangement, and at worst, a symbol of Russia's decaying influence in its immediate periphery.

The CIS and collective security

The basic elements of the CIS collective security system are enshrined in a collection of agreements signed in 1992 and 1993: the Agreement on Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS, signed in Kiev in March 1992; the Treaty on Collective Security signed in Tashkent in May 1992 (not signed by the Ukraine, Moldova or Turkmenistan, the latter having signed a special bilateral defence agreement with Russia), and; the CIS Charter, adopted by CIS Heads of States in Minsk, Belarus, in January 1993.[70] Part III of the of the CIS Charter reiterates elements found in the previous two agreements on the use of collective peacekeeping forces within the CIS, as well as stipulations concerning collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.[71] More recent agreements on defence and security are characterised by their bilateral nature. Russia has signed a number of agreements with Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova dealing with Russian military bases, maintenance of air defence systems, and border control.

This collection of agreements needs to be examined in context. Russia's interests towards its immediate periphery, the so-called 'Near Abroad', were formally articulated by the Russian foreign ministry in its Concept of Russian Foreign Policy belatedly adopted in March 1993 after nearly a year of infighting between nationalist and liberal factions in the Russian Duma and the foreign policy/defence establishment. The control and curtailment of conflict around Russia's immediate periphery and the protection of ethnic Russians communities living in the near abroad (estimated at 25 million) were listed as top priorities.[72] The policy effectively affirmed what Russia had already been doing since the turn of the decade in response to the alarming number of secessionist/ethnic conflicts in and around Russia. Russian claims went much further, however, to the extent that they sought to legitimise the development of the CIS as an anchor tying the newly independent republics to Russia's economic and security interests.

CIS Peacekeeping

As ex-Soviet troops were withdrawing Eastern and Central Europe, Russia's military doctrine was reoriented towards maintaining stability in the CIS. The new doctrine placed a heavy emphasis on rapid troop deployments and preparedness to use a high level of force to protect Russian interests.[73] Russian military leaders and policymakers have dismissed the notion that the country's 'peace restoring' activities in the CIS should be guided by traditional UN peacekeeping principles. In light of Western criticisms towards Russia's approach to CIS peacekeeping, for example, (former) Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev is on record as having called for a 'realistic' approach to conflict control in the former republics, a euphemism for letting Russia act as it saw fit in order protect its national interests in the CIS.[74]

Thus far Russian/CIS 'peacekeeping' troops have operated in four locations: South Ossetia (since July 1992), Moldova (since July 1992), Tajikistan (since December 1992) and Abhazia (since June 1994). Russia is the leading player in all these operations, also contributing the majority of the military personnel involved. In South Ossetia and Moldova, Russian troops operate in local coalitions integrating troops from the disputing parties in the peacekeeping force.[75] Neither operation has been sanctioned by CIS decision-making bodies. By contrast, the missions in Tajikistan and Abhazia have been endorsed, *ex post facto*, by CIS decisions. In Tajikistan, a small Central Asian brigade operates alongside a much bigger combined Russian Army/Ministry of Interior contingent. In Abhazia, a Russian force separates Georgian government forces and Abhaz separatist rebels whom Georgia believes to be covertly supported by Russia in order to maintain a rationale for its continuing presence in the country. Overall, the record of the last few years tends to confirm the view that the protection of Russian interests is the determinant factor as far as peacekeeping operations in the CIS are concerned.

The one exception to date to Russia's bid for peacekeeping supremacy in the CIS is in the long-running Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between oil-rich Azerbaijan and Karabakh Armenians/Armenia.[76] In May 1994, Russia successfully brokered a ceasefire between the disputants, bypassing the OSCE's own moribund mediation attempts (the so-called Minsk process). Despite OSCE discussion lasting throughout 1994, however, Russia failed to obtain OSCE endorsement for its CIS peacekeeping missions.[77] With Azerbaijan uninterested in Moscow's own proposal for a peacekeeping force, and OSCE members (including CIS countries) refusing to grant Russia exceptional peacekeeping privileges, it looked as if the ceasefire would not be consolidated with a more comprehensive plan.

At the OSCE summit of December 1994 a last minute compromise was agreed to by Russia and the United States. Moscow would co-chair the OSCE Minsk Group –

an implicit recognition that no solution could be found without Russian approval – but Russia would have to accept an OSCE-led peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh in which, ironically, it was likely to play a major role. As of early 1999, the OSCE peacekeeping mission had yet to be deployed and was unlikely to be for the foreseeable future.

Living with uncle Russia

Among the many factors which may affect future collective security operations in the CIS, three stand out as particularly significant: the shaky cohesion of the CIS, the rapid degradation of Russian military potential, and continued Western insistence on Russian transparency and accountability in its CIS affairs.

The dramatic decline of the Russian military is having a major impact on Moscow's ability to maintain regional order in the CIS.[78] The disastrous showing of the Russian armed forces in Chechnya in 1995-1996 simply highlighted the accelerating rate of decay of what was once considered the world's mightiest army.[79] Throughout 1996 Russian political and military leaders redoubled their calls for closer military cooperation with the CIS Republics. That call has gone largely unheeded. In effect, Russia may well have lost the military means to fulfil the ambitions set out in its 'Near Abroad' policy and is desperately seeking ways to redistribute the defence and peacekeeping burden with the republics in a new 'CIS military partnership'.[80]

One readily apparent problem, however, is that none of CIS republics, bar Belarus, is enthusiastic about military (re)integration with Russia. Ukraine has succeeded in developing a special relationship with NATO and other European institutions and has been at odds with Russia on several security-related issues (e.g Crimea, Black Sea fleet); Azerbaijan rejects CIS military integration and believes Russia is actively hindering its efforts to exploit its considerable oil reserves; and Georgia accuses Russia of meddling in its internal affairs, both for the purpose of justifying its military presence there and for checking Turkish political and economic advances in the Caucasus region.[81] These three countries, along with Moldova, and joined recently by Uzbekistan, have formed the so-called GUUAM group (Georgia-Ukraine-Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan-Moldova) which is essentially a diplomatic caucus meeting on the margins of the OSCE. Similarly, with the exception of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the former being for all intents and purposes a Russian protectorate, the Central Asian republics have opened up towards the West, including to NATO, and are trying to reduce their economic dependence on Russia through increased regional trade within the framework of the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), the regional economic arrangement which bridges the countries of West Asia and Central Asia.[82]

Unlike the UN Secretariat, which has extended *de facto* recognition to the CIS as a legitimate regional organisation, most Western countries individually regard the Commonwealth as little more than an extension of Russian foreign policy.[83] They have repeatedly dismissed Russian demands for UN and OSCE funding of CIS peacekeeping operations, and their actions are invariably designed to promote the independent character of the NIS, or to hold Russia to higher transparency in the conduct of its CIS affairs.[84] To a certain extent this has played in the hands of many CIS republics which do not consider the Commonwealth to be the exclusive framework for conflict resolution in the territory of the FSU, hence their intermittent appeals for OSCE or UN involvement to help them mitigate Russian influence.[85] Yet, after two chaotic years (1992-1994) of international conflict control efforts in the FSU, there has also been a muted acknowledgment that Russia holds legitimate interests in the stability of the CIS and that Russia may at times be best placed to deal with regional conflicts.

Since 1992, both the UN and the OSCE have been fairly active in conflict control efforts in the CIS. However, poor coordination, if not competition, between the two bodies have at times created problems, notably in Georgia.[86] On other occasions UN or OSCE initiatives have been sidelined by Moscow or have effectively legitimised Russia's dominant role in peacekeeping and peacemaking. Such was the case of the peacekeeping operation in Abhazia/Georgia, for instance, the only Russian peacekeeping operation endorsed by the UN Security Council (SC Res. 937 of 21 July 1994).[87] Overall, however, Russian reluctance to be supervised by international bodies and Western reluctance to get involved directly in CIS conflicts have considerably narrowed the scope and nature of external involvement.

As relations between the former soviet republics and the West develop, the United States and Western European countries are likely to demand that Russia be more accountable for its peacemaking ventures in the CIS. The debate over OSCE peacekeeping in Nagorno-Karabakh and the dispatch of UN observers in Georgia and Tajikistan, for instance, certainly point in this direction. At a time when Russian leaders are tremendously concerned about the consequences of NATO expansion, however, Western countries also recognise that antagonising Russia could be counter-productive. A low-key, cooperative approach through multilateral bodies, even if imperfect, is therefore likely to remain the preferred option for some time to come. However, the possibility of Western initiatives in the political-security sphere with selected NIS is likely to grow in parallel with the latter's desire to demonstrate political-diplomatic independence from Russia.

African Regional Organisations

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

Attempts to set up effective OAU structures for managing and resolving African conflicts have encountered serious obstacles ever since the organisation's founding in 1963. The original OAU organ established for dealing with inter-African conflicts, the OAU Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA), created in 1964, was stillborn and never became operational. Absent such structures the organisation developed a culture of adhockery and a reliance on so-called 'eminent persons' as mediators in its efforts to address conflicts on the continent. This approach seldom proved effective, and for more than two decades the OAU remained the very embodiment of the status quo in Africa.

The establishment, in June 1993, of a new OAU conflict management mechanism was a very significant step for the organisation. It arguably constitutes the most important institutional development since its establishment. Thus far, however, this structural change has had little impact on the OAU's ability to prevent and manage major African conflicts, let alone resolve them. In fact, throughout the first half of the 1990s, the UN, not the OAU, played the lead role in African conflict management efforts. One readily apparent problem is that the OAU lacks a strong political constituency, a core of influential African states which champion its cause. Major African powers such as Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa prefer sub-regional rather continental solutions to African problems. Without the appropriate combination of power and responsibility, however, the OAU remains handicapped and only likely to play a role where the interests of major African countries are not directly involved.

The birth of the OAU Mechanism

The genesis of the recent wave of OAU reform dates back to the early 1990s and owes much to the vision of Salim Ahmed Salim, the Tanzanian Secretary General of the organisation who took up that post in 1989. At the July 1990 OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government African leaders had called for a speedy resolution of all conflicts in Africa, opening the way, in principle, to some form of OAU involvement in the resolution of intra-state conflict. In May 1991, the Kampala Conference on Security, Stability and Development in Africa (CSSDA), a unique NGO-organised gathering of African policymakers, provided added impetus to the movement towards reforming African institutions.

A first OAU restructuring exercise culminated with the creation of a small division of conflict management within the OAU Secretariat in March 1992. Simultaneously, political consultation took place in order to determine the wider framework through which new OAU conflict management activities were to take place. In June 1992, Secretary General Salim laid out the options to the OAU Council of

Ministers in Dakar.[88] Two options were quickly discarded: 1) the revival of the CMCA, and 2) the creation of an African Security Council.[89] What Salim proposed was the establishment of an new OAU Mechanism with a dual mandate of conflict prevention and conflict resolution headed by the OAU Bureau of the Summit. He also envisaged the possibility of OAU peacekeeping with the reactivation of the OAU Defence Commission which would have been entrusted, among other things, with setting up of a inter-African peacekeeping force loosely modeled on the UN stand-by forces system.[90]

The ultimate results of these discussions were somewhat different from Salim's original proposal, but remained extremely ambitious.[91] Meeting in Cairo in June 1993, the 29th OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Governments established the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (henceforth referred to as the Mechanism).[92] The objective of the Mechanism is to "anticipate and prevent" conflict.[93] In circumstances where conflict has occurred, the Mechanism is called on to undertake "peace-making [i.e. mediation] and peace-building functions".[94] However, peacekeeping was deemed to be out of the reach of the organisation because of financial reasons.[95]

Officially, the principles underlying the operation of the Mechanism are the sovereign equality of member states, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, their right to independent existence, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the inviolability of national borders. The Mechanism nominally functions on the basis of consent and the cooperation of the parties to a conflict. Thus, rather than offering major changes in the way the OAU operates, the Mechanism remains grounded on the organisation's principles enshrined in its charter, a document which does not constitutionally provide for enforcement measures nor, as is also the case of the UN Charter, for peacekeeping forces.

The executive arm of the Mechanism is the Central Organ, a rotating council of 15 states elected annually and headed by the annual chair country of the OAU.[96] The Central Organ assumes overall direction and coordination of the activities of the Mechanism between ordinary sessions of the OAU Assembly. The second most important component of the Mechanism is the Office of the OAU Secretary-General which is given executive powers related to decisions taken by the Central Organ and is tasked with early warning and preventive diplomacy, a function that will in principle be facilitated by the recent addition of a new U.S.-funded crisis room at OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa.

As originally planned, the activities of the Mechanism were to be funded by the new OAU Peace Fund made up of financial appropriations from the regular OAU budget, voluntary contributions from OAU member states as well as other funding sources in Africa.[97] However, the OAU Secretary General reserved the right, with the approval of the Central Organ, to accept contributions from sources outside Africa. In

the three years following the establishment of the Mechanism this last provision proved absolutely crucial to OAU mediation efforts, particularly in Burundi, as well as to OAU capacity development.

The 'Mogadishu' effect

Over the last few years, two events have considerably heightened international expectations on the OAU and African states as regards conflict management: the political failure of the American-led UN mission in Somalia, and the powerlessness of the UN during the 1994 Rwanda genocide. The events of mid-1993 in Somalia were the root cause of a major reassessment of U.S. policy towards the UN's post-Cold War interventionism. Before UN forces were finally withdrawn from that country, in March 1995, the Clinton administration placed stringent conditions for future American participation in UN peace operations, a position tacitly endorsed other Western countries as far as military interventions in Africa were concerned.[98] This severely curtailed UN options on the continent, making it very unlikely that the Security Council would soon again sanction a UN operation in an ongoing African conflict manned by principally by non-African troop contributors.

The Rwanda crisis essentially confirmed this state of affairs. Neither the OAU nor the UN had sufficient leverage to make the August 1993 Arusha Accords 'stick' between the Rwanda Government and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF).[99] With neither the mandate nor the personnel to enforce a cease-fire the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) sent to oversee the implementation of the Arusha peace plan essentially became a bystander as the accords unraveled in early 1994, followed in April of that year by the start of the tragic massacre of an estimated 800,000 Tutsi civilians under the apathetic eye of the UN Security Council, and later by the extremely controversial (but UN-sanctioned) French intervention in Rwanda.[100]

If Rwanda was a disaster of the highest order for the UN, it was no less so for the OAU whose newly revived 'African solutions to African problems' rhetoric had proven to be rather shallow.[101] Yet the crisis brought home a clear lesson for African states: after the Somalia and Rwanda crises, neither Western countries nor the UN could not be relied upon to take decisive measures to stop the kind of chaos these crises gave rise to.

Post-Rwanda initiatives

A flurry of policy activity intended to enhance African conflict management capabilities has been evident ever since the Rwanda conflict. First, in the immediate aftermath of genocide the United States, Great Britain, France launched separate African conflict

resolution initiatives with a view to reinforcing the capabilities of the OAU as well that the peacekeeping readiness of African militaries.[102] In light of the multiplicity of proposals, however, the U.S. State Department decided to launch an international consultation process in May 1995 in order to develop a more coherent Western approach.[103] If anything, however, these discussions highlighted the lack of consensus between the United States and Europe, and the objective of coordination was never fully achieved.

In 1995, both the EU and the WEU expressed a strong interest on the issue of African conflict management.[104] However, attempts to organise concrete EU or WEU initiatives on this issue have proven to be more declaratory than substantive, and national-level initiatives have been far more significant. After the Rwanda genocide, for instance, Paris called for the establishment of an African peacekeeping force. The project quickly ran into serious political trouble and appeared stillborn for more than three years. However, it resurfaced with French support for sub-regional efforts to manage the internal conflict in the Central African Republic. For its part, Britain ran a peacekeeping assistance program in 1995, having carefully selected partner countries across English-speaking Africa, most notably Ghana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. As of late, some Scandinavian countries were also considering providing peacekeeping training to the armed forces of some SADC members in Southern Africa.

Second, following the launching of these initiatives, consultations began in early 1995 at the UN aimed at developing a global multilateral response to the problems of managing African conflicts.[105] Given post-Somalia attitudes, the main assumption of these discussions was that African states and institutions would have to play a much greater role in policing the continent. Therefore, consultations centered on how to best focus external multilateral assistance. The issue was taken up by the UN Secretariat, leading to the presentation of full recommendations to the General Assembly in November 1995.[106]

Finally, in the first half of 1995, the OAU Secretariat cautiously mooted a change of direction on the issue of peacekeeping. In a report presented to the June 1995 OAU Summit in Addis Ababa Secretary General Salim acknowledged the financial and material difficulties of mounting OAU peacekeeping operations, but he opined that "the need for Africa to prepare to take some degree of responsibility in peacekeeping is even greater today than is has even been before".[107] A year later, in June 1996, the first ever OAU military summit endorsed the principle of stand-by arrangements and the earmarking of national military units to serve under the UN, the OAU, or sub-regional arrangements on a voluntary basis.[108]

Rhetoric and realpolitik: Burundi

During the summer of 1996, the rapid degradation of the situation in Burundi heightened fears of a Rwanda-like scenario repeating itself.[109] For nearly two years UN efforts had overshadowed those of the OAU in Burundi, with UN Special Representative Ahmedou Ould Abdallah playing an important role in brokering what turned out to be unstable power-sharing arrangement following an aborted coup by the Tutsi-dominated Burundi military in October 1993. Since 1994, the OAU had deployed a small observation mission in the country, the MIOB (*Mission de l'OUA au Burundi*), sent to Burundi under a extremely vague mandate. Burundi's military and radical Tutsi elements both regarded the OAU mission as outside interference in the country's affairs and had succeeded in limiting the number of OAU observers. The role of the MIOB was therefore extremely limited. About all it could effectively achieve in its two-year stay was to help with small reconstruction projects and report on increasingly frequent massacres to OAU headquarters.

In 1995-1996, after the Rwanda tragedy, Western nations increasingly supported regional diplomacy as a way to resolve ethnic strife in Burundi. In effect, this constituted their response to UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's calls for direct UN military intervention. By mid-1996, however, peace talks led by former Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere on behalf of East African governments were crumbling, his impartiality questioned by hard-line by Tutsi elements. With an upsurge in ethnic killings and the new coup by the Tutsi-dominated military, in late July 1996, OAU Secretary General Salim took the unprecedented step of threatening military intervention.[110] This turned out to be an awkward bluff. For weeks before the coup, an East African 'technical committee' had been examining plans for sending an African peacekeeping force in Burundi under the framework of the OAU-supported Arusha peace process. Yet, not only was it obvious that the OAU could not fund such an operation and that Western countries were not interested in paying for it, but the new situation undermined the very rationale for peacekeeping in the country. Instead, East African states imposed economic sanctions on the new Burundi junta in order to try to force a return to constitutional government, a gesture that received the imprimatur of both the OAU and the UN.[111]

The Burundi coup was perhaps a fortuitous turn of events for the OAU. An OAU-led military intervention in Burundi might have not only become a military quagmire, but it could also have led to a serious crisis within the organisation.[112] Nevertheless, the imposition of regional sanctions on Burundi marked an important (if largely symbolic) step. As Glynne Evans notes, for the first time the OAU endorsed a coercive action by a group of countries against one of its own.[113] The crisis also sparked a new U.S. initiative. In late September 1996, the Clinton administration proposed to

organise, train and equip an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF).[114] The United States was reportedly prepared to shoulder half of the estimated cost of US$ 25 million for setting up a 10,000 strong all-African peacekeeping force, proposing that the EU make up for the difference.[115]

Initially, the African response to the ACRF proposal was extremely reserved. Though some countries showed interest in the initiative, a number of others, foremost among them South Africa, criticised the fact Washington seemed to be telling African how to organise themselves, bypassing the UN and African institutions in the process.[116] A bellicose Nigerian regime called the scheme "a package aimed at recolonising Africa and the developing nations".[117] The American proposal was also subjected to diplomatic sniping by France, which had proposed an analogous plan in November 1994.[118] In the end, the Clinton administration was effectively sent back to the drawing board and the original ACRF initiative now appears to be a *lettre morte*. Washington has opted instead to offer peacekeeping training services – under the renamed African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) – to a small but growing number of African militaries vying for U.S. military assistance.[119] It is also proposing to fund a new African-based think tank which will examine peace and security issues on the continent.

African problems, African solutions: with or without the OAU?

Though a number of positive developments can be identified in terms of OAU capacity-building, the rhetorical support of African states for the 'new' OAU has simply not been matched by action. Since the Rwanda crisis, they have been increasingly prepared to take matters into their own hands without waiting for effective OAU (or UN) action. Whether in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Sierra Leone or the former Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) coalitions of interested African states have either played a role as mediators and peacekeepers, or have otherwise actively supported change through a mix of coercive means. While some of these efforts have received the imprimatur of the OAU *ex post facto*, as is the case in Burundi with regional sanctions imposed by East African states, others have actually undermined OAU initiatives. Direct Ugandan and Rwandan support for, and participation to, the Zairian/Congolese rebellion, for instance, made a mockery of joint UN/OAU attempts to mediate between the crumbling dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko and rebel forces led by Laurent Kabila.[120]

The OAU Mechanism has yet to prove its worth as regards serious African crises, and for the foreseeable future the OAU is only likely to play a marginal role in managing African conflicts.[121] The absence of consistent and vigorous diplomacy by some of Africa's most influential states within the framework of the OAU structure remains the organisation's Achilles heel. There are, however, other reasons for this

assessment. The organisation's perennial financial difficulties constitute a major obstacle and make the OAU dependent on external assistance for almost any major undertaking. There are also problems of institutional effectiveness within the organisation's secretariat which point to the difficulties of developing a new problem-solving culture within the organisation.

Any realistic assessment of the OAU, however, needs to take into account the UN's own difficulties on the continent. Given the scope and magnitude of the problems at hand, no single institution – whether the UN, the OAU or a sub-regional organisation – can realistically provide the political direction and resources to deal with Africa's conflicts. If the OAU is to be taken more seriously as an institution able to provide some sense of security for both the populations and governments of the continent, then African countries and international actors will have to establish a much greater level of coherence between their different levels of action (national, sub-regional, regional, global). Otherwise, they will simply have to accept the consequences of 'self-help' as a way to deal with conflicts and instability in Africa.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Established in 1975 with a view to forming a West African economic community, ECOWAS has become better known in recent years for the peacekeeping role it played in Liberia and more recently in Sierra Leone.[122] In 1993, the then Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Abass Bundu, had hailed the regional intervention in Liberia as the "finest demonstration thus far of African initiative, African responsibility and African capacity in resolving an African problem".[123] In reality, few recent cases have illustrated the potential problems associated with regional peacemaking and peacekeeping in situations of internal conflict as distinctly as the ECOWAS intercession in Liberia, and later in Sierra Leone.

Nigeria: strong leadership or weak hegemony in West Africa?

ECOWAS is a hybrid organisation: an economic cooperation framework combined with two mutual defence agreements. Its original and primary goal was the improvement of intra-regional trade and the construction of a West African common market by 1990.[124] Early on, however, participating states also saw ECOWAS as mechanism for fostering regional political stability. Two ECOWAS protocols related to non-aggression (1978) and mutual assistance in case of threat of or actual armed aggression (1981) were thus signed between member states.[125]

The official arguments for moving the grouping toward a security role were straightforward: in a region prone to instability, economic development could simply

not take place without a regional commitment to security. However, some analysts have argued that these measures were in fact concerned primarily with *regime security* rather than regional security.[126] Given that the main threats to the region's governments were ethnic instability and mutinous militaries, and the fact that the 1981 protocol did not differentiate between internal and external sources of threat or aggression, this is an eminently plausible assessment.

As an economic organisation ECOWAS can claim few real achievements. Throughout its history it has suffered from a number of problems which have severely hampered its economic and political objectives.[127] Its founding treaty, modeled loosely on EC principles, has been called "a study in laissez-faire principles of integration".[128] By the mid-1980s the common market scheme was running well behind schedule and many analysts considered it to be a deeply flawed project. In fact, throughout the 1980's a number of serious and destabilising disputes between ECOWAS member states vitiated the very concept of a working and integrative regional community.[129]

With a population of 112 million people and an oil-driven economy which currently accounts for over 46% of West African GDP, Nigeria is both the largest sub-regional actor and a major player on the African political scene.[130] Yet despite its economic weight it remains an incomplete regional power, a vast and unstable country ruled, at least until very recently, by powerful military cliques, and divided by religion, ethnicity and vast socio-economic cleavages. Moreover, the failure of democratic governance in Nigeria has considerably undermined the African leadership role that successive Nigerian regimes have claimed for themselves.[131]

Nigeria's *de facto* regional predominance has consistently raised fear of hegemony in West African francophone states. Partly as a result of this 'Nigeria factor', francophone states have developed regional institutions which overlap with their membership in ECOWAS, institutions such as the *Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (CEAO) and the *Union monétaire ouest-africaine* (UMOA, now UEMOA). More Recently, they revived the 1977 *Accord de non-aggression et d'assistance en matière de défense* (ANAD) with a view to forming a new sub-regional (francophone) peacekeeping force.[132]

Liberian peacekeeping: what model?

ECOMOG, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia, was first deployed around the Liberian capital, Monrovia, in August 1990. There has been considerable debate as to the real motivations behind West African intervention in that country ever since. Two interpretations dominate. The first is that ECOMOG was deployed in Liberia as a peacekeeping-cum-humanitarian force in order to put an end to a brutal civil war and reestablish constitutional order. The second is that Nigeria intervened in Liberia under

the multilateral cover of ECOWAS at a critical moment of the conflict in order to prevent Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) from taking power and upsetting a balance of power favourable to Nigerian interests. Whatever the real motivations, the fact remains that the operation was mired in controversy from the start. The ECOMOG force, which was principally composed of Nigerian troops, was deployed without the consent of the NPFL and soon found itself fighting Taylor's forces alongside a baroque assortment of ethnic militias, local armies, and disgruntled factions, many of which were composed of teenage youths.

In a damning indictment of the ECOMOG experience, some observers of African politics have concluded that the enforcement strategy adopted by ECOMOG commanders early in the conflict had contributed directly to an outcome the intervention had purported to prevent: the regionalisation of the conflict to neighbouring states, notably in Sierra Leone.[133] After repeated UN and American intercessions between 1993 and 1996, and innumerable failed peace plans, some of the problems associated with ECOMOG (e.g. consent, composition, financing, regional support) were gradually addressed. However, locked in a deadly power struggle, the Liberian factions often reverted to terror tactics against civilians and humanitarian organisations, and continued engaged in open conflict with their opponents in order to control small sections of territory. Overall, it is fair to say that the ECOMOG experience was a clear demonstration of the dangers of regional intervention in civil wars without full local consent, strong international backing, and unanimous support from neighbouring states.

In 1998 there was little evidence that ECOWAS would be better prepared to face another Liberia than it was in 1990. Although the possibility of formalising ECOMOG as a regional conflict management mechanism was raised by the former ECOWAS Executive Secretary as well as by Nigerian leaders, it appeared unlikely that the countries of the region would soon agree to embark on an endeavour of similar scope under Nigerian leadership.[134]

In May 1997, with the rebel-led coup that overthrew the fragile government of President Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone, Nigeria lost an important regional ally. The rebels eventually allied themselves with pro-Taylor Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces and effectively put a stop to fragile UN peace efforts in that country. Nigeria, supported by Sandlines International, a private mercenary firm paid for by the Kabbah regime, and with the tacit support of the UK government, devised a plan to oust the rebel Junta. In January 1998, Nigerian forces stationed inside Sierra Leone, initiated a series of attacks against the rebels. In early March they succeeded in reinstalling President Kabbah (which was the putative motive of the Nigerian intervention) at the helm of Sierra Leone. However, this only proved to be a new phase in a tragic internal war that left UN peace efforts in tatters and found Nigeria heavily involved in Sierra

Leone, but this time with limited support from other ECOWAS members.[135] Heavy fighting ensued for most of 1998-1999, eventually leading to a ceasefire agreed to by RUF leader Foday Sankoh in May 1999. Hostilities have continued since, however.

ECOMOG and the regional option

The ECOWAS/ECOMOG experience raises several critical issues in relation to the regionalist thesis. Did ECOWAS' intimate knowledge of local issues provide it with a special advantage in terms of bringing about a resolution of the conflict? On this point the answer must be negative. From the beginning of the conflict, Liberia's neighbours either supported specific Liberian factions, or were hostile to the main challenger to power in Liberia, Charles Taylor and his NPFL. Moreover, ECOWAS countries were divided along francophone-anglophone lines. Ivoirian and Burkinabe support to the NPFL poisoned early mediation efforts led by ECOWAS anglophone states.[136] Burkinabe support, which reportedly facilitated Libyan arms shipment to Taylor's forces, continued even after the UN had sent observers to Liberia to implement the Cotonou peace plan brokered by a joint UN/OAU/ECOWAS team in July 1993.[137] Moreover, the NPFL allegedly benefited financially from business contacts with France, which was known to be 'irritated' by the Nigerian intervention and generally regarded the ECOMOG intervention as a Nigerian attempt to establish regional hegemony in West Africa.[138]

Another critical issue is the track record and mandate of ECOWAS. ECOWAS is first and foremost an economic cooperation framework. Can weak institutions primarily oriented towards economic cooperation suddenly reinvent themselves as conflict resolution mechanisms with the institutional capabilities, knowledge and resources to deal with civil wars? The answer, in this case at least, must be negative. ECOWAS does not have an institutionalised political-military interface, its member states have widely different foreign and security policies, and the organisation is perceived to be thoroughly dominated by Nigeria. The revised ECOWAS treaty (1993) places greater emphasis on conflict resolution, maintenance of regional peace and peaceful settlement of disputes. In and of themselves, however, these new treaty provisions do little to transform the capabilities of its member states.

Following UN involvement in Liberia in 1993, neighbouring francophone states showed increased support for ECOWAS efforts. Overall, however, they have remained wary of increased political cooperation with Nigeria, particularly so because the military junta headed by General Abacha was ostracised internationally because of its abysmal human rights record and its failure to restore legitimate constitutional order in Nigeria itself. Nigeria's self-proclaimed image of benevolent African peacemaker was tarnished by the actions of its military in neighbouring West African states, and its military is

widely believed to have profited handsomely from the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone.[139] The fact that Charles Taylor, Nigeria's arch-ennemy in the early 1990s, is now officially the elected Liberian head of state is not the smallest of paradoxes. Many observers think Taylor's rather surprising political rehabilitation in 1995-1996 was possible only because he struck a deal with Nigerian leaders desperate to save face after years unsuccessful ECOWAS peacemaking efforts in Liberia.

One question which has often been raised about the ECOMOG experience is whether or not it validates the 'contracting out' model of UN-regional organisation relations. This is not a helpful way to view the Liberian case for a number of reasons. First, in 1990 the UN never formally 'contracted out' the management of the Liberian conflict to ECOWAS. Rather, without any overriding strategic interests at stake in the region, most Western countries simply acquiesced ECOWAS' role. Indeed, some African governments insisted early on at the UN that Liberia was purely an 'African problem'. True, the UN Security Council, in its resolution 788 (19 Nov. 1992), did endorse ECOWAS efforts, *recalling* the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. A year later, however, the UN initiated a joint ECOWAS/OAU/UN mediation effort in recognition of the fact that ECOWAS efforts on their own were probably doomed.

Second, ECOMOG repeatedly used large-scale force without the approval of the UN Security Council, as is required by Chapter VIII of the Charter. Although Chapter VIII was invoked *ex post facto* by ECOWAS states as justification for regional action, one can find few international jurists who would readily agree that ECOWAS is a Chapter VIII organisation; it has neither been officially recognised as such by the members of the UN Security Council, nor has it formally claimed this status for itself.

Finally, the 'contracting out' model implies some relation of authority between the UN Security Council and regional organisations. Yet, ECOMOG and the UNOMIL observer force (sent to Liberia in late 1993) were never hierarchically organised; that is, ECOMOG was never under the command or the control of the UN, and working relations between the personnel of the two organisations were not particularly good.[140] The 'sub-contractant' model, therefore, appears to be of little relevance to the ECOWAS intervention. The fundamental issues raised by this case are rather those of the conditions under which regional 'self-help' can be exercised, and whether the UN, or indeed individual states, can or should provide support and legitimacy to flawed regional conflict management efforts when no other realistic alternatives exist.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Formerly known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), the organisation was founded in 1979 (established formally in 1980) as a

sub-regional economic cooperation structure by the so-called Frontline States (FLS).[141] Its principal objective was to reduce regional dependence on the South African economy.[142] During the 1980's, however, SADCC's economic objectives were considerably undermined by South Africa's policy of regional destabilisation which sought to weaken regional support for the African National Congress (ANC) and to bring Southern African states closer to its economic orbit.[143] Consequently, SADCC economic achievements during that period were at best limited. In 1992, partly as a result of EC external aid policies towards Southern Africa, SADCC countries opted for an increasingly integrationist agenda.[144] The SADCC name was dropped and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was born.

The post-apartheid SADC

By 1993-1994, the end of the apartheid era in South Africa had all but eliminated the *raison d'être* of the FLS. It was already clear that South Africa would come to play an important if not central role in any future regional political arrangements. In July 1994, SADC states moved towards a policy of closer cooperation with South Africa. The FLS was formally dissolved before the important SADC Gaberone (Botswana) summit of 29 August 1994, paving the way for South Africa's entry in the organisation. The Gaberone summit was an important moment in SADC history, not only would South Africa become a member, but its members endorsed a proposal to establish a so–called 'sector' on political cooperation, democracy, peace and security.

At the very moment these changes were taking place, events in the small country of Lesotho were highlighting the new sense of regional cooperation brought about by the ANC electoral victory in South Africa. Following the dissolution of parliament and the imposition of martial law by Lesotho's King Letsie III (17 Aug. 1994), Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe acted jointly and successfully pressured the Lesotho monarch towards restoring parliament (14 Sept. 1994), an action supported by the EU and the United States who also threatened to impose sanctions.[145] This experience was quickly followed in October 1994 by a post-elections crisis in Mozambique in which South Africa and Zimbabwe helped keep the UN-sponsored peace process on track.

Between 1994 and 1996 a debate arose over the form and content of regional security cooperation. One proposal given serious consideration throughout 1994-1995 would have seen the FLS replaced by an Association of Southern African States (ASAS) which would not be part of SADC, but would report to SADC Heads of Government summits. In the end, it was decided that SADC was the most appropriate framework for regional political cooperation rather than a separate body. At their June 1996 summit in Gaberone, SADC countries formally established the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. After an internal debate over who should chair this new

body, Zimbabwe obtained the chairmanship of the SADC Organ.[146] This was viewed by many as a South African concession to regional concerns that Pretoria might accumulate too much influence within SADC.

The terms of reference of the new SADC Organ are surprisingly far-reaching. The main objective of the Organ is to "protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict and external aggression".[147] SADC states have thus adopted an instrument which has both an intra-state and inter-state mandate. The establishment of the Organ was reported to be the first stage of further regional security cooperation which might include a mutual defence pact, collective security measures, and the development of a regional peacekeeping force. The latter is already starting to take shape. In March 1997 the first ever SADC peacekeeping manoeuvres (exercise *Blue Hungwe*) were held in Zimbabwe.[148]

It is much too early to judge SADC's success in matters of regional security. However, the measures adopted and/or envisioned by SADC governments represent, at least on paper, an advanced example of political-security cooperation in a developing region. One potentially significant aspect of the new 'political' SADC is that regional governments appear to be moving towards a position of zero tolerance as regards the overthrow of democratically elected governments in the SADC area. However, whether SADC countries adhere wholeheartedly to this ideal is certainly open to question. In 1997, for example, Angolan troops helped former Congolese leader Denis Sassou N'Guesso overthrow the Congolese government. Moreover, the reaction of some SADC members to the developing crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the DRC was granted membership in SADC member in 1997) certainly suggests that democratic governance is not a requirement for entry into the organisation.

To a large extent, SADC's economic and political future remains tied to South Africa. As Booth and Vale rightly note, South Africa dominates the Southern Africa sub-region by every conventional indicator.[149] Realist scholars might even argue that the country is a natural leader in a security complex that is fairly well defined, both in economic and political terms. However, the image of South Africa as a regional or even a continental hegemon is one the ANC government has sought to avoid.[150] Indeed, in its few couple of years in office it has demonstrated a considerable reluctance to play the role of 'African policeman' in spite of considerable pressures on South Africa to contribute forces to various peacekeeping operations on the continent.[151] With a heavy domestic burden to carry and a military undergoing a difficult transition from the apartheid era, this was perhaps not an unreasonable position.

As of late there been have signs that South Africa might be willing to play a more active political role outside in African politics, particularly in relation to the conflict in the DRC. In 1997, South Africa's (unsuccessful) mediation efforts heralded

in a new era in its continental diplomacy. A year later, however, it has become apparent the situation in the DRC had created a rift between more interventionist SADC governments led by Angola and Zimbabwe, and moderates led by South Africa. This has highlighted the latent fragility of intra-SADC politics and underlined the fact that some countries within SADC are far from willing to defer to South African leadership as a matter of course.

The Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD)

Established in 1986, IGAD is a small sub-regional organisation headquartered in Djibouti which was established partly as a result of UN efforts to stimulate regional dialogue and cooperation on resource and environmental issues in the Horn of Africa.[152] This theoretically apolitical organisation has been involved in a number of sub-regional conflict management efforts. In April 1988, meetings held under its aegis produced a disengagement between warring Ethiopian and Somalian forces.[153] However, IGAD has become better known in recent years as the locus of sub-regional efforts that seek to resolve the Sudanese conflict, one of Africa's deadliest and longest running internal conflict.

Under the chairmanship of Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi, IGAD convened a first meeting with the Sudanese factions in Kampala in September 1993. Four other IGAD meetings were held between January and September 1994, at which point negotiations stalled.[154] IGAD countries nevertheless kept the dialogue open. Meeting again on Sudan in January 1995, they asked for international support for their initiative. The UN agreed to send an observer to future negotiations.[155] The following February, the Netherlands, the United States, Norway, Canada, and Italy quickly agreed to form a 'Friends of IGAD' group under Dutch stewardship as a way to highlight international support for the initiative.

Various proposals for an IGAD peacekeeping/observation mission in the Sudan have been raised during this period. In March 1996, IGAD countries moved towards formalising the conflict management role of the organisation and IGAD Charter was amended in order to include new functions, among them conflict resolution.[156]

Regional Organisations in Asia, Latin America, and The Middle East

ASEAN/ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

The establishment, in July 1993, of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the most recent step in what can be characterised as a slow and incremental evolution towards a

more explicit regional security role for that organisation. Established in 1967 in the aftermath of the *Konfrontasi* between Indonesia and Malaysia (1963-1966), ASEAN was to be a Southeast Asian forum with an inward-looking mandate for promoting regional cooperation and building regional confidence.[157] At its inception, therefore, ASEAN was neither a defence alliance, nor a regional organisation coming under the terms of the UN Charter. Many of its members, in fact, remained signatories of pro-Western security alliances.[158]

In many ways, ASEAN's unique status was indicative of the particular approach towards regionalism adopted by Southeast Asian countries, a consensual approach in which political dialogue was favoured over legalistic procedures and military commitments.[159] ASEAN's intra-mural conflict management norms reflect these inclinations. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (which is currently being revised by ASEAN countries) emphasised respect for territorial sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, and a renunciation of the threat or use of force.[160] Rather than being called to act collectively in the event of a member state coming under attack or threatened by a neighbouring state, ASEAN members are required to prevent disputes from arising between them, or settle those disputes through a voluntaristic approach relying on the consent of disputing parties.[161]

The birth of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

With the end of the Cold War and the push towards the formation of more cohesive Asia-Pacific community, ASEAN has now taken a political role that goes beyond the boundaries of Southeast Asia. Between 1990 and 1993, uncertainties surrounding of the future shape of the balance of power in East Asia led to a growing regional consensus on the desirability of developing an Asia-Pacific wide security dialogue. In a part of the world where multilateralism was traditionally weak, or based on hostile coalitions of interests, ASEAN had the advantage of being perceived as a success story as well as presenting an informal and non-committal model of inter-governmental dialogue, notably through the annual ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) which joins ASEAN countries to a number of ASEAN 'interlocutors'.[162]

In mid-1990 separate Canadian and Australian initiatives proposing the establishment of CSCE-like processes in Asia had been criticised as inappropriate both by the Bush Administration and regional leaders.[163] In a remarkable turnaround, regional attitudes shifted perceptibly the following year when ASEAN governments, supported by Japan, started to voice an interest in establishing a regional security dialogue. Between 1991 and 1993, ASEAN leaders successfully led a process allowing the creation of a new ASEAN-based security forum with would in time include the six ASEAN countries, the seven PMC dialogue partners, as well as China, Laos,

Papua-New Guinea, Russia and Vietnam.[164] In May 1993, a first tentative discussion agenda was agreed to in Singapore, and the following July, again in Singapore, all eighteen countries concerned moved to the establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as the security component of the extended ASEAN-PMC talks, with yearly meetings to be held between the foreign ministers of participating states.[165]

The ascendancy of ASEAN as the locus of a new regional security forum can be explained by a number of factors, the first being the settlement of the Cambodian conflict. Though unsuccessful, ASEAN's peacemaking attempts in Cambodia in the 1980s not only strengthened the internal cohesion of its membership, but it also contributed significantly to building up its regional and international credentials.[166] In 1989-1990 the shift from regional to international peacemaking in that country proved to be instrumental in fulfilling one of ASEAN's founding objectives, the elimination of major armed conflict from the sub-region, an objective shared by all the major power brokers of the region.[167]

Second, as the Cold War wound down in the Pacific, both Japan and the ASEAN states were concerned by the long-term consequences of a gradual military disengagement of the United States from East Asia. While the United States initiated a reduction of its Pacific forces in 1990-1991, it basically maintained a strategic posture based on its traditional alliances with Japan, Korea and Australia. Yet, the days when the United States could dictate alone the terms of the Pacific-wide security architecture were effectively over, and Washington had to acknowledge the calls for a regional security dialogue coming from its allies. In early 1993, the new Clinton administration indicated a modicum of support for a new regional security forum.[168]

Third, an ASEAN-based forum was selected because that option essentially presented the path of least resistance. The ASEAN option already included key regional players through the organisation's annual ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC); it presented a model of cooperation based on dialogue rather than formal agreements; and the process leading to its formation was largely initiated by core Asian nations rather than extra-regional powers.

Thus far the ARF has held five annual meetings. Arguably the most significant to date has been the August 1995 meeting in Brunei during which participants agreed to a concept paper outlining a gradual evolutionary approach for the forum.[169] Stage I would see the promotion of confidence-building measures and Stage II the development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms. Stage III, the development of conflict resolution mechanisms, was seen as, "an eventual goal that ARF participants should pursue".[170] In 1995, ARF participants also agreed to expand the scope of ARF activities by instituting an inter-sessional support group (ISG) on confidence-building as well as holding inter-sessional meetings (ISMs) to discuss a range of security issues (e.g. peacekeeping, search and rescue, non-proliferation, etc.). The ISG/ISM proposals

effectively formalised the process of inter-governmental consultations and seminars which had begun the previous year.

'Trust building' or diplomacy as usual?

The development of the ARF thus far suggests that it is a useful forum for government-to-government dialogue on an ever-expanding range of matters related to regional security. In effect, the forum has been able to inch its way forward precisely because it hasn't been established as a decision-making mechanism. Thus, as Michael Leifer observes, the ARF is essentially an extension of the ASEAN model of conflict avoidance and 'peace through cooperation'.[171] Yet, being neither a full-fledged regional security organisation, nor a collective security regime, the ARF currently offers precious little by the way of concrete measures for conflict prevention and crisis management.

The ARF's 'trust building' approach undoubtedly offers many advantages. It can be argued that in the absence of an Asia-Pacific regional organisation, the ARF process is slowly building a common security agenda were none existed before; that it may extract collective commitments – even seemingly minor ones – on a whole range of issues; that it fosters a gradual change of national perceptions and 'socialises' governments into working together. It can also be argued that it contributes to build a regional consensus on global norms and regimes (e.g. peacekeeping standards, the UN arms register, non-proliferation), and that it makes a necessary contribution, along with the intellectual contribution of a bevy of regional think tanks, to the emerging architecture of what still remains a rather inchoate Asia-Pacific community.[172]

In many respects, however, the ARF does not constitute an entirely satisfactory framework for building Asia-Pacific security. It is not at all clear that an arrangement such as the ARF, which is overlaid over a complex network of regional and bilateral security alliances, can overcome regional tensions through intermittent dialogue. Legitimate questions can also be raised about the validity of extending the ASEAN model, through the ARF, to the whole of the Asia-Pacific region. The ARF process is driven mainly by an internal rationale, a desire to improve regional confidence and cooperation, as was ASEAN at its foundation. Unlike the early years of ASEAN, however, the forum's cohesion is not buttressed by common threat perceptions or a shared colonial experience. Here we can only note that the idea of a common Asia-Pacific destiny is much more present in the political and economic rhetoric of Western policymakers than that of Asian leaders.

Another key issue with the ARF process is its leadership structure. An ASEAN-controlled process for building Asia-Pacific security is a mixed blessing as the ARF can only be considered a largely irrelevant instrument for the management key regional relationships (e.g. China-United States, China-Japan). Washington and Beijing

– neither of which are particularly enthusiastic about a multilateral approach to regional security – have adopted a rather passive position towards the forum, signifying through their actions or policies that it plays a rather marginal role in the conduct of their regional affairs.[173]

Developing a substantive security agenda which can accommodate the security perspectives of the ARF's membership – which include China, Japan, the United States, Russia, and now India – will require extraordinary diplomacy yet by its very nature risks recreating the sort of interminable and largely unproductive dialogue that characterised the early years of the CSCE in Europe.[174] Irrespective of the merits of inclusiveness, some of the ARF's Western members already feel some frustration over the pace of ARF development. A key issue here is that if the forum does not move towards actual problem-solving the United States is unlikely to regard it as anything other than a regular diplomatic conclave.[175] Yet moving toward a more demanding form of regional security cooperation is precisely what China as well as some ASEAN countries seek to avoid.[176] Furthermore, with neither Taiwan or North Korea participating in the process, thus making ARF discussion of the two most serious conflicts in the region effectively impossible, and big players like China and the United States only marginally interested, the ARF is decidedly of limited relevance to Northeast Asia.

Finally, the ARF is most unlikely to play a role in internal matters which might have an important bearing on the regional political outlook, including amed conflict like that over East Timor. In recent years, issues such as human rights, labour standards, freedom of the press, or system of government have been a perpetual sources of tension between Western and Asian governments.[177] The debate over the political situation in Burma at the July 1996 ARF meeting in Jakarta illustrates very well the limitations of the ARF regarding those issues. Responding to Western pressures for a tougher stance against the Burmese junta, Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas, backed by China and the other ASEAN countries, made it clear that he did not see democratisation and human rights as appropriate topics for discussion in the forum.[178]

ARF and the China factor

More than any other single factor the direction taken by China, as the main pretender to great power status in the region, will be the central determinant of the future stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Since 1993, China's position towards the regional security situation in Southeast Asia has shifted sightly. After a period of tension with ASEAN states over the Spratly Islands in 1994-1995, Chinese diplomacy seemed to recognise that alienating its southern neighbours might be detrimental to its diplomatic and strategic interests. However, recent events on Mischief Reef (a shaol in the Spratly Island group claimed by the Philippines) suggest that China is unbending in its territorial

claims in the South China sea. Should it pursue its claims too vigorously against other claimants to the Spratly Islands, the risks for China are clear: fuelling a fear of Chinese intentions which might lead to the creation of a tacit or even overt anti-China coalition.[179] This is a development China could ill-afford at a time when it is seeking much greater regional leadership role and increased participation in the regional and international trading system.

On the other hand, the level of mistrust between China and the United States remains high. China seems to perceive U.S. intentions in East Asia as fuelled by an instated policy of strategic confinement. On the other hand, the United States tacitly regards China as the principal challenger to its leadership position in East Asia, a competitor whose full economic and military potential will develop fully in the next century. The state of US-China relations remains the dominant aspect of any overall security outlook in East Asia. The ARF, however, can only play but a relatively small part in the political dynamic between these two behemoths.

The Arab League

In March 1995 the Arab League – otherwise known as the League of Arab States (LAS) – celebrated its 50th anniversary in an atmosphere of uncertainty about its role and its future.[180] Once a powerful force united by anti-colonialist sentiment, pan-Arab ideology and a collective hatred of Israel, the Arab League is now widely regarded as something of a political dinosaur. This is a remarkable decline for an organisation which was once seen as the central pivot of Arab unity and which launched one of the very first regional peacekeeping operations, the Arab Security Force in Kuwait (1961-1963).[181]

The problems of Arab regionalism

The internal problems with have bedevilled the League are well known.[182] Fundamental political, economic and religious issues divide its membership. These divisions pit a secularist vision of the Arab state against Islamic fundamentalism, 'progressive' Arab states against conservative Arab regimes, petroleum-rich states against resource-poor states, and supporters of peace with Israel against hard-line Arab states. The League's cohesion is also hampered by the fact that its membership straddles three sub-regions, each with their own specific problems, power configurations and interactions with adjacent areas: North Africa, the Near East and the Gulf states.

Given the League's many problems it is perhaps not surprising that Arab states have complemented various forms of 'sub-groupism' to disunited Arab regionalism. In 1981, reacting to the sudden change of regime in Iran which brought Islamic

fundamentalists to power, Arab Gulf monarchies formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It weaknesses as a defensive alliance were patently demonstrated at the onset of the 1990 Gulf War and to this day GCC states rely on Western military commitments to protect the Persian Gulf and the oil fields of the Arabian peninsula. However, because of their immediate proximity to Iran and Iraq and their influence in the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC), GCC states remain the most important interlocutors to both countries in the Arab world. Another sub-regional organisation, the *Union du Maghreb Arabe* (UMA), was created in 1989 with a view to strengthen North African economic cooperation and present a stronger North African front against EC trade policies. However, the UMA's performance to date can only be qualified as modest.[183] Yet another regional arrangement, the short-lived Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), represented a failed attempt by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein to build a counterweight to the GCC in which the other 'senior' participant, Egypt, saw an opportunity to build an Arab economic pole which marginalised Syria and Saudi Arabia. The ACC collapsed almost as soon as it was created with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

The Gulf War and its aftermath

The end of the Cold War started very inauspiciously for the Arab League. It was deeply divided by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Iraq and a number of North African states sympathetic to its position were pitted against a more conservative group led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia that favoured action against the Iraqi regime. Following the Arab League's peculiar custom of voluntary cooperation whereby League resolutions are only binding on those states actually participating in the voting, only thirteen of the League's then twenty-one members attended the organisation's emergency session of 2 September 1990.[184] Though many Arab states went on to participate to the US-led coalition against Iraq, the League's own collective military instrument, the Joint Defence Council, was never activated.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War there were signs that a small group of Arab countries would support the creation of an Arab peacekeeping force (as opposed to an Arab League force) to maintain security in the Gulf region. Meeting in Damascus in March 1991, the six GCC countries, Egypt and Syria (known since then as the Damascus Declaration States) officially proposed the creation of such a force. However, the plan was shelved almost as soon as it was agreed to. The unequivocal U.S. commitment to defend Kuwait, as well as tensions between Egypt and Syria over the Middle East peace process (MEPP) – which, as noted in a previous chapter, bypassed the Arab League altogether – no doubt contributed to this outcome. Nevertheless the 'Damascus Declaration States' remain part of the fragmented Arab

political constellation. One of their most visible, if limited, accomplishments to date was the adoption of a common position against Israel's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the lead up to the 1995 NPT review conference.[185] More recently, in June 1997, the Damascus group called for a revival of the Arab Common Market project, a proposal which had been lying dormant since the mid-1960's.

Since the 1990-1991 Gulf War, other regional conflicts have confirmed the weakness of the Arab League as an instrument for managing inter-Arab conflicts. In February 1992, the Arab League appears to have been dragged along reluctantly (with the OAU and the OIC) in UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's ill-fated efforts to obtain a cease-fire in Somalia.[186] Later in the Somali conflict even this supporting role subsided as it became clear that resolving the conflict was not a high priority issue for the League's membership. In two more recent conflicts involving Yemen, the Yemeni civil war of May-July 1994 and the more recent flare up between Eritrea and Yemen over the Hanish Islands in the Red Sea, the League failed to play a meaningful role.[187]

Is reform possible?

Between 1991 and 1994, the attempts of Arab League Secretary General Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid to revive the organisation yielded little progress. Thereafter, there emerged a modicum of consensus on the necessity of reforming the League. A December 1994 meeting in Alexandria between Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, Syrian leader Hafez al-Hassad, and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia saw the League's three pivotal countries pledge their support for 're-energising' the League.

Egypt – which both history and geography have placed at the centre of the League – has been a major driving force behind attempts to rejuvenate the organisation. In March 1995, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary summit of the Arab League, president Mubarak proposed a new Code of Honour for Arab Security and Cooperation in order to revitalise the organisation and improve its capacity to deal with inter-Arab conflicts. In the following months, a committee of experts, which included fifteen of the twenty-two League members, developed a set of reform proposals which included, *inter alia*, the creation of an court of justice for the settlement of Arab disputes; increased use of the Office of the Arab League Secretary General and Arab League structures for the resolution of disputes; the establishment of an Arab League peacekeeping force, and; amendments to the Arab League Charter pursuant to the objectives adopted through the proposed Code of honour.[188] Significantly, the proposals did not hint at greater UN-Arab League cooperation, nor of coordination of future League activities with the vacillating MEPP, nor does there appear to be any interest in developing a League role in the management of internal conflict. Here, one can only note the deafening silence of the League on the situation in Algeria,

demonstrating once again the unwillingness of Arab political elites to tackle governance and human rights issues on a regional basis.

The reform measures discussed above were reportedly agreed to in principle at the June 1996 Arab League summit in Cairo, an event largely designed as a demonstration of Arab solidarity in response to the electoral victory of the Likud party in Israel.[189] However, given the League's record – its Charter has never been amended – one can justifiably question whether the proposed reforms will move ahead. Indeed, their full implementation would constitute a radical departure from the divided inter-Arab politics of the last forty years and a revival of Arab regionalism the likes of which have not been seen since the days of Nasserist Egypt. At this point, the only proposal which appears as though it may move forward in the short to mid-term is the proposal for an Arab Court of Justice.

Western countries have very limited faith in the League's ability to play a truly constructive political role in the Middle East, and throughout this decade the idea of a new Organisation for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (OSCME), of variations thereof, has been mooted on several occasions. In the same vein, the now defunct Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group of the MEPP (seven rounds of talks were held between 1992 and 1994) also examined a number of multilateral confidence-building measures and structures which were partly inspired by the CSCE/OSCE experience in Europe. The prospects for these proposals do not appear very good since they would imply a major shift in the national security strategies of Middle East countries which the current generation of Arab leaders appears unprepared to consider.

The Organization of American States (OAS)

After a long period of stagnation lasting from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, the OAS is an institution which has regained some credit in terms of legitimacy and authority.[190] As Vaky and Muñoz have noted, the genesis of this change of fortune can probably be found in two mutually reinforcing trends which evolved throughout the 1980s: the growing convergence of macro-economic policies between Latin and North America, and the development of a hemispheric consensus on the desirability, promotion, and defence of constitutional democracy.[191]

Beyond those trends, a succession of events contributed to the revival of the OAS. The Central American peace process of the late 1980's provided the organisation with a new sense of relevance in a broad range of spheres, from human rights to electoral assistance via the demobilisation of combatants. The Bush Administration's embrace of a more multilateralist hemispheric policy after the 1989 Panama invasion gave considerable impetus to the renewal of the inter-American system. Finally,

Canada's accession to the OAS, in 1990, contributed to a depolarisation of inter-American dynamics, notably by diluting the dominating position of the United States within the organisation. These developments have had far-reaching consequences, not the least of which has been a partial restoration of the OAS collective security rationale under the new mandate of defending democracy in the Hemisphere.

Promoting and defending democracy: new OAS norms

The basis for the new OAS role in the protection and protection of democracy is found in three OAS decisions adopted in 1991 and 1992. In June 1991, the OAS General Assembly adopted the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System, to which it joined Resolution 1080 on representative democracy. In the Santiago Commitment member states pledged to "adopt efficacious, timely and expeditious procedures to ensure the promotion and defence of representative democracy in keeping with the Charter of the Organization of American States".[192] Resolution 1080 called on the OAS Secretary General to convoke an emergency meeting of the OAS Permanent Council "in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden, or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the illegitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's member states."[193] The third decision is the December 1992 Protocol of Washington which allows the suspension of an OAS member state "whose democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force".[194] Also noteworthy was the creation of the Canadian-sponsored OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) established to support democratisation processes in the Americas.

The adoption of these new regional norms, indeed, of these new obligations, indicated a shift in the attitude of Latin American governments. By giving the OAS a role in the protection and promotion of democratic governance Latin American countries not only recognised threats to democracy as a hemispheric security issue, but they also effectively agreed to shift the boundaries of OAS responsibility to encompass decidedly internal issues. However, while the defence of democracy has provided the rationale for OAS initiatives in such countries as Haiti, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru, the breadth of the new mandate has also raised some difficult issues.

The OAS Charter does not contain any provisions for imposing economic sanctions, nor is the organisation formally mandated to undertake peacekeeping or military enforcement tasks.[195] Indeed, suggestions to the effect that the OAS should become an enforcement agency invariably raise criticism from Latin American countries. The organisation is therefore limited in the range of functions it can perform, making the task of organising a coherent collective response all the more difficult when

confronted with a situation of *fait accompli*, or when its own membership does not comply with voluntary measures.

Nowhere have the general principles enunciated in the Santiago Commitment clashed so flagrantly with the weaknesses of the OAS Charter than in Haiti. In late-1992 the ineffectiveness of the U.S.-sponsored (but non-binding) OAS sanctions against the Cédras junta was a major factor behind American and Canadian pressures to seek UN involvement.[196] To a large extent, the Haitian crisis confirmed two trends that had been developing ever since the involvement of the OAS in the Central American peace process. The first was the somewhat uneasy relationship between the organization and the United Nations. The second was the reluctance of Latin American governments to move the organisation in the direction of regional enforcement.

Between 1987 and 1992, UN-OAS cooperation in Central America, though ultimately successful in Nicaragua, did not prove to be a particularly positive.[197] Because of the limits of OAS resources and the exclusively civilian nature of its involvement the OAS was widely regarded to be a junior partner to the UN. When the Haiti crisis was put on the OAS agenda in September 1991 – an obligation incurred under Resolution 1080 – many Latin American countries wanted the OAS to provide the focal point of diplomatic efforts. This was initially the case. Towards the end of 1992, however, it became clear that OAS measures were not effective and that more decisive UN machinery was needed. With the arrival of the Clinton administration in 1993 the United States began playing a more active political role in Haiti and effectively shifted the locus of decision-making away from the OAS, notably by sponsoring mandatory UN sanctions (UNSCR 841 of June 1993) against the illegitimate junta of General Raoul Cédras. Several Latin American countries criticised the strong-fisted approach adopted by the Clinton administration. However, lacking the capacity to decree and enforce sanctions in the face of an obstinate Haitian junta, OAS measures had effectively run their course, and the UN, led by Washington, began to play the central multilateral role, although great care was taken to ensure the OAS maintained a role.

It is fair to say that both the Central American and the Haitian experiences temporarily damaged relations between the OAS and the UN. In 1993, then OAS Secretary General João Baena Soares criticised what he perceived as the 'hub and spoke' model of UN-regional organisations relations presented by UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali.[198] His successor, ex-Colombian President César Gaviria, has been less strident in demarcating OAS-UN responsibilities. He has been an advocate of better coordination between the two organisations, provided they respected the general rules enunciated in Chapter VIII of the UN Chapter, notably regarding the recourse to regional organisations as the primary locus of regional problem-solving.[199] Practical UN-OAS cooperation is possible, as evidenced by the joint UN-OAS International Civil

Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH – established in April 1993) that served as the locus of international efforts to restore some measure of stability and fundamental rights in that country.[200] In fact, in spite of disappointing results in strengthening democratic practices in Haiti, MICIVIH did represent one of the novel ways the UN and a regional body could operate on non-military aspects of conflict management.

The second important trend to emerge out of recent OAS experience is the non-military nature of the organisation's involvement in conflict resolution efforts.[201] Almost all OAS missions thus far have been given tasks such as human rights monitoring, electoral assistance, observation, fact-finding or mediation.[202] Through these types of activities the OAS has demonstrated a substantially higher level of involvement in regional problem-solving than in the past, particularly as regards internal situations. However, there is little support within the organisation's membership for moving in the direction of regional peacekeeping or enforcement, nor are there any plans to amend the OAS Charter to allow it to do so.[203] Overall, therefore, the framework for OAS involvement in conflict resolution remains firmly based on a pacific settlement of disputes philosophy relying on the consent of the parties involved.

The nascent OAS security agenda

The operating framework described above has also been determinant in the development of the OAS regional security agenda. At the OAS General Assembly in Nassau, in 1992, the OAS established a Special Committee on Hemispheric Security to "study and make recommendations on the various aspects of cooperation for hemispheric security".[204] In Port-Louis (Haiti) in 1995, the OAS General Assembly formalised this arrangement by transforming this Special Committee into one of only a handful of permanent OAS committees.

Thus far the OAS regional security agenda has been limited to relatively few issues. Arguably, its most important achievements to date have been the adoption of a 'Western Hemisphere Wide Anti-Personnel Land Mines Free Zone' at the June 1996 OAS General Assembly in Panama City, the adoption in 1997 of an OAS convention on the illicit exportation of small arms, and the constructive promotion of military confidence-building measures (CBMs) between certain OAS members.

Despite these positive developments there is a widespread understanding that the OAS membership will only sustain a slow evolution of the organisation's regional security role. Inter-American military cooperation, for example, is not on the organisation's agenda. Proposals to bring the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) –

an old and thoroughly obsolete body created in 1942 to coordinate Latin America's role in the war effort – closer to the fold of the OAS were received very cautiously by Latin American countries. In spite of a long-running process aiming to redefine the OAS-IADB relationship begun in 1992, and more recent proposals on this question put forth by OAS Secretary General Gaviria, the fact of the matter is that the OAS-IADB relationship hardly ranks as a priority issue for the vast majority of OAS members.[205] Moreover, it is probably not insignificant to note that a number of events and high-level conferences related to inter-American security – notably two defence ministerials held in 1995 and 1996 – have taken place outside the organisation's framework.[206] This tends to reinforce the view that even though the OAS has developed a rejuvenated constituency since the end of the Cold War, the conduct of hemispheric security diplomacy is by no means the organisation's exclusive purview.

Leaders, followers, and bystanders

Examples such as the ones presented above underscore the fact that there remain wide attitudinal differences within the OAS membership as to the proper role of the organisation.[207] Countries like Mexico and Brazil have remained in the non-interventionist orthodoxy, wary not only of U.S. influence in the organisation, but also of the possibility that a stronger OAS might be used to poke its nose into their affairs. More 'activist' countries such as Canada and Argentina, on the other hand, have generally tended to favour greater OAS cooperation on a range of hemispheric security issues.

It should be pointed out that the perception that Latin American states place a low priority on inter-American political cooperation belies a healthy level of regional interaction. Both the Latin American Rio Group (which at its foundation in 1986 was the offspring of the Contadora initiative) and recent efforts to create a Central American political and economic identity demonstrate a political will to create regional cooperation frameworks not dominated by U.S. interests. It is possible that a strengthening of political regionalism in Latin America may limit the OAS role to that of legitimising authority for episodic inter-American initiatives. The current push towards a hemispheric trade agreement, however, ultimately militates against the formation of a cohesive political and economic Latin American bloc.

U.S. policy towards the organisation is characterised by a dualist approach. On the one hand, the United States remains a key player in the inter-American system, and both the Bush and Clinton administrations have respectively led efforts to reinforce certain OAS functions, strengthening its role in protecting democratically-elected governments and using the organisation to promote stronger national legislation against drug-trafficking and money-laundering for example. On the other hand, the United

States has historically maintained a rather instrumental vision of the organisation, reserving for itself what it sees as a right to unilateral action in the Hemisphere, or acting with other states outside the organisation when it considers it to be an inappropriate forum for problem-solving. To give one recent example, during the 1994-1995 Peru and Ecuador border war Washington strongly insisted that the basis for mediation should be the 1942 Rio Protocol, with its system of 'guarantor' countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, United States), rather than OAS dispute resolution mechanisms.[208]

In spite of what can be considered renewed political dynamism, the bottom line seems to be that the OAS does not currently have the commanding position in inter-American political affairs that some would like it to have. Rather, its work runs parallel with other initiatives in what can only be described as a developing framework for hemispheric cooperation in which regional trade, not regional security, is currently the most important issue.

Concluding Remarks

As evidenced by the case studies in this chapter, the past decade has been a time of tremendous institutional and political change for regional organisations, both in terms of institutional and normative development. In fact there is not a single period during the entire postwar period when so many were experiencing this level of change. Some of these developments are directly attributable to the impact of the end of the Cold War. This is particularly the case in Europe where institutions such as the CSCE/OSCE and NATO have struggled to redefine their role beyond the vanishing East-West paradigm and were directly confronted with a spate of conflicts in the Balkans and the FSU. In many other cases, however, the repercussions were less immediate, and a combination of regional dynamics and domestic political changes were primary factors behind institutional change, or lack thereof.

Many of the cases examined in this chapter suggest that regional institutions are not necessarily effective frameworks for preventing, managing and settling local or regional conflicts. Some would argue that they are undergoing a period transition, and that it is therefore unrealistic to expect them to suddenly become leading conflict management agencies in their respective areas. This may be a partial answer in some cases. Overall, however, the issues involved run much deeper than the question of institutional change.

Many large membership regional arrangements lack the cohesion which could enable them to play a more effective and timely role. As well, many of them remain deeply influenced by the interests of key regional powers and can therefore hardly be considered completely neutral parties in third-party conflict management efforts. Finally, the question of regional intervention in cases of internal conflict remains particularly contentious. Though a number of regional organisations have been involved in attempting to manage situations of internal instability in recent times, many, if not most, of them are often less well equipped than the UN to deal with such problems. Because of their rules upholding territorial inviolability and juridical sovereignty, they tend to favour states, and therefore governments of the day, over other any other type of actor, insurgent groups for example.

While the general outlook can hardly be considered satisfactory, it is not entirely negative either. Within the limits of their capabilities some regional/sub-regional organisations have fared somewhat better on the basis of a functional specialisation, a smaller and more cohesive membership, or a convergence of interests around the protection of specific principles. Also, the numerous internal conflicts in the 1990s compelled many regional institutions to work in conjunction with the UN, with uneven results no doubt, but nevertheless more so than during previous periods.

The multiplication of regional and sub-regional institutions, each with their own agendas and rules, has highlighted like never before the question of coordination and coherence between regional arrangements. Whether in the former Yugoslavia, in Central Africa, the Caucasus, or other locations where conflict occurred in recent years, the record of intra-regional cooperation amongst different regional bodies is either uninspiring or poor. These problems are largely the result of the competing agendas of regional powers. Here again one needs to be reminded that it is impossible to separate regional organisation from regional politics.

The increasing numbers of regional/sub-regional arrangements has multiplied the levels of political authority and legitimacy. Whether in Africa, Europe or Latin America, governments can now jump from one regional forum to the next in order to pursue their foreign policy objectives. In other words, it is becoming more and more difficult to talk about the 'regional level' of decision-making when there are now so many levels of regional decision-making.

What also emerges from this review is that very few regional organisations have crossed the line between pacific settlement of disputes methods towards more coercive means of regional problem-solving. Whether this is good or bad depends very much on one's perspective. Nevertheless, it does reflect the fact that a majority of extant regional arrangements do not have effective collective instruments going beyond those usually found under the pacific settlement of disputes category.

Is regionalism failing? Attempts to answer this question simply cannot restrict themselves to the examination of regional arrangements or institutions writ large. One of the more fascinating paradoxes of regional efforts to resolve conflicts during this decade is that the limitations of established regional organisation have spurred on the development of new forms of regional/international cooperation and, indeed, of new regional organisations. Chapter 6 examines some of these trends and discusses factors likely to affect the future role of regional organisations as conflict management agencies.

Notes

1 Diana Chigas, "Preventive Diplomacy and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Creating Incentives for Dialogue and Cooperation", in Chayes and Chayes (eds.), *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations*, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1996, pp. 72-74.

2 Biennial follow-up meetings of Heads of States and Governments and annual CSCE ministerials were instituted, a permanent secretariat was established in Prague (CSCE/OSCE headquarters are located in Vienna, however), and two subsidiary CSCE bodies, the Conflict Prevention Centre and the Office for Free Elections (now Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) were also set up. Finally, overall coordination would be provided by the new CSCE Chairman-in-Office, a position held by the foreign minister of the country holding the annual CSCE chairmanship, and well as by a Committee of Senior Officials (now Senior Council).

3 Mark Danner, "The U.S and the Yugoslav Catastrophe", *New York Review of Books*, 20 November 1997, p. 60.

4 Between 1990 and 1992 the CSCE did adopt a number of mechanisms designed to mitigate the consensus rule. Their effects were more procedural than substantive, however. Chigas (see note 1) observes that since 1992 there have been no serious attempts to dilute the OSCE consensus rule further (p. 41).

5 See James B. Steinberg, "International Involvement in the Yugoslav Conflict", in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, p. 35 and p. 57ff.

6 See CSCE, Helsinki Document, *The Challenge of Change*, Chapter III , 1992.

7 The position of OSCE Secretary General was created in early 1993. However, the tasks assigned to that position were extremely limited and did not carry a political role, as is the case of NATO or UN chief executives.

8 See Max van der Stoel, "The Role of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in CSCE Preventive Diplomacy", in *The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy*, Stockholm, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994, p. 42. Max van der Stoel was the first CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.

9 OSCE, *Budapest Document 1994, Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era*, 21 December 1994. The decision to change the name from CSCE to OSCE was formally adopted at the summit. For a discussion of legal implications of this decision see Miriam Sapiro, "Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects of a Political Transformation", *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 89, no. 3, July 1995, pp. 631-636.

10 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl reportedly called the summit a "catastrophe", while Georgia's Eduard Shevardnaze called on the organisation to "become a force for action, not merely a frothing of words". Jane Perlez, "No Unity on Balkans at Europe Summit", *New York Times*, 7 December 1994.

11 John Borawski and Bruce George, "The CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation", *Arms Control Today*, vol. 23, no. 8, October 1993, p. 15

12 OSCE, *Lisbon Document 1996*, annex IV.

13 See Marie-France Desjardins' enlightening reassement of the the CBM (Confidence-Building Measure) concept in *Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures*, Adelphi Paper 307, London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996.

14 For an interesting discussion on NATO's survival see Robert McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War", *International Organization*, vol. 50, no. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 445-477. See also

Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy*, Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press, 1997, pp. 218-229.

15 For an overview of NATO debates in 1990-1991 see Werner J. Feld, *The Future of European Security and Defense Policy*, Boulder Co., Lynner Rienner, 1993, pp. 7-17.

16 The principal ground combat formation which emerged out of NATO's former 'layer-cake' defensive posture in West Germany is the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The ARRC played a central role as the command and control structure for the NATO IFOR force sent to the the former Yugoslavia in 1995-1996.

17 North Atlantic Alliance, *NATO Handbook*, Brussels, NATO Information Service, October 1995, p. 238, para. 16.

18 See Alfred van Staden, "After Maastricht: Explaning the Movement towards a Common European Defence Policy", in Walter Carlnaes and Steve Smith (eds.), *European Foreign Policy – The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe*, London, SAGE Publications, 1994, pp. 152-154.

19 NACC was the brainchild of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher who jointly suggested the need for such a forum in early October 1991. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was announced at the time of the first NACC meeting, following which FSU states were quickly invited to join.

20 North Atlantic Alliance, *NATO Handbook*, pp. 265-268.

21 Prospective participants were required to adhere to a set of guidelines (e.g. respect for international law, civilian control of military structures, transparency in terms of military budgets and force structure reviews) as well taking part in joint exercise and military programs to improve cooperation with NATO countries.

22 For a detailed overview of PfP see Nicholas Williams, *The Future of Partnership for Peace*, Sankt Augustin (Germany), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, April 1996.

23 British American Security Information Council (BASIC), *NATO, Peacekeeping, and the United Nations*, Washington D.C., 1994, pp. 22-24.

24 Of note was the clear distinction made between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peace enforcement was said to require that the Alliance "should deploy and be prepared to commit prepared to commit a decisive force". Operations short of peace enforcement, on the other hand, were said to be premised on more conventional and consensual methods.

25 In March 1966 president Charles De Gaulle announced France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure (it remained a participant to NATO's political bodies), confirming France's decision to develop an independent nuclear weapons capability outside the NATO framework. This long-held policy has remained a central pillar of French defence policy for more than a quarter century.

26 See Anne Marie Le Gloannec, "Europe by other means?", *International Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 1, January 1997, pp. 86-87; Stanley Sloan, *NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense*, McNair Paper 46, Washington D.C., Institute for National and Strategic Studies, 1995, pp. 41-42.

27 Catherine M. Kelleher, *The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment*, Washington D.C., Brookings, 1995, p. 72

28 Danner, "The US and the Yugoslav Catastrophe", p. 63.

29 A excellent review of the UN peacekeeping experience in Yugoslavia is presented in William J. Durch and James A. Schear, "Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia", in William J. Durch (ed.), *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, Houndsmills Basingstoke (UK), Macmillan Press, 1997, pp. 193-274.

30 See William J. Perry, *U.S Choices in Bosnia*, text prepared by the U.S. Secretary of Defence for the 100th Landon Lecture Series, Kansas States University, Manhattan (Kan.), 9 March 1995. The public stance against lifting direct arms shipments to Bosnia (the 'lift' portion of the so-called 'lift and strike' policy) was largely a public relations exercise with the U.S Congress and European allies. In November 1994, following the adoption of the Nunn-Mitchell amendment in the U.S. Congress, U.S. Navy ships ceased enforcing the UN-sanctioned naval embargo against weapons shipment to the Bosnian government, itself a NATO maritime operation under the overall command of a U.S. admiral! Since then it has become known that, as early as 1992, the Clinton administration was aware that numerous countries were supplying weapons to the Bosnian government but took no action to stop them. See "Balkan Arms Smuggling: Wider than the U.S. Acknowledged", *International Herald Tribune*, 13 May 1996.

31 It must be added that the July 1995 Croatian offensive against Krajina, which effectively put an end to the UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (formerly UNPROFOR/Croatia), changed the regional strategic equation and forced NATO allies to fully concentrate their minds on the situation in Bosnia.

32 IFOR, the 60 000 strong force deployed in Bosnia was composed primarily of troops provided by NATO countries (50 000), non-NATO contributors providing 10 000 troops. In all 32 countries participated to IFOR. In December 1996, IFOR was replaced by the smaller (34 000 troops) NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) which is deployed still in Bosnia as of this writing.

33 Antonia H. Chayes and Richard Weitz, "Military Perspective on Conflict Prevention", in Chayes and Chayes (eds.), *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World*, p. 414.

34 For a discussion on pro-enlargement arguments see Albert Legault, et al., *L'élargissement de l'OTAN et les intérêts transatlantiques canadiens*, Québec, Institut québécois des hautes études internationales, 1996, pp. 66-68.

35 Poland, Hungary and the Czech republic were invited to join NATO as the first tranche of new members at the July 1997 Madrid summit. Along with these three states, eight others have expressed an interest in joining NATO since 1995: Albania, Estonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

36 In February 1997, a U.S. Dept. of State report estimated that the costs of developing a mature defence capabitliy for "a small group of non-specified Central European countries", essentially a first tranche of new members, would be in the order $27-39 billion up through the year 2009. Other estimates have set these figures at much higher levels. See U.S. Department of State, *Report to the Congress on Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Costs and Implications*, Washington D.C., February 1997, p. 18 (internet version); "Clinton facing fight in U.S. Senate over larger NATO", *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 9 October 1997.

37 Such was the declaration of Belgian foreign minister Mark Eyskens at the onset of the Allied ground offensive in Kuwait in January 1991. Cited in Feld, *The Future of European Security and Defense Policy*, p. 97.

38 The Economic Community (EC) formally became the European Union (EU) after December 1993.

39 The CFSP replaced the European Political Cooperation (EPC process) which consisted of regular consultations between policymakers and bureaucrats on matter of foreign policy. The EPC had emerged in 1970 but had no formal status within EC procedures until it was enshrined in the 1986 Single European Act. For an overview see Jean De Ruyt, *European Political Cooperation: A Unified European Foreign Policy*, Washington D.C., Atlantic Council of the United States, 1989.

40 Title V, Article J.2 and J.3 of the Maastricht treaty.

41 Ibid., Title V, Article J.1.4.

42 The expression 'metropolitan colossus' is borrowed from James Laxer, *Inventing Europe: The Rise of a New World Power*, Toronto, Lester, 1992, p. 313.

43 There are innumerable accounts of the European role in Yugoslavia. The following two give an extremely well informed account of European/Western policymaking during the conflict: Susan Woodward's impressive study, *Balkan Tragedy - Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*, Washington D.C., Brookings, 1995, and also David Owen's *Balkan Odyssey*, London, Victor Gollancz, 1995. This author believes, however, that the full story of external involvement in the Yugoslavia conflict has yet to be told. For example, what role did Muslim countries play in their support for the Bosnian government? What were the nature and objectives of Western covert operations in Bosnia and in the former Yugoslavia? What specific assurances did the Clinton administration give Sarajevo and Zagreb when it negotiated the formation of the Muslim-Croat federation in 1994? What role did the United States play in the planning and execution of Operation *Oluja* (Operation Storm), the blitzkrieg-like Croatian offensive against Krajina in the summer of 1995?

44 The CFSP framework did not enter force until the Maastricht ratification process was completed at the end of 1993.

45 "EU: Reflection Group's Report (Messina 2nd June 1995 - Brussels 5th December 1995) (95/12/05) ", Reuters News [online], 13 December 1995.

46 Robin Niblett, "The European Disunion: Competing Visions of Integration", *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 20., no. 1. 1996, Winter 1996, p. 104

47 Anne Marie Le Gloannec, "Europe by Other Means?", *International Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 1, January 1997, p. 96.

48 See *What kind of Europe Do We Want?*, Speech by Hans van Mierlo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 15 May 1997.

49 See note 45.

50 The official name of the agreement is the *Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts.*

51 See Mario Zucconi, "The EU in the Former Yugoslavia", in Chayes and Chayes (eds.), *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World*, p. 272.

52 "Moscou formera une «troïka informelle» avec Bonn et Paris", *Le Devoir* (Montreal), 1 December 1997.

53 The Modified Brussels Treaty (the original Brussels treaty was signed in March 1948) established, *inter alia*, the WEU Council of Ministers and the Assembly of the Western European Union (Art. VIII(2) and Art. IX). The Treaty contained a mutual assistance clause in case of armed attack against any of its members in Europe (Art. V). The Treaty also stipulated that the WEU Council could be convened in order to "consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise" (Art. VIII(3)). Finally, the Treaty made clear that the WEU was not meant to be a European duplication of NATO, stating that the organisation would work in close cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance and rely on its "information and advice on military matters" (Art. IV).

54 Kelleher, *The Future of European Security*, pp. 56-57.

55 Working at first with commercially available imagery, the centre is to rely on satellites developed through the joint French-German satellite program when and if they become operational. France launched the first such satellite, Helios I, in July 1995, and three other military satellites were in planning stage: Helios II , Horus, and Syracuse III. As of 1998, it seems that only the Helios II project will see the light of day. See "Helios and Horus, a New Stage in Franco-German Military Cooperation", Agence France Presse, 7 December 1995, translated in FBIS-WEU-95-237, 12 December 1995.

56 Two years earlier, at Petersberg (Bonn), the WEU had opened the door to cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries and established the new WEU Forum of Consultation, thus emulating NATO's own North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).

57 The full members of the WEU are Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. WEU Associate members – Iceland, Norway and Turkey – are NATO but non-EU members. Associate partners are Bulgaria, the Czech republic, Estonia, Hungary Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. Other EU members, Austria Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and Finland, are WEU observers.

58 Western European Union, WEU Council of Ministers, *European Security: a Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries*, Madrid, 14 November 1995, para. 171.

59 The prevalent understanding of the CJTF agreement is that it covers contingency operations which would *not* come under the NATO mandate of collective defense enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

60 Translated from Nicole Gnesotto, "La Défense européenne au carrefour de la Bosnie et de la CIG", *Politique Étrangère* (Paris), no. 1, Spring 1996, p. 113.

61 Philip H. Gordon, "Does the WEU have a Role?", *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 1, Winter 1997, p. 126.

62 A 1993 Rand study estimated that the force projection (airlift/sealift) costs for a 50 000 strong European intervention force at the low end of capabilities would be a minimum of $18 billion over 25 years. A minimal satellite capability, of the type currently contemplated by France and Germany would add $9 billion to this amount. M.B. Berman and G.M. Carter, *The Independent European Force: Costs of Independence*, Santa Monica Ca., Rand, 1993, pp. xi-xvii.

63 David Huntington, "A Peacekeeping Role for the Western European Union", in Chayes and Chayes (eds.), *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World*, pp. 440-445.

64 Their association with the WEU, or indeed with NATO, also raises constitutional issues since all of these countries, most of them are strong OSCE supporters, want to retain their neutral status.

65 Tony Blair, "It's Time to Repay America", *New York Times*, 13 Nov. 1998.

66 "Portugal: Cautious on French-German Proposal at IGC", *Diario de Noticias* (Lisbon), 29 October 1996, translated in FBIS-WEU-96-211, 29 October 1996.

67 Vladimir Baranovsky, "Conflict in and around Russia", in Swedish International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 1996*, London, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 273.

68 Vladimir Baranovsky, "Russia and its Neighbourhood", in *SIPRI Yearbook 1995*, London, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 258.

69 See "CIS: Russian Minister Reviews CIS Integration", *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), 6 January 1997, p. 5, translated in FBIS-SOV-97-004, 6 January 1997; "CIS: Minister Tuleyev Urges CIS Integration Moves", *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), 16 February 997, p. 6, translated in FBIS-SOV-97-033, 15 February 1997.

70 For an detailed overview of CIS political-military developments see Vladimir Baranovky, "Russia and its neighbourhood: conflict developements and settlement efforts", in Swedish International

Peace Research Institute, *SIRPRI Yearbook 1995*, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 231-264; Baranovsky, "Conflict in and around Russia", pp. 251-278.

71 See Robert Siekman, "CIS Peacekeeping", *International Peacekeeping* (The Hague), vol. 1, no. 1, January-February 1994, n.p.

72 For a discussion on the 'Near Abroad' see Wynne Russell, "Russian Relations with the "Near Abroad" ", in Peter Sherman (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990*, Boulder Co., Westview, 1995, pp. 53-70; Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Russia's Monroe Doctrine: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, or Imperial Outreach?", in Maureen Appell Molot and Harald von Riekhoff (eds.), *Canada Among Nations 1994: A Part of the Peace*, Ottawa, Carleton University Press, 1994, pp. 231-264.

73 See A. Raevsky and I.N. Vorob'ev, *Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations*, UNIDIR Research Paper no. 28, Geneva, UNIDIR, 1994.

74 See Kevin O'Prey, *Keeping the Peace in the Borderlands of Russia*, Occasional Paper no. 23, Henry L. Stimson Centre, Washington D.C., July 1995, p. 8.

75 An agreement to withdraw Russian troops from the pro-Russian Transdniestr region was struck between the Moldova government and Russia in October 1994. However, Moscow has indicated that it will not withdraw its troops until a lasting settlement of the Moldova-Transdniestr conflict has been achieved. In March 1997, the Moldova government asked Ukraine, which is not a party to the CIS Collective Security treaty, to provide peacekeeping troops for the Transdniestr region.

76 For an overview of the conflict see Michael Mihalka, "Nagorno-Karabakh and Russian Peacekeeping: Prospects for a Second Dayton", *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 3. no. 3, Autumn 1996, pp. 16-32.

77 A basic understanding on third party peacekeeping forces had been reached at the Rome OSCE Council of 30 Nov.-1 Dec. 1993. However, the Council mandated the CSCE Council of Senior Officials (CSO) to "elaborate further conditions and necessary provisions for possible CSCE arrangement of this nature", hence the debate on OSCE peacekeeping which lasted throughout 1994. See UN Doc. S/26843 (4 December 1993), p. 11.

78 In its 1996/1997 edition, the authoritative *Military Balance* report of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) noted that "the decline in capability in all departments of the Russian armed forces seem set to continue". International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1996/1997*, London, IISS, 1996, p. 104. See also Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 2, March/April 1995, pp. 86-98.

79 See Anatol Lieven, "Russia's Military Nadir: The Meaning of the Chechen Debacle", *The National Interest*, No. 44, Summer 1996, pp. 24-33.

80 See "Russia: Rodionov States Objectives of 'CIS Military Partnership' ", ITAR-TASS radio, 1652GMT, 25 December 1996, carried in FBIS-SOV-96-249, 25 December 1996; "Rodionov Proposes Changes in Military Doctrine", *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, vol. XLVIII, no. 50, 8 January 1997, pp. 1-5.

81 See Volodymyr Pedchenko, "Ukraine's Delicate Balancing Act", *Transitions*, vol. 4, no. 1, June 1997, pp. 72-76; P. Pavilionis and R. Giragosian, "The Great Game: Pipeline Politics in Central Asia", *Harvard International Review*, vol. XIX, no. 1, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 24-27 and pp. 62-65. It should be noted that Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova formed a loose coalition in 1995-1996, the GUAM grouping, to exchange views on their respective security situations. All four republics are confronted with separatist forces generally thought to be supported by Russia. In 1999, in a demonstration of political independence from Russia, Uzbekistan joined the GUAM group (now GUUAM).

82 See Houchang Hassan-Yari, "Organisation de la coopération économique (ECO), un pont stratégique entre le Moyent-Orient et l'Asie centrale, *Études internationales* (Québec), vol. XVIII, no. 1, March 1997, pp. 47-71.

83 The CIS has been sitting as an observer organisation at the UN General Assembly since 1994.

84 The UN Secretariat has recognised the CIS as a legitimate regional organisation. However, Western countries have been extremely reluctant to grant a special status to Russian peacekeeping forces. The fact is that such a recognition is not a decision the UN Secretary General can make entirely on his own. In April 1994, while in a visit to Russia, Boutros Boutros-Ghali answered Moscow's request to obtain 'blue helmet' status for its peacekeeping troops by stating that UN peacekeeping forces must be multinational forces under direct UN control. Since then, the UN has gradually warmed up to Russia's peacekeeping role. In May 1996, for example, Boutros-Ghali declared in Moscow that the UN-CIS relationship was "primary example of the successful implentation of a division of labour between a regional structure and the United Nations". See UN doc. SG/SM/5987 (16 May 1996).

85 Elaine M. Holoboff, "Russian views on Military Intervention: Benevolent Peace-Keeping, Monroe Doctrine, or Neo-Imperialism?", in Lawrence Freedman (ed.) *Military Intervention in European Conflicts*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1994, p. 172, n. 62.

86 Margartha af Uglas, "Conditions for Successful Preventive Diplomacy", in Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy*, p. 31.

87 Apparently, the approval of the UN Security Council (UNSC) for the operation was a *quid pro quo* with France and the United States, both of whom had received UNSC approval for using Chapter VII provisions in Rwanda and Haiti. See Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, "The United Nations in the Former Second World: Coping with Conflict", in Chayes and Chayes (eds.), *Preventing Conflict in the Former Second World*, p. 519. In March 1997, an OSCE parliamentary delegation visiting Georgia declared itself in favor of a continued CIS presence in Abhazia. The Georgian parliament, however, declared the operation a "complete failure" and demanded that the force enlarge its mandate or withdraw. See "Georgia: OSCE Official Favors Continued Presence of CIS Peacekeepers", ITAR-TASS radio, 19 march 1997, carried in FBIS-SOV-97-078, 19 March 1997; "Georgia: Georgia Says Russian Peacekeepers Must Do More", Reuters News [online], 24 March 1997.

88 OAU doc. CM/1710 (LVI) (22-27 June 1992).

89 The first option was deemed incommensurate with the problem at hand – internal conflicts – because the CMCA focussed exclusively on the settlement of inter-state disputes. The second lacked support from OAU member states because it breached the OAU principle of sovereign equality of states.

90 The idea of an inter-African peace force has been the object of discussion ever since the founding of the OAU. Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah first broached the idea in 1963. In 1965 the OAU Defense Commission proposed the creation of an African High Command and the earmarking of national forces for OAU operations. Finally, the idea briefly resurfaced following the French military intervention in Shabah (Zaire) in 1979.

91 The International Peace Academy (IPA), a New York-based NGO which has privileged contacts with both the UN and OAU Secretariats, was instrumental in the development of the OAU Mechanism, notably by holding a number high-level consultations with the OAU on African conflict resolution in internal conflicts in 1992, 1993 and 1994.

92 OAU doc. AHG/DECL. 3 (XXIX)Rev. (28-30 June 1993). Sudan and Eritrea expressed official reservations about the creation of the new Mechanism.

93 Ibid., para. 15.

94 Id.

95 Financial considerations were not only the only factor behind this decision. There was in fact little support amongst African countries for the idea. The first OAU peacekeeping effort during the Tchad-Lybia conflict (1980-1981) had been a failure and had highlighted serious deficiencies in the capabilities of the OAU and of participating member states.

96 The Central Organ was initially composed of 9 states and was later increased to 15.

97 A minimum, some would say dismal, amount of US$ 1 million per annum from the OAU General Fund was to be set aside for the OAU Peace Fund.

98 See "United States: Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations", *International Legal Materials*, vol. XXXIII, no. 3, May 1994, pp. 795-813.

99 The OAU did send two small military observation missions, NMOG I (1992-1993) and NMOG II (1993) to monitor the ceasefire along the Rwanda-Uganda border. NMOG I, which received financial support for the United States, was part of an informal OAU/U.S. peacemaking effort. NMOG II was an interim observer force deployed alongside the UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) until the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was deployed. It was subsumed in UNAMIR, the first troop elements of which were belatedly deployed in November 1993 weeks after the Security Council had approved the mission mandate.

100 See Security Council Resolution 912 (21 April 1994). In late June 1994, France launched *Opération Turquoise* with the reluctant agreement of the Security Council (SC Res. 929 of 23 June 1994). Many analysts believe that the intervention was nothing but a veiled attempt to stop the Rwanda Patriotic Front's advance so that UN mediation could take place with pro-French Government of Rwanda forces at the negotiating table. The financial (estimated at around $320 million) and political costs of the operation proved to be so high, however, that it sparked a profound reassessment of French policy towards Africa. In 1998, the French Parliament opened a *mission d'information*, a pulbc inquiry, to look into France's role in the conflict. This followed Belgium's own parliamentary inquiry (1997) examining the events leading up to the massacre of Belgian soldiers by Rwandan government troops in April 1994. See, among others, Bruce Jones,

"Intervention Without Borders: Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda, 1994", *Millenium*, vol. 24, no. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 230-232; La France et le Rwanda (Supplément), *Le Monde*, December 17, 1998.

101 In the first annual report on the activities of the Mechanism (June 1994), the OAU Secretariat addressed its role in the Rwanda only in the vaguest possible terms. Incredibly, the report did not even acknowledge the role of its own truce supervisson missions sent to Rwanda in 1992-1993 (NMOG I/II). See OAU doc. CENTRAL/ORGAN/MEC/AHG 1 (II) (June 1994).

102 For a short review of these initiatives see Charles van der Donckt, "The OAU's Conflict Management Mechanism Two Years On", *Pacific Research*, vol. 8, no. 3, August 1995, pp. 42-45.

103 Earlier in 1995, the OAU Secretariat sought a 'clarification' of the various Western plans, expressing in polite terms the OAU's frustration over the lack of consultation with OAU authorities over the drawing up of the American, British and French initiatives. See OAU doc. Central Organ/MEC/MIN/3 (IV), n.d.

104 The Chirac-Juppé government, like its socialist predecessor, had strong reservations about a continental approach to African conflict management and advocated a sub-regional approach to peacekeeping operations on the continent. Observers did not fail to note that a sub-regional approach also suited French political interests in francophone West Africa. In late 1995, France, as well as other EU countries, managed to put African conflict management on the WEU and EU agenda. However, neither organisation has been able to put together a clear and transparent approach on this question and the results thus far have been very limited.

105 Great Britain and Nigeria can be credited with giving impetus to the issue in early 1995.

106 See UN Documents A/RES/49/64 (23 January 1995), A/50/711–S/1995/911 (1 November 1995).

107 OAU Document CM/1883 (LXII) (21-23 June 1995), para. 32. It should be noted that African countries provided most of the infantry troops for UNAMIR II, the follow up UN mission in Rwanda deployed in July/August 1994.

108 OAU Document OAU/CO/C.STAFF/REC.1 (I) (3-5 June 1996). Staff officers from 24 (out of 54) African countries attended the meeting. Some states which did not attend the meeting were reported to be opposed to OAU peacekeeping because of the lack of formal provisions for peacekeeping in the OAU Charter.

109 As is the case of Rwanda, Burundi's history has been marred by political violence and ethnic conflict ever since the early 1960's. See René Lemarchand, "Burundi in Comparative Perspective – Dimensions of Ethnic Strife", in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (eds.), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, London, Routledge, 1993, pp. 151-171.

110 "Ethiopia: OAU Threatens Force to Meet Any Coup in Burundi", Reuters News [online], 25 July 1996. That such a threat could be made was only possible because a small group of East African countries were directly affected by the situation in the Great lakes region. Thus, the real driving force behind the Burundi peace process was not the OAU as a collective institution, but rather an East African concert supported by the OAU and the UN.

111 See also Chapter 2, note 51.

112 One can speculate that Secretary General Salim, a prominent Tanzanian political figure, had threatened OAU intervention was probably no stranger to the fact that Tanzania was one of the countries most affected by the flow of Burundian refugees fleeing civil war in that country.

113 Glynne Evans, *Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes*, Adelphi Paper 311, London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997, p. 36. I add the qualifier symbolic because two well-known NGO's, Human Rights Watch and the recently-created International Crisis Group (ICG), reported that the regional embargo had been woefully ineffective, creating more problems that it had solved. In April 1998, the EU Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, Sergio Ajello, expressed similar views. See "Une Accusation the Human Rights Watch: L'embargo contre le Burundi aurait été allègrement violé", *Le Devoir* (Montreal), 9 December 1997; UN, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Central and Eastern Africa: IRIN Update No. 405 [internet version], 28 April 1998; IRIN Weekly Roundup 16-98 [internet version], April 1998.

114 "U.S. Presses For All-Africa Crisis Force", *Washington Post*, 28 September 1996.

115 Though then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose made it clear that, should the force actually be deployed operationally, the United States would expect the costs to covered by normal assessed UN contribution. This leaves its exact status to be determined since it would be neither a OAU or UN force. U.S. Department of State, *Briefing by AS Moose on Secretary's Trip to Africa*, 3 October 1996, retrieved from the U.S. State Department web site.

116 "Namibia: Africans Say They Must Lead Continental Peace Effort", Reuters News [online], 14 October 1996; "Christopher's Africa Trip Stirs Hope, Fears for Complicated Continent", *Washington Post*, 16 October 1996.

117 "Nigeria: Radio Denounces USA's African Peacekeeping Initiative", Reuters News [online], 31 July 1997.

118 "France: France Hits Back at U.S. Over Africa War of Words", Reuters News [online], 14 October 1996.

119 As of August 1997, these countries reportedly included Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Senegal and Uganda. Ghana joined this group later. See UN, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, IRIN Emergency Update No. 234 [internet version], 22 August 1997.

120 See Philip Gourevitch, "Letter from the Congo", *The New Yorker*, 4 August 1997, pp. 42-55.

121 For a 'self-appraisal' of the OAU Mechanism, see Salim Ahmed Salim, "Localising Outbreaks: The Role of Regional Organizations in Preventive Action", in Kevin M Cahill, (ed.), *Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before they Start*, Basic Books, New York, 1996, pp. 100-120.

122 ECOWAS currently groups 16 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte D'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

123 Citation taken from "ECOWAS comes of age", *West Africa*, no. 3956, 19-25 July 1993, p. 1255. In October 1996 the (now defunct) Nigerian head of state, General Sani Abacha, was no less hyperbolic about ECOMOG's role:

> ECOMOG rightly symbolizes Africa's flagship in international peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as the final demonstration, [word indistinct] of African responsibility and African capacity in resolving African problems. Nigeria is, indeed, honoured and proud to be a major part of this achievement which has saved Africa and the world from the nightmare and trauma represented by the kind of genocide which occurred in Rwanda and Bosnia.

Taken from "Nigeria: Nigeria – Gen Abacha Announces Creation of Six New States", Reuters News [online], 2 October 1996.

124 For a description of ECOWAS economic objectives see Naomi Chazan et al., *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, 2nd ed., Boulder Co., Lynne Rienner, 1992, pp. 282.

125 A review of the two protocols is presented in Clement Adibe, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Liberia*, Geneva, UNIDIR, 1996, pp. 14-17.

126 Ibid., p. 16.

127 ECOWAS' economic problems are described in Chazan et al., *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, pp. 283-284.

128 David Fasholé Luke, "Regionalism in Africa: A Short Study of the Record", *International Journal*, vol, XLI, no. 4, Autumn 1986, p. 865.

129 See Terrence Lyons, "Regional Dynamics", in Francis M. Deng *et al.*, *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa*, Washington D.C., Brookings, 1996, p. 142.

130 See "Country profiles", *Africa Recovery* (United Nations), vol. 10, no. 2, October 1996, n.p.

131 See Julius O. Ihonvbere, "Are Things Falling Apart? The Military and the Crisis of Democratisation in Nigeria", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 34, no. 3, June 1996, pp. 394-420.

132 The ANAD agreement was signed in Abidjan in June 1977. Meeting in Nouakchott in April 1996, six of the eight member countries of ANAD (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte D'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal) agreed to establish a new regional 'stand-by' peace force. In January 1997, four ANAD signatories (Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal, Togo) along with Chad and Gabon, agreed to dispatch a battalion-strength unit to the Central African Republic (CAR) after a regional contact group brokered an agreement (the so-called Bangui Agreement) between the CAR government and army mutineers. See "President Diouf Interviewed on ANAD Defense Agreement", *Radio France International*, 0630GMT, 21 April 1996, translated in FBIS-AFR-96-081, 21 April 1996; "Central African Republic: Gabon's Bongo on Peacekeeping Force under Accord, *Africa No 1 Radio* (Libreville), 1215 GMT, 24 January 1997, translated in FBIS-AFR-97-016, 24 January 1997; "Niger: ANAD Chiefs of Staff Meet on Formation of 'Peace Force' ", *Voice du Sahel* network, 1200GMT, 24 April 197, translated in FBIS-AFR-97-115, 25 April 1997.

133 See John Stephen Stedman, "Conflict and Conciliation in sub-Saharan Africa", in Michael E. Brown (ed.), *The International Dimension of Internal Conflict*, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1996, p. 252; Herbert Howe, "Lessons of Liberia": ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping", International Security, vol. 21, no. 3, Winter 96/97, pp. 151-160.

134 See "ECOWAS comes of age", p. 1256.

135 See Festus B. Aboagye, *ECOMOG: A Sub-Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management, and Peacekeeping in Liberia*, SEDCO, Accra (Ghana), 1999, pp. 229-264.

136 W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia", *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 1, no. 3, Autumn 1994, p. 273.

137 "Unlikely Diplomat Emerges in Africa - Burkina Faso Chief Assailed For Support of Liberian Rebel", *International Herald Tribune*, 17 March 1995.

138 See Robert A. Mortimer, "Senegal's Rôle in Ecomog: The Francophone Dimension in the Liberian Crisis", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 34, no. 2, June 1996, pp. 301-306; "Le Nigéria conforte en Sierra Leone son statut de puissance régionale", *Le Monde*, 13 February 1998.

139 See Marc-Antoine de Montclos, "Libéria: des prédateurs aux ramasseurs de miettes", in François Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, *Économie des guerres civiles*, Paris, Hachette, 1996, pp. 290-295.

140 See 'Funmi Olonisakin, "UN Cooperation with Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping: The Experience of ECOMOG and UNIMIL in Liberia", *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 3, no. 3, Autumn 1996, pp. 33-51.

141 The original FLS group developed in relation to the Rhodesian liberation struggle. It was made up of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. Following the 1979 Lancaster House Agreements the struggle against apartheid South Africa then became the central focus of the FLS. Over the years, the group expanded to include Angola, Zimbabwe, and later Namibia. Apart from the former states, SADCC/SADC was gradually expanded to include Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, South Africa, Mauritius, Zaire and the Seychelles Islands.

142 See Martin Holland, *European Common foreign Policy: From EPC to CFSP Joint Action and South Africa*, London, MacMillan, 1995, pp. 188-215. Pinter notes that "without EC and other international support SADCC could certainly have been stillborn" (p.191). For a discussion of the South Africa and the FLS during the 1980's see Thomas Ohlson, "Strategic Confrontation versus Economic Survival in Southern Africa", in Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman (eds.), *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, Washington D.C, Brookings, 1991, pp. 219-271.

143 See Eugène Berg, *La politique internationale depuis 1955*, Paris, Economica, 1989, pp. 960-965.

144 In 1993, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was established between fifteen Eastern and Southern African countries (there are now twenty three members), many of which belonged to SADC as well. This has lead to jurisdictional differences between SADC and COMESA countries which have yet to be fully resolved.

145 For a detailed account of events see "How to Counter a Coup", *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 30 September 1994.

146 "Southern Africa: Southern African Development Group Sets Up Politics, Defence, Security Body", Reuters News [online], 1 July 1996. The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security will operate at summit, ministerial and technical levels and function independently of other SADC structures.

147 Ibid.

148 "South Africa: South Africa likely to provide peacekeepers", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 5 March 1997, p. 15. Britain provided military trainers and was a important financial contributor to the *Blue Hungwe* exercise. Interestingly, France did not send any observers to the exercise though it had previously committed itself to do so.

149 Ken Booth and Peter Vale, "Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, Beyond Realism", *International Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 2, April 1995, p. 287.

150 Ibid., p. 288.

151 For a perspective on the regional role of the post-apartheid South African Defense Force see Rocklyn Mark Williams, *South Africa's New Defense Force: Progress and Prospects*, CSIS Africa Notes, no. 170, March 1995, pp. 8-9.

152 IGADD's membership is composed of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda.

153 Terrence Lyons, "Regional Dynamics", pp. 137-138.

154 See Francis Deng, *Mediating the Sudanese Conflict: A Challenge for IGADD*, CSIS Africa Notes, no. 169, February 1995; "IGADD Show a Clear Way to Peace: How Will the Sudanese Parties React?", *Sudan Democratic Gazette*, no. 49, June 1994, pp. 2-3.

155 The OAU does not appear to be involved in these discussions. When IGADD countries asked for international support in 1995 it seems clear that they sought Western support rather than OAU assistance.

156 *Keesings Record of World Events*, March 1996, p. 40988.

157 Another interpretation of the early ASEAN role presents the organisation as a mutually agreed attempt to strengthen the hand of nascent Southeast Asian political elites. See Amitav Acharya, "Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World: Comparing the Origins of the ASEAN and

the GCC", in Brian Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1992, pp. 143-163.

158 Malaysia and Singapore were members of the FPDA – an alliance born out of the earlier confrontation with Indonesia – and both Thailand and the Philippines were SEATO members as well as closely allied to U.S. interests in the region.

159 ASEAN's 'uniqueness' as a regional institution is described by Jörn Dosch and Manfred Mols in "Why ASEAN Co-operation Cannot Work as a Model for Regionalism Elsewhere – A Reply", *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, vol. 11, no. 2, November 1994, pp. 216-218.

160 One Malaysian official wrote that despite its intra-mural orientation the 1976 Treaty was primarily devised to exclude "unwelcome interference" in regional matters. See Abdul Kadir Mohammad, "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation", Paper presented at the second workshop on 'ASEAN-UN Cooperation for Peace and Preventive Diplomacy', Singapore, 6-7 July 1993.

161 See Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia: Going Beyond ZOPFAN", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 12, vol. 12, March 1991, pp. 289-297.

162 They include the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and the European Union.

163 For a description of, and reactions to the 1990 Canadian and Australian proposals see Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, *Presumptive Engagement: Australia's Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s*, St Leonards (NSW), Allen & Unwin, 1996, pp. 17-23.

164 The so-called dialogue partners, six countries as well as the EU, are ASEAN's leading economic partners: Australia, Canada, European Union, Korea, Japan, New Zealand and the United States.

165 For a chronological account of ARF's formation see Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, *Presumptive Engagement*, pp. 23-25; and Michael Leifer, *The ASEAN Regional Forum*, Adelphi Paper 302, London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, pp. 21-30.

166 For more on ASEAN's role in Cambodia see Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict", *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 46, no. 2, Winter 1993, p. 453.

167 Between 1989 and 1991, the tortuous path to peace in Cambodia was steered by a small contact group, composed of Australia, France, and Indonesia, acting in concert with the two leading backers of the Cambodian factions, China and the United States.

168 Rosemary Foot, "Regionalism in Pacific Asia", in Andrew Hurrell and Louise Fawcett (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 242.

169 See ASEAN, *The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper*, Bandar Seri Begawan, 1 August 1995.

170 Ibid., operative paragraph 15.

171 Michael Leifer, "The extension of ASEAN's Model of Regional Security", in Coral Bell (ed.), *Nation, Region and Context: Studies in Peace and War in Honour of Professor T.B. Millar*, Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1995, pp. 73-90.

172 See Kerr and Ball, *Presumptive Engagement*, pp. 30-32.

173 Indeed, ever since ARF was established, in 1993, the U.S. has made it repeatedly clear that the ARF is but a complement to its network of regional alliances. In a January 1998 U.S. Information Agency interview with Kurt Campbell, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Asian and Pacific Affairs, the ARF did not even rate as much as a single mention. See U.S. Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy in the East Asia-Pacific Region*, February 1995, pp. 12-14; "Ensuring Security in the Asia-Pacific Region", *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda*, USIA Electronic Journal, vol. 3, no. 1, January 1998.

174 Since 1993 the ARF membership has expanded to include Cambodia, India and Myanmar. France and Britain would like to join under national chairs, and Pakistan would also like to join now that India has become a member. Further expansion of ARF could be problematic, however. At the 1996 ARF meeting in Jakarta, ARF members decided that the "ARF should only admit participants that can directly affect the peace and security of the region on which the ARF shall focus". See ASEAN, *Chairman's Statement: The Third ASEAN Regional Forum (Third ARF)*, Jakarta, 23 July 1996, p. 1.

175 See James Lacy, *Stonework or Sandcastle? Asia's Regional Security Forum*, IDA Paper P-3110, Alexandria Va., Institute for Defence Analysis, July 1995, pp. 39-40. To the knowledge of this author, risk reduction/conflict prevention measures have been privately proposed by Australian and American officials with some support from Canada. ASEAN countries, however, have remained wary of the ARF process being overtaken by initiatives stemming from non-ASEAN members.

176 A Chinese paper presented at the 1996 ARF seminar on preventive diplomacy (held in Paris) stated that "ARF should keep its role as a forum for consultation, instead of trying to become a

mechanism of [*sic*] solving disputes. Only thus can it play a larger role as the most important forum for multilateral dialogue in the region". Shi Chunlai and Xu Jian, "Preventive Diplomacy Pertinent to the Asia Pacific", Paper presented at the ARF Seminar on Preventive Diplomacy, Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Paris, 7-8 November 1996, p. 4.

177 For a discussion on these issues see Amitav Acharya, "Human Rights and Regional Order: Asean and Human Rights Management in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia", in James T. H. Tang (ed.), *Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia-Pacific*, London, Pinter, 1995, pp. 167-182; James A. Dorn, "Economic Liberty and Democracy in East Asia", *Orbis*, vol. 37, no. 4, Fall 1993, pp. 599-619; Michael Freeman, "Human Rights, Democracy and Asian Values", *The Pacific Review*, vol. 9, no. 3, 1996, pp. 352-366.

178 "ASEAN-West Rift Over Human Rights in Burma Persists", *The Nation* (Bangkok), 26 July 1996, carried in FBIS-EAS-96-145, 26 July 1996.

179 For a recent overview of the Spratly Islands dispute see Craig A. Snyder, *Making Mischief in the South China Sea*, CANCAPS Paper no. 7, Joint Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies, York University, Toronto, August 1995.

180 The Arab League currently has a membership of 22 states, including a seat reserved for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

181 The Arab Security Force in Kuwait is the first of two instances where the League gave its agreement to an Arab peacekeeping mission. The second was the Syrian-led Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon in 1976. In Syria, however any illusion of Arab League peacekeeping soon wore off, and the Syrian 'peacekeeping' presence transformed itself into an occupation force. For more on Arab League peacekeeping see Robert MacDonald, *The League of Arab States*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965; D.C. Watt, *Survey of International Affairs 1961*, London, Oxford University Press-Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965, pp. 519-545; Istvan Pogany, *The Arab League and Peacekeeping in Lebanon*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1987.

182 For a short review of the Arab League's problems see Charles Tripp, "Regionalism in the Arab Middle East", in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics*, pp. 286-291; Saïd Ihraï, "La Ligue des États arabes: bilan de 50 ans d'action dans le domaine du maintien de la paix et de la coopération régionale", *Arès* (Grenoble), vol. XV, no. 2, June 1996, 85-104.

183 For an assessment of the UMA's performance see Charles Tripp, "Regionalism in the Arab Middle East", pp. 295-298.

184 Joseph A. Kechichian, *Security Efforts in the Arab World: A Brief Examination of Four Regional Organizations*, Rand Note N-3770-USDP, Santa Monica Ca., Rand, 1994, p. 7; James Goodby, "The Utility of International Organizations for Collective Action in Regional Conflicts", in Goodby (ed.), *Regional Conflicts: the Challenge to US-Russian Co-operation*, New York, Oxford University Press-SIPRI, 1995, p. 215.

185 *Keesing's Record of World Events*, vol. 42, Reference Supplement 1995, p. R145.

186 For a detailed record of UN-Arab League interactions during the Somali crisis see *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996*, United Nations Blues Book Series, Vol. III, New York, United Nations, 1996.

187 *Keesing's Record of World Events*, vol. 42, December 1995, p. 40858. It is interesting to note here that during the Hanish Islands dispute UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali put aside his own regionalist rhetoric and intervened personally between the two warring parties. In early 1996, Eritrea and Yemen reportedly agreed to refer the conflict to a French-led arbitration commission.

188 "Egypt: Arab League Committee Drafts 'Code of Honour' on Arab Security and Cooperation", Reuters News [online], 8 August 1995. While the 'Code of Honour' was being drafted by League officials and Arab representatives, the organisation was reported to be facing a very serious financial crisis which prevented it from paying salaries to some 500 employees. See *Keesing's Record of World Events*, vol. 42, Reference Supplement 1995, p. R145.

189 By League standards this was a significant event, the first Arab leaders summit since the divisive League summit of August 1990. Of the League's 22 members, only Iraq was absent.

190 One of the best recent analyses on the OAS was authored by Viron P. Vaky, and Heraldo Muñoz, *The Future of the Organization of American States*, New York, Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993.

191 Ibid., p. 13. Since 1983 thirteen Latin American countries have made the transition to democratically-elected governments.

192 OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/XXI.0.2, vol. 1 (20 August 1991), p. 3.

193 Ibid., p. 4

194 OAS Doc. OEA/2.2/19/93 (6 May 1993).

195 The 'teeth' of the inter-American system were originally contained in the Rio Pact which provided for collective defense in case of armed aggression against its signatories. Articles 17 and 20, and

more specifically Article 8 of the Rio Pact (which was revised in 1975) would also seem to permit the OAS to impose mandatory sanctions, although whether OAS sanctions against Haiti were actually invoked by using these provisions is not altogether clear. White (1994) asserts that they were, while Acevedo (1993), himself a former legal adviser to the OAS (see next note), seems to imply that they were not. Nigel White, "Collective Sanctions: An Alternative to Military Coercion?", *International Relations*, vol. XII, no. 3, December 1994, pp. 86-87.

196 See Domingo E. Acevedo, "The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy", in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, New York, Council of Foreign Relations, 1993, pp. 135-138; David Malone, *Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti, 1990-1997*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998.

197 See Stephen Baranyi, "Peace Missions and Subsidiarity in the Americas: Conflict Management in the Western Hemisphere", *International Journal*, vol. 50, no. 2, Spring 195, pp. 348-351.

198 For the OAS response to *An Agenda for Peace*, see Chapter 3.

199 See César Gaviria, "Cooperación entre la Naciones Unidas y la Organización de los Estados Unidos", statement presented at the second meeting between the United Nations and Regional Organisations, New York, 15-16 February 1996, retrieved from the OAS web site (see bibliography).

200 See J. Taylor Wentges, "Third Generation Electoral Observation and the OAS-UN International Civil Mission to Haiti", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, vol. 4, no. 3, Winter 1997, pp. 51-63.

201 For a discussion on this issue see Vaky and Muñoz, *The Future of the Organization of American States*, pp. 43-47, and; Baranyi, "Peace Missions and Subsidiarity in the Americas", p. 336

202 The one exception is the presence of a small contingent of unarmed soldiers from Brazil and Guyana to assist in the destruction of weapons during the 1992 OAS mission to implement the Moengo peace agreement in Suriname. The OAS had been invited to assist in the mediation process at the request of the government of Surinam. See OAS Doc. CP/doc. 2335/93 (15 January 1993).

203 The OAS mounted one peacekeeping operation in its past history, the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) in the Dominican Republic in 1965. For an assessment see Virginia Page Fortna, *Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping: Experiences in Latin America and Africa*, Occasional Paper No. 11, Washington D.C., Henry L. Stimson Center, June 1993, pp. 2-6; Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, St Martin's Press, pp. 54-62.

204 The development of the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security is detailed in the Commission's first report which was submitted to the June 1996 OAS General Assembly in Panama. See OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. P AG/doc. 3352/96 (29 May 1996).

205 The IADB is funded through the OAS general budget. For historical reasons, however, it has remained a separate and independent body essentially controlled by Washington. For more on the IADB see Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy Towards Latin America*, Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J., 1987, pp. 1977-179.

206 The first 'Defense Ministerial of the Americas' was organised at the initiative of the United States and held in Williamsburg (Virginia) in July 1995. Also, an inter-American military summit was held in Bariloche, Argentina, in October 1996.

207 For an analysis of the motivations of major inter-American actors see Andrew Hurrell, "Regionalism in the America's", in Fawcett and Hurrell (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics*, pp. 263-276.

208 For an overview of the conflict see David Scott Palmer, "Peru-Ecuador Border Conflict: Missed Opportunities, Misplaced Nationalism, and Multilateral Peacekeeping", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, vol. 39, no. 3, Fall 1997, pp. 109-147.

6

Conflict and the Regional Option: Looking Towards the Future

Numerous factors influence the role and performance of regional organisations as conflict management organisations: the nature of the problems at hand, institutional rules and constraints, availability of resources, membership cohesion, political opportunity and willingness to act. These are issues that all inter-governmental organisations have to face, whether they are global or regional in scope. Beyond those factors, a number of important issues and trends are likely to influence the political role and responsibilities of regional communities and regional organisations over the coming years.

This chapter examines five such issues. The first two fall in the 'big topic' category: global U.S. leadership in matters of international security and the effects of what is commonly referred to as globalisation. Three other factors seem particularly important: the uncertain future of the UN as an international political force, the increasing resort to ad hoc or 'self-help' strategies to deal with regional conflicts, and the development of new regional groupings and alliances.

Throughout the 1990s U.S. foreign policy has reflected conflicting trends in American leadership; on the one hand a tremendous eagerness to off-load some of the burden of maintaining international peace with new actors, on the other a desire to maintain global U.S. leadership. Beyond the debate between multilateralism vs unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy, neo-isolationists and more 'cosmopolitan' political forces have been constantly at odds on the U.S. domestic front, leading to considerable confusion in terms of policy discourse. Second, the new and very fluid post-Cold War international environment does not lend itself easily to all-encompassing doctrines. Third, the United States now lives in a world where its interests must be increasingly reconciled with those of its allies and as well as with those of a growing number of regional powers, all of whom have an increasing say in how both regional and international security are conceived of, and maintained.

The tension between global interests and global responsibility is nowhere more evident than in the globalization debate which has emerged as the dominant intellectual and policy debate of the 1990s. Globalization, it is argued, is integrating far-flung economies into global markets and enhancing information and technology flows, breaking down of geographic and cultural barriers in the process. However, as the

Asian financial crisis has demonstrated, globalization also raises serious questions concerning the ability of regions to organise into coherent political and economic units that can cope with massive economic shocks. Economic problems cannot be easily resolved at the national or regional level if they are caused, in part at least, by developments in global financial and commodity markets.

The globalization theme dovetails nicely with the role of the UN inasmuch as trying to reinforce, if not rebuild, fragile polities has been one of the principal objectives of UN political action since the end of the Cold War. After a period of considerable activism lasting roughly from 1988 to 1993, however, the UN peace and security system was essentially pushed beyond its functional, conceptual and resource limits. The over-extension of the UN peacekeeping operations, disillusionment vis-à-vis its ability to manage complex internal conflicts, and the obstacles encountered in trying to reform its bureaucratic and decision-making organs have all had significant repercussions, not the least of which is a general loss of confidence in the UN as a meaningful decision-making body on matters of global importance.

Another, and perhaps not altogether surprising repercussion of the UN's problems is that states are increasingly resorting to all manner of 'self-help' strategies for dealing with regional or localised violent conflict. Since the early 1990s ad hoc conflict management initiatives have become much more common than during the postwar period. Collective will is being expressed outside traditional inter-governmental institutions and new groupings are being created partly in reaction to the inadequacies of traditional problem-solving mechanisms. These different processes have not been confined to one single continent. One can find relevant examples in Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, Central and Southeast Asia, and even in the South Pacific. Self-help strategies currently represent a major trend in international/regional conflict management efforts. Whether they will be more successful than traditional approaches relying on international or regional institutions remains to be seen.

These processes are taking place at a time when a reordering of regional relations is taking place on almost every continent. Whether in Central Asia or Central Africa, new groupings are emerging which either present a challenge to established patterns of regional relations or seek to create some form of regional order were none existed before. However, it would be naive to think that the new institutional architecture such as it was laid in the 1990s will set the framework of a post-Cold War international order permanently, especially since many regional structures have already shown their limitations. Furthermore, with answers to questions about the rise of China regional and the success of the European project still unclear, it is premature to assert that post-Cold War transformations of the international system are over.

Before proceeding, a note of caution. The issues and trends discussed in this chapter are by no means the only factors which will influence the development of

regionalism. Asserting so would be presumptuous as there are many variations of domestic or regional-level factors which might influence regionalism and regional cooperation in the next few years. What I do contend, however, is that the topics examined in this chapter are salient issues which have, or will have, a major impact on regionalism, regional organisations and the regional approach to problem-solving.

America, the Reluctant Leader

The tension between the definition and exercise of U.S. national interests on the one hand, and multilateralism on the other, has been of the key dilemmas of contemporary U.S. foreign policy. In 1989-1990, with the ending of the Cold War, the United States found itself in an unprecedented geostrategic position. Being the world's only remaining superpower, it could contemplate exercising its international power and influence unopposed by any major enemies abroad. Paradoxically, with the winding down of the Cold War American policymakers found out that the costs of unilateralism were also rising sharply.

This dilemma has weighed heavily upon speculations of a global *Pax Americana*, a popular theme in academic journals and policy discussions at the turn of the decade. Within a few years, these speculations have been replaced by a profound skepticism over whether the United States is either willing or able to play the role of global leader. At issue is not really the 'relative decline' of American power.[1] Quite the opposite, in fact. Since 1992-1993 the United States has enjoyed an unprecedented period of economic growth which is the envy of OECD governments, and in spite of major cuts to the American defence budget the United States still enjoys uncontested military superiority over any potential adversary and will do so for the foreseeable future. Neither is it the possibility of a return to the type of isolationism which prevailed in the United States in the interwar years. Even though neo-isolationist forces have been at play in American politics throughout the 1990s, notably in the ultra-conservative wing of the Republican Party, the scale, scope and importance of American interests overseas ultimately precludes that option as a realistic possibility. What is really at issue here is rather the prospect of United States gradually losing the confidence of some of its most trusted allies by constantly bullying them into accepting the American vision of international order, while at the same time generating anxiety about the credibility of its security commitments.

Searching for strategy in the post-Cold War world

The lack of overarching policy framework and the absence of a clear set of priorities have been the two most frequent criticisms addressed towards U.S. foreign policy throughout the 1990s.[2] Former U.S. Defence Secretary James Schlesinger warned in 1993 that without clear guideposts for the post-Cold War era U.S. policy would be determined by "impulse and image".[3] The problem, he noted, was not the lack of foreign policy objectives for the new international environment – he believed that, if anything, too much had already been promised – but rather that many U.S. goals were often in contradiction with each other, the tensions between U.S. trade and U.S human rights policies being a oft-recurring example. Schlesinger raised the apparent problem of relating means effectively to desired ends. Unilateral sanctions, for example, have been increasingly employed by the United States to bring about change on a wide range of issues (e.g. weapons of mass destruction, narco-trafficking, international terrorism, human rights). However, not only are they recognised as very blunt policy instruments whose effectiveness is often questionable, but their use has been an increasingly frequent source of discord between the United States and its allies over the last few years.[4]

Most commentators on U.S. foreign policy have also noted that extent to which the exercise of U.S. leadership in world affairs throughout the 1990s has been selective, if not outright opportunistic. In the Balkans, the United States half-heartedly tried to save a crumbling Yugoslav state, then pressed EC states to find a 'European solution', only to come riding into Bosnia at the eleventh hour when transatlantic solidarity was in danger of being irreparably damaged. In Somalia, the United States attempted to show the world how it could restore order and stability to a disintegrated country ravaged by famine and clan warfare, arguably an over-ambitious task; yet in Rwanda it rejected proposals to send troop reinforcements to a beleaguered UN peacekeeping force, an action which could have saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan citizens (international remorse is now flowing from all sides).

Examples such as the ones outlined above considerably dampened enthusiasm for the task of creating the 'New World Order' propounded by President Bush in 1990. In truth, by 1992-1993 the idea was already in deep trouble. Despite the start of the Middle East Peace Process in 1991, the dramatic increase of American and European weapons sales to the Middle East after the Gulf War indicated that any new order in that region would be build on decidedly old foundations.[5] This was hardly convincing evidence of a new, more cooperative way of dealing with regional problems. More broadly, it was also becoming increasingly apparent that the United States had little interest in granting a stronger voice to developing countries within major international political and financial institutions. For the champions of the developing world,

countries like India and Malaysia, the very idea of a 'New World Order' remained fairly shallow. They essentially saw it as a Western-driven discourse which showed little promise of altering a historical relationship between North and South that they believed was detrimental to their interests.

An important aspect of U.S. foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War was the rapid reduction of the global U.S. military presence abroad, particularly in Europe and Asia. In 1990-1991, a significant proportion of U.S. forces deployed to Kuwait from their NATO bases in Europe left their barracks for good, coming back to the United States after the war, while major U.S. military installations in the Philippines were closed in 1992. The effect on U.S. allies was predictable. In Europe, many EC countries debated about the possibility of a post-NATO Europe and questioned U.S. leadership. In Asia and the Pacific, U.S. allies worried about the strength of U.S. commitments, pondered about future Chinese intentions, and discussed possible new security structures in the region.

The 'New World Order' theme, which closely associated with the Bush administration, did not figure prominently in the 1992 Democratic presidential campaign. Rather, international trade and economic security were given prominence by the Clinton team. International trade, incidentally, was also seen as a means to encourage democracy and human rights with America's commercial partners.[6] There were indications that a Democratic presidency would support a strengthened UN, especially since the organisation was riding high on a string of successes made possible by the *nouvelle entente* between the members of the Security Council. However, Clinton's electoral success was essentially the result of his domestic platform oriented towards domestic and economic issues, the Democratic Party having won support from the American electorate on such issues as the stagnant state of the U.S. economy under the Bush administration (a situation which was turning around in Bush's last year in office) and the declining living standards of the American workforce.

Upon taking the reigns of power the Clinton presidency immediately found itself engaged in a crises in Haiti, Iraq, Somalia, and Yugoslavia for which it was ill-prepared.[7] Multilateralism in policy-making either became a convenient excuse for procrastination (Bosnia), a chance to demonstrate U.S. leadership (Somalia/Haiti), or a principle occasionally incompatible with the pursuit of American national security interests (Iraq). The question of multilateralism would also be the object of a major declaratory policy fiasco.

In early 1992, leaked U.S. Department of Defense plans defining the U.S. military role for the post-Cold War were received with incredulity by the U.S. Congress and the media. The plans laid out a world full of emerging threats where the United States would have to play the role of global policeman.[8] The issue would come back to haunt the Clinton presidency a year later. In April 1993 the administration enunciated

its doctrine of 'assertive multilateralism' which proclaimed a U.S. commitment to UN peacekeeping under the rationale that international conflict prevention and resolution were not issues subject to 'parsimonious interests', but rather constituted fundamental U.S. objectives.[9] The new doctrine did not survive the eventful summer of 1993 in Somalia. In the fall of that year President Clinton would start to talk about the UN that "could say no" and U.S. foreign policy rhetoric switched back to trade liberalisation and 'global democracy' as its two major themes.

After the 3 October 1993 incident in Mogadishu during which 18 American servicemen died, and with the Clinton administration resisting direct U.S. involvement in the Bosnian conflict in spite of having itself raised the possibility of unilateral intervention, whatever support was left within the State Department, the Pentagon and the White House for forceful UN interventions evaporated and relations between the United States and the UN took a turn for the worse. Stringent requirements were placed on U.S. participation to UN missions under PPD-25, the 1994 presidential directive on multilateral peace operations. Furthermore, the new Republican-dominated Congress, elected in November 1994, proposed to cut U.S. financial support for UN peacekeeping operations and blocked payments of U.S. arrears to the UN budget, a bargaining chip which would later be used by the Clinton presidency to extract reforms from the UN.[10]

The crisis in American-UN relations came to a head in mid-1995 over the situation in Bosnia and Croatia. By then Washington was virtually ignoring UN peace efforts in the former Yugoslavia, yet the U.S. presidency it was caught in a major foreign policy dilemma. A French and British pullout from Bosnia, an increasingly likely possibility in light of mounting casualties and lack of progress in EC/UN-sponsored peace talks, would compel the U.S. to lead a major NATO operation to help extract UN forces, an intervention the United States wanted to avoid at all cost because of the high likelihood of troop casualties.[11] However, a U.S. refusal to lead such an intervention could cripple NATO politically and poison transatlantic relations. As discussed in Chapter 5, U.S. choices were facilitated by the actions of the Bosnian Serb Army against UN troops and the Croatian offensive in Krajina (Operation *Oluja*, August 1995), the latter receiving Washington's tacit support. By mid-1995, the main Western protagonists in Bosnia had finally decided that their interests would best be served only if they took a harder, more proactive stance in order to end the conflict.

Whether 'image and impulse' accounts for the confused and confusing policies of the Bush and Clinton administrations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda has already been extensively debated. These crises had important repercussions for the perception of American power abroad, placing the United States in an unwelcome position of ultimate arbiter in situations where domestic imperatives for action where weak and political opinion divided. This stood in contrast with the more proactive approach

taken by the Bush and Clinton teams on other 'hot' issues, such as preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, international trade negotiations, bilateral relations with Russia, NATO reform, the Middle East Peace Process, or the situation in Iraq. At the very least, this strongly suggested that a limited number of issues were identified as situations where the United States wanted to be, and be seen, in a leadership position, often to the point of discouraging parallel initiatives by its allies.

Stanley Hoffman noted in 1994 that without the Cold War as an organising principle "the world did not lend itself easily to a sweeping vision, or even a simple slogan".[12] That may be so. Yet it is also true that for forty five years the world got into the habit of expecting a certain kind of global leadership from the United States, inspired both by Wilsonian ideals and *realpolitik* considerations. It is more than time to review those expectations. There have been plenty of indications throughout the 1990s that the U.S. approach to global leadership and responsibility remains highly selective. U.S. allies, of course, were always aware of this, and, it should be added, benefited immensely from U.S. willingness to defend and support them, particularly Western Europe and Japan. However, without the unifying bonds hitherto provided by Cold War geopolitics many U.S. allies now feel less constrained to acquiesce American global primacy and more confident about pursuing their own economic and political interests. The absence of a common enemy reduces the incentives for cooperation and increases allied skepticism, mostly unspoken, about the reliability of American security guarantees.

American policymakers have demonstrated a decidedly mixed attitude toward signs of greater assertiveness in foreign policy from their allies. The gradual fraying of the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq, the constant dissonance between Washington and Europe throughout the Bosnian conflict, U.S. resistance to becoming a signatory to the anti-personnel landmines treaty, and U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-European rows over trade sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Libya, are all cases in point. In effect, and more often than western leaders like to admit, the great liberal-democratic coalition which was expected to build a post-Cold War international order finds itself working in fits and starts rather than in unison.

Without getting into the theoretical debate about hegemonic stability, it may well be the case that U.S. leadership remains vital on a number of issues. Without the United States taking a determined stance against nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons proliferation, for instance, it is doubtful whether any coalition of liberal-democratic states could muster the combination of power, influence and technology necessary to control the spread of such weapons. However, on a range of other issues – the environment, global trade, social and economic rights – U.S. allies often doubt that U.S. leadership is as globally responsible and even-handed as Washington claims.

The U.S. and regionalism: back to the future?

Throughout the 1990s the United States played an important if not determinant role in the evolution of regional and transatlantic bodies such as NATO, the OSCE and the OAS. Its policies also directly or indirectly influenced the direction taken by other regional bodies, such as the ARF, the OAU, the WEU and the GCC. Whether in Asia, Europe or Africa, the United States has been a major advocate of shifting greater responsibility for regional stability towards local allies and selected institutions. This is a tendency in U.S. foreign policy that goes back to the Nixon Doctrine enunciated in 1969.

Though it has not received the same kind of attention as other (and perhaps more appealing) themes like trade liberalisation or 'global democracy', burden-sharing has indeed one of the major U.S. foreign policy goals of the 1990s. Of course, this has always been an issue in contemporary U.S.-European relations. Throughout the Cold War, and more particularly during the 1980s, U.S. policymakers and Congressional leaders regularly lashed out at NATO's European members for not dedicating enough resources to the transatlantic defence effort against the Soviet Union. Burden sharing also became a major issue with Japan during the 1980s as well as during the Gulf War, to which the Japanese government refused to participate militarily, but did so through 'chequebook diplomacy', ostensibly on constitutional grounds.

Throughout the 1990s, political developments worldwide certainly provided a new geopolitical dimension to this question. Many, if not most, emerging conflicts in Africa, the Balkans or the CIS did not directly engage major U.S. strategic interests. Moreover, just as much as there was a 'crisis of expectations' at the UN, there were undue expectations placed on the shoulders of the United States as the major provider of political influence and military power for dealing with localised crises and internal conflicts.[13]

In a 1993 congressional hearing on the future of U.S. foreign policy, former editor of *Foreign Affairs* William Hyland lamented the fact that America's dominating position within NATO throughout the Cold War had created an unhealthy "psychological" dependence on U.S. leadership on the part of its closest allies.[14] Hyland also raised questions that have found considerable resonance in Washington throughout this decade. What are vital U.S. interests? Where should the United States intervene? What issues should be left to others? The answer of U.S. policymakers to these questions has been more than a little ambiguous.

In its relations with Africa, Europe and Japan, the Clinton administration has generally pushed for a much greater level of regional responsibility for the maintenance of regional peace and stability, expecting more of its allies and tacitly acquiescing the role of regional power-brokers. Greater reliance on regional organisations was also seen

as part of the solution, although on that front expectations were and remain more limited.[15] Washington, on the other hand, has remained wary of any regional coalition or more permanent regional organisation which might potentially jeopardise U.S. strategic advantages, be they political or economic, and that also includes the EC/EU with which the United States has always had an uneasy relationship. Moreover, the United States has not been shy about engaging in geopolitical games of influence, most notably with France in Africa and with Russia in the CIS. In effect, regionalism is a principle which America is willing to espouse, but only when it corresponds with its own understanding of regional and international security. Here, important parallels can and should be drawn between this situation and American alliance policy during the postwar era.

Despite debates about its changing roles and interests the United States retains considerable diplomatic and economic influence in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. As the world's only truly global power, what it does and does not do, approves or disapproves, continues to influences events far from its shores. This unequalled position in world affairs is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. Indeed, one can not see on the horizon any serious pretender(s) to superpower status, whether in Europe, Asia, or anywhere else.

Globalization: Putting Regionalism Back in the Bottle?

Globalization, the ubiquitous catch-all concept described by Andrew Hurrell as the "sense of increasing interdependence between national economies and interconnectedness between societies", is likely to have a major impact on the development of regionalism.[16] Globalization conjures up images of unimaginably large sums of money moving unfettered across world financial markets, denationalised economies in which governments have little apparent ability to conduct effective economic policy, and cultures transformed by the marketisation of a new 'MacWorld' way of life. As an end of the century phenomenon globalization poses a definitive challenge to some of the traditional functions of statehood. It is, however, an uneven process whose scope, ramifications, and consequences for national and international governance are neither simple nor easily explicable.[17]

One might legitimately ask what globalization has to do with the ability of regional political or trading arrangements to contribute to regional stability. First, globalization raises questions similar to those raised in the old UN universalist-regionalist debate. For example, does globalization weaken or strengthen the

development of stable and cohesive regional groupings? Second, the very idea of globalization (writ large) has become a melting pot for a plethora of current policy and academic debates – the future of international trade, the supremacy of the market system, the diminishing role of the state, U.S. economic 'imperialism', international distributive justice, the development of 'global values', etc. – many of which are directly or indirectly relevant to the possible responses of regional groupings in their efforts to further regional growth and stability, be it political or economic.

How does globalization affect regionalism?

This is a difficult question to answer. First, because is there no agreed definition of what globalization is, and second because globalization, as it is widely perceived, consists of a variety of processes and trends in which a multitude of state and non-state actors play a role yet whose consequences are often difficult to evaluate. Take the debate on the information revolution and the diffusion of knowledge, for instance. Many in the West believe that increased access to information worldwide will lead to a globalization of social and cultural values. However, few would disagree with the statement that the diffusion of ideas and values under globalization is essentially a one way street; Americans or Europeans are not bombarded in their media by Indian culture, or Chinese business philosophy. So, does globalization reinforce the Western conception of global interdependence, or does it provide for transnational exchanges on a more equitable footing?

Economists have tended to present a more orderly vision of globalization than political scientists in recent years, perhaps because the foundations of mainstream (neo-liberal) economic theory have been strengthened rather than weakened over the last two decades. Their major claims about the features of economic globalization are as follows. First, there are increasing economic links between high-income and low income countries. Second, national economies are becoming more integrated through trade, finance, production and regimes. Third, multinational corporations play a critical role in global trade and in patterns of international production. And finally, there is an increasing harmonisation of international economic regimes.[18] This should not be read as a univocal endorsement of a unified vision for international trade, however. Does anyone remember the great debate of the end of 1980s and early 1990s about the rise of regional blocs? There is obviously an inherent tension between research that tends to demonstrate the development of regional trading blocs, and thus a regionalisation of the world economy, and research that presents arguments about the global integration of the world economy.[19]

In order to try to answer the initial question, we are therefore left with a set of hypotheses and arguments based on a mix of hard facts, circumstantial evidence, and

informed (and sometimes uninformed) speculation. To confuse matters further, they lead in many directions rather than one in particular. Hurrell, for example, makes a convincing argument that globalization may in fact act both as an impediment to, and as stimulus for, regionalism, presenting the case for a push-and-pull interpretation.[20] His basic argument is that global interdependence promotes the search for global, rather than regional solutions. On the other hand, global problems, or global 'challenges' as they are often termed by governments, may stimulate more coherent regional-level responses. Both statements may be accurate, but they obviously depend on the nature of the issue and the capacity of different entities to respond to them. EU countries, for example, have the ability to respond to global issues, including international economic competition, on regional terms. More vulnerable African states, on the other hand, rely to a much greater extent on international support, and notably on international institutions, to help them deal with a range of issues defined as global in scope (e.g. environmental problems, pandemics, population movements, etc.).

Globalization and governance: regionalism as a filter?

Another key set of arguments in the globalization debate relates to the effects of the market system on governance, and on the tensions between the promotion of global markets and democracy, tensions which many economists recognise. Jacques Attali, the controversial former director of the European Reconstruction and Development Bank (EBRD) and long-time adviser to French President François Mitterrand, has warned against the rise of a global "market dictatorship" which is dislocating established social contracts in industrialised societies and undermining responsible governance in weaker polities.[21] In a similar vein, noted American commentator Robert Kaplan has painted a bleak portrait of democracy's future in a world increasingly influenced by an international corporate oligarchy.[22]

Whether or not democracy is doomed under the tremendous weight of global forces remains a highly contested issue. At the very least, it can certainly be argued with some authority that globalization is contributing to develop civil society and trans-national networks in both established democracies and in countries governed by regimes with less than democratic credentials. Moreover, democracy and commitment to economic pluralism are inextricably linked while the spread of globalization has been matched by an increase, not decrease, in the number of countries with democratic forms of governance. What is indisputable, however, is that global market forces are slowly gnawing away at the autonomous powers of modern states. Governments ignore or

defy the imperatives of the global market at their peril. Challenging them risks incurring the wrath of financial markets and international economic institutions.

How regional entities of all types can respond to such forces is not clear. Stronger, more cohesive regional groupings composed of established democracies can arguably respond more vigorously to perceived threats to their democratic foundations, if only because they can put up more effective and accountable regulatory responses to market forces and corporate actions. Weaker polities have a more limited range of strategies. As discussed in previous chapters, a number of regional institutions are weak or ineffective on matters of regional governance. Governments can raise barriers to attempt to protect their political foundations or national culture. However, their capacity to control or regulate transnational forces is often limited, and their efforts in this regard can be offset by sanctions from much bigger international players or by the costs of not opening themselves to wider markets, a route which some states follow regardless. Finally, in weak polities societal demands for accountability and transparency cannot be channeled upwards as easily as in established democracies, and those demands must also compete with a range of powerful pressures: markets forces, an objective need for foreign direct investment in the national economy, corruption in bureaucracy and in political systems, etc.

One particularly interesting example of how globalization is playing out on regional groupings was provided by the 1997 Asian financial meltdown which clearly highlighted the tensions between the forces of globalization and the forces of regionalism. It also provided plenty of grist to the mill for both the advocates and detractors of 'global markets'. In spite of the long-standing Asian discourse on economic self-reliance and 'Asian values' the crisis exposed the high degree of susceptibility of East Asian economies to external financial forces. It also demonstrated the lack of effective regional instruments for dealing with such situations as neither ASEAN nor the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum proved to be capable crisis-managing frameworks. Rather, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have been the two core non-state actors throughout the crisis, though it should also be mentioned that both organisations have come under very severe criticism as a result of their past and current policies toward East Asia.

At this juncture the conclusion to the Asian financial crisis remains an open-ended question. Some have interpreted the crisis as a demonstration of the need for greater transparency and accountability in regional economic and political systems. Other have concluded that international markets are all powerful, and that any regional effrots to manage crises on regional crises are doomed. For others in the region, the crisis has highlighted the inter-connectedness of Asian economies and the need to some form of regional system in order to better protect against international speculation. The fact remains, however, that the so-called 'Asian flu' is having a profound social,

economic and political impact on East Asia, and that is has brought about severe, if temporary, disruptions in world financial and trade markets, to the extent that G-7 leaders have openly questioned the ability of international financial institutions to deal with such situations.

Globalization is a fact of life in many sectors of the international economy, it is having a major impact on self-conceptions of national and regional identity, and it is changing the expectations placed on governments and multilateral bodies. No one can predict with certainty how such forces will play out in years to come. As the 90s decade is drawing to a close, however, there seems to be a growing, and perhaps healthy, recognition of the more negative aspects of globalization and of its consequences for political governance and economic stability. Perhaps the ultimate irony in this last respect is that some aspects of globalization are increasingly being viewed as a threat to the stability of the global economy, and that this, perhaps more than anything else, has opened the way for a much needed renewal of the debate on international economic governance.

The UN at a Crossroads, Again

In 1988, just as there were signs of a UN 'renaissance', the American United Nations Association published a book entitled *A Successor Vision: The United Nations of Tomorrow*.[23] Innumerable plans for adapting the UN to post-Cold War conditions have been put forth since. The book's title, however, captured the very essence of the most important challenge facing the UN system: finding a successor vision. Ten years on, one can only observe that progress has been very difficult on that front and that no such vision has yet jelled permanently.

Under the stewardship of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and then Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN saw its fortunes rise and fall. The purposefulness which prevailed in the early 1990s has been replaced with deep sense of introspection and a general sentiment that, after having burned its fingers once too often in the embers of 'robust' peacekeeping, the UN had yet to find a clear post-Cold War role. In truth, the UN has always represented different things for different governments. Great powers have historically used the UN as a mechanism to deal with unforeseen international incidents or as a platform to legitimise their own foreign policy actions. Under the heading of a 'rules and institutions-based' international order, middle powers have sought refuge in the multilateralist principles embodied in the UN system to promote their own position and values in world affairs. Small and disempowered states have tried to use their numbers to gain leverage on richer industrialised countries. And regional powers have shielded themselves behind the UN Charter in order to prevent other nations from poking their noses into their affairs.

The current existential crisis of the UN is certainly not its first. Indeed, it appears to be a cyclical occurrence. One can think, for example, of the UN intervention in the Congo (ONUC 1960-1964), which resulted in a deep political and financial crisis and severely restricted the peacekeeping role of the organisation for more than fifteen years.[24] There was also the great financial crisis of the mid-1980s, brought about by a vindictive U.S. Congress that withheld nearly $500 million in U.S. dues to the UN between 1985 and 1988.[25]

The UN never really overcame the financial difficulties inherited from the 1980s. From 1988 onwards, with the UN Security Council authorising one peacekeeping operation after another, UN finances never really kept up with the increased pace of activities. The accumulation of unpaid arrears and the exploding costs of peacekeeping operations delivered a shock to the UN budgetary system from which it has still to recover.[26] The fact is that the UN was effectively kept on the brink of financial insolvency by a minority of reluctant payers, most notably Russia and the United States. As of January 1998, a staggering $3.1 billion in outstanding contributions were owed to the organisation, $1.5 billion to the regular budget and $1.6 billion to the peacekeeping operations budget. The United States alone accounts for nearly half of owed arrears.[27] Late in its first term in office the Clinton administration decided unilaterally that the United States would reduce its assessed contributions to the UN general budget (from 25% down to 20% of the UN's total budget), as well as its contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget (from 31% down to 25%). This decision has been heavily criticised by many countries, but particularly so by Washington's European and Canadian allies. From whatever perspective one looked at the state of the UN in 1995-1997, these were not signs of an organisation in good shape.

What is the UN's role under such circumstances? Is the UN essentially confined to the role of international relief agency, with the Security Council continuing to provide international legitimacy for all manner of coalitions or regional actions deemed worthy of support by a restricted group of major powers? Or is the organisation set to become the central node of international cooperation in the 21st century? There are valid arguments for both positions. Many UN agencies are doing truly indispensable work for humanity, much more so than is appreciated by the habitual detractors of the UN system who rarely benefit themselves from the work provided by UN agencies. On the other hand, the UN's international political role is being challenged on several fronts. The legitimacy of the Security Council is rapidly eroding, and for most of this decade there has been growing resentment amongst developing countries that their voice is simply not listened to when big UN decisions are made.[28] Moreover, in the aftermath of the controversial UN interventions in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, there has been a general crisis of confidence in the moral authority and effectiveness of UN action.

The imperative for internal restructuring is currently a major driving force in UN affairs and is likely be so for the entire mandate of Kofi Annan, Boutros-Ghali's successor at the helm of the UN. The much-needed rejuvenation of the UN system will neither be quick nor easy, and difficult issues like Security Council reform and other critical issues which go at the very heart of international order seem unlikely to be fully renegotiated by the end of Annan's tenure. However, this first wave of reform may open the way for the real debate about the role of the UN in the 21st century: Is the UN simply to be a more efficient and better managed organisation, yet one which essentially defends the international status quo? Or can it evolve into a new international cooperation mechanism which will truly defend fundamental freedoms, promote good international governance and bridge North-South differences?[29]

America's benign vision of the UN

Throughout the history of the UN the United States has always held a determinant if not commanding position over the affairs of the organisation. It is therefore a foregone conclusion to assert that any major structural reforms at the UN depend to a considerable extent on Washington's imprimatur. It is abundantly clear, however, that American policymakers hold on to a rather benign vision of the UN. Indeed, such is the gap between the current attitude of American policy elites toward the UN system and the global mandate of the organisation that it increasingly difficult to see how the two can be reconciled. This is particularly evident with respect to the organisation's peace and security mandate, but it also palpable in ongoing attempts to reform UN structures.[30]

Among the list of American grievances towards the UN is the question of administrative effectiveness. This issue served as a pretext for the United States to scuttle Boutros Boutros-Ghali's bid for a second term the helm of the UN. Boutros-Ghali had proposed *An Agenda for* Peace (1992), *An Agenda for Development* (1994) and *An Agenda for Democratization* (1996). However, he has shown comparatively little interest for an agenda for internal reform. His management style – generally described as aloof and haughty in the Anglo-American press – was ultimately detrimental to the objectives he was pursuing and contributed to a gradual erosion of the crucial UN-United States relationship.[31] For better or for worse, Boutros-Ghali had been at odds with Washington too many times and on too many issues during his tenure. In 1996, the opinionated Secretary-General would discover that the Clinton administration had no qualms about fronting the rest the world in vetoing his candidacy for a second term.

Coming on the heels of the NATO intervention in Bosnia, the U.S. veto on Boutros-Ghali's re-election marked a new low-point in U.S.-UN relations. In a January

1996 statement to the UN General Assembly working group on strengthening the UN system, then U.S. Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright made a carefully worded presentation about U.S. priorities at the organisation. Three years before, under the short-lived 'assertive multilateralism' policy, she had proclaimed the United States ready and willing to support UN peacekeeping. Albright now declared that the UN should focus its efforts on tasks that the organisation was "comparatively well-qualified to perform", noting that the UN was "but one of many instruments available for countries seeking to act cooperatively".[32] The central thrust of her statement was the urgent need for better internal management at the UN. But she added that the United States wished to see the streamlining of UN economic and social programs, the restoration of the UN General Assembly (which in her trademark forthright style Albright called a 'global sedative') as a forum for substantive debate, and a restructuring of the UN Secretariat to transform it into a more efficient international bureaucracy.

One can easily criticise the peremptory manner in which the United States shoved the internal reform agenda down the UN's throat in 1995-1996. Irrespective of the method, however, it is also a fact that most knowledgeable observers of the UN have pleaded for years for genuine and meaningful internal reform, not only because effectiveness and accountability within the UN system objectively need to be increased, but also because bureaucratic entropy had damaged the credibility and authority of the organisation over the years. One can certainly speculate as to why an internal reform agenda was not initiated earlier by Pérez de Cuéllar or Boutros-Ghali. Though both former secretary-generals were not generally regarded as enthusiastic reformers, the reason essentially lies with the extremely defensive attitude that both the G-77 (developing countries) and WEOG (Western Europe and Others Group) groups within the UN took towards internal reform in order to protect their national and group interests within the organisation. In the end, the resistance to change from large portions of the UN membership and from within the UN bureaucracy itself simply set the stage for a very determined UN reform drive launched by the United States, the UN's biggest financial contributor.

Kofi Annan, Boutros-Ghali's successor, was all too aware of what was expected of him. He spent the first few months of his tenure developing a comprehensive reform agenda which he presented to the UN membership in mid-1997. Annan's team proposed major changes to the UN Secretariat's structure and functions, and to UN program delivery, financial management and staffing. A new independent Department of Disarmament Affairs has been created in order to reenergize the UN disarmament agenda. Emergency relief coordination, sustainable development, human rights and post-conflict peace-building have been given heightened importance within the Secretariat's structure. It is tempting to state that never in the organisation's history has such a sweeping agenda for reform been adopted so swiftly. In reality, these reforms

have come as result of a drawn out and divisive debate which has lasted for years, and the most difficult part, implementation, has yet to be fully played out.

One aspect of UN reform conspicuously absent from Albright's January 1996 speech was the question of Security Council reform. Soon after taking office, in early 1993, the Clinton administration had shown its colours and came out in favour of an expanded Security Council with Japan and Germany as new permanent members. Many developing countries were outraged that the United States had not come forward with a proposal that would also include greater representation from their ranks, especially since the Security Council is universally viewed as an anachronism. The debate which ensued at the UN (and that is still ongoing today) focussed on the composition and powers of new members, and the one major concession of the United States, if one can call it a concession, was recognition that it must become a more representative body.[33] Otherwise, the American position has changed relatively little since then; Japan and Germany should become members of an expanded Council, the new Council should have no more that 20 or 21 members (5 or 6 more members than the current 15), and an expansion of the Council should not change the obligations and privileges of the current permanent members.[34] What this points to is that the United States is in no hurry to reform a Council which has been so favourable to its national interests for the last fifty years. American diplomacy knows full well that the process of selecting new Council members other than Germany and Japan is bound to be lengthy and extremely difficult.[35]

Another key aspect of the UN mandate which the United States does not appear particularly eager to promote is an enlarged economic and social role for the organisation. Over the last few years an extended debate has taken place on the UN's international economic role as well as on the increasing distance separating Bretton Woods institutions from the UN system. For conservative policymakers and opinion leaders in the United States such discussions bring back memories of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) debate of mid-1970s in which the underdeveloped South challenged Western economic hegemony.[36] Perhaps an unavoidable observation here is that over the last decades the United States (as have most other OECD countries) has skilfully manoeuvred its trade diplomacy so that the UN has come to play an increasingly inconsequential role in international economic affairs.

The NIEO challenge was squarely defeated in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This time around, however, it might prove more difficult for Washington to cast aside appeals for a more meaningful UN economic role for several reasons. First, developing countries have made important concessions in the process of UN reforms; in return they expect international development to be placed once again at the forefront of UN concerns. Second, contrary to the 1970s, there is now a declaratory consensus on the

importance of market-oriented economic policies and political pluralism as the basis for development amongst less developed countries (LDC's).[37] It is therefore increasingly difficult for the United States to reject demands for a greater UN economic role on the basis that LDC's repudiate both the market system and democratic values. Finally, the tacit U.S.-Europe coalition which defeated the NIEO does not exist as it did in the 1970s and early 1980s. Indeed, under the heading of sustainable development EU countries now appear to support a greater economic and social role for the UN. In early 1997 they proposed an important overhaul of the UN economic and social system.[38] It is also noteworthy that during the past decade the World Bank's agenda has broadened considerably and now embraces many positions that were once the unique preserve of the UN, a trend accelerated by the Asian financial crisis. The relationship between the Bank and the UN is now closer than it has been for many years.

'Be careful what you ask for because you might get it', or so the saying goes. In a few years time the United States might be placed in a strange situation. The UN will perhaps be a leaner and more efficient organisation that Washington might find increasingly difficult to criticise because of its wasteful administration and Byzantine bureaucracy, and American leaders could come under increasing international pressure from many their closest allies to renew their commitment to multilateralism within the UN framework. For the UN, this would constitute an optimistic scenario. On the other hand, with the United States enjoying global economic and military supremacy, it must be recognised there are few structural incentives to bind U.S. power to burdensome global multilateral frameworks. As the principal global player, the United States enjoys the power to set the international agenda rather than simply following it.

Saving the state: the UN's most important role?

Failed states and crumbling states have posed the greatest challenge to the UN peace and security system in the 1990s, and it has become obvious that, regardless of conceptual frameworks or good intentions, the question of international involvement in disintegrating states remains one of the most complex and delicate issues in international politics. Indeed, the problems posed by recent UN interventions in civil wars have meant that Western industrialised nations have lost their enthusiasm for risky peacekeeping operations organised under the UN framework, and the virtues of a more traditional approach to peacekeeping have been rediscovered once again.

The other great lesson from the 1990s is that collapsing states can pose a threat to regional security and stability, and possibly to international security as well.[39] The domino effect of the Rwandan conflict on the Great Lakes region and the regional consequences of the Liberian conflict are obvious case in point. Not all the internal conflicts of the 1990s have had similar repercussions. In Peru and Colombia, for

example, domestic violence and terrorism have not threatened the wider regional order. However, regional spillover has been frequent enough to highlight the need for strong regional and international measures to prevent state collapse before it occurs.

At present, the instruments at the disposal of the international community for preventing these types of situations are inadequate. Not only does conflict prevention require that considerable political resources be mobilised before effective action can be taken, but it also requires that a common understanding be reached amongst all concerned parties as to what exactly is to be prevented, what agency or coalition is best placed to deal with the problem, and an agreement as to what strategies are likely to be most effective. These conditions are rarely met. Conflict prevention seems relatively straightforward in lecture rooms and at international conferences, but it remains an extremely demanding form of action that can only be successful under certain conditions.[40]

Western governments clearly understand that a collapsing Russian state would be a catastrophe for Europe, if not the rest of the world. Consequently, economic and political support for Russia's fledgling 'market democracy' was recognised as a geostrategic imperative, an insurance policy against the likelihood that a worst-case scenario will develop. On the other hand, the 1990s have provided ample evidence that the collapse of smaller states in Africa or Central Asia does not rate very highly on the geopolitical scale. Moreover, in such places as Afghanistan, Iraq or Zaire (in 1996-1997), internal instability or revolutionary change appears to have been deliberately promoted by certain Western powers, either directly or indirectly. What does this tell us about the rhetoric of conflict prevention? Probably that it is only possible where key local and international players genuinely agree to commit sufficient resources and diplomatic know-how to do something about a specific situation. In the *realpolitik* world of international affairs, however, it also means that difficult compromises often have to be made between ideal objectives, national interests (broadly and narrowly defined) and the possibility of already bad situations sliding into chaos.

In the 1990s the idea of conflict prevention has developed largely in relation to the tremendous costs of international efforts to help rebuild faltering states or mitigate the effects of state disintegration on local populations. Within this paradigm, individual human beings and well-defined population groups have been propelled closer to the centre of international concerns. One can take note, for instance, of concept of 'human security' which risen to prominence in a number of international institutions as well as in academic and policy circles. That human security is a fundamental factor in the achievement of peace and development is undeniable. Indeed, it was so well before the concept ever became fashionable. Yet the concern for human security only reinforces the need for viable and responsible states, as weak states often constitute the greatest threat to civilian populations. Ultimately, it is states who have the responsibility of

upholding international norms regarding political, social or human rights, not international organisations or NGO's. There is no way of getting around this problem by bypassing the state altogether; human security simply cannot be achieved under conditions of weak or faltering statehood. This being said, 'human security' is a difficult concept for many G-77 to accept because it is seen as implying a level of external interference in domestic affairs that is squarely at odds with traditional conceptions of sovereignty.

As discussed previously, the forces of globalization present a major challenge to the exercise of state sovereignty and responsibility. With the repercussions of the Asian financial crisis considerably more dramatic than anyone had anticipated, many think international financial markets are far too volatile, becoming themselves the proverbial bull in the china shop of political and economic governance. At the very least, the crisis in Asia suggests that the sweeping embrace of market philosophy may well increase problems of governance and social fragmentation that exist in both developed and under-developed states. If the international community really wants viable and responsible states, then, as historian Paul Kennedy argues, it "must prevent the sovereignty of [UN] member states being further impinged upon by forces which they cannot individually handle".[41] If one adopts this logic, then it not only implies a certain urgency in forging a new consensus on how to resolve global problems, but it also underlines the need for international statesmanship of the highest order.

The UN enjoys a unique international position because of its legitimacy and representative nature. Efforts to revitalise the UN system need to be supported as further erosion of its capabilities and its credibility may well usher in a revised version of balance of power politics. However, a UN reform process that stopped short of tackling Security Council reform and a meaningful restoration of the UN's economic and social role would be (rightly) perceived as a failure. Of course, neither issue is likely to be solved in the short-term. But the direction taken on the debate on both issues will have an important impact on the credibility and legitimacy of the UN in the coming decade.

With respect to the question of regionalism proper there is another important factor that needs to be taken into account when considering the UN's international role. The episodic losses of credibility in the UN system have historically proven to be a catalyst for the development of alternatives to global approaches to problem-solving. The development of a new security-driven regionalism in the 1990s might derive, in part, from the UN's own predicament. Sensing that the UN is unable to respond to their collective problems or goals, regional communities or other coalescing groups of states may well have seen more promise in regional or coalition approaches than in the search for solutions through a weakened global organisation.

'Self-help' on the rise

Whether in Albania, Central Africa, the Korean Peninsula, Yugoslavia or the South Pacific, the 1990s have seen an increasing resort to contact group politics, informal coalitions and ad hoc multilateralism to manage and/or resolve regional tensions and conflicts. The motivations for this development are extremely diverse and do not lend themselves easily to generalisation. Nevertheless a number of hypotheses can be put forward.

First, the UN is manifestly unable to respond to each and every crisis. Throughout the early 1990s the organisation was overwhelmed by the expectations placed upon its shoulders, and in turn this has generated a movement towards finding other avenues of problem-solving. The corollary argument, of course, is that the UN Security Council is in fact not tasked to respond to each and every crisis, but only to those threatening international peace and security. Since 1995, a reassessment of the Security Council's work has taken place in recognition of the fact that attempts to tackle too many difficult situations at once can only lead to disappointment and disillusion.

Second, as discussed in the previous chapter, many regional organisations have taken steps to increase their jurisdictional and functional capabilities in the field of conflict management, yet remain limited in what they can do, or are hamstrung by cumbersome decision-making rules. For governments that want to act, ad hoc approaches or regional 'coalitions of the willing' may provide more flexible and less constraining forums for handling regional problems than broad-membership institutions. Indeed, regardless of their goals, governments acting within a limited group of like-minded states can more easily control the scope, pace and intensity of a common initiative than their are able to within larger forums. A corollary argument needs to be added here. Not all regions of the globe are covered by regional organisations endowed with strong peacemaking or peacekeeping mandates. Therefore, if the UN is not in a position to act, and no relevant or effective regional security institution exists, some form of ad hoc multilateralism involving states having a direct stake on the issue at hand may be the only pragmatic problem-solving approach.

Third, after the disasters in Somalia and Yugoslavia and the mixed record of CSCE/OSCE involvement in the CIS, key international powers have become extremely selective in the range of conflict management functions they will allow multilateral organisations to perform. In Africa, for example, the United States and EU governments are increasingly inclined to tolerate or even to encourage local problem-solving approaches rather than initiate new high level UN action, particularly if it might involve risky commitments on their part. In the case of the Albanian crisis of 1997, so considerable were the political obstacles for UN, NATO or OSCE peacekeeping in that country that only a restricted group of 'willing and able'

governments led by Italy and France proved willing to send a temporary stabilisation force.

Finally, aside from obvious reasons such as trying to prevent the spread of a problem before it gets out of hand, or attempting to transform a conflict through some form of multilateral process, playing a greater role in conflict prevention/management may present a number of benefits for regional powers or 'coalitions of the willing': 1) third party conflict management efforts may either raise or reaffirm the regional and/or international status of the governments involved; 2) by demonstrating a willingness to pursue a common cause, such efforts may also contribute to reinforce solidarity amongst the parties involved; and 3) informal coalitions (and, sometimes, regional groupings) may decide that tackling the problem on their own can provide some insulation from external involvement in the region, either by the UN or by extra-regional powers.

Regional and sub-regional peacekeeping: more frequent than ever

One aspect of particular relevance to this study is the development of regional or non-UN peacekeeping forces since the end of the Cold War. Resort to such forces has been more frequent since 1990 than at any time since peacekeeping was developed as a conflict control mechanism in the 1950s. The following are recent instances where non-UN peacekeeping forces have been deployed:

- ECOWAS peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) in Liberia (1990 -);
- CIS/Russian peacekeeping operations in Abhazia, South Ossetia, Moldova and Tajikistan (from 1992 on)
- OAU Neutral Military Observation Group (NMOG I/II) in Rwanda-Uganda (1992-1993);
- OAU observation mission (MIOB) in Burundi (1994-1996);
- Rio Treaty Guarantor's Group military observation mission (MOMEP) along the Peru-Ecuador Border (1995 -);
- NATO force (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995 -);
- Caribbean Community (CARICOM) troop contingent as part of the UN Mission in Haiti (1995-1997);
- Multinational Protection Force (MPF) in Albania (1997);
- Francophone West African force (MISAB) deployed in the Central African Republic (1997-1998), transformed into a UN operation (MINURCA) in 1998;

- South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (1994) and Truce Monitoring Group (1998 -) on Bougainville Island (Papua-New Guinea);
- ECOWAS force (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone (1997 -).[42]
- Nato force (KFOR) in Kosovo (1999-)

In addition, there are now numerous examples of multinational military forces established specifically for contingency/peace operations, both within and outside the framework of the UN. Within NATO, a variety of land, air and naval formations can be used for that purpose, notably under the framework of the new Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept.[43] Of note are also the new EUROFOR/EUROMARFOR forces recently set up by number of European countries under the WEU.[44] NATO and, perhaps in theory only, the WEU constitute exceptions with regard to the scope of capabilities they can potentially bring to bear, though NATO truly remains in a class of its own in terms of actual capabilities. All other multinational military forces being established are smaller and more limited in scope and in capabilities. Some are standing forces while others are meant to be stand-by arrangements. Some already exist, others are projects currently under discussion. They include the following:

- Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBATT), composed of troops from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania;
- Central Asian Battalion (CENTRASBATT), composed of troops from Kazakstan, Kyrgystan and Uzbekistan;
- The U.S. African Conflict Resolution initiative (ACRI), which has already led to U.S.-sponsored peacekeeping training in a number of African countries;
- The French RECAMP initiative (*Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix*) under which a West African regional peacekeeping exercise (Exercise *Guidimakha*) was held at the Senegal-Mauritania-Mali border in early 1998;
- Stand-by High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) initiative piloted by Canada and Denmark, to be eventually used for UN peace operations (not, however, for enforcement actions);
- SADC peacekeeping force, which held it first ever military exercise (Exercise *Blue Hungwe*) in early 1997;
- ANAD peacekeeping force in francophone West Africa, of which the first operational deployment may have been the MISAB force (1997-1998) in the Central African Republic;

- Trilateral Peacekeeping Brigade, recently established between Italy, Hungary and Slovenia;
- Joint Hungarian-Rumanian Peacekeeping Battalion, also a recent project;
- Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE), a recently created military formation composed of seven Southeastern European countries.

It should be noted that all of the latter initiatives have received some measure of political and/or military support from Western countries or flow from proposals by NATO countries.[45]

The foregoing examples might suggest that states are more willing than ever to find alternatives to UN-organised peacekeeping. Before making a definitive assessment, however, we need to take a sober look at the evidence. First, most of these new regional/multinational forces either constitute ad hoc responses to particular situations or are functional adjuncts to larger political endeavours. Second, a number of these projects are not tagged for use by one specific organisation to the exclusion of all others and could conceivably be activated under a mandate emanating from the UN, or from a relevant regional organisation. Finally, whether in Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda or Yugoslavia (in 1991-1992), it needs to be remembered that a number of recent regional peacekeeping experiences have not proven to be particularly effective in terms of helping to resolve conflict, reminding policymakers that the peacekeeping 'band-aid' is usually ineffective when opposing parties are determined to fight.

When examining the performance of regional peacekeeping forces all the conventional criteria related to peacekeeping in general need to be taken into account (i.e. legitimacy, consent, neutrality, use of force policy, clarity of mandate, etc.). The international community, however, will have to live with the fact regional peacekeeping may not necessarily have the same character as conventional UN peacekeeping. Some third-parties may be far less than neutral when making the decision to intervene under the peacekeeping mantle. On the other hand, it is also clear that the permanent members of the UN Security Council have adopted pragmatism as the guiding principle as regards the deployment of regional or coalition-based peacekeeping forces.

Should the fact that the Security Council is unwilling to send blue-helmeted forces to particular flash points prevent local actors or coalitions from attempting control the situation on their own? The current answer to that question is non-equivocally negative. Western countries may be uneasy about Russian intentions in Central Asia or the Caucasus, but they tacitly recognise that a Russian peacekeeping presence there may be better than none at all. The same argument motivated the UN and some Western countries to support ECOWAS peacemaking/peacekeeping efforts in Liberia in spite Nigeria's rather blatant lack of neutrality in the conflict.

In the aftermath of Somalia and Yugoslavia many have deplored the decline of the UN as a peacekeeping agency. The facts certainly point in that direction. Between 1995 and 1999 only three new UN operations were approved by the Security Council, two small civilian missions in El Salvador (MINUSAL) and Guatemala (MINUGUA), and a peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA). Moreover, a majority of the troops currently deployed around the world for peacekeeping purposes are not under the command of the UN. Rather, they are deployed under the aegis of a regional security organisation, under that of other regional bodies, or under the authority of ad hoc coalitions.

In reviewing the situation it should not be forgotten that peacekeeping was a mechanism conceived under particular Cold War conditions in order to prevent localised clashes from degenerating into a wider international conflict. Few of today's localised conflicts threaten global order. The major rationale for peacekeeping as it was conceived in the postwar period has therefore largely disappeared. However, the substitute justification for the 'new' peacekeeping, humanitarianism and rebuilding faltering states, has thus far not proven to be as compelling as the previous one, especially inasmuch as it has divided UN members and confronted them with extremely difficult operational and moral choices. Under these conditions, the loss of enthusiasm for 'robust' peacekeeping was perhaps not altogether unexpected. One needs to put the current situation in perspective by comparing it to what happened to the UN as a result of its military role in the Congo in the early 1960s.

The ongoing evolution of wide variety of regional peacekeeping forces strongly supports the hypothesis that there has been a shift of peacekeeping responsibility from the global to the regional. What is at least as significant is the manner in which this has been done, either ad hoc responses to local problems by coalitions of the 'willing and able', or plans to create multinational military capabilities for use by a variety of inter-governmental bodies, both regional or global. Advocates of a UN standing military force might be disappointed by the latter development. In the end, however, delinking multinational military cooperation from the politics of large-membership international organisations might give policymakers more 'hard' options than interminable debates about the pros and cons of a UN army.

Foreign policy by posse: the way of the future?

Is 'foreign policy by posse', as Richard Haas calls informal multilateralism, set to replace more traditional forms of multilateralism such as standing alliances and international organisations?[46] Even though informal multilateralism seems to be enjoying a surge of popularity as a diplomatic mechanism, this seems unlikely. All key international players place considerable importance on the stabilising role of alliances and international

organisations. As the classical (neo-liberal institutionalist) argument goes, in an international system based on solely on adhocery and informalism, transactions costs would increase exponentially. Moreover, without the 'rules of the road' and boundaries provided by institutions and alliances, such a system would be prone to instability and unpredictability.

There is also another important reason why the informal approach may only complement, rather than completely replace, more traditional forms of multilateralism. Although informal coalitions may offer more flexible and/or timely problem-solving possibilities for participating governments, they may not always carry the same level of international legitimacy as more formal action by existing inter-governmental bodies, thus the need for wider external support. In the case of IGAD-sponsored dialogue and mediation efforts in the Sudan, for example, increased legitimacy for regional initiatives was provided by a wider 'Friends of IGAD' group. In other cases, the contact group on the former Yugoslavia and francophone West African efforts to stabilise the situation in the Central African Republic, for example, wider support for informal efforts came from the UN Security Council itself.

Informal coalitions constitute a very significant feature of post-Cold War international diplomacy. For some, this signals a return of the concert approach in international politics, albeit in a revised form. For others, informal coalitions constitute diplomacy's response to an increasingly fast-paced world where promptness and flexibility are needed. Whatever one's interpretation, the fact should not be lost that informal coalitions organised on a regional basis constitute a form of regionalism. They may offer more flexibility for the participants involved, but they can also suffer from the same 'ailments' as other regionalist endeavours because of the inherent limitations of the regional approach.

Regional Dynamics and the New Regionalism

Stating that regionalism has an impact on regionalism might appear thoroughly tautological. Yet is it also the case that new regional cooperation processes evolve in part as a result of the problems or deficiencies of other such efforts. It goes without saying that not all regionalist endeavours have been successful. Some have polarised regions, others have collapsed, and yet others never really got off the ground. Inversely, emerging poles of cooperation can have important repercussions for regional and international order. NATO and the European Community, for example, established a long-term pattern of stability and security in Europe which transformed the continent. On a different scale, ASEAN helped to normalise relations between Southeast Asian countries in the late 1960s, and it provided a foundation for regional stability and

economic development. The point is that the basis for regional cooperation is not set in concrete; it can and does evolve with time and new circumstances.

Ascribing success and failure on such matters is, and will remain, a delicate exercise. What is officially declared a success by governments will not necessarily seem so to outside analysts. What analysts might declare unsuccessful at any one point might turn out to be more successful than they thought a few years down the road. What no one can deny, however, is that many new regional decision-making forums are emerging, and that this has created an element of confusion as to how new regional divisions of labour can be negotiated or renegotiated. In the end, we have to investigate the goals of governments who support those forums to see if they are compatible, and examine the resource they are willing to invest in them and the mechanisms they seek to use to resolve the real problems.

The following sections discuss current trends in regional dynamics. The purpose here is to highlight important developments likely to have an impact on regional security and regional institutions in coming years.

Eurasia

NATO and the EU are poised to take their biggest leap forward (literally) in decades, and the consequences of these changes, while already appreciable, will only become clear at the beginning of the next century. The start of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), it is hoped, will breathe new air into continental Europe's deflated economic lungs by reducing the costs of doing business amongst EU members. However, it is easy to paint a rosy picture of EMU, as the European Commission does very professionally, without mentioning the risks involved. EMU will considerably reduce national autonomy in matters of macro-economic policy, and there is an ongoing debate about the democratic accountability of the new European Central Bank which will reign over the new euro-currency and determine European interest rates. This has raised once again the question of the democratic deficit within EC/EU institutions, and, more precisely, the possibility that further bold steps towards integration will engender a backlash against the European ideal and fuel a return to nationalist sentiments across the EU's established membership.[47] Proceeding with EU enlargement might also prove to be a major political headache, particularly because involves making difficult decisions about new members (e.g. Turkey, Cyprus) as well as unpopular changes to the EC's most cherished programs, notably the Common Agricultural Policy which has kept European farmers happy for decades.

As for NATO expansion, the first tranche of enlargement, comprising Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, is already a *fait accompli*. Despite the objection of ultra-nationalist forces inside Russia, Russian leaders *de facto* agreed to it in 1997, at the

price of establishing the NATO-Russia Council (note: the Council is already dysfunctional as a result of the Kosovo crisis). In reality, there is little they could realistically have done to stop it even if they had wanted to. Given Russia's reaction to the NATO military campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over the Kosovo 'problem', and the marginalization of the UN Security Council early on in the crisis, Russian policymakers are likely to see future discussions on enlargement eastward in an even more negative light than before

Before the Kosovo crisis the Alliance was already facing a long list of external challenges, such as how to maintain long-term stability in Bosnia, managing regional expectations with respect to enlargement, and determining how best to sustain a cooperative relationship with Russia. It was also facing two important internal challenges: how to give more concrete meaning to the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the framework of the Alliance, and renewing its 1991 Strategic Concept. Some hurdles have been crossed. At the Washington summit of April 1999, for example, NATO governments endorsed a new strategic concept and avoided divisive debates over ESDI and nuclear doctrine. Most of the challenges mentioned above lie ahead for NATO, however. The Kosovo crisis has rekindled the debate on European military capabilities, though probably in terms more favourable to NATO than in the early 1990s, and NATO-Russia relations are once again at the forefront of Alliance concerns.

With the adoption of a new strategic concept NATO countries are now beholden to an expanded mandate. In particular, NATO governments have pledged to become more active in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This raises the thorny issue of the Alliance's role beyond Europe, and that of its members' divergent interests with regard to actual and potential 'proliferators'. Moreover, it has now become obvious that NATO will probably have to remain actively involved in trying to maintain stability in Southeast Europe for a lengthy period of time. These two roles alone raise key issues expected to have an important impact on the Alliance in the coming decade. This is particularly the case with respect to the apparent willingness of NATO members to take on tasks going beyond the Alliance's traditional collective defence functions, but also with regard to the practical necessity of developing greater coherence between transatlantic/European organisations in common endeavours.

The rise of numerous mini-lateral European forums, the 'cinderellas' of European politics as one British analyst calls them, should not go unmentioned here.[48] Not only to they demonstrate the rapid development of various interests organised along sub-group lines on the continent, but they might prove to be useful complements to larger institutions, creating alternative channels for discussion if the other ones are deadlocked.

The other major grouping on the Eurasian landmass is the CIS. As a regional cooperation framework the CIS has elicited considerable skepticism ever since its hasty establishment in 1992. Not only is it thoroughly dominated by Russian interests and used by Moscow to maintain Russia's influence over the territory of the former Soviet Union (with the exception of the Baltic states), but as evidenced by the recurrent crises in intra-CIS relations, it is also a rather volatile arrangement. Indeed, the new post-Soviet regional order appears to be neither fully stable nor satisfactory for the players involved. Given its dismal economic situation and its deteriorating military capability, Russia's ability to maintain its conception of order in the FSU is questionable, especially since many of its most important CIS partners have been increasingly looking elsewhere for assistance, investment and political support.

The 'soft underbelly' of the CIS, the Caucasus and Central Asia, has been the stage of a modern day version of the Great Game throughout the 1990s.[49] Turkey's attempt to bolster pan-Turkic regionalism and Iran's interest in regional trade and politics have been a considerable source of concern for Russia, explaining in part why it has been so keen to maintain a military presence across the CIS southern border. As a result of civil war in Tajikistan, the integrity of the CIS has also been challenged along the border with Afghanistan, heightening Russia's ever-present apprehensiveness about the 'Muslim factor' in the former soviet republics. Regional sources of instability are not the only concern for Russian leaders. Western countries have been increasingly assertive in defining both national and collective interests in the newly independent states of the FSU. Western oil corporations, for instance, are getting heavily involved in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, threatening a sector historically controlled by Russian interests, and NATO is developing closer relations with Central Asian countries, a gesture partly made as a show of support for their independent status.[50] Overall, the picture that emerges from the Caucasus and Central Asia is that of unstable areas subjected to important external and internal pressures.

Latin America

Over the last few years economic integration and cooperation have become dominant themes in both Latin American and inter-American relations. MERCOSUR and the Rio Group are gaining influence as credible cooperation forums, and Central American leaders are embarking once again in a regional cooperation scheme. Moreover, because of its growing (yet fragile) economy, Brazil appears set to become the Latin American giant of the 21st century. However, barring a more pronounced convergence of interests between Argentina, Brazil, Chile and, possibly Mexico, Latin American regionalism might not be as potent as it could potentially become. Both the scope of U.S. interests in the region and the eventual establishment of a hemispheric trade

agreement – the current project is to establish a free-trade area of the Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005 – ultimately militate against the formation of a cohesive Latin American bloc.[51]

The optimistic vision of a Latin American continent free of conflict has been recited by American and Canadian leaders many times over during the 90s decade, sometimes to the point where it was presented as a statement of fact. As anyone familiar with Latin American affairs knows, however, there remain numerous sources of domestic and regional conflict on the continent. Here the situation in Colombia epitomises the full range of problems confronting many of the countries of the region in one way or another. The complex internal conflict in that country is linked to issues of governance, ethnicity, socio-economic injustice, narco-trafficking, the environment and territory. Therefore, painting a rosy picture of Latin America's future only through the prism of regional trade simply obfuscates a much more complex reality, and many, if not most, Latin American democracies remain fragile polities in spite of the democratic advances of the last decade.

Africa

Sub-saharan Africa is currently witnessing important geopolitical changes and an opportunity to establish a modicum of stability and development exists in a number of African sub-regions. There have been a number of democratic advances in such countries as Benin, Ghana, Mali, Niger and South Africa, and positive developments towards growth and political liberalisation have taken place in a number of other countries, most recently in Nigeria. SADC has gained in credibility as a sub-regional cooperation framework, and in francophone West Africa, the relatively stable CEAO states are moving to solidify their economic and political ties in order to gain a stronger regional and international voice, especially now that Paris has decided to downgrade the strategic importance of its relations with the continent (an indirect result of its intervention in Rwanda in 1994).[52] Developments in both Southern Africa and West Africa seem to strengthen the view that intra-regional interactions are growing within Africa's sub-regions.[53]

Whatever hopes some have of witnessing the birth of an 'African renaissance', however, the fact remains that the early post-Cold War period has also seen Africa go through a series of terrible humanitarian and political disasters equal if not larger in scope to the worst moments of its contemporary history.[54] There is universal agreement on the net result. Many areas have major setbacks in terms of economic growth and social development, and though there are a few 'islands' of stability, a state of continental insecurity prevails. The magnitude of Africa's problems has put the OAU, the tired embodiment of the pan-African ideal of the 1960s, in a difficult

position. Not only does it not have the means to cope with these problems, but for most governments on the continent it has yet to become a credible forum of first, or even second, resort.

The situation in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa remains particularly worrisome. In the aftermath of the Rwanda tragedy of 1994 this region continues to be embroiled in a spiral of ethnic violence and humanitarian disasters. As these lines were written an agreement was struck in Lusaka, Zambia, between the governments involved in the fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and there was a faint hope that some stability might be restored to the region. Political developments inside the new Congo over the next year or two will show whether these hopes are truly founded. Being the essential example of a disintegrated state, the former Zaire has been a net exporter of regional instability for years. Until such time as its borders are secured, some semblance of internal democratic order is established, and lasting regional political arrangements can be agreed to – admittedly a very optimistic scenario – the situation in that country and adjacent areas will impact negatively on the whole of sub-saharan Africa.

The former Zaire is but one example of a long list of African conflicts that have contributed to deflate the already low level of international assistance to the continent. These conflicts have also had the detrimental effects of shifting international assistance away from development in order to fund peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, introducing a political logic whereby the most conflict-ridden countries have often received more assistance from international agencies than those who have succeeded in maintaining stability. John Stedman, the well known American africanist, has argued that if the international community really wants to make a positive contribution to Africa it should redirect its assistance to those countries which already show promise of stability and responsibility.[55] Indeed, the World Bank's new aid philosophy takes a not too dissimilar line. This, of course, remains a difficult ethical choice. But in many cases it is one that is perhaps unavoidable given both the practical and the political difficulties of providing assistance to disintegrating states.

The Middle East

Though not all recent regional developments in sub-saharan Africa have been positive, the fact that some positive regional developments did take place contrasts with the rather moribund state of Arab regionalism. Charles Tripp, an observer of Middle East politics, recently wrote of Arab regional organisations that one of their chief characteristics was their lack of solidity, which replicates the highly centralised and personalised organisation of power within Arab states.[56] A review of recent inter-Arab dynamics largely bears him out. Middle Eastern regionalism remains a largely (but

highly) symbolic issue, the substance of regional cooperation being negotiated through private diplomacy 'between friends' rather than on basis of established and open regional frameworks. Moreover, the formation of sub-regional groupings in the Gulf region and North Africa in the 1980s and the failed attempt to establish the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) prior to the Kuwait conflict are all indicators of a fragmented Arab world.

In the early 1990s some Western countries sought to promote a form of cooperative security in the region, notably through the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRES) group of the Middle East Peace Process. For a variety of reasons meaningful progress on that front is unlikely to take place for some time. Why? First because it would require an extraordinary convergence of interests amongst key Arab players, chiefly Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria, all of which compete for regional leadership in one way of the other. Second, before and until substantial progress is made in Arab-Israeli relations – on difficult issues such as the Palestinian question, the Golan Heights, Lebanon, the West bank, etc. – key Arab countries are unlikely to view cooperative security as concept of real value for the whole of the region. Third, the bilateralism that characterises Western defence agreements with Israel as well as a number of Arab countries (e.g. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates) militates against a general approach to security in the region. For the West, and especially the United States, truly cooperative security in the Middle East also raises the thorny issues of relations with Iraq and Iran, a source of discord both within the West and with the countries of the Middle East. Finally, cooperative security is hardly a homegrown Arab concept. Historically, Arab political elites have shown considerable reluctance to adopt Western ideas about national governance and regional security. In this respect, the Arab League's reluctance to confront internal governance issues hardly suggest that it is a promising forum for resolving internal instability and managing political change within Arab states. Generational change in the leadership of key Arab countries might perhaps facilitate experimentation with new types of regional cooperation processes in the future, but it is unlikely to bring dramatic changes on those areas where governing elites remain most sensitive and conservative: national security, governance, and human rights.

The single most important incentive towards more stable (if not entirely amicable) relations in the region might be provided by economics. Arab populations have been growing steadily for more than fifty years. However, regional per capita GDP has been in sharp decline since the early 1980s, and under-development and under-employment are both recognised as major regional problems. By sowing the seeds of social upheaval and extremism they constitute an underlying security issue both at the national and regional levels. There is therefore a case to be made for region-wide economic initiatives, supported both by the international community and richer Arab

nations, which would also include Israel. Some are already under way, for example the Middle East Development Bank, but they are more than likely to be subjected to existing regional tensions. However, there is an increasing recognition that the rising social and political costs of the economic status quo in the Middle East can not be supported eternally.

Asia-Pacific

Developments in East Asia and the Pacific since the late 1980s point towards what can be called 'region formation', a vast movement towards the creation of a more organised region in terms of economic networks, institutions, and inter-governmental relations, under the heading of the new 'Asia-Pacific'. If only from a historical perspective, the results thus far have been significant for such a vast and heterogeneous area with a history of regional and sub-regional confrontation. From a theoretical standpoint, the situation in the Asia-Pacific would also seem to strengthen the view that increased linkages do indeed promote increased institutionalisation in order to reduce information and transactions costs.

However, if the Asia-Pacific has been the scene of more regional dialogue and cooperation than ever, the fact remains that neither political nor economic integration have been a central theme of the new Asia-Pacific regionalism, far from it. On the political front, truly regional cohesion is undermined by divergent attitudes on a wide range of issues, ranging from governance and human rights, to the regional role of the United States and the international role of the UN.

Within smaller groups like ASEAN, sustained action on such regional political issues as Burma and Cambodia has proven extremely problematic, partly a result of the non-interventionist creed the organisation was founded on, partly because ASEAN governments remain very uncomfortable with Western pressures to tackle issues related to governance and fundamental freedoms. On such matters, the position of ASEAN countries (Malaysia and Indonesia in particular) is often closer to that of China than many of their western allies would prefer.

On the economic front, the Asia-Pacific area remains characterised by a cooperation-competition dynamic (e.g. Japan-United States), and new forums such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) do not demonstrate a shift towards regional integration. Rather, APEC is perhaps better described as a region-wide initiative to clarify the rules of economic competition in the Asia-Pacific with the long-term objective of creating a free trade area.[57] However, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, hopes that APEC would propel the Asia-Pacific towards an era of 'open regionalism' have been essentially put on hold. APEC is now facing a major identity crisis. Not only is the APEC forum not structured to deal with major financial crises,

but after half a decade of summitry and inter-governmental discussions there has been very little real movement forward on key elements of its trade liberalisation program. Additionally, the impending start of the next round of negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has almost completely shifted bureaucratic and political attention away from APEC issues.

APEC's woes, coupled with the internal turmoil in a number of East Asian countries, notably in Indonesia, have raised important question for the establishment of an Asia-Pacific community. With the launch of the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM), in Bangkok, in March 1996, participating East Asian governments had already signalled to APEC's non-Asian members that they should not expect an exclusive regional relationship. As a first attempt to demonstrate a collective East Asian identity, the symbolism of ASEM was important. ASEM could be read as an attempt by East Asian governments to dilute U.S. influence on the regional economic agenda, and for EU countries to promote their collective interests in East Asia in a forum not dominated by Washington. In the view of some, the exclusively Asian nature of Asia's participation in ASEM (Australia wanted 'in' but was never invited) also indicated that East Asian governments, including China, were now developing a stronger sense of 'Asian' collective interests.[58] Given the region's cultural and political diversity, and the numerous outstanding security problems in East Asia, however, the rise of a non-hyphenated Asian community seems by no means assured.

ASEAN cohesion has arguably been one of the first casualty of the 'Asian flu'. Devoid of effective financial management instruments, ASEAN appeared weak and almost irrelevant to the unfolding of events in 1997-1998. The aftermath of crisis itself has not played in ASEAN's favour either. First, some bilateral animosities within ASEAN were rekindled, and this in turn exposed some of the organisation's long-standing political weaknesses, in particular the difficulty for ASEAN governments to agree to measures that would have direct impact on the internal affairs of their neighbours. Second, ASEAN governments are now absorbed by domestic political and economic issues; building effective regional architecture is not their first political priority. Finally, the difficult transition to a new post-Suharto order in Indonesia will likely employ political energies in that country for some time thus leaving more interventionist ASEAN governments (Thailand, Philippines) to face off ASEAN-traditionalists (Malaysia, Singapore). Given a number of unresolved bilateral problems amongst this group, the likelihood of developing a strong ASEAN voice on regional and international matters without a strong or otherwise fully engaged Indonesia seems diminished.

A major geopolitical feature of the region remains the network of bilateral alliances maintained by the U.S. with its allies in East Asia and the Pacific. For Washington these alliances constitute the most potent demonstration of American

engagement in Asia and remain the true pillars of stability in the region, notably as they relate to Northeast Asian stability. U.S. willingness to maintain its military presence in the region is not in doubt. However, with the exception of Korea, Japan, and Australia, regional support for maintaining U.S. bases in the region has been fickle, and it is fair to state that East and Southeast Asian regional leaders maintain a certain ambivalence towards the continuation a U.S.-led security order in the region. For ASEAN countries in particular, the juggling act between support for US military presence in Asia on the one hand, and support for broader political and economic engagement with China on the other, often implies that they can never fully satisfy both objectives. This geopolitical dilemma is in essence their permanent strategic condition. Though they have been thus far reluctant to develop, or commit to, concrete 'preventive diplomacy' measures within the framework of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ultimately the often stormy relations between the United States and China may slowly move them in this direction in the future.

Faced with the challenge of having to manage relations with a confident China, with an insecure Japan faced with a major recession, with South Korean and ASEAN governments confronted with economic and political turmoil, and with an aggressive North Korea demonstrably able to threaten its neighbours with long-range missiles, U.S. policymakers are having to thread a very delicate line in East Asia. The tremendous importance of these issues ensures that considerable demands will be placed on U.S. economic and political leadership in the next few years. However, none of Asia's problems are amenable to resolution through the unilateral exercise of American power. Ultimately the United States has a considerable interest in promoting greater burden-sharing and regional cooperation in the region. Whether it is interested in power-sharing, however, is a matter that is not yet resolved.

Concluding Remarks

The 1990s has certainly provided many examples of the dilemmas regional communities confront in seeking to deal with emerging or protracted regional conflict. Whether in organising regional-level responses to conflicts in their own 'neighbourhood', or in formulating projects for establishing stability and growth, regional communities are all influenced in one way or another by the different issues discussed in this chapter: U.S. influence in world affairs, the processes of globalization, the state of the UN and its role in international security, ad hoc multilateralism and the rise of self-help in the post-Cold War, and trends in regional dynamics.

The influence of these factors is not unidirectional. The problems of the UN, for example, have given impetus to the rise of alternative approaches to problem-solving, many based on the 'coalition of the able and willing' approach, others

organised around more traditional classical regional lines. Similarly, economic globalization may promote, albeit in different ways, both the erosion of regional barriers and their reinforcement. But then, as the 90s decade demonstrated time and time over, international politics rarely conforms to one elegant theoretical line of argument.

One of the conclusions that emerges from this discussion is that the traditional form of international political organisation, the permanent conference formula embodied in established international and regional organisations, is often inadequate to the task of mobilising political will and organising collective action to prevent and manage violent conflict. In the post-Cold War environment collective decision-making centres are multiplying, following an irregular path between the fulfilment (or protection) of national and collective interests, the need for wider recognition and legitimacy, and the search for effectiveness. In the best of worlds, these requirements should intersect. In reality, they only do so on certain occasions, and when they do there cannot be any guarantee that collective conflict prevention or conflict control efforts will be successful.

Notes

1 Kennedy's weighty essay, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, caused quite a stir in academic and policy circles, prompting a serious (and still ongoing) debate about the future ofAmerican power. See Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000*, New York Random House, 1987.

2 See James Schlesinger, "Quest for a post-Cold War foreign policy", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 1, America and the World issue 1992/1993, p. 18; Zalmay Khalilzad, "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War", in Brad Roberts (ed.), *Order and Disorder after the Cold War*, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1995, pp. 57-78.

3 James Schlesinger, "Quest for a post-Cold War foreign policy", p. 18.

4 The literature on economic sanctions is extensive. One of the most comprehensive studies on this topic remains Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott and Kimberly Ann, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy*, Washington D.C., Institute for International Economics, 1990. For more recent debates see Nigel White, "Collective Sanctions: An Alternative to Military Coercion?", *International Relations*, vol. XII, no. 3, December 1994, pp. 75-92; Elizabeth Rogers, "Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts", *Security Studies*, vol. 5, no. 4, Summer 1996, pp. 43-72; John Stremlau, *Sharpening International Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Role for the United Nations, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict*, New York, Carnegie Corporation, November 1996.

5 See "U.S. Mideast Arms Sales: Business As Usual", *Arms Control Today*, vol. 21, no. 3, April 1991, pp. 20, 25.

6 See Desiree Millikan, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World: Options and Constraints", in John Petrie (ed.), *Essays on Strategy XII*, Washington D.C., National Defense University Press, 1994, pp. 83-85.

7 A detailed account of the Clinton's team approach to foreign policy is given in Charles-Philippe David, *Au sein de la Maison-Blanche: la formulation de la politique étrangère des États-Unis de Truman à Clinton*, Quebec City, Presses de l'Université Laval, 1995, pp. 455-478.

8 See "Pentagon Imagines New Enemies to Fight in a Post-Cold War Era", *New York Times*, 17 February 1992; "War in 1990's? Doubt on Hill", *New York Times*, 18 February 1992; Leslie Gelb ,"They're Kidding", *New York Times*, 9 March 1992.

9 See Evan Thomas, "Playing Globocop", *Newsweek*, 28 June 1993, p. 23.

10 In a backlash against the Somalia incidents of 1993 the Republican-dominated Congress of 1994-1996 turned out to be one of the most rabidly anti-UN congresses in recent American history.

For an overview of Republican positions see Bob Dole, "Shaping America's Global Future", *Foreign Policy*, no. 98, Spring 1995, pp. 29-43.

11 In 1993 NATO prepared a plan (OPLAN-40103 *DISCIPLINED GUARD)* for the implementation of the Vance-Owen peace plan (VOPP). U.S. leaders, however balked at the size of the required military commitment and directly contributed to the VOPP's demise by imposing impossible conditions for U.S. participation. With the worsening military situation in late 1994, NATO prepared plans for a withdrawal of UN forces under NATO cover (OPLAN-40104 *DETERMINED EFFORT*). In early 1995, NATO went on a heightened state of preparation and a U.S. marine amphibious force was dispatched to the Adriatic Sea. Known in technical terms as a fighting withdrawal, the operation would have been an extremely risky endeavour. Moreover, because of their pattern of deployment and their lack of combat mobility, UN forces would have had to leave considerable amounts of equipment on the ground. There is no doubt that a UN withdrawal ran the risk of becoming a military and political nightmare, especially if local Muslim populations had tried to prevent the departure of UN troops by blocking access to roads and UN barracks.

12 Stanley Hoffman, "What Should American Foreign Policy Be?", *Dissent*, Fall 1994, p. 497.

13 I borrow here the title of R. Thakur and C. Thayer's recent book, *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s*, Boulder Co., Westview Press, 1995.

14 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy (Part 1): Regional Issues*, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 2, 3, 17, 23, 24 February and 18 March 1993, pp. 236-237.

15 See speech by U.S. ambassador to the UN William Richardson, *The United Nations, Regionalism and the Future of International Peace and Security*, Ditchley Foundation Lecture XXXIV, Chipping Norton (UK), Ditchley Foundation, 1997, p. 7.

16 Andrew Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective", in Hurrell and Fawcett (eds), *Regionalism and International Politics*, p. 54.

17 See Dani Rodrik, "Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate", *Foreign Policy*, no. 107, Summer 1997, pp. 19-36; and also his book, *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?*, Washington D.C., Institute for International Economics, 1997.

18 Jeffrey Sachs, "International Economics: Unlocking the Mysteries of Globalization", *Foreign Policy*, no. 110, Spring 1998, pp. 97-111.

19 For an examination of this debate see Julie K. Fujimura, *Towards Regional Economic Blocs: Are We There Yet?*, Policy Staff Paper no. 95/01, Ottawa, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, February 1995; Andrew Hyatt-Walter, "Regionalism, Globalization, and World Economic Order", in Hurrell and Fawcett (eds), *Regionalism and International Politics*, pp. 74-121.

20 Hurell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective", pp. 55-58.

21 Jacques Attali, "The Crash of Western Civilizations", *Foreign Policy*, no. 107, Summer 1997, pp. 54-63.

22 Robert Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?", *The Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 280, no. 6, December 1997, pp. 55-80.

23 Peter J. Fromuth (ed.), *A Successor Vision: The United Nations of Tomorrow*, Lanham Md., United Nations Association of the United States of America-University Press of America, 1988.

24 See William J. Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, New York, St Martin's Press, 1993, pp. 315-352; Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*, New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1994., pp. 545-589.

25 See Linda Melvern, *The Ultimate Crime: Who Betrayed the UN and Why?*, London, Allison & Busby, 1995, pp. 238-257.

26 For a review of the problems and issues surrounding the financing of the UN system see the report by the Independent Advisory Group on UN Financing, *Financing an Effective United Nations: A Report by the Independent Advisory Group on UN Financing*, New York, Ford Foundation, 1992.

27 United Nations, Office of the Secretary-General, *Daily Press Briefing*, 30 January 1998.

28 See "At the UN, a drive for diversity", *New York Times*, 24 October 1994 .

29 See Robert W. Cox, "An Alternative to Multilateralism for the Twenty-first Century", *Global Governance*, vol. 3, no. 1, January/April 1997, pp. 103-116.

30 For an overview of U.S. interests in UN reform see Donald Puchala, "Outsiders, Insiders, and UN Reform", *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 4, Autumn 1994, pp. 161-173.

31 See Jeffrey Gedmin, "The Secretary-Generalissimo", *The American Spectator*, 10 November 1993, pp. 30-37; Stanley Meisler, "Dateline UN: A New Hammarskjold?", *Foreign Policy*, no. 98, Spring 1995, pp. 180-197.

32 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nation, *Statement to the United Nations General Assembly High Level Working Group on Strengthening the UN System*, USUN Press Release 005-(96), 15 January 1996.

33 For a discussion on Security Council reform see Helen Leigh-Phippard, "Remaking the Security Council: the options", *The World Today*, August/September 1994, pp. 167-172; David D. Caron, "The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council", *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 87, no. 4, pp. 552-588.

34 "United Nations: U.S. Wants Germany, Japan on Council, Silent on Others", Reuters News [online], 12 March 1997.

35 The criticisms raised by developing countries towards a minimalist approach to Security Council expansion masks a debate which has yet to take place: the business of deciding which countries should be represented amongst the Asian, African or Latin American groups. India is an obvious candidate for Asia, but would Pakistan ever accept a permanent seat for New Delhi at the Council? Nigeria has openly stated that it is interested in a seat, but does it have the right credentials? Should Argentina, Brazil or Mexico represent Latin America? These questions have yet to be answered. An overriding argument in the selection of new members is that they must be able to make an effective contribution to international peace and security. This dilutes somewhat the representativity argument, especially since countries like Australia and Canada have made more important contributions to international peace than many prospective candidates from the regional groups. Ultimately, the selection of new members will depend on a compromise between these two principles as well as considerations of size, as a Security Council which is too large in terms of membership could turn into a debating forum rather than become a stronger decision-making body.

36 See Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economic of International Relations*, Princeton N.J. Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 298-301; Marianne H. Marchand, "The Political Economy of North-South Relations", in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill (eds.), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, 1994, pp. 293-295.

37 See Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trends and Transformation*, 4th ed., New York, St Martin's Press, 1992, p. 269.

38 See European Union, *Proposals of the European Union for Reform of the United system in the Economic and Social Areas*, 28 january 1997. This Document was retrieved from the UN internet site (www.un.org/reform/intgov/4refinr.htm).

39 See Michael Brown (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1996.

40 See David Owen, "A Clinician's Caution: Rhetoric and Reality", in Kevin M. Cahill (ed.), *Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start*, New York, Basic Books, 1996, pp. 305-318; Philippe Moreau Defarges, "La diplomatie préventive", *Défense Nationale* (Paris), January 1997, pp. 37-45.

41 Speech by Paul Kennedy, "The United Nations and the Challenges of the 21st Century", Mexico City, 17 October 1994. This paper was presented in the context of Kennedy's role as director of the Ford Foundation's Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations which published its final report in 1995 (see bibliography).

42 Most of these missions received the support of the Security Council through a UNSC resolution, often after they had been deployed. Note that this list does not include the deployment of civilian/police missions such as the Economic Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) in Yugoslavia, the WEU customs operation on the Danube, or the numerous OSCE civilian missions in the Balkans and in the former Soviet Union. Neither does it include the NATO/WEU joint naval force in the Adriatic. One should note here that the number and scope non-military peace support mission has developed rapidly since the end of the Cold War.

43 For a review of the NATO experience with rapid reaction forces see A.G. Christie, "Multinational Rapid Reaction Forces: Applying NATO's Experience to the UN Rapid Reaction Requirement", in David Cox and Albert Legault (eds.), *UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities: Requirement and Prospects*, Cornwallis Park (Nova Scotia), Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 1995, pp. 86-113.

44 Separate from these southern European initiatives is a projected Danish-German-Polish army unit. which should become operational in 1999.

45 BALTBATT and CENTRASBATT have held military exercises with NATO countries; SADC received financial and military support from Britain for its first peacekeeping exercise; Francophone West African countries received the logistical support of France in order to deploy troops to the Central African Republic. The ACRI and SHIRBRIG initiatives stem, respectively, from American and Canadian-Danish-Dutch initiatives.

46 Richard Haas, "Foreign Policy By Posse", *The National Interest*, No. 41, Fall 1995, pp. 58-65. See also Werner J. Feld, Robert Jordan and Leon Hurwitz, *International Organizations: A Comparative Approach*, 3rd ed., Wesport Conn., Praeger, 1994, p. 278.

47 Martin Feldstein recently proposed a controversial thesis about EMU, arguing that it may lead to the erosion of transatlanticism and open the way for conflict in Europe. Martin Feldstein, "The Euro and War", *Foreign Affairs*, vol 76, no. 6, November/December 1997, pp. 60-73. The author rejects Feldstein's arguments and sees no good reason to believe that European countries would move to sever the transatlantic link as a result of EMU, and ever less so of going to war with their neighbours.

48 See Alyson K. Bailes, "Sub-regional organisations: The Cinderellas of European Security", *NATO Review*, vol. 45, no. 2, 1996, March 1997, pp. 27-31.

49 For an analysis of the regional situation see M.E. Ahari and James Beal, *The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia*, McNair Paper 47, Washington D.C. Institute for National Strategic Studies-National Defence University, 1996, January, 1996.

50 See "U.S. Plays High-Stakes War games in Kazakstan", *Wall Street Journal*, 16 September 1997.

51 See Andrew Hurrell, "Regionalism in the Americas", in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics*, pp. 250-282; David R. Mares, "«En attendant Godot». Le multilatéralisme a-t-il un avenir en Amérique latine?", in Michel Fortmann, S. Neil Macfarlane and Michel Roussel (eds.), *Tous pour un ou chacun pour soi: promesses et limites de la coopération régionale en matière de sécurité*, Québec, Institut Québécois des hautes études internationales-Université Laval, 1996, pp. 155-179

52 See "Adieu la France", *L'Autre Afrique*, no. 25, 12-18 November 1997, pp. 8-21.

53 The tendency towards sub-regionalism in Africa is not just a general impression. It is also backed by quantitative empirical studies. See Daniel S. Geller and David J. Singer, *Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 104.

54 See Stephen John Stedman, "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa", in Michael E. Brown (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1996, pp. 237-238.

55 Ibid., pp. 264-265.

56 Charles Tripp, "Regionalism in the Arab Middle East", in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics*, p. 303.

57 See Richard Higgott, "Competing Theoretical Approaches to International Cooperation: Implications for the Asia-Pacific", in Richard Higgott, Richard Leaver and John Ravenhill (eds.), *Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict?*, Sydney, Allen&Unwin, 1993, pp. 290-311.

58 Stephen FitzGerald, *Is Australia an Asian Country?*, Sydney, Allen&Unwin, 1997, pp. 36-54.

7

Conclusion: A Revised View of the Regional Option

When research on this study began the outlook for the development of a UN-centered approach to managing conflicts around the globe appeared to be positive. With the UN more active than ever, including through a number of joint ventures with regional groupings, many commentators and policymakers described the UN peace and security system as "finally working the way it was originally intended to". This optimism has now largely subsided, not only because the interventionism which prevailed in the early 1990s quickly turned into political and military overreach for the UN, but also because cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in a number of recent conflicts has been repeatedly marred by confusion, and sometimes open discord, over division of labour issues.

Whether this could have been predicted remains an open-ended question. However, as do Inis Claude, Robert Keohane and John Lewis Gaddis, the author believes IR scholars should be more aware of the limits of the IR field, and especially those of theory, in extending accurate forecasts on extremely complex issues.[1] Another way of looking at this is simply to state that international affairs have become extremely volatile since the end of the Cold War, to the extent that some scholars now propose that turbulence, chaos and disorder are fundamental objects of theoretical study in world politics.[2] Nevertheless, as Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated, it is also clear that there already existed a vast reservoir of scholarly research and historical experience which could have alerted both scholars and policymakers of the dangers of being seduced by a momentary convergence of interests, by fleeting concepts, or by the reading of theory as self-fulfilling prophecy.

The question we are concerned with is whether regional organisations and, more broadly, regionalism, have demonstrated to be a promising avenue for preventing, managing, and resolving conflict in the early post-Cold War period. As argued in the introduction, this is a question that cannot be resolved in the abstract. Any serious assessment must be grounded on a thoughtful and nuanced assessment of recent experiences. But we also have to keep in mind the fact that regionalism is a concept bestowed with different meanings in a variety of contexts and that there is not one, but many bodies of theoretical and empirical research which can contribute to explain it.[3] The problem not only stems from the complexity of the manifestations and

mechanisms that go under the name of regionalism, but also from the fact that the diversity of regional experiences has never lent itself easily to systematic generalisation. Some may therefore dissent with my own conclusions. Judging by the dissonance in the literature and the ambiguities which still surrounds the role of regional communities in preserving and maintaining peace, however, it seems hard to disagree with Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell who concluded in a recent study that regionalism was "far from being a 'unified concept' " and thus, they argued, "far from being the organizing principle for any new global system."[4]

General Assessment

This study finds that the case for a regional approach to conflict management in the 1990s has generally been over-stated and that oft-repeated suggestions that the UN should 'contract out' conflict-control tasks to regional organisations rest on shallow arguments which do not accurately reflect the complexity of the issues involved. In this respect, and although many experiments in cooperation have been carried out, I do not share the optimism shared by some relating to the possibility of establishing what Alan Henrikson calls a new 'global-regional peacemaking system'.[5] Others have concluded similarly. For example, David Malone, Canada's deputy ambassador to the UN in the early 1990s, wrote recently that "the fashionable emphasis in the mid-1990s on the importance of regional organizations may have represented attachment to an ideal, a flight from reality – or both."[6] In a similar vein, the Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict concluded in its final report that regional organisations "may not always be the most appropriate forum through which states should engage in or mediate an incipient conflict because of the competing goals of their member states or the suspicions of those in the conflict."[7]

Even where mandates have been more carefully thought through and institutional machinery has been improved, strictly regional approaches to managing conflict too often suffer from problems of legitimacy and partiality, lack of resources, or quarrelsome regional politics. Moreover, this study finds that some regional organisations remain thoroughly dominated by the interests of a major regional power (e.g. CIS, ECOWAS), remain so divided that they appear structurally unable to address regional problems effectively and positively (e.g. Arab League), or otherwise cannot escape a wider geopolitical context in which their role is limited (e.g. OAS, WEU, OAU, OSCE, ASEAN-ARF, SAARC).

From the perspective of many under-developed or developing countries there is certainly a good case for 'democratising' the international system, as Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued in *An Agenda for Peace*. Now Secretary General of the *Organisation*

internationale de la Francophonie, the francophone grouping which aspires to become a sort of Commonwealth equivalent in the French-speaking world, Boutros-Ghali continues to argue that regional arrangements constitute a form of international democracy within the international state system.[8] There is another side to the coin, however. Absent a vision of post-Cold War international order and collective responsibility truly shared by a representative plurality of the international community, 'democratising' the international system by delegating more power to regional bodies may also give authoritarian regimes or dominant regional powers a freer hand in shaping regional politics or in interfering with legitimate international efforts to deal with regional problems. This is not a hypothetical possibility. This is a situation Western countries have already had to deal with in relation to Nigerian 'peacemaking' efforts in West Africa and Russian 'peace-restoring' actions in the CIS.

This being said, regional communities undeniably play a more salient role in international affairs today than they did during the Cold War. The reasons for this are simple enough. The end of global superpower confrontation compelled regional communities to reconsider the conditions of regional and global order and reassess their common goals and interests. As a result, new multilateral processes have been mushrooming in almost every region of the world. As discussed in the case studies developed in Chapter 5, some are based on well-established foundations, others are trying to lay out new ones; some cohere with well-defined geopolitical contexts, others seek to escape from them. Also, in the early 1990s some regional communities were confronted with a quick rise in the number of localised armed conflicts, the great majority of them internal in nature, which either posed a threat to regional stability and security or challenged regional norms of state behaviour. In certain cases collective conflict control efforts were organised around the UN or existing regional machinery, in others ad hoc responses were developed in order to try deal with the situation or simply evolved out of the difficulties of finding effective and timely solutions through institutional means.

The following sections seek to draw together the findings of this study concerning the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, and the advantages and disadvantages of the regional approach to conflict management.

The Relationship between the UN and Regional Organisations

In 1990-1992, the UN, which was already involved in major peacekeeping efforts in Africa, Europe and Southeast Asia, strongly encouraged regional organisations to play a role in problem-solving under the rubric of burden-sharing. The over-extension of UN responsibilities around the globe certainly created a situation where alternatives to UN

action were urgently needed. Between 1993 and 1995, however, the UN Security Council spent considerable time and energy attempting to deal with the failure of a number regional peace initiatives whilst simultaneously facing major peacekeeping problems of its own. Overall, it is fair to say that the experience of UN-regional organisations cooperation during this period was not a terribly happy experience.

The result of UN debates (1992-1998)

Despite six years (1992-1998) of official discussions genuine progress was slow to emerge in the debate on UN-regional organisations relations. Beyond accepted propositions that there should be more effective cooperation between both institutional levels important obstacles stood in the way of forming truly effective institutional partnerships. In particular, it became apparent that establishing a clear division of labour which would go beyond the vague terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter was, and remains, a complex and sometimes controversial issue. Indeed, as pointed out in Chapter 4, Chapter VIII provisions have been rarely invoked in recent UN Security Council resolutions in spite of a very significant rise in the number of regional actions. This fact has been overlooked in much of the recent literature. Yet it points to real and continuing problems in the use or invocation of Chapter VIII provisions.

Essentially, what has emerged from the institutional debate on UN-regional organisations relations is a set of principles guiding cooperation between the two levels. These principles evolved chiefly through the consultations which followed the publications of *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), the *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* (1995), and the two UN-regional organisations summits (August 1994, February 1996). A third UN-regional organizations summit took place in July 1998, but it did not significantly alter the conclusions reached below. They are as follows:

- Cooperation between UN Security Council and regional organisations should be based on the primacy of the UN;
- Regional organisations and the UN should aim for consistency in dealing with a common problem involving both levels of organisation;
- The division of labour must be clearly defined in order to avoid overlap and institutional rivalry. There is also a recognition of the problem of sponsoring too many mediators from different inter-governmental organisations;
- Agreed mechanisms for consultation should be established but need not be formal.

Lack of resources was also identified as a major impediment limiting the operational capacity of many regional organisations. As the UN Secretariat itself recognised, the differences between the wide range of regional organisations in terms of capabilities and mandates militate against a universal approach to UN-regional organisations relations.

Beyond broad agreement on principles, cooperation between the UN and regional organisations has evolved largely out of experience and diplomatic compromise than as a consequence of legal doctrine or theoretical conceptions of international order. This too was implicitly recognised in the 1995 *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* which identified the different forms of cooperation between the two levels: (1) consultation, (2) diplomatic support, (3) operational support, (4) co-deployment, (5) joint operations. The UN later added a sixth category, technical support, to this list. The *Supplement* sought to clarify the relationship between the UN and regional organisations like no other UN document did before and, as such, it remains an important policy statement.

Importantly, the *Supplement* also recognised that the UN did not have the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control major enforcement operations, and stated that coalitions of the 'willing and able' or major security organisations such as NATO were often better placed than the UN to carry out such actions. However, the document also deemed that, in the enforcement role, UN-authorised coalitions were "greatly preferable" to unilateral actions.[9] This being said, it needs to be pointed out that unilateral action with UN approval is, at least on certain occasions, acceptable to the permanent membership of the Security Council. After all, in spite of strong reservations from many quarters, the Council did authorise U.S. and French interventions in Haiti and Rwanda in 1994.

To sum up, one can only conclude that there has been only a partial realization of Boutros-Ghali's vision as enunciated in the *Agenda for Peace*. Regional arrangements certainly have come to play a much more prominent role in the 1990s, but not necessarily because Chapter VIII of the Charter suddenly emerged as the new *modus operandi* of conflict management. Rather they did so because, either by default of by design, they often were the first locus of political action in trying to deal with regional problems. Second, new forms of cooperation did emerge between the UN and regional organisations, but one can question whether they truly attenuated the competing agendas of key regional and international players in dealing with regional conflicts or whether this always facilitated conflict resolution.

No doubt part of this new dynamic emerged as a result of the desire of industrialised countries, mainly the United States and European countries, to off-load some conflict management tasks to developing regional bodies. However, the

development of regional-level institutions and/or capabilities should also be regarded as a foreign policy objective in its own right, either to buttress claims to regional leadership as is the case of Russia with the CIS, to consolidate political-military links with new security groupings in the case of the United States, or to pursue the construction of a more credible political-military architecture in the case of the European Union.

Beyond the *Agenda for Peace*, understanding the role of the UN Security Council in delineating the division of labour between the UN and regional bodies is pivotal to the dynamic that emerged during the 1990s. Here is can be argued that the Security Council *de facto* introduced a three-tiered logic of cooperation with regional organisations and coalitions. The first implies that the UN can support the peacekeeping/peacemaking initiatives of regional organisations, both politically and materially. The second, that the Security Council may want to maintain certain oversight privileges on actions either envisaged or taken by regional organisations or coalitions, notably by the dispatch of UN observer missions alongside regional peacekeeping or stabilisation missions . And the third, that major security organisations like NATO, ad hoc coalitions of the 'willing and able', or even individual states, can be authorised to perform actions the UN is either unable or too divided to undertake itself, should the Security Council decide so. However, as the Kosovo conflict demonstrated once again, the absence of a formal authorisation or supporting resolution by the Security Council is hardly a sufficient deterrent for regional groupings determined to take coercive action.

An issue to be resolved?

Between the ideal of synergy between the UN and regional organisations and the practice of inter-institutional cooperation there subsist. Numerous obstacles need to be carefully negotiated: resources constraints, institutional differences, conflicting geopolitical interests, and regional problem-solving culture. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that relations between the UN and regional organisations relations were marked by tensions and institutional rivalry in numerous recent cases. The rivalry over institutional primacy sometimes extended to relations amongst regional organisations as well. Here the tacit competition which took place in the early 1990s between NATO and the EU/WEU, which can perhaps be more accurately described as a contest between atlanticist and europeanist conceptions of European security, readily comes to mind.

With this in mind, it is time to put to rest the argument that the UN has the ability 'contract out' conflict management tasks to regional organisations, especially

inasmuch as it implies that the UN Security Council can direct the actions of regional organisation. The fact is that in the 1990s there has not been a single clear cut case where the UN Security Council directed a regional organisation to perform peacekeeping or enforcement tasks that these groupings were not already contemplating or undertaking themselves. In Yugoslavia, it took several months before NATO countries consented to enforce the UN ban on military flights over Bosnian airspace, and a joint WEU/NATO naval surveillance mission in the Adriatic was already under way when the Security Council decreed a naval embargo in the zone of conflict. Similarly, the disastrous UN 'safe area' policy was never fully enforced by either the UN or NATO. NATO played did play a crucial role in putting an end to the conflict in Bosnia in 1995, but only after all non-coercive strategies had played themselves out and the political cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance was threatened as a result of the severe deterioration of military situation on the ground. In the cases of Liberia and conflicts in the CIS, the Council gave its conditional support, and therefore some degree of legitimacy, to ECOWAS and certain Russian peacekeeping efforts, but only *ex post facto.* And in yet other less publicised cases, Australian and New Zealand-led peacemaking/peacekeeping actions on Bougainville Island for example, regional operations were put in motion without reference to the Security Council. It should not be forgotten that, in theory, regional organisations do not need the express consent of the Security Council to undertake peacekeeping operations.

The question of Security Council authority over regional organisations remains a highly sensitive issue. Some regional organisations have made it clear that they did not support a hierarchic model of UN-regional organisations, and intimations that the Security Council should be able to veto decisions made by regional bodies invariably raise considerable controversy within the regional groups which form the UN's membership. Overall, it is fair to say that regional organisations have maintained a fairly high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the Council over the last few years.

The bottom line seems to be that the UN Security Council might have a theoretical right to direct regional organisations to take certain actions under Articles 52(3) or 53 of the UN Charter, but it arguably does not command the political authority to do so, nor, it seems, are the members of the UN ready to fund regional peacekeeping operations through UN-assessed contributions. As argued above, what the Council does have is the privilege to oversee regional actions if it feels they might be inconsistent which UN Charter principles, and it also retains the privilege to assist regional actions if its members feels they could benefit from UN help and assistance. Finally, it can give international legitimacy to certain enforcement actions. However, it is important to note that, barring a willingness of the P5 to take active measures to stop regional enforcement actions, such as imposing sanctions or authorising military

measures, for example, there is little the Council can actually do to stop such actions beyond the adoption of resolutions.

This last point certainly underlines the limits of the UN system, indeed, that of international law, in dealing with determined regional groupings. Whether in Kosovo or in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the disjunction between regional decisions and UN decision-making (or lack thereof) has highlighted a disquieting trend: the erosion of the authority of the UN Security Council as the ultimate forum for the maintenance of international peace and security. How can the Council maintain its credibility in the future if governments, including those who, rhetorically at least, most insist upon the centrality of its international role, make decisions on the use of force without clear UN Security Council mandates? This question goes at the very heart of the challenge facing the UN with regard to international peace and security. That challenge is really threefold: the organisation must find a clear role for itself in the constellation of post-Cold War security institutions, it has to regain some sense of credibility and higher moral authority, and, perhaps most important (and difficult) of all, it has to ensure that it is a cooperation framework still capable of mobilising international political will.

In the end, it is difficult to differ with Inis Claude when he argued years ago that the relationship between the UN and regional organisations was not to a problem to be solved but an issue to be managed.[10] However imperfect, regional organisations form an integral and important part of the international state system. All UN members must deal with that reality, and they must balance their decisions between what is ideally desirable and what is practically achievable. On that count, we can only note that governments are increasingly willing to adopt the coalition/contact group approach in order to mitigate some of the problems associated with institutional problem-solving.

Reflections on the early post-Cold War experience

The 'proximity to conflict' issue

Theoretically, the greatest strength of regional organisations lies in their interest in and knowledge of local conditions and in their proximity to regional problems and conflicts. This 'proximity', in fact, forms one of the core arguments buttressing the regional approach to problem-solving. Since the problem is literally in their backyard, so the argument goes, countries of the regional community concerned should in principle be better able to gain the political, and with it, the material and financial commitment of its members needed to deal with local disputes or conflicts.

In practice, however, the political value of this proximity varies. Some members of the regional community concerned may not be completely neutral among disputants, thus complicating the search for a collective solution. More powerful states may seek to influence the outcome of the conflict in order to suit their geopolitical interests. Finally, in many regions governments may lack the financial or military resources to contribute to the search for peace, no matter how strong their motivation to do so.

In certain cases, however, there may not be any alternative to regional/sub-regional or coalition conflict management efforts. This is especially the case when the international community at large, and the members of the UN Security Council in particular, show little or no interest in taking effective measures to prevent conflict from developing or in dealing with situations which have already deteriorated to the point where armed conflict has occured. In such cases, members of a regional community or a coalition of interested states might feel compelled to resort to 'self-help', either because they have a direct stake in seeing the situation contained or resolved, because important regional norms have been openly challenged, or because the situation affords them an opportunity to demonstrate regional leadership and/or unity.

The physical reality of 'proximity' varies also. Some regional organisations have an enormous geographic reach. For example, more states belong to the OSCE and the OAU today than to the UN at its foundation. Not only does this make collective decision-making difficult because of the large number of states involved, but the crossing of multiple layers of geographical, political and cultural boundaries within large membership political organisations often promotes a lowest common denominator approach to problem-solving.

Sovereignty still a limit, but...

International legal hurdles to external intervention and the difficulties of forging regionally and locally accepted solutions have always presented major difficulties for regional bodies in cases of internal conflict. Their Cold War record in the regulation of internal conflict is largely characterised by powerlessness, failure or irrelevance. The doctrines of national sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs were either deemed to be insurmountable obstacles or conveniently justified inaction.

Clearly, there have been some dramatic shifts on this issue in the 1990s, not only from the permanent members of the UN Security Council, but also from the international community at large which, in a number of recent cases, have accepted a more liberal interpretation of UN Charter provisions on sovereignty to facilitate humanitarian action. In certain situations state sovereignty was overridden and

international intervention launched without the full consent of states or belligerent parties. Indeed, in such places as Somalia and Liberia there was no working state left to grant or deny such permission. Given the considerable political and military problems associated with such interventions, however, is seems highly unlikely that this will ever become a common UN practice, even less so if the action considered involves potential conflict with a large and powerful state. The Security Council's refusal to intervene militarily in Rwanda and in strife-torn Burundi in 1995-1996, and the 'fence-sitting' of the P5 during the 1997 Congolese civil war, simply underscored the new conservatism which developed in the wake of setbacks in Somalia and Bosnia. In this respect, one can certainly venture the opinion that many Western observers and policymakers were perhaps too quick in hailing the emergence of new, globally-accepted principles of intervention. The Security Council certainly retains the privilege of authorising humanitarian interventions, but, as ever, it is only likely to exercise it on a case-by-case basis.

Regional organisations have shown even more reluctance than the UN to take bold steps on this issue. Indeed, for bodies like ASEAN or the Arab League, collective intervention in the internal affairs of one their own officially remains a regional taboo. Yet there has also been significant movement amongst some regional bodies. There are clear indications, for example, that OAS and OAU orthodoxy have been shaken off. Attempting to deal with internal conflict is a priority of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution, and the OAS has changed it statutes so that it can assume greater responsibility for protecting democratically elected governments in the Americas. In Europe, the OSCE has also developed an elaborate array of mechanisms to deal with internal situations related to national minorities and human rights which have proved useful in a number of situations. It is clear, however, that crisis resolution and stopping shooting wars are not the strong point of these regional institutions.

It is doubtful whether weaker regional bodies command the moral authority and political legitimacy to override state sovereignty without the consent from belligerent parties. In the one obvious relevant and recent case, the ECOMOG deployment in Liberia, the peacekeeping contingent was deployed without the consent of the most powerful military faction. Although it later received the mantle of UN legitimacy through Security Council resolutions, a special UN contribution fund, and the presence of UN observers, the ECOMOG force never fully recovered from the muscular approach it adopted early in the conflict and suffered from the perception of lack of neutrality for most of its troubled stay in the country.

In the majority of recent cases where regional bodies have gotten involved in the regulation and resolution of internal conflict they did so with the partial or full

consent of belligerent parties under preventive diplomacy, conflict stabilisation or mediation/conflict resolution mandates. In most cases this has imposed severe restrictions on their role. In others, consent and quiet diplomacy was exactly what permitted small successes and breakthroughs. Overall, the degree of influence of regional organisations seems to have been determined by five principal factors: 1) the nature of the conflict they were dealing with (ethnic/religious, political/constitutional, non-violent/violent); 2) the extent to which the parties in the area of tension were amenable to exterior influence; 3) the selection of appropriate conflict control strategies and the depth of national and international support for those strategies; 4) the timing of third-party efforts in relation to the development of the conflict, and; 5) the level and nature of support belligerents received from outside the area of conflict. In this last respect, we can only note that external mediation efforts appear to be most effective when belligerent parties are exhausted or have reached a position of 'hurting stalemate'.[11]

Peacekeeping is not a universal panacea

Previous to the period examined in this study the record had shown that peacekeeping had rarely succeeded in solving the underlying causes of conflict between belligerents. There were some successes in limiting armed conflict in the Middle East with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I/II), but it was largely attributable to the interest of the Permanent 5 in avoiding a wider confrontation that could draw them directly into the conflict. Overall, however, the peacekeeping tool had shown persistent limitations in getting belligerent parties to negotiate lasting peace agreements.[12]

In the 1990s peacekeeping became more complex as a result of widened mandates and considerably more complicated to carry out due to the internal nature of conflicts that needed to be addressed. To a certain degree, the policy emphasis placed on peacekeeping as a tool of regional and international conflict resolution resulted in a conflation of the political and military requirements of peace. Throughout operational deployments this often produced glaring contradictions between diplomatic and military strategies, irrespective of whether peace missions were carried out by the UN, a single power like Russia, or a regional organisation. With its complex mix of force and diplomacy, NATO's coercive actions in Bosnia in 1995 clearly shifted the debate on peacekeeping. Since then there has been a noticeable recoil away from the notion that, as a concept, peacekeeping can usefully cover the entire range of multinational military operations short of war. Furthermore, an important reassessment of how and when peacekeeping troops should be deployed has taken place, notably in the UN Security Council.

Negotiating peace agreements has also proven to be a considerable challenge. In conditions of internal conflict conventional methods of diplomatic negotiations could often not be applied or were subjected to constant battlefield developments, unlike the Cold War years when standing cease-fires gave negotiators and interested parties breathing room for diplomacy. Moreover, the high tempo of military operations required to deal with constant military contingencies 'on the ground' often overshadowed the efforts to try to gain agreement on long-lasting solutions. For third parties intervening with peacekeeping forces this was often a key factor in determining whether or not 'staying involved' was really worth the risk to soldiers.

For all the emphasis on developing better peacekeeping methods and organisation, the point that needs re-emphasizing is that peacekeeping is a tool, not an end unto itself. Moreover, it is now more clearly understood that peacekeeping has inherent practical limitations, not the least of which is that, in the absence of a clear path for finding political solutions peacekeeping may buy time, but it will not resolve or even settle conflict. In the context of what Alan James has referred to as the 'contingent' (non-enforcement) mode of action, we are again reminded that peacekeeping efforts can only be effective when disputing parties are willing to make peace, or at least prepared to stop using violent means to pursue their ends.[13] There is no reasons to believe that peaceful, long-lasting solutions can be reached otherwise through regional or other means.

Availability of resources and effective decision-making processes

The UN's long-running financial difficulties have highlighted the great vulnerability of international institutions to financial 'starving', the under-financing of international organisations by their membership. Regional organisations haven't been immune to this problem. Rather than being secondary issues, financial considerations act as a major determinant of the type of activities regional bodies can plan for and undertake. For example, establishing regional norms in the security field can be considerably less expensive than sending intervention forces or marshalling financial resources to help rebuild war-torn countries. To a large extent this is why many regional organisations have sought external financial assistance for their peacekeeping activities or have recognised the central role of international financial institutions and specialised UN agencies as providers of funds and technical help for post-conflict recovery efforts.

The critical state of the OAU's finances in the mid-1990s gives an idea of the budgetary problems confronting some regional organisations. Out of its regular 1994/1995 budget of US $26.7 million, the OAU Secretariat had only received contributions amounting to $3.5 million by December 1994. Moreover, as of this date the sum of arrears due from member states represented more than two consecutive

assessed regular budgets of the organisation.[14] The OAU's finances have since improved somewhat, notably because of the increasing level of international assistance for the organisation. However, the fact remains that any discussion of a potential OAU role in conducting major peacekeeping operations has a distinctly academic flavour given the considerable costs of such undertakings and the high level of military planning and preparation needed to carry them out.[15]

Inadequacy of financial resources is certainly not the only constraint for regional organisations. Needless to say, decision-making processes and the power of initiative accorded to their respective secretariats are critically important aspects of their functioning. Many regional bodies have slow, sometimes Byzantine decision-making processes, and some advocates of stronger regionalism in the security field have lamented the absence of regional Security Council equivalents.[16] The experience of European organisations with regard to the situation in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s certainly highlighted the difficulties of taking decisive action under consensus decision-making regimes. There are two sides to this issue, however. The consensus rule in the OSCE can be extremely cumbersome, but on the other hand once a decision is taken no member state can claim that it was taken against its will. This consensual form of decision-making, as well as the OSCE's flexibility, have helped the organisation to look into intra-state conflict in a way that no other regional organisation has been capable of.

Finally, in examining national choices about regional institutions we cannot overlook two important issues which are invariably raised in all multilateral institutions. First, the degree to which each organisation is effective in its normal operations and accountable to its member states will obviously have an major impact on its credibility. Second, national over-representation in the staff of certain organisations can lead to profound misgivings about national influence over bureaucratic agendas.

Formal institutions or looser arrangements?

In recent years ad hoc or informal multilateralism has often acted as a substitute for formal action through major regional and international bodies or as parallel diplomacy acting in support of the latter. The expressions of informal multilateralism are manifold: contact group diplomacy, temporary coalitions, 'Friends of the Secretary-General' groupings at the UN. The main advantage of theses approaches is that they can potentially provide governments most interested in resolving particular situations with a framework for coordination, and sometimes for action, when formal institutional approaches are insufficient or dead-locked.

Given that non-institutionalised processes have occasionally facilitated conflict resolution breakthroughs in the past (e.g. Namibia, Central America, Cambodia) there

are clearly some merits to flexibility. Perhaps the most important lesson to retain from this informal multilateralism is that formal institutions do not have the monopoly on conflict management processes. States, either individually or in small groups, can play a crucial part in peacemaking when their efforts to deal with issues through institutional means fail to deliver a positive outcome. Non-state actors can also help in the peacemaking process, particularly in situations of internal strife, by creating back-channels for discussion when belligerents feel that formal institutions cannot protect their interests.

The question of informal multilateralism is an issue which is not very well developed in the literature. Because of its significance in recent, and perhaps future, peacemaking endeavours the issue clearly deserves more consideration. It is conceptually distinct from the well-known concept of 'bandwagoning', whereby state actors support or follow a lead player in order to maximise their gains at minimum cost, and it also different from the concept of 'concert', which, at least in the traditional European sense, evokes a non-institutionalised yet semi-permanent arrangement between leading actors in a given system for the purpose maintaining stability. Perhaps one way of looking at informal multilateralism in the sense discussed in this study is to view this phenomenon as manifestations of temporary and process-oriented regimes. Following Arthur Stein's arguments, regimes develop for the purpose of collaboration, i.e. trying to reach a formal settlement on an issue of particular relevance to a determinate group of actors, or for the purpose of facilitating coordination, i.e. collectively trying to avoid particular outcomes through less than formal agreements.[17] A number of recent manifestations of informal multilateralism have had as goals either collaboration or coordination. Some, however, were developed to further both goals simultaneously, trying to ensure or enhance coordination within a given sub-group as well as attempting to develop a formal solution on a particular issue with a wider group that included disputing parties.

As discussed in Chapter 3, there are limitations and potential drawbacks to informal approaches. As was indirectly suggested by Feld, Jordan, and Hurwitz, ad hoc or informal approaches can undermine the credibility of institutions.[18] When a coalition take over a peace process because the UN or a regional organisation appears weak or is unable to take decisive measures, it is also sending a message about their adequacy and effectiveness. Another possible drawback to the ad hoc approach is that regional powers may be tempted to reassert *de facto* zones of influence or to obtain a favourable political position outside of the usual oversight provided by formal inter-governmental bodies. Russian peacemaking ventures in its self-declared 'near abroad' or Nigeria's heavy-handedness in Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example, have certainly raised regional and international concerns as to the real motives sustaining

intervention. In that respect, the international community has to ensure that peacekeeping interventions led by important regional powers comply with UN Charter principles and other fundamentals of international law. In particular, it needs to pay attention to humanitarian needs, human rights and the respect of international laws governing armed conflict when resort to force is inevitable.

There is another aspect of this question that deserves attention. Although informal groupings have played an important peacemaking role in a number of recent conflicts, recent experience seems to demonstrate that the burden of implementing peace settlements and post-conflict recovery efforts more often than not rest on the shoulders of international rather than regional agencies, especially when those efforts take place outside the European setting. Individual states, ad hoc groups and coalitions seldom have the wherewithal or the will to carry the whole conflict management process through on their own, particularly in developing or under-developed regions on the world.

The approach adopted by Western countries in organising the implementation of the Dayton agreement (signed in December 1995) illustrates how the issues of international legitimacy, effectiveness, national and collective interests can be addressed with an non-institutionalised peacemaking approach as a starting point. As agreed to by NATO members and the Bosnian disputants, the UN Security Council provided legitimacy for the agreement and authorised the deployment of a NATO force under a Chapter VII resolution (SC Res. 1031); a broad-based Peace Implementation Council (PIC) established the priorities of post-conflict recovery efforts and was to oversee the implementation of the peace process; acting under a steering group composed of the G7 countries and Russia, a High Representative for Bosnia was named to act as pointman and chief coordinator of international efforts; and different international and regional institutions were directed to carry out specific tasks (NATO, EU, OSCE, UN) or coordinated their work with the priorities set by the PIC (IMF, World Bank, International Red Cross).

Can this become a new model for the organisation of international conflict resolution and post-conflict recovery efforts? Probably not. Places like Rwanda, Liberia or Cambodia have only been allotted a fraction of the resources dedicated by the international community, and by Europe and the United States in particular, to Bosnian recovery. After years of NATO and EU dithering in Bosnia, maintaining the peace in the former Yugoslav republic is now touted as a showcase example of transatlantic resolve. That resolve, however, is sorely lacking in numerous other zones of conflict, particularly in Africa.

Despite problems, regional peacekeeping capabilities are developing

For all intents and purposes the UN's quasi-monopoly on international peacekeeping is now a thing of the past. The last decade has seen a dramatic rise in the number of non-UN peacekeeping deployments, and numerous initiatives are currently under way to improve regional, sub-regional or coalition-based peacekeeping capabilities, notably in Europe, in Africa, and in Central Asia.

The experience of the early 1990s showed that regional communities were not well prepared to undertake peacekeeping tasks. To one degree or another, most, if not all, the regional bodies which undertook peace operations in order to defuse regional conflicts suffered from lack of experience in collective control efforts, imprecise mandates in terms of their conflict management functions, problems of leadership and followership, financial and military constraints, and coordination difficulties with other organisations. Given the scope and nature of many of the conflicts they were facing, and the fact that quite a number of regional organisations were themselves in the middle of complex institutional reforms, many of these problems were probably inevitable. Yet they also highlighted structural issues which have been at play for a long time.

This being said, not only has it become clear that there are alternatives to UN peacekeeping, but there is also a growing recognition of the role regional peacekeeping forces might play, either acting on their own or in support of the UN. Many Western countries now actively support many such initiatives, particularly (but not exclusively) in Africa, either through financial assistance, technical support, military education and training, or logistical support for operational deployments.[19] In the process, some traditional peacekeeping principles are being turned upside down. For the sake of neutrality, it used to be that only those countries far removed from a particular conflict were selected to contribute to UN peacekeeping missions. In the context of regional peacekeeping neutrality still remains a fundamental consideration. However, instead of having outsiders policing the block, as with traditional UN peacekeeping missions, the members of regional 'neighbourhoods' are increasingly doing it themselves.

In considering the evolution of peacekeeping as an international conflict control mechanism it is always difficult to think in terms of ideal situations. Peacekeeping forces, by definition almost, deal with controversial situations and are never dispatched because things are going well. However, it can probably be argued that the best case situation for regional peacekeeping deployments rests on what might be termed the 'three consensus scenario':

- consent from all belligerent parties for the presence and mandate of a regional peacekeeping force after a cessation of hostilities has been agreed to and a modicum of commitment to peace and order has been expressed;

- agreement within the regional community concerned that a regional force is both a necessary and practicable response to a particular situation, and agreement on the mandate and operational concept of the regional force within a larger mediation framework;

- support by the international community, and more explicitly by the UN, for the aims and methods of a regional peace initiative, and/or for the composition and mandate of a regional peacekeeping force

It needs to be reminded that, under the UN Charter, Security Council authorisation for undertaking regional peacekeeping actions is not compulsory unless they involve the use of force. From a political point of view, however, Security Council support for any type of regional peacekeeping action can only be considered as extremely desirable. The distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement has often been difficult to maintain in recent peacekeeping experience, and the real issue has not been whether an enforcement action was undertaken without the Council's control, but rather in what context enforcement and use of force was taking place.

Admittedly, the three consensus scenario outlined above is an ideal situation. Some regional deployments may be preventive and try to stabilise a situation before it gets out of hand. Others may come in more forcefully to separate exhausted belligerents. Commentators and observers of UN peacekeeping often point out that no two situations are alike. Yet they also accept that there are some principles to which the UN must adhere to, perhaps more so now than ever, if new peacekeeping efforts are to be successful. No two situations will be alike for regional communities considering peacekeeping actions either. However, non-observance of the principles enunciated above can only lead to claims of partiality, illegitimate intervention, or muscle-flexing by regional powers or interested neighbours.

A Question of Responsibility

It would be a tremendous mistake to sweep aside the lessons and experience gained throughout the different international and regional peacemaking and peacekeeping experiences of the 1990s. It will be remembered as a time of considerable upheaval where the UN took on too much with too little and regionalism (re)emerged as a important if often inadequate force in international politics. If, as Ramesh Thakur notes, peacekeeping has proven to be a remarkably resilient instrument of conflict control over the years, the bitter experiences of Somalia and Bosnia are nevertheless

likely to influence the UN's future role in that field for the foreseeable future, with the Security Council showing itself extremely reticent to dispatch new peacekeeping forces to areas where belligerents have not yet shown a commitment to peace.[20] For reasons discussed in this study, the prognosis for regional peacekeeping is not so unambiguous. Some regional powers may be tempted to launch interventions in order to demonstrate their political 'weight', and in spite of limited resources some regional groupings may want to show to the rest of the world how responsible they are by taking on situations which the UN is uninterested in taking on itself.

As argued above, there are signs that a more flexible and fluid form of international conflict control diplomacy is being developed. In the absence of clear international norms on how to handle certain types of conflicts, informal multilateralism may prove to be more than a passing fad. The organisation of the Western response to the conflict in Kosovo, which saw the reactivation of the Contact Group on the former Yugoslavia, and later the political management of the conflict through the G8, has once again pointed in this direction. However, it should certainly not be assumed that this approach will be universally adopted – it is certainly unlikely to be by key regional powers such as China and India who adhere to a rigorously orthodox style of international diplomacy – or that it can be successful in all cases. If we may perhaps welcome the advent of a new flexible and problem-solving diplomacy in matters of conflict management, it is not so sure that the extension of this approach to decisions concerning the use of force by regional groupings will do much to restore the UN's credibility in matters of high politics.

We should not forget that regionalism essentially remains an instrument of statecraft. Governments engage in regional cooperation to further certain objectives or protect specific interests. They also compete to promote their vision of regional or sub-regional order. A combination of diplomacy and economics, and a more or less developed sense of regional community, is the oil which lubricates the friction between cooperation and competition. However, outside the different areas of the globe where democracy already has a strong foothold, civil society does not yet play a very important part in that dynamic, and what ultimately constitutes the 'regional agenda' is generally decided by governments of the day which have more than a passing interest in maintaining exclusive control over how that agenda is defined.

What to do?

Since it is axiomatic that multilateral institutions are only as effective as their members allow them to be, the development of regional leadership on peace and security issues constitutes a cornerstone of any strategy designed to increase regional conflict management capabilities. Here external assistance in developing the capabilities of

regional institutions can be of great value. However, this needs to be carefully balanced with the equally important task of supporting those countries which at the regional level play a stabilising and responsible role.

Recent experience in Africa has highlighted a range of parallel strategies which can be put in motion simultaneously to improve regional capabilities. Institution-to-institution support can enhance the legitimacy of regional efforts and provide needed technical help and financial assistance, as can state-to-institution support. State-to-state support can also increase regional capabilities. However, as evidenced by the lack of coordination of Western countries in trying to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities after the 1994 Rwanda genocide, the formulation of too many national initiatives may also present some problems, not the least of which are the pursuit of competing national agendas. No doubt, part of these efforts stem from the desire of industrialised countries to avoid direct intervention in conflicts regarded as marginal to their own security. In effect, many such efforts can be likened to substitution strategies. However, it is clear that this could be extremely damaging to the role of the UN and the idea of global security if such efforts became organised strategies of disengagement.

So-called 'second-track' processes similar to CSCAP in the Asia-Pacific region may also play a useful role. By promoting non-committal exchanges on sensitive security issues, high-level unofficial dialogue may contribute to a gradual change in threat perceptions and help building a common understanding of security problems and their possible solutions in a given region. These processes have their limitations, however, and they should not be viewed as substitutes for decision-making forums.

If regional communities can be helped in developing mechanisms to deal with regional conflict, we also have to be mindful of the fact that there is a limit to what can realistically be done from the outside. Ultimately, regional communities must bear the primary responsibility for ensuring the effectiveness of their efforts and that of their common institutions.[21] Perhaps an inescapable comment here is that the most effective multilateral fora are usually those that can meet the needs of the moment rather than those that reflect the realities of the past.

The regionalisation of security politics which has occurred since the end of the Cold War is putting much greater responsibility on regional levels of decision. However, any discussion about regionalism and security must also acknowledge the often shallow nature of multilateralism in the developing world, both in the economic and the security area. There have been too many failed or weak regional institutions in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia to embark again on the wholesale promotion of ineffectual structures, be they regional or global in scope. Understanding the conditions under which multilateralism can successfully deal with both regional and

instrastate conflict is a question that needs more research. What is also clear, however, is that a pragmatic outlook must be kept in addressing the issues involved.

At a time when the UN is experiencing major financial difficulties there is an indisputable attraction in the idea that the UN should off-load more conflict management tasks to regional organisations. Evidence does indeed suggest that regional organisations and groupings are increasingly getting involved in different aspects of conflict management or are looking at ways to improve their organisational capabilities in that field. Yet, their recent record, much like their Cold War performance, is unimpressive. Indeed, the rhetoric of regionalism appears to be far ahead of its actual accomplishments in preventing, managing and resolving conflict. Since the present structural and operational weaknesses of many regional organisations – whilst certainly not immutable – are unlikely to change dramatically in the near future, urging for a radical reordering of the division of labour between the UN and regional organisations on the basis of some kind of global subsidiarity principle is a rather simplistic and reductionist proposition.

Whatever the circumstances, resolving regional and international conflict has never been easy task and never will be. There are no magic recipes and no conceptual reformulations that can easily overcome the problems associated with trying to find short and long-term solutions to deeply-seated conflicts rooted in ethnicity, territoriality or dysfunctional governance. Any sober assessment of recent international experiences in trying to resolve conflict shows that successes have been few and far apart, that societies cannot be changed overnight as a result external intervention, and that disputants more than anyone else decide when peace is possible and desirable.

Notes

1 Inis L. Claude Jr., "The tension between principle and pragmatism in international relations", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 19, 1993, pp. 215-226; Robert Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War", in David Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 215 and 218; John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War", *International Security*, vol. 17, no 3, Winter 1992/93, pp. 5-58.

2 See James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*, Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press, 1990.

3 For recent overviews of the theoretical debate surrounding regionalism I refer the reader to the excellent concluding chapter of Hurrell and Fawcett's study, *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*, London, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 309-327, and also to Andrew Hurrell, "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics", *International Affairs*, vol. 21, October 1995, pp. 331-358.

4 Fawcett and Hurrell (eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics*, p. 327.

5 Alan Henrikson, "The Growth of Regional Organizations and the United Nations", in ibid., pp. 163-168.

6 David Malone, "The UN Security Council in the Post-Cold War World", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 28, no. 4, December 1997, p. 397.

7 Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report with Executive Summary*, Washington D.C., December 1997, p. 147.

8 At its Hanoi summit (November 1997) the member states of *La Francophonie* endorsed proposals giving the organisation a stronger mandate in the political field. In July 1998, *La Francophonie* joined the group of regional organisations participating in the third UN-regional organisations summit at UN headquarters in New York.

9 UN Doc. A/50/60 (3 January 1995), para. 80.

10 Inis Claude Jr, *Swords Into Plowshares*, 4th ed., New York, Random House, 1971, p. 117.

11 For more on the 'hurting stalemate' concept see I. William Zartman, "Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management and Resolution", in Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman, *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1991, pp. 306-310.

12 For an excellent discussion on 'success' and 'failure' in peacekeeping see Paul F Diehl, International Peacekeeping, John's Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1994, pp. 33-61.

13 Alan James, "The History of Peacekeeping: An Analytical Perspective", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vo. 23, no. 1, September 1993, p. 11.

14 Salim Ahmed Salim, OAU State of the Continent Address to the Council of Ministers, Addis Abeba, 23-27 January 1995.

15 President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda recently rejected the idea of an African military force, stating that it woud be "amorphous" and "would lack commitment". His answer to regional peacekeeping: "Regional troops can do the job in areas of conflict. OAU gives blessing and the work is done by people who are near. They save on domestic demands because they can walk across the border." Cited in UN, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Central and Eastern Africa: IRIN Update No. 408 [internet version], 1-4 May 1998.

16 See, among others, Jon Lunn, "The Need for Regional Security Commissions within the UN System", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 24, no. 4, December 1993, pp. 369- 376; Ali Mazrui, "Decaying Parts of Africa Need Benign Colonization", *Los Angeles Times*, 4 August 1994.

17 See Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World", in D. Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*, pp. 41-45.

18 Werner Feld, Robert Jordan, and Leon Hurwitz, *International Organizations: A Comparative Approach*, 3rd ed., Wesport Conn., Praeger, 1994, p. 279.

19 This stands in direct contradiction to Job's opinion that "states, regimes or communities *(peuples)* involved in such [regional] conflicts are unlikely to receive support from the international community" (my translation from French). See Brian Job, "Multilatéralisme et résolution des conflits régionaux: les illusions de la coopération", in Michel Fortman, S. Neil Macfarlane et Stéphane Roussel (eds.), *Tous pour un ou chacun pour soi: Promesses et limite de la coopération régional en matière de sécurité*, Quebec City, Institut Québécois des hautes études internationales, 1996, p. 26.

20 Ramesh Thakur, "UN Peacekeeping in the New World Disorder", in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer (eds.), *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s*, Boulder Co., Westview Press, 1995, p. 22.

21 See Graham E. Fuller, "Respecting Regional Realities", *Foreign Policy*, no. 83, Summer 1991, p. 44, for similar comments with respect to the situation in the Middle East.

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Note: only current WWW addresses are provided here. When research on this thesis began in 1992-1993 very few regional organisations had internet sites. Today most important regional organisations have adopted this mode of communication which provides researchers with access to official documents and up-to-date information.